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Abstract*
(Much of this thesis is literally a detailed exsunination# 
and this abstract is very bare. A guiding suiamary is 
placed after the Index, and suimaries precede each Chapter).
The confused character of theory of mind (Ch.I) parallels 
confusion as to the status of **substance** (Ch.II). The ^
philosophical problem 1b that of relating incompatible 
theses, and especially of discovering what is involved in 
modes of argument ejijployed by metaphysicians in terms of 
••mind** and **substance**, since these produce a fantastic 
set of **conclusions**. "
Types of argument to **necessary substances** can be shown 
to be vacuous. But it remains to show that these are 
actually eniployod by philosophers.
Descartes does employ such arguments (Ch.Ill), and his 
••necessary substances** cannot be related to **actual subst­
ances**. The **unity of man** and the truth of observation 
statements are his real problems. As a conceptual system 
his dualism is of kinds of thing, and presents no problems; 
but he treats it confusedly as *• definitional** and related 
to empirical science. It is then a metaphysical dualism.
His arguments to an unextended thinking substance are 
complex €uid invalid. The Cogito does not reduce the sensing 
agent to a soul; and Descartes* theory of science treats 
Thought, not the thiiiking agent, as substantial. (Ch.V).
His theory of soul and thought is Socratic find untenable 
as a theory of thou^t or of science (Ch.VI - developed in 
Ch.VII).
The identification of Subject, Substance and Thing, when 
considered in relation to fact statements and natural science 
(Ch.VIIl) enables us to develop a theory of logic in an 
Aristotelian manner. Descartes* **two substance** thesis 
depends, upon this logic for its **necessity**, and is logically 
incoherent. Descartes* rejection is really of common nouns; 
he substitutes for them. **soul** and **body**, not **substance**.
Once (Ch.VII) the contrast is made clear between patterns 
of simple notions and human thinking and science, the issue 
becomes one of finding reasons for rejecting fact-valu es 
for the variables of propositions in logic. Descartes wants 
fact-predicates,e.g. **thinking**, and the vital claim is that 
there are manifold **qualities** of mind. But none of these 
can be discovered (Ch.IX) even if we go beyond Descartes* 
own writings in search for them.
The second great use of ** subs tance** is correlative with
"form". Contrasting "mental" and "material" substance 
we find that what holds these theses in meaningful opposition 
is History and history, as previously it was fact statements 
in a natural language and occurrences. Ve are now able 
(Ch.X) to relate (a) stateaaentsr.in logic, (b) stateiaents in 
History, and (c) metaphysical or category statements. These 
last are equivalent to statements about classes of stataaenta 
necessary to History and its accounts of historical individuals.
This is related (Ch.XI) to uses of "thing" and "substcmce" 
in ordinary discourse, and Aristotle*s logical, categorial 
and metaphysical concepts are derivable from this. In Ch.XII 
the central doctrine of the De Anima is shown to relate 
logic, metaphysics and classTTlcatoiy natural science, 
definitions and observation statements - from such a system 
are drawn the terms which Descartes and other metaphysicians 
treat as meaningful independent^ of statements in natural 
science. It is contended that Without natural science, 
logical and metaphysical truths are ontologically vacuous.
Ve conclude with the endorsaaont of "substance" as a 
valid category or metaphysical terra, and the rejection of 
"a metaphysical substance" and "a metaphysical subject" as 
meaningless^expressions; with the endorsement of statements 
about men doing science, empirical and rational, and the 
rejection of metaphysical arguments to minds or souls-^ ^ 
as doing science, erapirical or rational.
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Because of mistakes In page-nurabering, pages numbered 
30, 143, 148, do not exist. The opposite error results in 
p. 88a following p.88.
Omissions.
There is all top little recognition of my indebtedness 
to many philosophers whose lectures, writings, seminars 
and conversations have provided me with much that does 
not fit neatly into points or arguments or footnotes, but 
is easily or with dialectical discomfort absorbed into 
what one believes to be "philosophy**#
1.
General Suiiioarv
Much of this thesis consists of detailed investigation, 
in an atteiApt to discover the connections between a host 
of general and specific accounts all of which are held to 
belong at least to the same subject, which can be called 
loodely "Theory of Mind".
TVie variety of confusions and contradictions, which are 
obvious features of theory of mind, proves on examination to 
swell rather than to decrease. The task then becomes that 
of finding common features which may serve as a point d*appui 
for philosophical consideration, and this is provided 
initially by "substance". In contrast with an Aristotelian 
examination of mind-theory which results (I shall argue in 
detail) in the insistence upon men being a sub-class of 
animals and of living creatures which exhibit siiailarity of 
structure and of behaviour - the latter including doing 
science in any of its forms - primitive beliefs that souls 
leave bodies at death and sometimes during life (in sleep, 
in coma) closely resemble philosophical and psychological 
theories, which equally regard the soul or mind as a thing, 
a substance, which (even if "tied" to bodies of a particular 
kind) operates on its own initiative.
2. jc'rimitive and sophisticated theories, from this point of 
view, make the saiae sort of existential claim of souls that 
is made by Aristotelians of men and animals. Stateiaents are 
made which are factual and historical, and the subject of 
the statements is said to exist. Yet one difference is 
immediately plain* the sophisticated theories profess to 
prove their claims, fuid they offer proof in detail and in 
many ways.
It is commonly held that there is no disagreement as to 
the facts which constitute the premises of these arguments, 
but examination of the arguments reveals that th^ common 
view is erroneous. Similarly, it is held that the types of 
argument employed are generally valid,i.e. are formally 
identical with arguments in other fields. This, too, proves 
to bo erroneous.
My arfgument that arguments of the f o m  "p,q,r therefore s" 
or "p,q,r but not p,q,r unless s" depend for their force 
upon the truth of the propositions which can be substituted 
for the symbols p,q,r, however the truth be established, 
and upon a logical connection between these and a proposition 
substituted for s,i.e. a logical connection between premises 
and conclusion, introduces no novelty.
Similarly, in arguing that no existential claim holds 
of terms in s which are not already Included in the premises 
p,q,r, find hence that if s is an existential statement (e.g. 
"there are minds such that...") the subject has already 
appeared with an existential assumption or affirmation In 
the premises, I am offering nothing new. It follows from 
this that the existential claiia is not to be made good by 
arguiaent, except in so far as the argument is a part of 
investigation end discovery. This, too, is philosophically
il.
famlli r. The "contingency" of matters of fact and of 
existential truths has long been recognised. '
Yet it is immediately striking in the case of Descartes 
in the case of "substance" and In the case of "mind" (which 
is inseparable from "substance") that both their existence 
and their nature are argued and it is in general true 
of all "philosophical substances" that their nature and 
existence must be argued to. The forms of argument employed 
must be considered in detail, since whether they are claimed 
to be so or not, they may be special forms; and we find 
ourselves conypelled to consider the status and nature of facts 
or other premises and the language in which they are stated. 
This last must surely be considered in the contemporary 
philosophical climate, and my general position can be indicated 
in this way;
Fact statements are made in a language which develops 
in connection with a familiar world. Investigation of which 
determines the use and meaning of words in a developing 
language. Hence affirmation and denial are possible, in one 
language, and hence "evidence for" and "argument" will have 
a meaning, while existential claims can be made and rejected 
along with fact-claims, in ter?>io of established meanings and 
criteria and relations of facts.
What is further involved, and cannot be avoided, is 
the consideration of scientific methodologies which insist 
upon "o3q)lanctoiy concepts" and "conceptual systoas", since 
these depend for their claimed function upon entailments 
between concept-statements and fact-statements, or upon 
statements of relation which are peculiar in kind (are neither 
conceptual nor factual), and the concept-assertions are 
accompanied by both denials and assertions of the existence 
of the concepts as things.
A key problem in the understanding of Descartes is 
precisely his doctrine of concepts end of method; and only 
a detailed exazaination can show adequately what is involved 
in his attempt to make truths of logic, of mathematics, of 
conceptual physics and of "real science" identical with 
"mind" in a sense coiqpletely incompatible with the treatment 
of "mind" as a simple thinking agent. What comes into 
question now is the '/diole Cartesian thesis as to the nature 
of science and logic and metaphysics, and the focal point is 
"substance". My goal here is to show Cartesian science and 
metaphysics is, in spite of Descartes* reiterated insistence 
upon history and historical fact, completely anti-historical.
3. The Aristotelian, by contrast, is factual and historical.
In presenting the contrast between Aristotelian and Cartes­
ian, the crux is the philosophy of Substance. My procedure 
is complicated, since attention to details of Aristotle and 
of Descartes has resulted in its being impossible for me to 
accept general accounts of the general philosophy or the 
philosophy of mind of either. My viewpoint became primarily 
Aristotelian in the course of working on this thesis, on} I 
want to show (a) what his doctrine of Substance as Individual 
amounts to, and (b) the importance which it has in general 
philosophy as well as in the philosophy of mind. Thus I
ii
want to show that even where there is professed opposition 
to the Aristotelian position, or when the methodology appears 
to be opposed to the Aristotelian, the science of man which 
has developed since his day (including psychology) rests 
upon it. Aristotelian logic, and theory of classification, 
are connected with this - they involve a common-sense 
pluralism which treats ordinaiy fact-claims and existential 
claims as meaningful and valid - and while a misunderstanding 
of the logic and of classification resulted in a misguided 
treatment of Substance, the Cartesian revolt against Arist- 
otelianism endorses this misguided treatment, obtains 
"necessity", and is incompatible with the comroon-sense plural­
ism \idiich no scientist or philosopher can consistently deny.
Elucidating the senses of Substance and the forms of 
arguments in terms of Substance, lets us recognise, especially 
in the case of Descartes, that certain arj'uments in terms 
of "necessary truth" are either vacuous or invalid, and the 
conclusions, when not vacuous, contradict or render meaning­
less the premises; that a Cartesian dualism is not proven but 
assumed; and that such a dualism is not a genuine dualism 
but an abstract division of familiar facts which Descartes, 
for example, strove desperately to reconcile with the claimed 
coiiApleteness and unity of his metaphysics.
The consequent task is to question accepted accounts of 
post-Cartesian science, endeavouring to discover whether the 
assumed dualism determines methodological assumptions or 
vice versa. Unless this is done, I am left in the position 
of denying what are accepted "scientific truths"; the actual 
position is that in the case of psycholo(^ (and not only in 
the case of psychology) we can still find the Cartesian 
distinction of Hind, "I", Self, Consciousness and Thou^it 
recognised for certain purposes, and alongside this the 
completely uncriticised assimilation of thma for other 
purposes..
4. The final conclusions renched with regard to Substance 
are*
(1) It is a category term, and as such relevant to all 
scientific and fact statements.
(2) It is a philosophical, fomaal, or metaphysical term, 
and not an ontological one (althou^ there are other 
uses in ordinary discourse and in science), and much 
confusion has arisen because (a) it has, like ttiing. 
a dual function in ordinary discourse, as a class 
term and as a logical constant, and (b) the two 
functions have been assimilated by philosophers.
(3) While "substance" and "thing" are inter-changeable 
as category-tenas, and are b o identical in many 
philosophical uses, a distinction can be drawn 
between than, and between either and "subject"; %diile 
"substance" has a function In the sense of "matter" 
or "stuff" which can be distinguished in Aristotelian 
manner from the function of "thing".
IV.
(4) Like all category terms, "substance" cannot appear 
in fact statements, though it has an established 
function in questions which demnnd a fact answer.
As it stands. Section 4 may seem to have little meaning.
But one of the main aims of the thesis is to present a 
doctrine of categories and to show its range of application.
In essence, what Is concluded is that statements about 
categories are special types of stateaent about classes 
of stnteanents, rather as logical propositions are statmients 
about arguments or components and structure of components of 
arguments, propositions in grammar are statements about 
sentences and their structure, statements about class-relations 
are statements about classes with members. It is, in general,
I argue, because such higher-level statements about statements, 
arguments, sentences and membered-classes are treated as 
"separate" from their content thatbthey appear as "necessary 
truths", are treated as *hecessaiy facts", and thus that the 
existence of "entities" is proven in metaphysical arguments.
It is especially such "separate truths" which appear a©
the content, substance, matter, natural endowment end "forces"
or "processes" of Hinds.
6. It is the higher level applicability of formal statements 
that enables metaphysicians to use any set of facts as a 
proof of what they assume, and makes it necessary for critic­
ism to be extended to a number of apparently distinct argum­
ents to show their similarity or identity. We are thus to 
be concerned with arguments for the existence of souls from 
distinctions of predicates (thinking and extension), distinct­
ions of classes (thinking things and extended things), dist­
inctions between subjects and predicates (thinking and its 
subject-substance), distinctions between existants and ideas, 
distinctions between kinds of events. Along with these, Txit 
differeAA in some wsqrs, are the types of argument which depend 
upon treating "mental events" (thoughts, sensations) as things 
sensed, acts with objects, processes, and as "things" which 
just "appear", or "go on", or "exist","in minds" or "in us".
6. Aristotle*s "wrld" was a world in i^ diich men existed. 
Inquired, and discovered countless things of many kinds. 
Innumerable facts connected in various ways. Philosophy 
and science are concerned with this world, with these things 
and with these facts. The "necessary truths" of either 
science or of metaphysics, or of everyday discourse sad 
80 of language, are not meaningless, but they becoiae so when 
they are severed from their world and are interpreted as 
proofs that there are not many kinds of things but only two 
kinds of thing (minds and bodies) or one kind of thing (minds 
or bodies). Either of these interpretations leads readily 
enough to a thesis that there cannot be the variety of 
sciences which in general we distinguish, because there can
T.
■ be only tvio (IntroopeotlTo "mind-ology" or theoretical 
physics) or. only one (»înd^oloey). , Because of. this It is 
necessary to pay attention to-the question of relations 
between the different sciences; if dualisms or monisms are 
talc en seriously this, is the form they must assume»
Insistence cA science focusses our attention again on 
explanation ly concepts and'entitles vhidh are not to be 
located In the familiar world. They come under the 
Cartesian head of "useful hypotheses*» . If "minds" are 
such concepts, then they too do not exist in,the familiar 
world. If they are not, then like other things in the 
■familiar world they ore not in need of metaphysical'or 
scientific mid-wives in,order to make their sppearance 
in the world - they require search and, description, not , 
,roof of th.fr onotonco.
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Chapter I.
The Hind with which iÆdIOBOPhy of Mind is Coneemed.
Largely introductory, this chapter alias at indicating 
briefly certain features of the complex confusion of talk 
about "minds**.
1. The galasty of toms reveals neither consistency 
nor persistence of meaning, which varies with different 
periods, and with different schools of philos^ ophy and of 
psychology at one and the some period, jfchilosophical 
schools reveal no regular patterns of agreement and 
disagreement, and their metaphysical pre-suppositions 
appear in the complex disagreements of schools of psych­
ology. Neither in the case of facts nor of issues are 
agreeiaents and disagreements clear.
2. The suggestion that "mind", "soul" and *!solf" are 
synonyms, and that we as philosophers need concern our­
selves only with "self" is rejected; "self" is quite as 
difficult a concept as "mind" or "soul", and is not synonym­
ous with either except in special usages. It can be 
recognised that "self" has an important role to ploy.
Hume*8 distinction between personal identity "as it 
regards our thoughts and cognitions" and personal identity 
"as it regards our passions or the concern we take in our­
selves" is claimed to be coropatible with the self-objects 
being men, who have passions and desires and act in relation 
to "natural objects".
But in declaring men and natural objects to be 
substantial, i.e. to be substances, and in contending that 
philosophers have accepted this and never got b^ond it, we 
raise the whole question of substance.
"Let us now proceed to the doctrine which concerns the 
Human Soul, from the treasures whereof all other 
doctrines are derived# The parts thereof, are two; 
the one treats of the rational soul, vdil oh'^divine; 
the other of the irrational, which la common with twutes#
I mentioned a little before (in speaking of Forms) the 
two different emanations of souls, which appear in the 
first creation thereof; the one springing from the breath 
of Ood, the other from the wombs of the elements# For 
touching the first generation of the rational soul, the 
Scripture says, "He hath made man of the dust of the earth, 
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life"; whereas 
the generation of the irrational soul, or that of the brutes, 
was effected by the words, "Let the water bring forth; let 
the earth bring forth"# Now this soul, (as it exists In 
man) is only the instrument of the rational soul, and has 
its origin like that of the brutes in the dust of the 
earth. For it is not said that "He made the body of man 
of the dust of the earth", but "He made man"; that is the 
entire man, excepting only the breath of life# Wherefore 
the first part of the general doctrine concerning the 
human soul I will term the doctrine concerning the Breath 
of Life; the otrer the doctrine concerning the Sensible 
or Produced Soul" •
Bacon# De Augmentia Soientlarum#IV»lll#
"I said, "we wore not stocks and stones" - *tis very well#
I should have added, nor are we angels, I wish we were, - 
but men clothed with bodies and governed by our imaginations; 
and what a Junketing piece of work there is betwixt those 
and our seven senses, especially some of them, for my own 
part, I own it, I am ashamed to confess."
Sterne. Tristram Shandy. V.VIl.
"...And these are not the souls of the good, but of the 
evil, which are compelled to wander in such places as a 
punishment for the wicked lives that they have lived; 
and their wanderings continue until, from the desire for 
the corporeal that clings to them, they are again 
Imprisoned in a body.
And, he continued, they are imprisoned, probably, in 
the bodies of animals with habits similar to the habits 
which were theirs in their lifetime#....!*mean that men 
who practised unbridled gluttony, and wantonneaa, and 
drunkenness, probably enter the bodies of asses, and suchlike 
animals.
Socrates, in the Phaedo# (Church)
Chapter I
The Mind with whloh Phlloaophy of Mind la
Concerned.
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A contemporary Hume well be stricken with melanch­
oly and despair, be "affrighted and confounded", if he sur­
veyed what the history of philosophy presents as the attempts 
of philosophers to define, describe or explain those activities 
of man which are the "workings of his mind". A list of the 
theories in sumiaary form would fill a tidy volume, whose 
entries would range from what is undistin^ishable from 
simple mythology to the thesis that all infoimation about 
the working of minds must be won by the hard-headed empirical 
procedures of labatories, the noting and listing of behaviours 
observable by (the senses of) investigators. At one end of 
the vista is a mysticism wherein all that is concrete and 
particular is absorbed into a nebulous "mind"; at the other, 
concrete particulars expel all that has been claimed to be 
mental so completely that not even everyday mental teams any 
longer have application. The reduction of Mind to Jlatter, 
of Matter to Hind, these claims establish limits only, with 
an enormous number of incompatible theories in between.
It is not only the number and diversity of^theories 
which prevents schaaatisation, or the juxtaposing of theories 
of opposed schools. The greatest difficulty of all lies in 
the fact that each term employed in the theories - mind, self, 
ego, Goul, experience, sensation, perception, understanding, 
reason, noesis, noema, idea, concept, mental act, feeling, 
omotion, passion, affection, conation, intuition, image,  ^
impression, sense-datum, even general tems like consciousness.
2.
awareness, Intelligence, with or without subtle use of 
capitals, with or without the verb and adjective forms which 
add intricate variations of meaning in different contexts - 
is the source of general and special problems, each the arena 
of controversy. Most of them have changed their meaning more 
than once, some without having achieved an agreed meaning at 
any stage. Indeed, it is doubtful if "clear meaning" itself 
has a meaning in these contexts.
To the two difficulties, number end variety of theories,  ^
lack of precision and persistence in meaning of terms, we can 
add an obvious third. Any attempt to classify, and so to 
determine the major types of theory, is refused completeness 
by the interlocking of theories. Actual controversy between 
schools shows frequently contradiction and common ground, 
comraon ground which may constitute the full gamut of theory 
for another school. Idealist and empiricist can share the 
same account of sense-perception and assert and deny respect­
ively Innate ideas; major theorists in either school can be 
shown to embrace incompatible theories or components of 
theories; Descartes can, with evidence, be held to be the 
fore-runner of a straight-forward "scientific" view of the 
human being, and also the founder of a metaphysical thesis 
(or form of such thesis) which divides the world and the 
human being so completely that the mental and the physical 
realms are totally unrelated.
Primitive societies speak of the soul indirectly and 
with awe, and that as little as possible. The atheistically
3.
inclined and up to date, on a linguistic theory of philosophy, 
state quite confidently that mind can he spoken of only in 
metaphor, though admitting that some metaphors are better than 
others. The sleeping man must not be awakened, say the 
primitives, for his soul is absent and if he awakens before 
it returns he will be dead. "Minds do arise, to all appear­
ance, within the physical world; and they do remain, to all 
appearance, tightly bound to certain physical objects, viz. 
living animal organisms", says Professor Broad - not suggesting 
by "appearance" that they have ever been sensed, and not 
intending to suggest by "physical" other than familiar things 
in a familiar world, men and women as well as oysters and 
perhaps onions. When a man dies his soul goes to another 
world, said certain Egyptians, and certain Greeks who may have 
followed them, thereafter to return to earth as the soul of 
man or bird or beast or reptile, according to the moral record 
of the soul as man*s or the*man with the soul. When the man 
dies, so many have said and still,say, his soul goes to another 
world, to reap the rewards of virtue or vice or of the good 
fortune of having been b o m  a Christian or a Pagan, Mohammedan 
or Infidel, English or Geman, Chosen-National or Foreigner, 
in Hell, Heaven, Purgatory, Elysium, Nirvana or. Valhalla. In 
other versions it stays to haunt its familiar places in one 
of many diverse forms, or spends its time in a remote place 
seeking to re-establish communications with those it once 
knew, even if usually by means of those it did not know.
"According to Hume, the self is a succession of. . _
4.
impressions and ideas which, fleeting and perishing, are in 
a perpetual flux and movement. This view, variously kaended 
hut not transformed, has its adherents today, and is one of 
the current interpretations of the theory which L?mge desc­
ribed as "Die Psychologie ohne Seele"". So writes Laird, and 
continues to argue the complete agreement of Bradley, chief
representative of a school completely opposed to Hume on 
general grounds: "the Ego that pretends to be anything before 
or beyond its concrete filling is a gross fiction and mere 
monster, and for no purpose admissible (Appearance and Reality, 
p.6^". Hegel is, for both those who have read him and those 
who have not, the metaphysical antithesis of Hume; he is famed 
as the man who converted the Universe into Mind, Reason and 
Self-Consciousness. Bradley, though he himself denied it, 
is regarded as largely an Hegelian, r At the core of philosophy 
of mind Bradley the metaphysician and Hume the tou^-minded 
empiricist, and destroyer of metaphysics, are as one.
The soul has been proclaimed an indivisible unity, the 
essential one, by ancient Greek and contemporary theologian. 
This remains a conviction of market-place and ivory-tower, 
reinforced’by common usage and logic,^self-evidence and argu­
ment. The Greeks equally well could use the model of the state 
with its different classes and class-oppositions as the model 
for,the soul; the Aristotelian classification of souls into 
the sensitive, nutritive and rational, albeit misinterpreted 
as a division of souls,in the human soul, has collapsed into  ^
distinct Faculties, which became literally parts and components
5.
and agents in their own right. The Faculties have been 
redintegrated and the soul, as Mind, been again divided into 
distinct - if connected - sots of processes or aspects of 
a process entitled the Cognitive, Conative and Affective; a 
trinity which at the moment is as baldly dismissed in some 
circles as it is unquestioned in others. Measured and conv­
erted into Factors, î*aculties present us with the One and 
the Many in a new form, with a strong odour of old wine in 
new flagons. Nietzsche could say; quite intelligibly, that 
the way was open for "new acceptations and refinements of 
the soul hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul" 
and "soul of subjective multiplicity", and "soul as social 
structure of the instincts and passions", want henceforth to ' 
have legislative rights in science". (Beyond Good and Evil -12), 
In some quitters philospphers still speak of the "scan- ' 
dal of a divided consciousness", a consciousness which, 
durchelnander as James loved to put it, is self-conscious in 
fact and by necessity (albeit unwilling to inform Itself or 
others what its perpetually observed simplicity ié like, 
whether as "I" or ."Soul" or "Mind"). ' Yet amid a scream of 
protests the term "unconscious" established itself as a 
respectable scientific term, along with con-conscious and 
sub-conscious and multiple-personality, and the Unconscious 
is now the hobby-horse of the film and the novel as well as 
of the analytic retiring room and the lecture hall, indispen­
sable for any self-respecting nursery, iif spite of proof of 
the non-existence of Consciousness and the claims of a 
dominant psychological school to get along without it.
6 .  1
The Unconscious is seized upon as a useful concept (and 
no more, a mere hypothesis, an idea with no claim to rep­
resent) by yet others, who xannot get along without it, while 
the leader of the school responsible for its elevation to 
fame and respectability insists on its actuality, and reduces 
to an Illusion the god who was the proof and support of the 
Soul, oi the Universe, and of on encyclopaedia of systems ,
I
of belief about the history of the soul as well.
Most of the vital terms, even if current for centuries, 
reveal a chameleon-like character, adapting themselves to 
schools ond periods, asserted ond denied in any guise adopted. 
Early Empiricism (in the English variety) denied the natural 
light which enabled the soul to find certainty in its own 
creations, yet was forced to look for certainty in the immed­
iate presence in consciousness or to consciousness of unquest­
ionable particulars, sensations or impressions or ideas. As 
a result "powers" or "operations" of a self or mind were 
necessary to move from the particulars to the complex ideas
f
indubitably "before the mind" (whenever the owner of the mind 
did any thinking), and once the difficult search had failed to 
find any distinction between mind and what was in mind, the I 
old problems of substance and cause and relation, of quality 
and universal and mode, rose again in a slightly new form 
and with a revised vocabulary. - I
The old set of divisions between Ood and the World, 
Reason and the Senses, Reason and Fact, Mind and the External,
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also re-appeared In different terms and different proposit­
ions, with new confusions and new difficulties because of 
earlier failures to mention sources and an ignoring of the
precise theory and argument in those sources. Soul and
. /
Mind,. L*ame and 1* esprit, mens and anima, merge into one another 
and replace one another, as things which act, things which 
suffer, what is acted upon, what acts upon, as what has ideas, 
as the ideas themselves, as operations upon ideas, just as 
Subjective and Objective merge into one another at a Critical 
Period and somersault, to the dire confusion of the history 
of philosophy, as if the distinction between a Noumenal Self 
and a Phenomenal Self were not a sufficient burden on its own.
The Problem of Terms and Method.
"Generally speaking", writes Laird, "the words 'person*, 
"soul" or "mind" may be regarded as synonyms for the self, 
and it would be mere pedantry to avoid using them as synonyias, 
unless there is some special liability to ambiguity in the 
particular contexts in which they are employed. Indeed, the 
words * consciousness* and * mental ity* might sometimes be 
used in a similar sense, although with some inappropriateness 
and, in the latter case, with a wilful disregard of euphony", 
(problems of the Silf. Intro, p.7).
If this were intended as a general historical state­
ment it would be ludicrously false. It is intended, however, 
as an empirical statement of the linguistic uses of his day, 
and the last almost fifty years have produced some relevant ' 
changes in usage and theory. But as such an empirical state­
ment it is false for theii and for now in an important way. 
Indeed, Laird himself goes on to modify it, suggesting that 
each word has a shade of significance special to it, a shade 
which it is advisable to avoid stressing at the outset of an
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Inquiry, and he argues for the superiority of "self" on 
the grounds that it lacks the "extraneous associations" of '* 
"the soul", which is "too aristocratic to have its ancestry 
scrutinised and its income assessed", is redolent of the 
"rarified atmospheres of poetry and theology" and leads' to 
special questions and the ignoring of the possibility of a 
soul being "ignoble, and, what is worse, occasionally dull".
That there are advantages in speaking, in such an ^
inquiry as Laird*s, of the "self" rather than of the "soul", 
we might agree, without committing ourselves to the" view that 
the advantages were philosophical. While there are, as 
Laird notes, a great number of sentences in which the words 
* self* and * soul* (or "person* ahd'^^mind*) are synonymous, 
there are in fact many sentences, which have equal linguistic 
justification, which show limpeccably good taste and good ' 
usage, in which the terms are not synonymous and could not 
be interchanged at all; and there are, further, a great 
number of sentences in which the word *self* appears with a 
meaning completely different' from thait which it has in other 
sentences, i.e. sentences in which the same word appears.
(What is the connection between "To thinè own self be true" 
and "The self is given to self in every act of thought"?)
Restricting oneself to discussion of a single terra, and 
to selected uses of a single term, in such connections a s " 
these, results simply in the masking of issues which would 
be obvious if the "synonyms" were in fact used. We shall 
later meet a claim that Descartes meant by "a substance"
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no more than "a thing", and the suggestion that when this is 
recognised all major difficulties in understanding Descartes 
will disappear - and I shall he arguing that very frequently 
the only sense we can make of his uses of "substance" 
depends upon its identity with /thing"; but when we contem­
plate what the Cartesian writings would resemble if we did 
put "thing" for "substance" throughout, the result is rather 
caricature than interpretation# If we try and picture the laany 
volumes philosophers have written with "self" replacing 
"mind" and "soul" the result has a nightmarish quality about 
it, a quality which some of us at least have found to attach 
itself to notions of the Self#
Every major philosophical theory, whatever its general 
nature, has to give some account of the self, and when meta­
physicians have finsihed speculating about its primacy and 
simplicity, or its synthesising complexity, when empiricists 
in search of it have failed to find it, when it has been 
declared a fiction, and when moralists have evaluated it and 
produced a personal self, a moral self, a social self, we 
still have to encounter the philosopher-psychologists# They 
produce, like James, a hierarchy of Mes as knovm selves, with 
a bodily me at the bottom, a spiritual me at the top, and 
various material and social selves between, before approach­
ing the Self as Knower; or, like Freud, they produce for us 
an Ego, and Id, a Super-Ego, each of which is somehow a 
Self and part of the Self#
Laird, indeed, might have noted a distinction which 
Hume draws in the Treatise between personal identity "as it
tio.
regarde our thought or Lrmgination" and personal identity 
"ae it regards our passions or the concern we take in 
oureelvea" (IV.6). It 1b the first - the epistetaological , 
ego - with which Hume professes to be concerned, and it is
 ^ .. ; .- ’vï. 6--
this self which Hume declares to be a fiction# It is the  ^
same self (or aliuoot the same self) which Bradley declares 
to be unreal, although Bradley*© discussion, in places, is 
like Hume * s so confused that thin is obscured. Hume*s . _ 
central difficulty is his general theory of perception or 
of ideas, since what is known is an,idea and so an "object of 
consciousness", and the second (non-epistemological) self in 
BO far as it can be known is idea and so object, and as  ^ . 
"object of consciousness" it is, in typical idealist fashion,
"object" in relation to "a self as subject". But the second-  ^ "■ ' - *
self, when the distinction is made, is the ea%>irical self; 
it is the self of usage in which the word is synonymous with 
"the man", "the person", synonymous with "he" or "Socrates" 
or "Hume".
It is the self of ?know thyself", a phrase %^ich ^
6tresses self-ignorance and the need for study of vhat one is; 
it is diametrically opposed to the simple self-^nscious 
subject-substance the necessity of whose existence is ^
.... - L . - 4 a v . . r
established by metaphysicians. It is this last pure knowing
^  ^T. -  .4T
and self-knowing substance \diich Hume claimed to be a fiction,
: M  i. . ■>, , . • »
^ 'tc-:- T ' ' P r
Bradley to be a mere monster, and many, to be the foundation 
of all science and of the universe as we know it. I shall 
endeavour to show^that it is the empirical self vdilch is used
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by philosopher© to give plausihility to their talk of the
■ ■  .-■ 1 "  \ r .  ' r i
Bubject-solf or consclousneo© or laînd-soul.
It is the nind-soul-self a© consciousness with which 
Descartes begins when he is concerned with a method of p m -  
ccdur© in science -md the establishment of a logic of inquiry, 
nnd this is part of lAiat for him is doing metaphysics. It 
1© very different from the other part of metaphysics, demons­
trating that God exists, that the thinking-thing is iimoaterial, 
tmd immortal; and as metaphysics ilowers into science, a 
science of man and morals, we have other question© raised, 
and Descartes, like Hume, is forced into a treatise on the 
passions. What Descartes needs for hi© metaphysics 1© some 
thing capable of thinking, and a thing ca pable of willing 
and attending, a thing which, like the Socrsitic soul, is 
capable of a passion for truth and knowledge \diich can overcome 
other pasGicns, A doctrine of a will-thing vflilch is conscious
ond capable of thinking, or of a thing-with-aj-wlll which i© 
capable of thinking, emerges from the Descartes vAio turns 
his back upon metaphysics in order to get on with investigat- 
ion; and such a thing is capable of canying out an investigat- 
ion of itself a© a "self" which is "self-interested" smd
V- ^  tr -J *■ "  - ry ^ , ■-< - -f /
passionate. Ve approach the "Cyntlsh self" of Ibsen*© drama*
...... is the host
. of wl^ieB,appetites,desires — 
the Gyntish ©elf. It 1© the sea"
- of fsmcies, exigencies, claims,^?
all that, in short, make© my breast heave 
iOld vdiereby I, as I# exist.
afield'Thls^is the mind-soul-self, which can, be described by the
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Platonic Socrates In the metaphors of political and social 
class-structures; It Is the mind-soul-self of which Nietz­
sche spoke, and of which Freud is speaking; and it is the 
recognition of this mind which enables psychology to become 
more than a muddled off-shoot of logic, a science which 
described the relations between the effects of an unknown 
substance upon an unknown substance (so Mill presents it), 
a mystique of Ideas and relations, of subsistent entities 
whose persistence was an necessary and as unaccountable as 
was the entity in which they subsisted.
Hume, indeed, denied that if we sought this self we f " i 
could ever find it. What we find are particular "perceptions"- 
which include for Hume ••heat and cold, light and shade, love 
or hatred, pain or pleasure** indicriminately. If **percept- 
ions**, like •*ideas**, are ••mental**, it follows that the 
self as subject can never be known, unless knowledge (as 
knowing) is a relation between one idea and another - an imp­
ossibility which Hobbes and Descartes recognise. If Hume is 
in his realistic mood, what he is saying is that ’‘reflection** 
shows that we are aware of tables which are round, bodies 
which are cold, people who are angry, a glow of pleasure felt 
as a state or condition. He would not be at all perturbed 
by our talking in an Aristotelian fashion of a hungry man 
searching for food, recognising and rejecting stones as 
cold and inedible; at our treating “men** as the subject of 
awareness-statements; at our permitting Socrates to say that 
Plato was thinking and Plato to say **I am thinking**, and
13.
both to say the. same thing, to describe the sarae event, one 
using a proper noun and the other a pronoun. This possibil­
ity, the possibility of this occurring, it may be admitted, 
is what gives rise to problems; and all I wish to do here is 
to suggest that it makes problems both possible,, and possible 
of solution by looking further afield,e.g. by discovering 
more about the man who talks about himself as we talk about 
him.
Philosophers, however, have preferred to take Hume•s 
failure to find “his self“ as confirming the existence of 
a self which can never be knov/n as object, which can never be 
known in the way that anything else is known. No further 
questions can be asked about it; and so it resembles a 
“concept**, and yet this produces the old riddle, that what 
thinks cannot be a thought, what conceives cannot be a 
concept. How close this is to Descartes we shall see. But 
equally it produces pother riddle: What is the difference 
between saying that a thing cannot be known as object, that, 
a thing cannot be known at all, and that we have no justific­
ation for talking about it at all?
What sense can be made of the statement: “I can never 
be aware of myself as object?**; or of the statement "In 
knowing an object I am aware of myself as knowing the object"; 
if the “self" is not "object" in either case? And, in more 
sophisticated theories, if the self is necessarily known as 
object, and the self knows itself in every act of awareness, 
how do we avoid an infinite regress in eveiy "act of knowing"?
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These arguments, these difficulties, are not novel. We 
can find them arising in Aristotle, find them in Descartes 
and in his critics, and they are inevitably bound up with 
the notion of substance and simple substance, of subjects 
which are simple while their attributes are diverse, of 
subjects which must be grasped wholly in thought for thought 
to be possible. It is with the notion of "substance" that 
I am primarily concerned, in part with its history but only
in part. If the historical confusion in accounts of mind
. f
and of substance were purely a matter of history and were 
not present in our contemporary thinking, there would be 
little justification for bothering about the vanished 
muddles of the past. The philosophical problem is to find 
and in some sense to isolate the variant treatments of 
"substance" and to find the relation between them, in an 
attempt to show that the difficulties and apparent conflicts 
in theories are philosophical.
And since I am concerned with "substance" one further 
point needs to be made briefly in connection with Hume.
"Ideas" can be treated as "subsistent entities" while there
 ^ .  ... ••• ;
is a substance to which they belong, in which they inhere, 
or of which they are modes - the words we choose to say this 
are momently unimportant, though they will propagate their 
problems later. Accept the Cartesian notion of "ideas", and 
deny the reality of the substance which supports them, and 
they become substantial - ideas or perceptions are independ­
ent things, things of a mental kind; and together, since
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they occur in relation, they constitute "a mind", which is 
substantially distinct from body or bodies of any kind.
The mind, in the curious mixed metaphors which hide the 
difficulty of the very conception, is "a kind of theatre",
a stage on which perceptions "pass, repass, glide away and
1 'mingle in an Infinite variety". The mind is container and
contained, somehow a player on itself as a stage if it acts, 
a stage and players and something in the stalls if it 
watches the drama of ideas. Tf we ignore the mind or self as 
the agent, we have the problem of "ideas" as a special sort 
of substance, and we must take some account of it or of them 
as substantial, as well as of its dynamic, fluid counterpart, 
the "stream of consciousness". It is not enough for a philos­
opher to say that these are different ways of speaking suitable 
for different contexts or for different purposes, or that 
they are metaphorical ways of talking about the same thing, 
the same facts, the same occurrences.
Descartes, claiming occurrent fact as evidence in the
p
same fashion as Hume, found the self in every act of mind, the 
mind in every thou^t, and he found it clearly and distinctly 
to be incorporeal thinking substance. For Descartes, self 
and soul and mind are synonyms for at least part of the time; 
for at least part of the time Descartes moves directly from 
the self to substance; Hume, raising the question of what is
1. Hume still - TreatiseHV.6.
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meant by talking of "substance" and "inherence in substance" - 
questions which I want to raise - reaches something of my 
conclusion, that most of the arguments for substances estab­
lish nothing of the distinctions and "existences" which they 
purport to establish, that most of the arguments are indeed 
meaningless. Yet neither Hume's arguments nor Hume's central 
position are acceptable to me, since I find the doctrine of 
Ideas in Hume, in spite of his variations upon Locke, both 
Cartesian and inadequate.
Hume's dilemma will be resolved only when the attack he 
instigated on "substance" is carried through from the subject 
he rejects to the ob.jects he accepts, the little bits of mind 
which replace the single mind - and do so only by a change 
of attention. Hume saw Locke's difficulty, that he needs 
a spectator, a producer, a theatre and a cast, and that it must 
be maintained that the mind-play goes on being produced only 
while the spectator is present, but when we try and give an 
account of the spectator we can talk only of the play and its 
production. When Hume (in Treatise IV,5) routs "substance" 
and establishes that "perceptions" are independent existences, 
he does so by the same argument that Descartes uses, and claims 
that the "perceptions" are substances "so far as this 
(accepted) definition explains a substance". But they are not 
"always perceived" - and the maxim Hume is driven to is 
that an object may exist and yet be nowhere, and that " the 
greatest part of beings do and must exist in this way".
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What Hume wanted to maintain is not very difficult to see - 
that looking at and seeing, or touching, olives and figs on 
a table is different from tasting the taste of olives and 
figs. Look-seeing and touch-feeling are quite different 
activities from imagining and conceiving and reflective 
thinking; man, as looking-touching agent, is spectator and 
sees and feels what exists and is somewhere, but he is other­
wise concerned with ob.j ects which cannot be meaningfully 
said to be in things (as flavours in figs) which exist and 
are somewhere.
If Hume could stick to this, he would be maintaining 
a view that appears to be both common-sensible and the found­
ation of Cartesian theory. But in fact Hume can only maintain 
that there are different classes of "objects" which are all 
"perceptions", and that "man", as a substance related to 
substances it- is said to perceive, has to be "established" from 
individual and distinct perceptions. But...perceptions cannot 
perceive...."existing nowhere" applies to unexperienced per­
ceptions, ideas while not presently presented to us by consc­
iousness.... While he sticks to "perceptions" which depend 
for their existence upon a perceiver, something which has 
impressions, he is in exactly the same position as the Desc­
artes of the Meditations and the Descartes with a special 
theory of perception as "being affected by" - the problem is 
not to show that objects exist and yet are nowhere, but that 
some objects may exist and be somewhere. The spectator sees 
the play, the procession of ideas, and the question is to 
show that part of the play is really going on somewhere, and
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that It goes on somewhere whether it is watched or not.
I am not going to consider Hume in detail, hut he 
serves to illustrate what I shall contend, that we need to 
cut deeper than he cut in order to establish what he wanted 
to establish. That he succeeds in converting the problem of 
substance from one form into another indicates that what we ne 
need to examine is the who1e concept. To do this we must turn 
at least half aside from the heights of metaphysics and the 
clear and distinct dubiety which attaches to all talk of Ideas, 
and raise such a question as whether or not in such an account 
as "I saw the glass, thought it contained beer, drabk it, and 
immediately vomited my head off", it is the same "I" v/ho is 
concerned throughout; and the same "he" or "man" if instead of 
2*1^  we write "he" or "man".
If I am right, and the statement is intelligible; if, 
further, it is such a statement that gives rise to philosoph­
ical problems, then philosophers have never, in spite of their 
formidable voUume of theories of minds, souls and selves, of 
material substance and substrate, succeeded in getting beyond 
the substantive sameness of "the I" who am a man, or the 
substantiality of glasses and beer. The penalty of declaring 
this substantive sameness is not being compelled to claim that 
man is a simple substance, ii not a simple soul. Simplicity 
is a further question, and in proving to be a very complex 
one it illustrates a. central philosophical poinu, that wnen 
terms are correlative in use, trying to consider them in iso­
lation from one another will always result in paradoxes.
Chapter 11.
The Problem of Substance.
"Substance" presents most of the problems that were 
found with "mind" and "soul". Metaphysical theories 
can be compared by reference to their doctrines of subs­
tance, and these theories are implicit in scientific 
theories. The different issues discussed below can and 
must be discussed in relation to different and apparently 
conflicting schools of scientific thought, and different 
and apparently conflicting schools of philosophical 
thought.
What we are in quest of is an understanding of what 
the different schools accept in common as true, and as 
valid modes of argument; and this is clear neither in 
metaphysics nor in science. Nor is the relation between 
metaphysics and science clear.
It is contended that the contrast between Aristotle 
and Descartes clarifies the whole field with which we arc 
concerned, but for reasons stated the contrast cannot be 
made siigply.
(p*2&). Like "thing", "substance" is a familiar word and 
presents no difficulty in use. We are familiar with many 
things and many substances.
But many have found it clearly intelligible that 
the world should consist of one substance or of two subs­
tances, and this is argued about by thinkers without there 
being felt need for earnest research. The xoultitude of 
familiar substances or the many chemists* substances are 
seemingly compatible with various claims as to one "corpor­
eal" substance and as to what that one substance is. This 
substance is argued to, is claimed to be necessary, and 
this seems the case with all "ultimate substances". The 
arguiaents soeia to be like ordinary arguiaents, but the 
variety of conclusions reached is fantastically different 
from the conclusions of ordinary arguments.
2. Answers to ""v^ at corroded the knives?", in an actual 
case of corrosion, considered. A factual (discoverable) 
answer is defended, and held to be primary. Descartes* 
rejection of "virtues" and "powers" is mistaken; "x has the 
power to do Y" is correlative with "x does Y", and beyond 
•x does Y" fact-statements will not take us.
If cheixiists* atoms are occurrences, we have a^irical 
problems of how atoms behave, and of how their behf^viour 
explains. If they are argued to from facts, then "explan- 
ation" demands consideration. Treating "powers" as
"explanatory" and as "things" Is the error - and it will 
be argued bolov that Descartes commits it.
3. Descartes* answer to "What thinks?" is related to 
answers to "What corrodes?" No œapirical answer seems 
acceptable to Descartes, and this makes the question 
"How are thinking things related to bodies?" peculiar in 
character.
Philosophical questions and their answers seem to be 
different from scientific and factual questions and 
answers. Different forms of philosophical argum^t, held 
to provide answers and especially relevant to Descartes, 
arc discussed.
1. From act to necessary agent. This may give us 
tautologies, but (a) it does not give a dualism, and (b^ 
human values as subject in answering "What thinks?" give 
meaning to the dualism
2. "q and r and s are true; p explains q and r and 
s; therefore p". Descartes wants to reject the concept­
ualisée modal p (p may be the actual explanation), but 
for him p is necessarily true, and his difficulty is to 
show that it is actually true. He cannot avoid basing 
the argument on the factuality of q,r and s - and these 
are facts to be explained.
3. The Remlae doctrine of simple notions fails to 
provide what Is needed; observation statements are still 
the basis of actuality-claims.
Descartes* central problem, it is argued, is that 
man and his observation statements are "primary" to his 
science and to his philosophy.
(1, 2 and 3 above are thcaaes which require 
detailed presntation below).
"The peripatetic philosophy asserts the original matter to 
he perfectly homogeneous In all bodies, and considers fire, 
water, earth and air, as of the very same substance; on 
account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each 
other. At the same time It assigns to each of these 
species of objects a distinct substantial form, which It 
supposes to be the source of all those different qualities 
they possess, and to be the foundation of simplicity and 
Identity to each particular species. All depends on our 
manner of viewing the objects. Vvhen we look along the 
Inf^anslble changes of bodies, we suppose all of them to 
be of the same substance or essence. When we consider 
their sensible differences, we attribute to each of them 
a substantial and essential difference. And In order 
to Indulge ourselves In both these ways of considering 
our objects, we suppose all bodies .to have at once a 
substance and a substantial form.
The notion of accidents Is an unavoidable consequence 
of this method of thinking with regard to substances and 
substantial forms; nor can we forbear looking upon 
colours, sounds, tastes, figures and other properties of 
bodies, as existences, which cannot subsist apart, but 
require a subject of Inhesion to sustain and support 
them. For having never discovered any of these sensible 
qualities, where, for the reasons above-mentioned, we did 
not likewise fancy a substance to exist; the same habit, 
whj ch makes us Infer a dépendance of every quality on the 
unknown substance. The custom of Imagining a dépendance 
has the same effect as the custom of observing It would 
have. This conceit, however. Is no more reasonable than 
any of the foregoing. Every quality being a distinct 
thing from another, may be conceiv'd to exist apart, and 
may exist apart, not only from every other quality, but 
from that unintelligible chimera of a substance".
Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. I.IV.Ill•
"...It must be remarked, as a matter that is highly 
manifest by the natural light, that to nothing no affections 
or qualities belong; and accordingly, that where we observe 
certain affections, there a thing or substance to which 
these pertain, is necessarily found".
Descartes. Principles. I.XI.
"For we have no other Idea of substance, accurately taken, 
except that It Is a thing in which exists formally or 
eminently this property or quality which we perceive, or 
which is objectively In some one of our Ideas, since we are 
taught by the natural light that nothing can have no real 
attribute".
Descartes. Def.V.Reply to Objections II.
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PRELUDE.
It ia a central contention in this thesis that the problem 
of Substance ia relevant to every phase and aspect of the 
confusion indicated above; the confusion reflects the 
heterogeneous metaphysical theories and the methodologies 
and logics based upon them or upon assumptions which are 
Implicit metaphysical theories, and the most Illuminating 
point of comparison of metaphysical theories la their 
account of Substance* The contrast between Descartes and 
Aristotle, It now seems to me. Is sufficient to clarify the 
whole field of philosophy and science, but bringing out 
the contrast clearly la exactly the difficulty.
When an Issue arises between men In dally living, or 
between scientists in a particular field. It can be settled 
or reduced to an Insoluble clash of demands, unverlflable 
assertions, or "value judgments"* It can be settled If 
facts are accepted which are related by accepted forms of 
argument to the question at Issue. Traditionally there Is 
no parallel In philosophy, and In fact It Is not the case 
with arguments between different sciences, or In the higher 
realms of a science* The last Is Illustrated by 
contemporary physics, the second last by disagreements 
between physiological or neurological and "mentalist" 
schools of psychology. Yet if there are genuine Issues,
If there Is any real sense disagreement, there must be 
common mode of belief and common mode of argument* This
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holds true of philosophy, and the philosopher la In the 
situation of having the responsibility In terms of his 
tradition of finding such common beliefs and common modes 
of argument In the case of a clash or apparent clash between 
sciences, and at the same time he find a whole set of 
radically different and apparently opposed philosophical 
theses each of which gives a different "Interpretation" 
of the scientific clashes.
Every Issue which Is raised below has a variety of 
philosophical accounts, explanations and perhaps "solutions". 
Each Issue can be discussed In relation to such accounts 
and solutions, and the result will be a metaphysical 
encyclopaedia. Each Issue, even In the case of the 
physical sciences, can be discussed In relation to different 
sciences and different schools, and a further encyclopaedia 
be begun. ' Every issue seems to demand both treatments, 
philosophical and scientific, and this it Is obviously 
Impossible to undertake. Nor Is It possible to justify 
a starting point simply, nor to develop an argument In an 
order which satisfies our demands for clarity and distinct­
ness and ready Intelligibility.
Even Descartes and Aristotle cannot be simply and directly 
contrasted for at least the following reasons:
(1) interpretations of Aristotle, I.e. accounts of 
Aristotle's philosophy, are varied, and there is 
possible no readily acceptable account of his 
central doctrine. Until the background of his 
developing theory Is studied, what la philosophical 
In much of Aristotle's apparently simple statement
21.
and argument la not apparent at all. From the 
De Anima I conclude a doctrine of Individuals as 
suBsTances, and of talk of aoule as talk of acts 
and powers of Individual organisms; others derive 
a doctrine of a soul separable from the body. I 
admit the difficulties, but plead guilty only to 
considering chapters and not a single dubious phrase.
(2) The case of Descartes Is even worse, since In fact
he holds a variety of positions, and Interpretations
of these are as wide as those of Aristotle. I shall 
spend time In the early pages Indicating how 
complicated Is the Cartesian treatment of substance 
especially.
(3) It Is Impossible even In a large volume to present In
detail the philosophy and science of each of them.
(4) An endorsement of Aristotelian doctrine In various 
fields runs counter to dominant contemporary schools 
of loglc^and of science, schools which are regarded 
as legislative In their fields and as having 
completely superseded Aristotle.
(6) Traditional philosophical concern with the determination 
of categories, which runs from Aristotle to Kant,
Hegel and Alexander, la no longer sufficiently alive 
to make it possible to argue in a readily Intelligible 
manner In terms of categories.
(6) Contemporary philosophy and science Is so much in 
the Cartesian tradition, without having criticised 
the metaphysical basis of that tradition, that what 
lies outside its assumptions appears to philosophers 
and to scientists as simply false or Incomprehensible 
because It contrasts with obvious "facts" or the 
primary requirements of science.
(7) The divorce of philosophy (and logic) from commonplace 
facts Is so complete that It parallels the divorce
of science and such facts In the accounts of what 
science Is given by philosophers and scientists. It 
Is true VEat scientists and methodologists do pay 
lip service to facts as a foundation for science, 
which Is the ordering of such facts, the devising of 
concepts, the statement of laws and explanations In 
terms which do not appear in the fact statements at 
all. But the sundering of facts and science is one 
version, and an Important version, of the problem of 
mind and body, and If the sundering Is accepted, makes 
that "problem" Insoluble.
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(8) Cartesian physics and physiology (even if neither 
began with Descartes, i.e. Descartes has become
the banner of à long-standing movement) in fact makes 
commonplace fact-atatements meaningless, or meaningful 
in a way Irrelevant to science# Subjective- 
objective antitheses are as much accepted by 
scientists as by philosophers, and the insistence 
upon commonplace facts Is treated as evidence of 
naivete or of a complete Ignorance of science and 
of philosophy - either aa the assertion of the 
obvious which everybody knows, or the assertion in 
a crude and pre-scientlflc form of what science has 
made clear and distinct# That the same familiar 
field of human behaviour Is made clear and distinct 
in several ways and in a variety of unrelated jargons 
by rival schools seems to arouse no doubts 6bout 
the validity of each school's own method#
(9) To philosophers concerned with special problems or 
the problems of special sciences, and to scientists 
concerned with their own science, general issues 
are of little or restricted interest# They lack 
the vocabulary for the raising of general Issues, 
and In fact have done much to destroy the vocabulary 
once used by philosophers for the raising of such 
Idsues# Hence a discussion of the difference 
between Aristotle and Descartes directly in terms
of tnelr treatment of categories, or of their 
treatment of substance, universals, modes and 
attributes. Is Impossible, without some discussion 
of each of the terms, although the question of 
difference arises in the case of each of them in 
these terms and the questions themselves can be 
demonstrated to arise In all discussions of logic, 
method and science#
A point of beginning cannot simply be justified, cannot 
be even explained# I have decided to begin with a general 
discussion of Substance and Its relation to Cartesian theory, 
in order to bring out how confused the background is, how 
many distinct issues are raised by Descartes even when he 
Is concerned with mind as a thinking substance, a thing-agent.
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and how Impossible It Is to settle any issues In the modes 
of discussion which Descartes adopts# The first section 
serves to show what happens when v/e bring together a number 
of Descartes' clear and distinct principles, and the most 
positive argument is designed to show that If we treat the 
Cogito argument simply we are neither "dealing" with 
Descartes nor raising the mind-body problem In a meaningful 
form.
It serves also to raise the question of a distinction 
between logic and science, between metaphysical and 
scientific and fact statements, which Is a central issue 
between Aristotle and Descartes, and for any philosophy 
of matter or of mind, in fact any philosophy and any science 
at all#
Indirectly, too. It Introduces the suggestion that 
Aristotle was not an accident in space-time but a post- 
Platonic philosopher, whose science and whose philosophy 
Involve not the assertion of facts by a naive Interest but 
the re-asaertlon of facts by a philosopher who had 
discovered that metaphysical abstractions - matter, atoms, 
numbers and forma, motions and reason - were abstractions 
from concrete occurrences, and that metaphysical entities 
were entificationa of logical distinctions. \Vhatever 
Descartes did for mathematics and for physics, what he did 
for logic and for theory of mind was to restore the pre- 
Aristotelian entitles in an even more vacuous form than that
which they held OÿiginaUy. That, however, needs much
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demonstration, since It is now incumbent upon a realist to 
prove that for philosophers and for scientists there can be 
apples on trees and trains.running between stations which 
are not "complex Ideas" In one's ralnd, made up of odd 
"Influences" of unknov;n bodies and some unjustifiable ' 
Inferences about causation#^
1%'
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What la the Problem of Substance?
The problem of substance, as Wittgenstein might have said, 
la some thing that can be shown and not stated. It Is 
platitudinous to say that philosophers have been concerned 
with It, that every philosophical system has some thesis 
with regard to It; It Is equally obvious that the term 
appears In everyday discourse with something at least of the 
sense In which It appears In philosophical treatises, and 
that contemporary philosophers have little If any use for the 
term.
In familiar discourse we have no difficulty In using 
and understanding the word, and feel no call to explain It# 
Indeed, many of our problems are stated, our difficulties 
explained:; by using It. It seems, rather like "thing", to 
be a notion that Is native to us; we do not seem to have to 
learn It, to learn what it means, as we do with "rose" and 
"raspberry". Both the latter terms, like common names for 
things, we can teach with facility, but confronted by the 
question "how would you teach someone what 'substance'
I
means?" or "what 'thing' means?", we are rather at a loss.
If someone can distinguish chairs from tables, roses from 
raspberries, he seems to have grasped already the notion of 
'thing'; and if he can distinguish roses from colour, sugar 
from sweetness, he seems to have grasped already the 
distinction between substances and their attributes. This Is, 
in very large part, what Descartes meant when he added In
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Meditation III the notion of ♦thing» to a list of "simple 
notione* which eleevdiere (in the Reguiae. in the Prlnclplea) 
includes "thou^t" , "exlotence","unity" ,"certitude"« These
. I t :  I
notions ore most familiar, completely grasped, unerringly 
used, on Descartes* account of them# In the case of • thing*
I
the point seems trivial enough; hut when we have grasped the 
combination of universality, lack of partioulari^, the fazail- 
iar ease of use, and the claim that if ve did not have the 
"idea" of thing somehow in mind we could not distihguiah babies 
from chairs* any thing from another thing* we hegin to'^rasp 
what Descartes meant by innate ideas# The triviality vanishes 
when we realise that Locke, who spœit so^  much time demonstrating 
that there were no Innate ideas', haiHlni? scoured in his curious
Î ‘
way tho rooms and portals of the storehouse "mind", demonstrated 
(a) that we have no idea of "substance" (which is here ihdlst-
 ^' * r : :
inguiehablo from "thing"), (h) that we could not acguiro the 
idea hy any possible macna* (c) that we could not think as we 
do unless we had such em idea* and (d) that we have"no such 
clear idea at,ail", but "only an unèeftain supposition of we 
know not what* i.e. of something hereof we have no particular 
distinct positive idea* lAich we take to be the substratum or 
support of those ideas we know".^ '
In a sense our main conoem is to be with the passa# from 
the familiarly intelligible 'to the unintelligible of "thing" as 
substanoe-subj ect-substra^m. At first glance* thé question
seems remote from a familiarly accepted usé of "substance"* one
3 ;^ --- — — --- - - v -
1. Essay. I.iv.18.
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%Aich onablas us to aay that in the world around us are many 
substances* corrosive* sticky* liquid and dolid substances. 
Plastics* we say, are useful substances* because they are so 
easily moulded and they harden to the strength of metals. Many 
things* quite different in appearæice and behaviour, we reoog- 
nioo as being of the same substance.
Is the question ranote? That the world should be ultimat­
ely made of one substance has seemed an intelligible and plaus­
ible possibility to many, an Intelligible and à necessary 
condition of there being one world* to a large number of 
philosophers, and a very great number of sci^tists.
At least since Descartes* who popularised e doctrine, 
the majority of people in the Western world have found it 
clearly and distinctly necessary'that there should be in the 
world two substances - one corporeal or natter, and one mind 
or spirit. They state this as easily by "îîînd and matter" or 
by "Minds and bodies". '
Hetaphysiosl doctrines seem to be just like commonplace 
statements about things and ^at they are made of* if bi%er 
and better, easier to #raqp* and not demanding earnest rsseerbh 
to establish them, as' is the case wiiai a (âiemist's thesis that 
graphite,diamond and coàl are the same substance^ They are much 
more like obvious facts ' than arduouGly acquired theories,
Philosophas* like scientists, have disagreed. Twit the 
disagreements were not about "substance" but about that ^ e  
Substance is or t ^t Bubstanoes there areJ^ Thales said, in 
his primitive wagrpthat the ultimate substance was water;
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others said it was air, particles, atoms, matter, extended 
substance; and now modern science has progressed so far 
that we know it la force, or energy, or electricity, units 
of electrons or protons, or hydrogen nuclei. In primitive 
periods the thinking substance was breath, was gas, was fire; 
later it was regarded as experiences, sensations, impressions 
and ideas, a flowing stream of awareness, conBciousness, 
spirit, a spiritual substance, a thinking substance.
There are peculiarities about the historical picture.
We (sometimes) admit to having doubts about what precisely 
any of our predecessors meant, but presumably everyone at 
least thought that he knew what question he was asking, what 
question everyone else was asking; at least each one knew 
that the others had given wrong answers. (And, admittedly,
I think that I know what question was being asked, although 
I join Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel in saying that none of 
the answers suggested above are possible answers to it).
But there is a more striking peculiarity. Substance, is, 
for all theorists, closely concerned with the familiar things 
around us - otherwise all talk of it is meaningless; yet 
when empirical, particular problems arise in connection 
with substance or substances we seem, while concerned with 
finding what substance is in question, concerned with finding 
which of many substances is in fact an answer or a solution, 
and are satisfied that the goal is reached when we cease 
to use the terra "substance'' at all, when we are able to refer 
to sulphuric acid, carbon, plastic, or treacle.
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V/e are always concerned with this substance rather than 
that, and with showing that in fact this substance 3^ 
involved. But for metaphysical and higher-scientific 
solutions, the goal ia reached by showing some substance to 
be necessary, and there is seldom, if ever, any question of 
showing Lhat it is in fact involved; and even if the terra 
"substance" does not appear in the answer, aa it invariably 
seems to do with Descartes, the substances referred to are 
very different from the substances which empirical 
investigation detects and whose connection with other things 
it shows. There is never any question of someone showing 
us a portion of the metaphysician’s substance after a piece 
of empirical Investigation; no question of someone showing 
us that apples are made of such a substance as we can show 
that ice is made of water by melting it or by freezing water. 
We are confronted with arguments, and arguments whose logic 
seems to be the same logic that we employ in empirical 
research and common discourse, similar in the sense that the 
conclusions do not depend upon special types of arguments, 
quite unfamiliar to mere mortals, designed to meet the non- 
empirical situation. But it is also fairly apparent that 
our general modes oi argument do not produce conclusions like 
those of the non-empirical arguments, nor is there, in our 
general arguments, such a variety of claimed conclusions to 
a single inquiry, silly as many of our arguments and answers 
may be.
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î^om this brief survey. It would seem to follow as 
four principal points regarding "substance";
(i) that ’thing* and ’substance’ are special nouns, important
t
nouns, but very familiar. We know what they mean, can use 
them, and illustrate them, very easily.
(ii) We do ask questions about xrhat substance (or substances) 
a thing la made of (or consists of - there is no special 
point of "fabrication" at issue here), and expect an answer, 
which will be in terms of this substance as distinct from 
that.
(iii) Philosophers’ questions about substance do not seem 
to have been like this (and one of the reasons, I suggest, 
ia that philosophers have wanted to ask the question "Of 
what substance? " of the answer to any question Indicated 
in (ii).
(iv) Philosophers argue to thoir substance or substances, 
by modes of argument which sesm to have the same logical 
character as our familiar arguments, althou^ the results 
seem very different from those of ordinary arguments.
2. Part of what is involved here can be illustrated by 
one example. I return to my flat after a period of absence, 
and find that all my cutlery has corroded. I have then all 
the necessary evidence that corroding has occurred, and the 
inference, since such has not occurred before, is thQt there 
is or was a corrosive substance present with the cutlery.
But as an answer to "v/hat corroded the cutlery?", "A corrosive j 
substance" seems completely empty. Its only force is to
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insist that the corrosion was not just a process which went 
on in the cutlery wjthout an external agent being present.
(And no explanation Is given by saying that knives are 
material objects, or of matter, of atoms, of "extended
substance". That they are made cf steel is relevant, because 
it Insists on a difference between knives and the glass and 
china which do not corrode or did not corrode). The question 
is "What substance did it? What thing, what substance, was 
responsible?"
The answer might be "Salt in the air - there have been 
many sea breezes", or "The jar of acid on the shelf above 
has cracked". The general form of the hypothesis which 
guides an inquiry is disjunctive v/ltbln the field of our 
existing knowledge - a or b or c - without a conjunctive 
answer - a and b - being ruled out, or the possibility being 
excluded of it being something which we. have not previously 
encountered as corroding metal* Scientists may also be 
concerned with studying corrosion itself, and having 
discovered that oxidation is involved, or the formation of 
metallic salts, they may investigate further what the 
corrosive substances have in common.
1. We approach here questions of the "assumed uniformity of 
nature", or a first principle that all things continue 
unchanged unless something causes them to cliange. The 
relation of these "assumptions" and "principles" to substance 
and thing must be considered, but it can scarcely be claimed 
that they are components in ordinary arguments (unless as 
"unconscious" but tkniversal ideas).
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Not even the comparatively recent divorcement of philosophy 
from science (natural philosophy) can obscure the fact that 
this sort of hypothesis and investigation is not the 
philosopher's path to substance. The example is worth 
probing a little further, for this reason and for the further 
reason that it Illustrates a point at which science seems to 
follow the philosophical tradition. Both reasons are 
intimately connected with the Cartesian procedure.
Descartes rejects the doctrine of "virtues", according to 
which the discovery that a and b and c corroded knives would 
have been stated as " a and b and c have the virtue of 
corroding steel" or "there ia a corrosive power or principle 
or virtue in a and b and c". Such virtues or powers or 
qualities are, for Descartes, occult and scientifically 
damnable, and a line from Molière^ has proved sufficient to 
exclude them from later science and from philosophical 
consideration; unfortunately, like "substantial forms", 
their implications have also been excluded from philosophical 
consideration. Certainly talk of virtues and powers does 
not get beyond the facts, beyond " a and b and c do corrode 
steel", but only if we reject facts as explanatory will we 
reject "a is present" as an explanation.
Recognition of the presence of a as an explanation is not 
affected by our Inability to explain how the steel is corroded
1 Cf# Mill System of Logic V.vii
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by a, and If we note differences between a and b and c, and an 
identity in the various corrosive processes, we may go on to 
discover that oxygen is present in a and b and c, and to 
explain the corrosion by the presence of oxygen* Our account 
of corrosion is now much more complicated, since our account 
of the constitution of a and b and c is much more complicated; 
but we have not got beyond the fact that oxygen does under 
certain circumstances combine with metals, that oxygen has 
the power or virtue of combination with metals* Only if 
we replace ’corrosion* by *oxidation* and treat "oxygen 
oxidises and forms oxides" as a self-contained statement is 
there any element of "rational necessity” in our explanation, 
an element of rational necessity which enables us to say 
when we encounter corrosion that it is oxidation and there 
must be oxygen present*
Setting out an equation with symbols and plus and equal 
signs looks impressively exact and different, looks self- 
explanatory and necessarily true, but it incorporates the 
corrosion statement (which is primitive enough), the oxidation 
statement (which is sophisticated), and a fact claim about 
regular ratios of combination (at least), while ignoring the 
conditions under which combinations do take place, and the 
question "why?" can still only be answered by "such is always 
8o"$ What I am trying to indicate is the lack of independence 
of the formulae statements from facts, and the implications
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which this lack of independence has for statements about 
chemical atoms* If the atoms are explanatory concepts, 
which establish a rationale for regular relations of weight, 
then the factual wei^t-combinations are the regularities 
which give meaning to the statements about atoms; if atoms 
are existing things, we have only statements about how atoms 
do in fact behave, and much more to discover about atoms, 
i.e. it is fact-statements about atoms which function as 
explanations or as re-descriptions of previously observed 
processes.
Atoms cease to be rational entities or philosophical 
substances as soon as they are established as existing things, 
and the relation between gross things and atoms becomes an 
empirical question. Until such relations are established 
we are left with the enormous gap between (a) a world of 
unchanging atoms whose patterns of combination do change, 
and (b) a world of gross things and qualitatively different 
occurrences, vaguely claimed to be "reducible” to changing 
patterns of atoms. Descartes • general position is at 
times clearly indicatedj the corporeal world is not a world 
in which qualitatively different changes do take place.
Even the variety which is promised by a large number of 
different kinds of atoms must be denied; in the case of 
extended particles the only real differences are of size 
and shape and motion relative to other particles, all
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particles being substantially identical. They are unobserv­
able but real; and they must be argued to from gross 
phenomena or there is no point in talking about them at all.
(And, I suggest, the question of "substance” is completely 
answered; the question that remains is that of the actual 
structure of gross bodies. Descartes would not accept the 
argument that the particles must be argued to - when his ■ 
procedure is consistent it requires that we know the explanations 
before we know what is to be explained. But as he is forced 
to admit at the conclusion of part IV of the Principles, when 
we are concerned with observable occurrences the necessary 
truths of his rational physics become merely possible truths, 
and at beat probable truths when the argument is added that 
they do in fact explain many occurrences. Hence the claim 
is; ”q, r and s are true; p explains q, r and s; therefore p". 
What must concern us is the nature of "explains" in "p explains 
q, r and s", and the peculiar modality of p which it demands, 
since p is one of the necessary truths of science. Descartes, 
it will be remembered, dismisses contempuously syllogism and 
"merely probable^ arguments from investigatory science).
It is plausible enough to claim that the virtues or powers 
of gross bodies are a function of, or depend upon, their- micro- 
structure, but this determination of structure in seeking 
explanation is a macroscopic procedure, and is in fact the 
basis of Descartes* physiology. It is a familiar consequence 
of an interest in the source of powers, capacities.
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potentialities, dispositions and activities of any gross 
phenomena. Of any gross body it may be asked ."How or why 
does it so react?", and the answer may well be in terms of , 
a complex of lesser bodies in systematic relation. No,matter
how far we go by empirical investigation, we will still be 
concerned with bodies which are gross in the sense that 
particle-structures v^ill still evade us. If we are content 
to accept as explanation of the behaviour or capacities of 
two different gross bodies A and B that they are constituted 
of particles of different shapes in different patterns, the 
only argument being that the patterns must be different or 
the behaviours would be the same, we have necessity and 
nonsense combined with a complete barrier to discovery._
(And the same charge rests against any attempt to claim tbat 
bodies must be the same,^ and if their behaviours diffère 
there must be different minds "animating" the bodies).
The doctrine of powers and virtues is not a barrier to 
science, to the raising and settling of further problems^unless 
powers and virtues are reified .and converted into "simples" 
which are exhaustively known, i.e. which need no further 
investigation. In the case of the corrosion above, we 
should still have to search for the thing responsible for 
the corrosion, and then to discover its structure before 
we had an explanation of why it caused the corrosion. We 
must locate the thing which (grossly) causes the corrosion 
before it is even intelligible to ask "How?", even if we
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reject "This caused corrosion" as an explanation. Deny the 
reification of powers, deny the reification, as principles, 
of acts or behaviours or operations of a thing, and we are 
left with the thing and its acts etc.; and if we deny the 
thing, as the reification of powers and virtues denies it, to 
be more than a location or a sign of location of the reified 
"entity", we are left with nothing at all except at best 
"there is corrosion" or "corrosion occurs", neither statement 
being meaningful unless we accept it that something corrodes, 
that some substance undergoes change. ^
3. As the instance was first presented, "There is a corroding 
substance present" was equivalent to a question or an hypo­
thesis, answered or confirmed by the discovery of a thing 
present, a thing which could not be exhaustively described 
by "a corrosive substance", and still less by "a substance". 
What is meant by something being exhaustively described by 
a single predicate we can investigate later; what I want to
1. The reification of powers entails the denial that x acts 
and the assertion that there is in x a power that acts - 
potentia tends to become vis, located, simple, indivisible. 
TEis, since it seems patently close to Descartes* treatment 
of mihd, needs lengthy consideration, but it is worth noting 
immediately that the scholastic doctrine of Faculties (of Mind) 
went hand in hand with a denial that Mind was a "complete 
substance" - the complete substanee-thing was man. In this 
they seem to follow the Aristotelian, not the FTatonic-Socratic 
tradition. I shall stress below Aristotle*s statement that "it 
is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or 
learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does 
this with his soul" (De Anima. 1.4). This is precisely not 
reifying powers, but relating "men think" and "man have the 
power to think". It is Descartes who reifies powers and then 
has to find a substance for them.
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draw attention to is the impossibility of answering any question 
like "How is the corroding substance related to the room?", 
(orr^ to particles, or to bodies, or to anything else), if all 
we can assert is that there is a corrosive substance, with 
one proviso, namely that we can always say that it is related 
to the knives by "corroding". Yet the proviso, for all its 
necessity, is empty: it repeats as an assertion the original
question. "What .corroded the knives?" becomes "What corroded 
the knives corroded the knives". Equally empty is the 
assertion that unless it were a corrosive substance it would 
not have corroded the knives. The criticism applies to all 
doctrines of powers and virtues 3^ powers and virtues are 
treated as things within things. It may be the caffeine in 
the coffee which keeps us awake ; it may be the kitten in the 
basket which causes it to move; but until we have discovered 
the caffeine and the kitten we have only sleep-preventing 
coffee and a moving basket, coffee capable of keeping us awake 
and a basket capable of moving. The "powers" are not 3^ them 
in any sense of "in" - and we preserve a "metaphoric" use at 
the expense of incessant confusion.
One of our major problems is to discover the relation between 
the sort of situation illustrated by corrosion, the account of 
which (apart from certain reservations, and going beyond the 
limits I suggest) Descartes would maintain, and the situation 
of "thinking substance". Accept "men think" as a fact and 
as setting a problem in the form "thinking has occurred -
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who thought?" and we have either a ready answer or a problem 
of detection. Aak "What thought? What thinks" and we can 
answer "A man; this man; not non-human animals; not plants; 
not Inanimate, non-living things". Ask "How?" because we 
cannot understand how any animal does or can think, just as 
we can ask "How?" when we recognise that acid does corrode 
metal without knowing hpw it does so, just as we can ask "How?" 
when we have discovered that oxygen is a gas and knives are 
made of iron and the oxygen combines with the iron - and in 
what sense have we given an answer when we say "It is a 
thinking substance which thinks"? (And to repeat a point, 
relevant because "thinking substance" is contrasted by 
Descartes with "extended substance", "knives are extended 
substances" explains nothing about corrosion, and until we 
have discovered the thing which corrodes we have no ground 
for saying corrosive substances are extended or not extended).
Even granted that we have "Inside" knowledge of thinking 
as we do not have it of corrosion, that we would never mistake 
thinking for corroding, that thinking is the activity most 
familiar to us, what is the meaning of the statement that there 
is no problem of how thinking substances think because it is 
their nature to do so? Or that they think always, because it 
is their nature to think, and'there is no reason (no principle 
to explain) why they should ever cease to think?
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(Adding that, unless God interferes to destroy them or 
ceases to maintain them in his eternally rational but 
incomprehensible fashion, it is logically impossible for them 
ever to be not tMnking, is either mere repetition or, like 
Descartes’ law of motion that what moves goes on moving unless 
it is interfered with, a principle which runs sheerly counter 
to his metaphysics of atomic time sequences of inotanta*
God’s recreation instant by instant of the universe leads us 
on to the argument, apparent in the letter to More of 
Aug.30, 1649, that God does everything that happens in the 
world.^ These, however, are the higher flights in which 
lesser level contradictions become vacuously apparent, and 
it is lower levels that concern us here).
The Cartesian argument in the exact form indicated above, 
can be traced out in the Meditations and in the Replies#
Since.it is to be discussed immediately below, I shall do no more 
than note (a) that Hobbes makes the objection which is relevant, 
that the question unanswered by "thinking substance" is "What 
thinks ?" ; (b) that Descartes professes, in the reply to Hobbes 
and elsewhere that all he has tried to show before Meditation VI
1# Kemp Smith notes (New Studies, p.201) that Descartes, in 
his doctrine of motion, is afraTE of being taken to imply 
that God is the anima mundi, as the letter of More reveals. 
But the argument Tiolcls of minds as well as of bodies if minds 
and bodies are univocally substances. If God is the Sole 
Mover, God is the Sole Mover, a Moving Substance that lacks 
a principle of non-Movement and leaves no room for other 
movers, pensive or locomotive.
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la that there la a thinking substance-thing, and he has made 
no statement at all about what sort of thing it is; and 
(c) that Descartes asserts in the reply to Objections I that 
"according to the laws of true logic the question "does a thing 
exist?" must never be asked unless* we know what the thing is"
To this we can surely add; "the question of what a thing does 
cannot be asked unless v/e know what the thing is". We can 
understand the situation; "There is something going on here 
which is impossible to explain as an activity of what I know 
to be present, so there must be something present which I have 
not yet discovered". Yet the solution to that necessary 
question is an empirical one, and if the process or activity 
is "thinking", what seems plausible to argue is that until we 
have found what does the thinking, what sort of thing is the
n
mind or thinking substance inferred from the occurrence of 
thinking, it is meaningless to ask how the mind or thinking 
substance is related to anything at all.
4. I suggest, quite seriously, that this is the general 
philosophical situation, and that the desperate search for an 
answer to "What relation is there between minds and bodies?" 
is in part a desperate search for a relation which will enable 
some meaning to be given to "mind", i#e, wj.ll enable us to 
understand what minds are, or what "mind" means.
1. H and R.ll. p.13.
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I am not concerned to argue that what is true of corrosion 
is true of thinking, or that one must be discussed in exactly 
the same way as the other. But it seems fairly clear that in 
considering the philosophy of substance we must give special 
attention to (iv) above, i.e. to the way in which philosophers 
argue to their substances, by modes of argument which seem to 
have the same logical character as do our familiar arguments, 
although the conclusions seem to be very different from our 
ordinary conclusions. If the logic is the same in an argument 
from "corrosion occurs" as in an argument from "thinking occurs" 
we need at least something additional to establish that the 
conclusions are radically different from one another. If, as 
I added further, philosophers’ statements and arguments about 
substances are meaningless unless they are related to familiar 
occurrences, and if our arguments to particular and different 
substances hold (in the case of any situation in which change 
is caused or an act is observed), while of any answer we give 
as the substance in question the philosopher can still ask 
in his sense "V/hat substance is it?", then what seems Indicated 
is that philosophically all differences between familiar things 
or observable occurrences are irrelevant to the question of 
what substance. That means that the philosophical arguments 
are different from our familiar arguments, and this is borne 
out by the quite general claim that Substance as such is never 
observable, and that if any thing or substance is familiar and 
observable, if it can be encountered in its differences from.
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and its similarities to, other things or substances, it is not 
Substance at all. Yet somehow we must be encountering Substance 
all the time. No thing, no substance, is a better example of 
Substance than is any other; no thing and no substance is more 
adequately explained by Substance than la any other.
We cannot simply amalgamate the various claims that there is 
one Substance, or that there are two Substances, or a greater 
number than two Substances in the world, nor claim that there 
is really only one argument involved. That is one reason why 
I choose the long and detailed road in a consideration of 
Descartes. The arguments employed by metaphysicians are 
different from our ordinary arguments, and one of the points 
of formalising a logic - a procedure which Descartes, like 
the British empiricists, deplores - is that it enables us to 
detect such differences. Scientific arguments, too, are 
different from our ordinary arguments, like and unlike the 
metaphysical. Part of our quest is for an elucidation of 
such differences, and I have already suggested a parallel 
betv/een our ordinary arguments which move from occurrence to 
necessary question and the metaphysical argument w M c h  moves 
from occurrence to necessary answer.
If we can elucidate the differences, we may be able to see 
why Descartes refuses the argument; Socrates thinks, Socrates 
is an animal, therefore some animals think. We may be able 
to see why he does seem to argue; I think, I have a mind,
I have a body; minds are necessarily not bodies, therefore
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I am a mind. Our chief concern is here with "thinking 
substance", with mind as "that imdiich thinks" (though I shall 
argue that no account of mind evades "substance" and its 
logical problems, and that v/e have to consider' other matters 
than "thinking substance" to discover what substance-talk 
is about). There is no need to be misled by thB simple 
formulation - Descartes hliaself expands "that which thinks" 
in a variety of ways; into that w M c h  is aware, into that 
which feels and acts and suffers in diverse fashions, and 
I shall try to show that "thinking substance" appears in 
succinct arguments as (a) a synonym for the self, (b) a simple 
agent which acts, i.e. perceives "in the strict sense",
(c) a container of ideas, (d) thought itself, as a self- 
generating process, (e) the substratum of "ideas" or modes of 
consciousness, and (f) as a simple substance which is somehow 
a spectator to the thoughts wliich occui^  before it#
Provided we recognise that part of the time at least 
Descartes’ concern is, like mine, with the complexity of 
mental acts and states, processes and activities, wliich we 
regard as human, as acts, states etc. of a man, we can give
i -
a meaning to most of what he is saying directly. In other 
cases, we will need to note what truths he holds on tlie 
grounds of faith to be unquestionable in order to see why 
he argues as he does; and in otlier cases we will need to 
note Yfhat he is arguing against. But we are not restricted
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In any way to the account of thinking as a process of 
manipulating symbols or "things" called ideas which tempts 
people to believe that calculating machines are prototypes 
of minds, even if such a thesis is a simplified form of one 
of Descartes’ central theses. We can, as I shall show, get 
an account in Descartes’ writings of man as a very complicated 
machine, able to apeak, whose intricate inner mechanisms make 
thinking as we know it and communicate it possible. But 
Descartes adds as well that the man, in an obvious sense of 
"knows", knows what he is talking about.
Descartes shows no Inclination to reduce accounts of 
mental activity to physics; his gross error was to suppose 
that the account of everything except thinking was reducible 
to physics.
As a further guide to a discussion of the complexity of 
Descartes, let me elaborate forms of argument which are used 
by him throughout his writings. Two have been mentioned 
above.
1. The argument from "corrodes" to "a corroding substance 
corrodes", 'from "thinking" to "a thinking substance thinks", 
are both "obvious" if we know that "corrodes" and "thinking" 
are acts, and the "eternal truth" is "every act has an agent". 
But unless we are going to rest happy with saying "acts occur 
and there is one agent for all acts", or "acts occur and an
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unknown agent or a number of Identical unknown agents are 
individually responsible for such acts", we have to recognise 
that agents are different in kind as acts are different in 
kind.
In fact we make many act-statements which have recognisable 
subjects: catb mew, acids burn, beetles buzz, tea,revives #.
and we could give no meaning to act-verbs, no use to act-verbs, 
unless this were so. Our mode of inference is not in fact 
"mewing - act - agent - cat", but if it were such, we should 
have to go on to the fourth term before we had reached a 
conclusion.
Descartes rejects the syllogistic: "This mews, only cats 
mew, this.is a cat". (The Regulae suggest that this is to be 
rejected because unless we knew directly that cats mew, we 
could not formulate the major, which already contains the 
conclusion, which follows directly from "this mews^, and there 
is thus no need for majors at all). What he seems to 
substitute, in the name of "immediacy", is: "Mewing, therefore 
mewing substance, and "cat" is the name for a mewing substance". 
Compare "thinking, therefore a thinking substance, and "mind" 
is the name for a thinking substance", which Descartes insists 
to Hobbes is the argument in the first Meditations.
The difficulties of this peculiar nominalism will be 
considered later; but instead of syllogism, which gives the 
form of propositional arguments, Descartes Is concerned with
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the argument which establishes any singular proposition.
His problem is related to Aristotle’s treatment of metaphysics 
and categories, not Aristotle’s logic (and I shall<evidence 
below that Arnauld seems to recognise that the Categories - 
in a most Inexact form - constitute Descartes’ metaphysics). 
Hence his claim that substances are inferred from attributes.
The primary "truth" of which no minds can be unaware, or - 
which reveals its unconscious presence by the'fact that we 
do utter propositions and use nouns as subjects (i.e. facts 
prove the existence of the "truths" in our minds) is "every 
attribute is of a subject".
This first principle" can be stated as "if Y is an attribute, 
there is a Y-thing which is Y". Of this, "if Y is an act, • 
there is a Ying-agent which does Y" is a form or mode, and 
there is a multitude of varieties - in fact every case where 
our terms for an agent and for an act are correlative is a 
variant. If conducting, there is a conductor; if drinking 
there is a drinker. Mathematicians do mathematics; smokers 
smoke; scientists do science, philosophers philosophise, 
explanations explain. In each case the "necessity" depends 
upon the noun (philosophers) being equivalent to acting-thing 
(what philosophises).
(And let us not be blind to the fact that many scientists 
and philosophers, albeit in different terms, maintain this as 
the basis of scientific laws and definitions, and of arguments 
from particular synthetic statements to other particular 
synthetic statements).
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What Descartes wants to argue is that "thinking occurs 
therefore thinking substances" and "extension occurs therefore 
extended substances" are the two primary truths consequent 
upon "every attribute is of a substance", and hence that the 
only names we need are "mind" and "body". But if this is so, 
then any soul can be in any body, in the sense that a soul 
must be somewhere, and being somewhere is being in a body- 
world and, (if souls are unextended), being within the 
contours of a particle.
Thus he would seem bound to argue (a) that all familiar 
statements can be reduced to statements about minds or 
statements about bodies, although the only statement that 
can be made about . minds is that they are thinking substances 
("mind" is a name for "thinking substances" - "minds think" 
is a verbose repetition, equivalent to "thinking substances 
think") and are somewhere, and of bodies that they are 
extended substances ("body" is the name of "extended substances") 
which are in movement (a further piece of information) and 
spatially related to other bodies.
Hence the tremendous importance of the proof of the 
intimate union of mind and body in the case of man, i.e. the 
proof that man is a thing, not merely a soul located in an 
extended contour. Being "embodied" is the condition of 
there being a science of this world - although Descartes 
also seems to believe that a disembodied soul could do all 
science, could give an account of all possible worlds, very
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adequately and efficiently without the interference of the 
body which enables it to detect the actual as values of the 
possible.
The mode of argument now is; (a) men do feel when they 
see their bodies torn, (b) this would be impossible if mindsI
were merely spectator-percipienta, (c) bodies cannot (a priori) 
feel pain, (d) therefore minds feel pain, (e) therefore minds 
are not merely percipients but are pain-feeling substances 
pain-feelingly united to perceptible bodies.
V/hat determines the "reality" of the cause, of the "union", 
is the experienced fact of sight of torn body and pain. This 
is not a substance-attribute argument, however, and Descartes 
has, in terms of substance-attribute, two "solutions". The 
first makes "seeing" a mode of thought, and rests with 
"thinking substance" contrasted with "extended substance"; 
in this connection there is little discussion of pain or of 
sensing, both of which are embarrassing. (I shall cite 
below Descartes’ own admission that he does not mention this 
when he is proving that souls and bodies are distinct 
substances because it is embarrassing - harmful (nuisible) 
to the argument). The second makes pain-sensations, all 
sensations and sensing, and both appetites and emotions, 
attributes of man and not of the thinking substance, i.e. 
not modes of thought.
Thus there are three subjects, minds, bodies, and men, 
and three classes of statements. What I shall argue is
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that while "miode think" ia an impossible statement taken 
literally, and "bodies are extended" ia an Impossible 
statement taken literally, "there are minds" - as "there 
are thinking substances" - ia readily made equivalent to 
"men do think", and "there are bodies" - as "there are 
extended substances" - is readily made equivalent to "chairs 
and mountains and birds are extended".
Thus "Y is a predicate entails there is a subject X" 
enables us, noting Y, to find what value of X is concerned 
provided we know whet sort of thing to look for or how to 
look for it I and until we have found what value of X is 
concerned we have only a question. The factually 
encountered intimâte-union, man, who is thinking thing and 
extended thing, is the basis of any further argument that 
there are things of which man ia the union.
2. On p. 36 I maintained that a central argument in the 
Method was of the form* q, r and s are true} p explains 
q, r and s} therefore p. In the case of physics (qua , 
explanatory of freezing and tides and magnetism) what we . 
find are necessarily true statement about particles (perhaps 
true of all possible worlds) and a further statenmnt that 
the gross phenomena are explained by the particle statements 
(together with modifying statements about shape and particular 
motions and complexity). It is scarcely enough to say that 
they explain because they were designed to explain - and I
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suggested that this was indicated by the peculiar consequences 
when conceptual or "as If" statements cease to be such and 
become fact-statementa. It is all very well to say "fruit 
Juice "bites" the tongue" is explained by "fruit Juice 
consists of little sharp splintery particles which penetrate 
the membranes of the tongue"; it may be useful to treat 
Juices this way if we are only concerned with tongue-biting. 
But when we say that "fruit Juice consists of etc." is a 
fact statement, we have to consider other facts about fruit 
Juices. The "physical" hypothesis may indeed make nonsense 
of botany and chemistry if it is a fact statement. "The 
soul is a thinking substance" Is perhaps a useful thesis 
for someone concerned only with studying what is thought 
as thinking; it may make nonsense of biology and other 
sciences if it is a fact-statement. Consequent problems
are, I contend, philosophical problems of the methods and 
relations of sciences.
In a genuine sense of "explain", that extends beyond "it 
is convenient for this science to treat things as if", the 
explanatory propositions must be true, and must be occurrences, 
and this can be established only, if they are not observable, 
by a necessary connection between facts (q,r and s) and the 
(independently) necessary explanation (p).
Descartes cannot rest as a philosopher with "p explains 
q, r and s, so that p is a possible explanation, and there 
are or may be many such possible explanations". Whether
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non-philosophers can do so is a question 6 conceptuallsta 
certainly claim that all explanations are merely explanatory, 
but unless there are some criteria there is no limit to the 
number of sciences or explanations of any event. What 
Descartes wants to show is that p is the explanation, and 
this means establishing p as true as well as necessarily 
true, 1.0^.as more than "a relation of ideas"; while Its 
truth can only be established from the truth of q, r and a. 
For Descartes, p must be a possible fact to be a possible 
explanation; but it must also be an actual fact to be 
an actual explanation.
Indeed, the metaphysical problem seems to be, for him, 
to establish tlie "reality" as well as the necessary truth 
of first principles - such is the express aim of the method 
of Doubt, and the rejection of rational science as actually 
self-justifying. The quest for certainty is not a search 
for "necessary truth", since he has a multitude of necessary 
truths as analytic statements, but for a necessary fact. 
a necessary truth with an existential entailment. What 
he wants, like and unlike Spinoza, is a system of mutually 
entailing "truths", and the test of a system is both 
coherence (which any abstract system can have) and fact- 
truth; p and q and r and s belong together; q, r and s 
are fact-truths and entailment establishes p as fact.
(The Principles are indeed a conglomerate of distinct 
truths, a confusion of metaphysical, scientific and fact-
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statements, and It is easy to get the impression that the 
only teat for inclusion of another principle is compatibility 
Cl non-contradiction. But Descartes insista that they are 
all related, should be read "as a whole" and re-read, until 
they are all assimilated and related; his major contention 
seems to be that metaphysical, scientific and "experimental" 
truths are all true in the same sense, and one of the teats 
of the Principles would be their relation to each other 
tiiirough the unquestioned fact-system which is the world - 
they "explain" the complexity of What Is and they develop 
into the totality of What Is).
For a specific stai^ement that the argument from q, r, s 
to the reality of p is fundamental to the system, consider 
Part VI of the Discourse, where Descartes explains his use 
of "hypotheses" in the Dipptrlcs and the Meteors (the 
important essays to which the Discourse is, for Descartes, 
a casual introduction).
"....for it seems to me that the reasonings are so 
mutually connected in these treatises, that, as the last 
are demonstratod by the first which are their causes, 
the first are In their turn demonstrated by the last 
which are their effects. Nor must it be Imagined that I 
here commit the fallacy which the logicians call a circle: 
for since experience renders the majority of these effects 
most certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not 
serve so much to establish their reality as to explain 
their existence; but on the contrary, the reality of the 
causes ia established by the reality of the effects."
Descartes adds that he calls "the matters" in question 
hypotheses because he thinks he can deduce them from his 
first principles as already "discovered" - the deduction
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he will not demonstrate because others may build an extravagant 
philosophy on his principles and he may be blamed for it.
Others think they can master in a day "all that another has 
taken twenty years to think out, as soon as he has spoken 
two or three words to them on the subject". Maybe we do 
not know the "secret deduction", but whatever it is, what 
breaks the circle is "q, r and s are experienced facts", 
and the modality (p is possible) is clearly all that can 
be established if tho argument is only "if p, then q,r,s" 
and "q,r,s".
3. V/hat is th' case when a principle explains all possible 
worlds of which the actual is one is a question that need 
not concern us directly. But it is important to note that
the Regulae liad not been published when the Discourse saw 
the light of day, and the analytic doctrine of the Remlae 
ia quite different. Any thought, fact-claim or otherwise, 
can be analysed, it is claimed, into component simple notions 
with necessary relations. Once the analysis has been 
carried out, inspection is sufficient to show whether the 
thought is true or false (in fact v^iether it is a real or 
possible thought, or not really a thought). A thought q 
can be analysed Into a,b,o,d and e.... whi(±L are necessarily 
true, but since q is a necessary synthesis of a,b,c,d and e 
then we can argue "a,b,c,d,e together are necessarily true,
30 p ia necessarily true because p is equivalent to abode".
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No examples of this are given, and I suspect none can be 
given except by a special interpretation of mathematical 
systems; but if we begin with the unanalysable elements 
and their necessary relations it seems evident tliat we can 
explain or even describe by constitution all possible worlds, 
and yet for any such aystem-developmont to be science we must 
be able to discover by other means taat propositions like p 
are both true and true of this world. Hence we revert in 
part to the earlier problem, that p ia fact depends upon 
sensory observation, upon direct experience.
Our difficultiea are not resolved when we have to try and 
relate the doctrine of perception with its account of the 
occasioning of ideas in ua by "unknown" things, and the 
repeated claim that it is "our habitual use of the senses 
which has rendered the notions of extension, of shapes and 
movements, more familiar to us tlian our other notions".
The specific quotation is from a letter to Elizabeth; but 
in the VIth part of the Discourse we find;
"I reioarked, moreover, with respect to experiments, 
that they become always more necessary the more one is 
advanced in knowledge; for, at the commencement, it is 
better to make use only of what is spontaneously presented 
to our senses, and of which we cannot remain ignoranti 
provided we bestow on it, any reflection, however sli^t..."
This suggests that what we are to ailalys© is what we 
are confronted with, the complex ideas occasioned in us in 
such a way that they represent veridically a complex world,
i.e. "having ideas" is having something of the world "in;'mind".
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If this is so, then Deacartea* conviction waa that meta­
physical, scientific and fact-truths were true in one sense 
of one world, and it parallels my conviction that Descartes 
the metaphysician, Descartes the scientist, Descartes who 
wandered pensively in fields and grew monstrously angry with 
Voet, Deacartea who was born and died, was the one 
individual man# But was it his conviction?
Chapter 111.
The Complexity of Descartes.
lour uses of "suhetance" have been indicated - as "thing" 
in ordinary use, as "substrate", as "stuff of some things" 
and as "stuff of all things". These are related to use of 
the term by scientists to indicate things which are to be 
treated as uniform qua stuff for their particular science.
The substrate view points to the question of knowledge 
of substances and attributes, both in the case of "what 
knows" and "what is known". This is our first main cone m .  
It is inseparable from the notion of "principles".
2. Descartes is tree ted too simply. It is overlooked that 
he was concerned with a science of man. Without a concern 
for, and acceptance of, man, dualism appears as conceptual 
and as not presenting either problems of contradictions.
If we consider Descartes^ arguments seriously we are confr­
onted with the problem of the role of principles.
a. Can they be argued to? If so, they are dependent 
upon their premises, and ultimately on fact statements.
b. Are they true in the sense that fact statmients are 
true? Descartes is inconsistent.
c. jprlneiples function as explanatory in science - W t  
what is the force of "explain"? Conceptual statements fuad 
factual stateaents, and statements of the relations between 
these, form three classes of statements.
(p.73) The role of observers and observ^ition statements; it 
1É man v/ho fulfils the requirements of an observer. 
Descartes’ confused uses of "I" and "We" suggest that it is 
Home Co^1tat after all.
(p.76). (l)' The Cogito considered in relation to "We are 
men". It begins thus and is actually continued thus. The 
reduction is of species of act to generic act, and this 
permits the expansion in reverse. Descartes’ hae to concl­
ude with "man" as the subject of "thinks".
The mind-argument is like and unlike the body-arriment
(II) "Han does science" as a first principle. Its 
relation to conceptual and factual science. The results of 
writing "soul" for "man" by Descartes discussed.
(III) a."Explanatory models" of one science must be 
related to other sciences and to facts unless we are prep­
ared to say "model only". "E^oplanatory particles" do not 
lead on to a world of bodies or of minds; and the question 
is how there can possibly be a familiar world and observers 
of it on the thesis.
Descartes has at least a two-fold thesis with 
regard to the familiar world.
b. His use of "I" and "we" in argument to and in meta» 
physics must he related to the expansion of the Cogito* 
the "modes" are not deduced, and the expansion is through 
uses df "I", not uses of "thinking thing*. "I" is assumed 
to he the persisting suhject of a whole set of acts, and 
acts ordinarily and Justifiably treated as different 
(sensing, imagining, dreaming) are treated as identical.
Yet even here Descartes shows no consistency, and his 
two main lines of argument conclude with "men" - bodily 
agents who love and observe. Again, it is man Who makes 
dualism a problem. Ve turn to this in detailL
m
"Pour Deaoartea, au oontralre, la substance est avant 
tout ou plutôt uniquement le concret.
A vrai dire les textes, sur ce point, semblent d ’abord 
peu concordants."
Laporte. Le Rationalisme de Descartes, p.179
Sometimes the texts reproduce the scholastic notion of 
substance as the subiect of inherence % sometimes they 
present the very definition tiiai will serve as a foundatim 
for Spinoeismt "When we conceive substance, we conceive 
only a thing which exists in such a way that it has need 
only of itself in order to exist" - a definition which 
strictly applies only to God, without whom nothing could 
exist, but in a relative sense no created thing has need 
of any other created thing in order to exist.
Elsewhere substance is given as the productive principle 
of modes as well as their support - "the internal principle 
from which modes arise and in which they reside" {Wotae in 
Programna). Several texts have the air of identifying 
substance with the assemblage of attributes - "the attributes 
taken in their totality are simply one with the substance" - 
or with the principal attribute - " we can consider thought 
and extension as the principal things which constitute the 
nature of intelligent and corporeal substance, and then we 
should not conceive them as other than the very substances 
which think and are extended" - while other texts reject 
any confusion of an attribute, whatever it may be, with 
substance - "beside the attribute vhich specifies the 
substance, we must yet conceive the substance itself wliibh 
is its support".
A suranary of Laporte, Op.Cit. pp.179-181.
"Next, he quite correctly says, that we cannot conceive 
any activity apart from its subject, e.g. thought apart from 
that which thinks, since that which thinks is not nothihg.
But wholly without any reason, and in opposition to the 
ordinary use of language and good Logic, he adds "hence it 
seems to follow that that which thinks is something corpor­
eal"; for the subjects of all activities are indeed under­
stood as falling within the sphere of substance (or even, 
if you like as wearing the guise of matter. vi%. metaphysical 
matter), but not on that account are they to be defined as 
bodies.
On the other hand both logicians and as a rule all men 
are wont to say that substances are of two kinds, spiritual 
and corporeal".
Descartes. RopIv to Hobbes. (H and R.II.p.63).
Chapter III»
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The Complexity of Deaoartea♦
I have suggested, very sketchily, that "substance’’ Is used 
(a) as equivalent to "thing" in ordinary usage; (b) as a 
sub-stratum - roughly equivalent to "thing” contrasted with 
attributes in the case of a statement that a common noun 
(snowball) can be said to name a thing which is round and 
white and cold, the function of "thing" being to support 
or to hold together the attributes "round, white, cold";
(c) as a particular stuff of which a number of particular 
things can be shown to be made; and (d) as a stuff of 
which all things are made# Some elaboration will be 
necessary later, but these senses are fairly clear and 
fairly primary; Descartes uses the term "substance" in 
each of the senses above#
In the case of (a), "thing" is a class term or variable,
whose members or values are an indefinite number of
different things, lions and lambs, teapots and tables; 
and as "what things are made of" substance is likewise""
* * •' * r:
a class term or variable, whose members or values are 
glue and sand, toffee or air, any of which may be 
constituted of substances, any of which admits of empirical 
analysis* In either case, a disjunctive ezplanatIm of 
"thing" or "substance"'can be given. I.e. they can be 
explained by Indicating or referring to this and that and 
the other. , w>-
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I v«nt to atreaa this, since I claim that there la a 
ready tendency on the part of scientists to delimit their 
field of Investigation, especially when formalising their 
science, as an Introduction to students or as a means of 
readily distinguishing one field from another science’s 
field, by reference to a "substance". The traditional 
physicists’ "study of the physical properties of matter",- 
the biologists’ extension from the study of the features 
and the behaviour of organisms to the study of "living 
tissue" or "protoplasm", parallel one another here. In 
each case the second Introductory stage Is disjunctive 
Indication. The "simple substance" suggested by the 
Introductory and definitive sentences Is a class term; the 
simplicity la quite compatible with the Indicated members 
being complex and subject to analysis by other sciences or 
by a development of the same science.
If this la the case, then we may expect It to be true 
of any science that It will define Its field or be able to 
define Its field by an assertion "there are such and such 
things which can be studied, and so far as this science Is 
concerned those things are simples - we are not Interested 
In their analysis, but In their description and In their 
behaviour".^ If physics, as Descartes maintained, is
The extension of this statement to grammar, logic, 
arithmetic, psychology and other sciences Is to be 
considered below. The key word la "things"; the key 
problem "what Is the connection between classes of things, 
kinds of thing. In the different sciences?"
60.
concerned v/îth extended things which move, then it is 
concerned with any things which are extended and move, is 
not concerned with any thing which is not extended (whether 
it moves or not), and it is totally irrelevant to physics 
what another science may have to say about the constitution 
of things which are extended and move. The physicist can 
guarantee that no other science will be able to explain the 
constitution of his simples by declaring them to be 
"conceptual"; he then knows all there is to know about 
them. But if the concepts have to be re-established as 
"things”, we revert to empirical science and empirical 
problems.
What gives the meaning to the talk of concepts and simples 
is at least initially the possibility of disjunctive 
indication of distinguishable and recognisable things; and 
when we claim that certain classes of things can be analysed 
and discovered to be constituted of the same substance or 
substances, we are asserting the truth of a general 
proposition that any such thing will be made of something, 
and this is very close to what is asserted in (c), namely 
the use of "substance" as a particular stuff of which certain 
things are in fact made.
Both (b) and (d) are different from (a) and (c), and 
produce (historically) what seem entirely different questions. 
If instead of "a rose" we write "a thing whlcli*éuch and so", 
where "such and so" is a string of attribute-terms, and are
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aakod what ’thing" means, we can proffer a deaoription "such 
and so". If this la rejected as an explanaticn ("rose" ia 
explained by "thing auch and so", and what ia requested is 
a sentence which in the aame way explains "thing") we can 
give no explanation; and our statement that we have never 
met things not featured, never met things which were.not 
roaes or radiahaa (which reverts to (a)) leaves ua with 
"thing" as a class term, not as an individual noun#, Those 
who maintain "thing" to be auch a noun must, and do, declare 
that "thing" ia (and ao "things" as instances of "thing" are) 
unknowable, cannot be sensed or encountered in any way#
The attributes ("auch and ao") are held to be sensed and 
encountered; they provide the basis for diacourae in which 
"things" ia a class term or variable# But the move from 
collection of attriWtes to thing-wlth-attributes (a rose) 
depends upon the introduction of "thing" as a substance which 
supports attributes; or, by an analytic demonstration, the 
idea of "a rose", which ia Indubitably, an idea we have, is 
made up of the ideas of "such and so" and the idea of a . 
"thing" which such and so, and wltiiout the idea of "thing" 
there could not be the idea of "a rose"# It is logically 
impossible for attributes, on this argument, to be without 
such a substance, and it is "physically" impossible for us 
to be arware of such a substance#
"Thing" is, we may say on this view, "Inferred" from the 
attributes encountered# If this is so, then all Instances
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of "thing" are identical; it ia meaningless to say that a 
"thing" is different frcnn another "thing". "Thing" is 
substantially identical in, is the substantial Identity of, 
all our variously named different and similar things. And 
this is like (d), where it Is argued tliat there must be a 
substance Wliioh is identical in all things, but which cannot 
itself be encountered or "known", although in a sense we are 
encountering it all the time. What we encounter is a "form" 
or "mode" of it. Whenever we encounter a thing as in (a) 
we encounter a form of the substance identical in all things 
which can be disjunctively indicated; but the substance, 
while necessarily inferrable, ia not to be encountered as 
distinct from the form. This is difficult to distinguish 
from "whenever we encounter a tiling as in (a) we note or 
are aware of the features or attributes, and there ia a 
necessarily inferrable aubstance-"tliing" which is not and 
cannot be encountered independently of the features or 
attributes. We may add, however, that "inferrable" irdicates 
in no sense the arrival at a mental "entity"; the substance 
or thing is where the mode or form or attributes are. If 
they are at place p at time t, ^lle the encounterer is near 
p at time t, the substance-thing is at place p at time t.
For the first section below, the important sense of 
"substance" is that of "thing", with the consequent argument 
that if there ia at any time or place an attribute - and
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this includes a quality, an act, a state, in fact any term 
predicable of a thing - there must be a substance present.
I remark, to give point to what has been asserted above, 
that in Locke the argument reaches a different conclusion 
to the one indicated. Locke concludes with the substance- 
thing in place p at time t, and with the attributes in the 
encounterer who is near p at time t. Certainly he y/ants 
to leave some of the attributes attaching to the thing at p, 
the primary qualities, but he is in fact unable to do so.
PUrther, he seems to have to maintain that the attributes 
are somehow in the encounterer wherever he is at any time.
His non-mental substance is an unknowable somewhat always 
somewhere, somewhen, and apart from this existence claim 
all that can be said of it is that it has the power to 
affect a mind in a certain way. "Mind", however, seems 
to be a substance in much better case, since it can be 
known by itself. In Locke, it might be held, this is 
doubtful; "we" know the minds operations, and the operations 
are the attributes from which "we" infer the mind which 
supports them. In fact, it is "we" who have difficulty in 
grasping the ungraspable but necessary "substances", and in 
grasping why the metaphysical foundation whould have been 
regarded as the foundation of "Hknpirlcism" in revolt against 
rationalist metaphysics. What will concern "us" below and 
at length is the status of the "we" in relation to the 
unknown substances, one capable of having ideas, the o%her
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capable of arouaing Ideas In the other, exclusive substances 
both of which "wo" know all about, and whose attributes "we" 
aeea to possess In that we seem capable both of being aware 
and of causing each other to bo aware *
In keeping with what was said above about sciences and 
their simple substances, it might be noted that a science of 
thought could readily assume that there were thinking things 
vrtiose "thinkings" (qua behaviours) could be studied, things 
which 'vere simple In so far as the science In question was 
concerned. As long as the things existed and thou^rht, 
and the "thoughts" were available for consideration. It 
would not In fact be important If the thinking things were 
mice or men, atoms or globules, flames or spirits* A 
physics concerned with extension, and movement would be 
Interested In mice and men qua extended and moving, and 
uninterested In what other features they had,\whether they 
thought or felt or were organisms or were solid right 
through*. It Is when the science of "thought"^ and the 
science of extension and movement shake hands over the 
deasloated corpse of the familiar world, and agree that 
there are as things In the world only their simples, 
thinking things which have no other features, extended things 
which have no other features, that metaphysics has to be 
called In*
1* And a central problem, the relation between "thinking" 
and thought. Is here Indicated*
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2. Deaoartea, aa the xvorld known, gpve a simple account of 
mind and of body. Hla atateraenta are clear, his facta 
obvious, his c.rg'uments precisely propounded. In fact ho 
set the standard of clarity and simplicity and of modern 
science In the iidddlo of the camp of scholastic verbiage, 
logic chopping and philosophical quibbling. The problem 
he leaves ua with Is that of discovering the relation 
betY/een mind and body, which he proved to be distinct 
substances. Mind is a substance which thlhko and la not 
extended, body Is a substance which la extended and which 
does not, could not, think. This is obviously so, 
necessarily ao, and in fact ao.
If we begin by showing the world to bo vc?ong on the 
side of simplicity in ao appreciating Descartes, we may 
ulao recognise that the previous paragraph is not an 
adequate account of Descartes, falls cœupletely to indicate 
either the prob3.ema which Descartes recognised or Ills 
Intricate manner of disregarding them and hla metaphysics 
when he turned to science and to Inquiry, and falls to 
Indicate that If such an account did cover the Cartesian 
achievement there would be no Cartesian problem of dualism. 
It is the last point which leads on directly to what Is 
seldom apparent In volumes about Deaoartea, that he was 
concerned with a science of man, and that his metaphysics 
Is designed to provide necessary truths which (except for 
the existence of God) are Important only as the foundation
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havo, what uoacartee noant or thoufÿit that te meant by 
"deduction from principles", and what the procoas of 
arriving at lorinoiplea amounts to in a variety of contexts.
\Vhlle the perspective concerns ua, wo are not so much 
concerned with 'ihat Descartes says of imlnclples - he says 
in fact little, and we have to search until we find, say, 
a letter to Cleraeiler In 1G46 to find a definite and not 
very informative statement^ - but with what Descartes 
does with principles,
(a) Can principles be argued to? Descartes seems clearly 
at times to believe that they can; but If so, we establish 
principles by argument from other truths, which seem to 
be factual as distinct from rational truths. And If this
1. In tho letter Descartes distinguishes looking for common 
notions so clear and general that they can serve as principles 
in proving the existence of "all the things (entities,Sbres) 
which can be subsequently known", and looking for a thing 
(un Bbre) wl-ose existence can 'x so much better known u£
It can serve aa a principle for knowing other things,
V/hut is involved la (a) no existential proposition can be 
proven without an existential premise, and (b) nothing could 
be more manifest to us than "that our souls exist". But 
if all other exlstenWal propositions are "reducible to" or 
"provable by" the first principle, then other propositions 
are somehow contingent, and the others Include both "God 
exists" and "crcatwely existents exist", DcscarïTes Is 
content to demand that a principle should "come first". I.e. 
not depend upon another truth, and "serve in the finding 
of other principles"; but he adds "there may be In the 
world no single principle to which all things can be reduced".
All metaphysical roads In Descartes lead to the Cogito, 
and the central argument seems to be; I can be aware of 
nothing unless I exist, and unless I exist I can be aware 
of nothing; I can be aware of nothing existing unless I 
exist, and unless I exist I can be aware of nothing existing. 
But If the principle "our souls exist" is known to us, we get;
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ia 30, then faot-trutha and Implications or logical principles 
enable ua to deduce principles, but from the principles 
nothing can be deduced An the same sense of deduce. The 
Physics and what we might call the Psychology would then 
parallel one another In this, that In either If q Implies 
p, p Implies only that q may be true, unless p and q are 
equivalent. If q Is factual, a principle p "depends" on 
q; and If p Is non-factual. It la not easy to see how It 
can be meaningful Independently of qj while If p Is 
conceptual, and Its terms cannot be terms In a fact statement, 
our difficulty Is to show how p Is related to q, and how In 
any sense we can Infer q from p. And suddenly we realise 
that the Physics and the Psychology are utterly distinct.
The Cogito appears to be argued to from facta, to be 
ai’rlved at by consideration of facts ; the particle physics 
Is conoeptual, and possible facts are held to follow frcsn 
It - though exactly how they do neither Descartes nor his
we could not be aware that our souls existed unless we 
existed, and unless we existed we could not be aware that 
our souls existed. "We" and "our souls" fall apart here, 
and this provided a central riddle. It Is as difficult 
to find an answer to "Who.do metaphysics, we or minds?"
In the case of Descartes or Cartesians as It Is to find 
an answer to "Who do metaphysics, phenomenal or noumenal 
selves?" In the case of Kant and KantIans. The traditional 
procedure la, I claim, to talk as If men do In order to 
prove that men do not. The tradItlonai double-shuffle Is 
the conversion of ’lîgo" Into "the Ego" or "my Ego".
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enthusiasts ever enliglaten us. And somehow the particle 
physics Is held to follow frcsn the metaphysical certainty 
of "I exist aa a thinking thing", since even If we Insist 
on "follow after In order of philosophising" there must he 
some reason or basis for the order.
Yet the Psychology and the Physios are alike In that 
there are "real" terms In the principles - the thinking 
substance thinks as we do, the particles are extended and 
limited and related In the way that physical objects are 
extended and limited and related. Doth, indeed, look 
like fact statements, which are true along with other fact 
statements, but In order for there to be science, fact systems 
must be asserted or re-asserted Independently of the fact- 
seeming principles, and the fact-systems have. In general, 
been asserted by both those who had failed to recognise the 
principles and those who denied them. Everybody before 
Descartes had got the metaphysics and the physios wrong, 
perhaps, but they were wrong about the trunk and the roots, - 
the leaves and twigs of the tree of knowledge are common to 
all. Principles, not facts, seem to be disputable.
It Is sheerly Impossible, I suggest, to find a sense in 
which all the Principles are unlvocally principles; It Is 
sheerly Impossible to find any way In which the unextended 
mind "established" by argument In the Meditations - and then 
only In Meditation VI - oould be familiar with the faot- 
truths employed In arguing to Its existence or froiàtits
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unoxteridecin^ea to a system of world-facts^ at all.
(b) It If not impossiblG^ at least as difficult to 
discover couaisLoncy Izi Descartea’ arguments and general 
logic as it is to find any diacussion of his logic in the 
\/ritinga of those who stress his groat oontrlbutidha to 
that science# If we take seriously the doctrine stated 
In Rogula XII and re-aaaerted clearly, as ws shall see 
below, in the letters to iSlizabeth, if wc take seriously 
the criterion of clarity and distinctness as the criterion 
of truth, Descartes soorris to be professing a doctrine of 
material Impllototion# p is true ; q is true; " p#q" la true# 
All can be? seen to be true, and can simply and only be seen 
to be time# Certainly this would explain to rdiy the 
imny Principles are seemingly regarded as on the same 
logical level, but it serves not in tho least to explain 
Descartes’ admitted dlfflcultiea at the end of the 
Principles. which he was 'unable to complete or even to 
continue aa ho had intended to continue it, that what is 
to be explained "(the facta of general experience) alone 
can establish the reality of the explanatory, meaningful 
and necossàrlly true pi^opoaitloas which are the ordered 
prlnclplos; nor does it explain the mixed variety of 
arguments of a non-material implicatory kind which he "
employa at various points even In the Principles# Sometimes 
"clarity and dietinctnoss" aeems to function ao widely that
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the criterion appllea to all statements and all arguments; 
soraotlmea the application seems limited to "ideas", to 
purely conceptual aystoms. In tho latter case, the "logic" 
aeems to be plouaiblc for geometry or for an elementary 
particle system; but the main point of the Cogito la to 
s h w  that the thinking substance cannot be an Idea, cannot 
be a concept - It exist a, and is Itnown necessarily to exist 
by Itself If not by you and I (or by you and I, if not by 
itself). Doing metaphysics ia utterly different from doing 
geometry or physics, just because gooaotrlcal figures and 
purely estendod particles do not necessarlly exist, and at 
least m y  not exist at all In the sense that souls exist.
The soul cannot tie just Its o'mn concept. And yet we are 
told on many occasions by Deacai'tes that the mlnd-aoul-thing 
T/lalch exists can only bo conceived.
(c) If we take Qosoartcs seriously as a pMlosopher we find 
ourselves neck-deep In problems lAilch scarcely figure in the 
Cart03Ian lltoraturo at all; and in taking Descartes 
seriously 'sre find ouraolvos recurring again and again to the 
same points and the same problems, aware tliat ere 
confronted with problems of vital Importance for post- 
Cartcslan philosophy aiyl col once and tlmt we are unassisted 
by commentators who work elaborately upon special questions 
within a framework but ignore even the problems of Inter­
relation of questions which Descartes himself sometimes
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recognised In setting out the framework# I have stressed 
the jxizzle of "prlnclplea" in part because it confronts 
all philosophers who insist that there are propositions 
which are purely explanatory, which have a different logical 
status from that of propositions which are held, to he 
explained or to need explanation; but when we have done 
something to find out what la involved generally in this, 
we find that we have hold of one thread only in a tangled 
akeln#
% a t  in general ia assumed by scientists is that if q 
la a fact-statement or set of related fact-statements 
verifiable by accepted techniques, and p, which is not ao 
verifiable, is said to explain q, we cannot accept both 
"p explains q" and "q explains p" - "p explains q" and 
"q explains p" cannot both be accepted if the sense of 
"explains" is the same, because we can get to p cxily 
throui^ q# So, it is claimed, p Is conceptual or 
hypothetical, reached by argument or deduction from q; 
in "q therefore p" the "therefore" indicatef) logical 
necessity, and there may be even alternative p-theories 
1^.1 ch are equally justifiable from a^particular q-system#
But "p therefore q" is in different case# If p is 
meaningful independently of q, and true independently of 
q, it la not a logical but a factual connection between 
p and q that must be determined, and the established fact 
of a connection between p and q brings p into a fact system, 
which seems to scientists to demand an explanatory hypothesis
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The contrast betiveen ccncepttial and factual provides a 
dualisn of aa uneasy kind, since concopt-atatemente and 
fact stateaents have to be related, either directly or by 
the Aid of statements which ere neither of the one kind 
nor the other ; and the difficulty of accounting for the 
third kind of statement producer on the cme hand e scepticism 
of the senses which brings factn Into the realm of the 
conceptual, or e scepticism of reason which finally, because 
facts ceem to be "reasonable", makes even conwonplcce feet 
statements matters of high dubiety. Desoartoa seems to be 
attempting to hold all three, positions at once.
(d) In most of his scientific woi'k Dosct.rtcs follows tl^ ose 
scientists who assume that they can both observe, end * 
conceive explanatory système - and the problem here is purely 
that of relating conceptual and'observational propositions 
whJLch are stated In a language end intelligible •sdtbin the 
specific science in question. Hot even relativity - , 
physicists sugfjest that psychologist g should be oons’jilted 
to solve the problems of physics in obger'/ing, conceiving 
or relating. I mention relativity physics, because therein 
the obaerver ia atreaaed, and apart from conveniences or 
inconvenienoca of measûrement and calculation, such physics 
does not demand an observer %dio ia fact unextended.
It ia uatiafied with men who can sense (though It would 
be difficult for any physicists to ignore special theories 
of .sensing like those which Descartes offers initially aa
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"lij'pothetlcQl" tn the Kepulae) and conceive, i.e. men who 
can clo science. Succeaofuliy or -anouccefiefully, the 
relativity thesis appcarc to suggest that a recognition of 
tho physicist as a man serves to bring together thoory and 
fact.
Men observe and conceive, and the relation between 
observations and conceptions is matter for logicians and 
scientists, p-syatemc are intelligible and justifiable in 
terms of q-systcma. But as soon as the p-syatema are 
applied to the whole observational aituatlŒi, i.e. to 
observe q" instead of to "q la observed", the conclusion 
oGoas to follow that q oould not be obsoi'ved at all.
«■hat follows from this in not simply that, ao Descartes 
olaime in Principles II.III, the perceptions of tbi» senses 
do not teach us what ie the reality of things (what "is in 
reality in things") but what is beneficial or harmful to 
tho composite whole of body and mind, since the human body 
can be discovered a M  investigated only by use of the senses, 
but (a) that our commonplace fact assertions are equivalent 
to extremely dubious theories, based up«n (b) "facts" which 
are indubitable but extremely difficult to indicate, (c) 
that our talk of senses is as difficult to give a meaning 
as our accounts of sense-organs are to justify, as well aa 
(crucially) (d), that our p-aystera seems to iiave lost, along 
with the q-system, all Its meaning.
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We aeora to have no room In either fact or science for 
man, for statements of which man Is the subject, or for the 
evidencing statements upon which we relied so heavily before 
in doing science, that .r was observed to be y by a man.
With the "removal" of man our old facts, our old science, 
our old modes of argument, and the '«hole of the old familiar 
world of charactered things which could be reco^lsed, 
distinguished end olaaalfied, disappear completely. Instead 
of propositions with subjects and predicates which function 
as premises in argument, peacartes seems to claim that we 
have occurrent predicates; instead of clear and distinct 
relations between concepts we have clear and distinct 
relations between occurrences and apparently empty concepts; 
and the two are combined in the guise of a "necessary and 
clear and distinct truth" that from every occurrence of a 
"quality ©r affection" a subject which has the qiTsllty or 
affection can be inferred.
(e) Throughout his writings Descartes employs the pronoun 
"I" and the pronoun "we" as I have employed them above.
To one who, like myself, claims that "men think", "men 
observe", "men reflect", "men ppeak", "men are social 
animals", the usage is clear, and belongr. with the fact 
systems which are stated In a non-technical language.
If, as Descartes did, I wish to object to a criticism 
a man like Gassendi makes to an argument of mine, I can 
state quite intelligibly that I deny his assertion, can
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state that we disagree. But can I assert, as Descartes 
does; "You are quite avong in your statement and argument, 
because I deny that 1 am a body", meaning by "body" being 
bodily, and profess to be using "I" in the same sense in 
stating denial and stating what is derded? 'Vhen I say 
that I corrected a popular notion when I showed that-it 
oould be supposed that no body existed, and that nevertheless 
everything by means of Which 1 recognise myself as a thinking 
being remains, is this in fact even meaningful?^
We seem far from the heights of meta^Aiysics and principles} 
but we are very close to the Cogito, very close to the first 
principle, of human Itaowledge, very close to noting the 
technique by which Descartes and Cartesians seem to treat 
"men observe and thiink" as obviously true, obviously trivial, 
and yet to be proven false, proven impossible or proven 
inexplicable with all the aid of logic and of science.
The first proposition which must all costs be denied is 
homo cogitatt yet the first proposition that Is to be - 
assorted as a prelude to its denial and as part of the 
argument to its denial Is exactly hwio cogitat.
Homo cogltat.
1, So far I have done little but indicate problQas; what
V
I want to do now ia briefly to felate what has been said to
1, Of, Reply to Objections to Meditation.S» H,& R.II pp,207-
208,
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the Cogito as It appeara In the Meditations. Op<Ki the 
distinction between mens cogitat and homo cogitat depends , 
our interpretation of all the general questions raised 
above.
. . . . .
The argument begins with "I can doubt that I sense q, 
since previous beliefs that q were false and previous beliefs 
that the subject of q existed were false", (That this is 
clearly and distinctly confused as pescartoa treats It we 
can note later). The fact basis is actually "My senses 
sometimes deceive me"; and "sometimes deceive me", as a 
fact statement, or "always deceive me" as any sort of 
statement, entails that I am.a man, an organism, an animal 
with organs, We can, with more sophistication than 
Deaoartea, argue tl*t.if there were things that were not 
bodily, did not have organs, but had "our" experiences and 
talked as we do, knowing that they were unbodily.and without 
organs, they would not be compelled to accept the entaila^nt* 
But what in fact this means to sophisticates heaven knows, 
and while Descartes wants to conclude with something like 
it, he certainly does not begin with it. He wants to prove 
that there is a fact about us who I'Scognise each other, 
talk and argue with each other, read, each other’s writings, 
which will compel, ua finally to admit that the "I" in each 
of our Individual cases is a thing which is somehow 
accidentally related to its sense organs, or to its "senses" 
which are themselves related to organs in a way which la 
obvious, if unintelligible.
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Doubtless there are many who believe it'to be obvious 
that what thinks is a mind, an unextended thing, and that 
unless we grasp this we can never understand how men think, 
sense eto,. It will take many pages to consider the opposed 
contention that it is easy to understat'd that men think, 
that men sense, and completely impossible to understand the 
explanatory accounts, with or without their discussions of 
"senses" and "organs" and "cognitive subjects", The opposed 
contention is quite distinct fron the claim that "men think 
etc." is good enough for the market-place, taut what really 
goes on is.., where the account of what really 
goes on, unfortunately incomplete and presenting insoluble 
problems, is not evidenced by "men think etc," but is the 
genuine equivalent of crude, ordinary language statements.
Quite clearly Descartes, and many others, treat the 
dubiety of sense-based statements as establishing that I, 
like ail men, am sometimes mistaken, and can never guarantee‘ 
the truth of any sense-based fact claim or sense-based 
existential claim. It ia only by a hammer and tonga logic 
that this can be converted into^ a claim that no sensory 
experience is veridical, that, for example, I am not able 
to see and touch and hear the typewriter which I am'now 
using; but it can readily enough be admitted that if there 
is a sense of "necessarily true" which is not satisfied 
by any such statement as "I am sensing such to be so", t h %  
no man in search of necessarily true statements in this
7,9.
aenao will find them in aenao-taaaed judgmenta, and oust 
look alflowi-vero,
The meaning of this la tortuously obscure,-but what ia 
important for the moment is t'mt having used the fallibility 
of "the senses" to reject a class of propositions as necess­
arily true, wo cannot at the same time use the rejecticaa 
of the existential claims on behalf of the "observed" things 
to justify the rejection of "I am an animal with org^s",
The argument itself is n^aningiess if it is denied that I am 
a thing capable of sensing at all, whether this is-hold to 
be’hecessarily ao" or merely so*
ve begin, seemingly, with facta stated in an ordinary 
language, move a conventional argument which all men will 
accept, to an indubitable truth, that when I thihk that I 
sense p i think, and the indubitable truth either depends 
upon the truth of the fact statements (which*entail# that 
they are meaningful) or there is no'argument at all. If 
there la no argument, then "I"am a thinking thing vfeich can 
always be certain that it thinks when'it”" thinks" (or "that 
it exists when it thinks that it exists") is eitl:^r a :^ot 
statement compatible with "I am a thing with organs and 
sense erroneously" w  it la a scientific hypothesis, clear 
and distinct because it is conceptual, i#e, something which 
is clear and distinct to me because it is tMnkabie by me.
So it appears in the Re«ulast but if it is thus a cmoeptual 
proposition, then (a) it gives no information about the
eo*.
conoelvar, beyond that he (or It), conceives the proposition, 
and (b) no inferences are possible unless further concepts 
are devised along with rules of use in a conceptual system - 
and "I am such a thing" is a statement which is meaningful 
only if the concept-statement belongs to the same level of 
discourse as the established uses of "I" by men who are 
socially related in the way the presented argument assumes 
they are, and it still requires proof, still requires 
relation to fact statements with "I" as subject ard predicates 
other than "think" in the special sense of the hypothesis*
If, as I argue, the "fallibility*? statement can only be 
made by an animal, here at least by a man with organs, and 
of a man with organs; if the alternative is that to a 
"thinking substance" which puts forward the argument 
"senses sometimes deceive" and "senses aliways deceive" 
are meanln^ess sound patterns; and if there is no 
"reduction" of the subject "I"„,in an argument which considers 
only what "I", can or cannot do, ao, that the "I" is finally 
equivalent to "a man" as it Was initially equivalent to 
"a man"; then homo 00f!:itat is,not only a justIflabie 
assertion, but it functions as Descartes wants the cogito 
to function, aa a truth which expands into a science* 
we have no difficulty in making a further.series of
r
statements about *?man" since we have already made them, ,
' ,<r i 'I-
rejected them aa not certain in a special sense of "certain", 
and need oily re-assert them aa merely true in order to
SX,
get an expanalon which, if ordered, la what Descartea
ia seeking as a science,
Vifhat we find Descartes denying at various places ia each
of the condition-assertions above, if x is an animal, x
cannot make statementsj things without organs can
understand "x has organs" because they have the ideas of
"x" and of organa j and the Ego of *i>go Coglto, reached
by the Dubito argument, is stripped of all body - though
it takes several meditations after the Coglto ia established
to justify the latter.
Nevertheless, when we examine the argument in the
Meditations in some detail, we find that Descartes expands
the Coglto exactly as I suggested. To the necessary truth
"1 am a thinking thing" is added "I do think as I do" »
the rejection of the doubting permits the re-aasertlon of
what was ignored as dubious, although what is re-asserted
'1 ' 
is subtly different in either subtle tsr confused ways.
And when we recognise the procedure, the inn^ light
positively radiates.
Thinking, cogitatio, simply ^  understanding, willing,
imagining, perceiving (septire, sentir)t "I am a thinking
thing" means "I understand, will,imagine etc.", "Thinking"
is generic, and the genus flowers into the species because
it is the sum of the species, and the specific terms are
thenaeives general claasiflcatory-deacriptive terms for
my various "doings", The q-syatem is established by
noting aota and naming them acoordlng to similarities and 
différencesi the piaystem ia established by naming m e  
whole class of acts; and given the starting point q can 
be seen to be true, p can be seen to be true, and "p entails 
q" and "q entails p" can be seen to be true. Uut this is 
not material implication, demands no special logic; there 
is not, in the ordinary sense, an argument at all, 
like case is "I am thinking thing and if I were not a 
thinking thing I would not be a thinking thing",
tihero argument might be demanded is as tne level of 
discrimination and classification of acta; or at the level 
of rejecting from consideration certain of the species in 
order to arrive at an act which is itself the essence end 
genus, and does not demand a bodily agent as certain of 
the species clearly do, Elsewhere the one agent is 
converted at a point in the elaboration of species into 
an intimate union, a real man; and Descartes can prove 
as conclusively that the union is indissolubly intimate = 
in the case of all men while they are alive and argue with 
one another as he can prove that the mlnd-part.of the union
I '
can act on its own and prove to its own satisfaction (or ours) 
that it is absolutely distinct from body. , Descartes says 
and proves many things elsewhere; but so îar as »the 
expansion of the Principle is concerned, it coaes first 
in oi^er because it is generic, and expands into its species 
because it ia generic, ,
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’Vh®n we tarn to the physical, the pattern Is roughly the 
same. The nature of body consists in ^tensicwi alcxie 
because hard bodies and soft bodies, bodies of various 
colours and weights, are all extended. To say that x is 
a member of the class bodies is to say that x is a member 
of the class extensions.' ive justify the principle by 
pointing to the members of the class of which it is the 
gsnua-name or genua-character. Together the two
principles give us the only two aumma gopera Descartes 
will admit.
It ia true that at least many of the other principles 
do not work in this way; it is true that we have classified 
acts on the one hand and extended things on the other; it 
is true that Descartes proceods to remove f r m  science the 
"bodies " which are members of the class extensions, the 
trees and sponges and stones which, as values of x, provide 
a subject for "x ia extended" that prevents length, breadth 
and thickness being merely dimensions of void space - ^ich, 
as space, gives Descartes a uniformity for the matter of 
his geometrical physios, and which, as void, needs only to 
be called "full" in order to make the geometry material; 
it is further true that while Descartes calls the classes 
minds and bodies, he has to devise a special argument to 
get from the class of acts to the agent, the thinking 
thing or substance, and that by this means he gets rid of 
"man" as a thinker in the same way that he gets rid of^
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man as an Qxtenslai, although the "body" to which the 
mind-suhetance is related ia quite obviously the human body* 
It is equally true, though this n'^ ods to be shown in 
detail, that juat as Descartes converts the quality 
"extension" into a substance he converts the activity 
"thinking" into a substance, naming it "thought" and 
preserving its connection with human beings by the use of 
the possessive "our". And coi?reapondingly he uses sensory 
evidence in order to give meaning and "reality" to the 
statements of his explanatory physics.
1 1. we could readily enough accept "ffh©re would be no 
physical science unless there were thihking things, and 
bodily things for thinîclng things to think about", and 
thus accept "There ar© thinking things" as the first 
principle in orderly philosophising. we could then 
accept "There are extended thihga" as the second principle 
in so philosophising. And we could regard both as 
necessarily true for simply the "unless" reason, while 
at the same time regarding them as fact statements.
Either, we might say, is entailed by "There are 
scientists" or "There is science", and the existence 
of the one or the occurrence of the other we could take 
as obvious. Indeed, by denominating either proposition 
"science" we could prove by uttering it that we exist as 
scientists, thus assuaging any anxiety resulting from an 
assumption that words in a language may be meaningfully
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uaod without "having any reference", (Much of Descartes' 
metaphysics is concerned with precisely this, i»e, proving; 
that individual existential statements are meaningful and 
true, given that universal propositions are meaningful and 
true independently of existential and individual propositions, 
we have to investigate the theory of ideas, the theory of 
perception, and the metaphysical logic to see why the 
arguments are developed).
Neither of the two principles demands an alteration 
of our other factual beliefs, which hav© their own criteria, 
and criteria for changing criteria. Both appear to be 
general statements logically related to the individuals who 
are members of the class "thinking things" and the class 
"extended things", individuals already recognised (or the 
statements are meaningless to the non-recogniser), 
individuals which sciences can study and further classify. 
Assume, however, that at some stage the principles are the 
only propositions which are understood, and nothing follows. 
Nothing can be related to principles because there is nothing 
to relate. nut to us, knowing something of a describable 
world and developing soieno©, the principles are logically 
related to other fact statements.
certain facts, or oe-w facta, about man as scientist 
might lead ua to conclude that our account of man needed 
alteration, perhaps should include an account of something 
in man which acted in certain ways necessary for man to act
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In the way or waya he does In doing science, and many 
accounto of mind seem to imply this. Indeed, for three
- i-
hundred years it seems to have been standard doctrine in 
certain schools that Descartes proved it, we shall be 
much engaged in noting how what is "proved" denies the facts 
\9hloh Justify the proof, and the role of "substance" in 
proving that ther« may be facts other than tiie first fact, 
equally, if w® believe that conceptual systems must be 
devised to explain facta, we may devis© such conceptual 
systems, Descartes’ "soul" and "ideas" appear to be 
such.conceptual systems ; but th® role of "substance" is 
to help turn souls and ideas into the only realities, wiiiie 
all else (m®n and their world) appears as complex concepts 
conceived by an existing concept. This too must concern 
us in detail, since whether th© soul is men's concept or 
whether "man" (and "body") ar© the soul'a concepts, we 
should hardly look for a spatlo-t©mporal relation between 
a thing and its conceptions, Kor neod we be deterred by 
the absence of such considerations as thsg® from the. 
literature on Descartes.
Nor are our prinoipie-propositions trivial. Th® 
insistence that the important thinking things - if there 
are to be discovered thihking things other than men - ar© 
m®n stresses that conceptual Systems and theories ar© 
humanly devised, and not divinely revealed, as it stresses 
that observâtion-pr00©dures ar© human, governed,by human
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needs, boiiofa, traditions and sensory incapacity - and 
so are fallible, in dogre® and avsn in kind* The situation 
"man undor conditions Y observes that Z is ï/" admits of > 
investigation, and a variety of sciences develops from 
til® investigation* V<e can leam more about men, mor® 
about the conditions, more about Y and th® W-nOas of Y*
That wo loarn to observe bettor, to discriminate more 
closely; does not entail that we cannot observe, cannot 
discriminate, or that observation and discrimination are 
iri'Olovant to science and to philosophy, as Descartes' 
substance doctrine adapts itself to these contexts, we 
shall have difficulty in telling whether our questions ar® 
epistemologica 1, psyckiological, neurological, physical, 
optical, mechanical or theologico-embryologioal; but we 
needs must do more than label them "ontology", and 
introduce a special perceiving substance and a special act 
or power of "perception" to make.the ontology intelligible. 
The view of th® human situation above indicated, the 
view of man in his world, is.naive; init in such a situâtItm 
and woi'ld we find a number of languages which ar^ ', so to 
speak, adequate. They permit the making of fact statements, 
th® raising and settling of problems, and many problems, and 
they present to ua ^yanmiatioal and logical functions of 
words and terms in statements^ and..arguments. In the 
realm of fact statements w® noxmially mak® no distinction 
between what ia truly said, what is truly thought, what
æ .
la actually obaerved, what Is fQmOmbercd, what Is noted,
>
discovered, perceived or found to be the cas®, and what Just 
ia ap. It is hero that a variety of sciences find their 
meeting place, their common problems, and their meaning 
qua sciences.
These facts we assume, if again naively, to be at 
least the foundations of sciences, and the techniques for 
discovering or determining facts are human. Further, 
we assume readily enough that facts are necessarily 
compatible with on® another, that anything discovered to 
be 3 0 belongs with whatever else can be discovered to 
be so. The familiar world, as we discover it, has a 
factual structure, spatio-temporal relations and 
behaviours of tilings being part of the world.
It is not unusual to find it claimed that no scientist, 
no philosopher, wants to deny facts, but that her© our 
problems, as scientiests or as philosophers, begin. VAiat 
is unusual to find is the assertion that her®, too, our 
problems end, in the sens© tliat a philosophical or 
scientific system which had no relation to facts, or 
whose entailmOnta were faot-claims which were contradictorlea 
of discovered facts, would present no philosophical or 
scientific problems. «hether such a system could be 
meaningful is a further question - what la important la 
that it could scarcely be called philosophical or 
scientific. That we should find our ontology in such a
familiar world of obsorvution'and discoveTy, alon?î with 
our met(%»hyalC8, and that the familiar world should present 
itself on inspection as a* conbeptual" systam without thereby 
ceasing to be factual or occurrent, may appear as outrageous 
ouggeetlone, in spite of the faclltiy with which philos­
ophers exea%)lliy their technical terns and statements Igr 
reference to facts and occurrences.
The suggestions 1 am mahing,’'claiming further that 
most sections of Descj’rtes, and all of his philosophically 
technical teims, tan be related directly to the fraailiar 
world. What is of immediate concern Is that at the level 
of familiar facts we find a use for "thing" and "substance" 
or uses for "tiling* and "substance",^ established prior to 
special technical uses by philosophers, scientists or. In 
an indirect manner, by gmiamarians. At this level is
a "thing", and "flesh" is a "substance"; and it is nonsesse 
to deny that a man is thing, that man is ah œiaaî," that 
a man is b o m  of %voman"end dies^^willingly or ühwiïlinglyl^ 
having experieoced'much, learned much or little,"acted and^ 
suffered in multifarious ways* All men'do science^ if 
incipiontly - Deccartos agrees* Scmie do science in cozqplic- 
ated detail, and explltitiyi some do l o^c and meteàhyBics» 
llalgre Descartes, w  have no reasoh^to 'do^y^that alaan is%"*"'
. 7 ’- ' . .i  ..
n»an at any level of his activities; no .reason to assert that 
when a man decider "to crawl and crawls into a poêle and 
meditrites he ceases thereby to be a man*
What seems to become apparent as we proceed is that
Descartes is maintaining as factual truths (a) that there 
are men vflio do science, and (h) that^there are souls which 
think and which are, while God permits them, eternal doers 
of science* What he is forced to maintain is that souls 
are substfinces, and that men are substances; and this, on 
the definition of substance as conceivably existing indepen­
dently of other things, results in the contention that 
men can exist or be conceived to exist independently of 
souls The proposition "There are men \dio do science" is, 
however# so woven into our language end discourse# our 
general cocmology and our science, that any attempt,to deny 
it or to ignore it results in a pieceaeal collapse of all 
our thinking. Vhat we shall find immediately helow is that 
Descartes regards "there are men without minds'^ as logically ” 
impossible. The collapse in general cannot be ..demonstrated 
«oept .t X«lSth..
When "there is a soul which does science" replaces 
"men do science" we, who are permitted by Descartes to retain 
our human identity by the use of personal pronouns - and
by being merely related to souls, are thus presented with
1 . Cf. Broad’s contention that minds are "bound to organ­
isms. But this is distinct from (a) minds are bound to 
systems of particles, (b) minds are bound to fibred extensi­
ons, (c) minds are bound to what can only be conceived or 
imagined by & mind, (d) minds are bound to animal-machines,
(e) minds are bound to brutes. The "bodies" here may 
represent stages in developing science, but "mind" and the 
"binding" stay magnificently "self-identical at all stages.
90.
(i) a logic which haa no application, and which consista 
largely of negations of an established logic, (1 1 ) 
principles which mean nothing unless they are restored 
to the familiar tongue and the human situation, (lit) a 
familiar world language and no familiar world In wlilch 
to use It, (Iv) Ideas which are of nothing, represent 
nothing, so far as the mind which "has" them is concerned,
(v) the need to imagine a world in which all Is clear 
and distinct but which cannot be related to the thinking 
mlnd-thlng, or to the world which, known to us, we are 
trying to explain, so that we have also (vi) explanations 
which explain nothing, since the minds have nothing to 
explain.
111. If I could find a short way through these complexities 
I would follow it; but I camot. The difficulty Is that 
of considering distinct issues and yet showing the relation 
which makes them genuine issues.
(a) Consider a Cartesian explanation^ i’Salt water bites 
the tongue. This la fact, to be explained. It Is 
certainly clear and distinct that little particles shaped 
like needles would stick Into flesh as needles do, just as 
clear and distinct that they would cause pain of a kind as 
needles do. (Need we hesitate in the claim because it 
seems to be empirical fact that microscopic needles would 
not?). The model, like all models If they are familiar
1. In Lea Météores.
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In other contexts, seems to work, although as Blaise Pascal 
pointed out to Descartes* teacher, père Noel, if we explain 
by positing the existence of any entitles anywhere, with 
whatever powers and qualities we like,explanation is as 
easy as it Is futile.
v^ hat Is needed for the explanation of sea water biting 
the tongue is the truth of the assertion that such happens 
because salt water Is so made up. The "biting^ can 
scarcely be done by particles which are not "In the water". 
Descartes Is clearly entitled to assert that salt water 
la so made up, but that It mat  be so Is certainly not 
clear and distinct In any sense. indeed, what seems clear 
and distinct enough, that needles and the Ilk© bodies do 
penetrate, and do cause pain, which may be held to have 
the obscurity of m©re facts, seems to become extremely 
obscure in the realm of necessary truths.
The t(X)gue is a human tongue, and human beings ar© 
hurt by the pricking of the tongue. True, we can say In 
Cartesian terms, that the mind feels pain ^ © n  the body 
Is Injured, - but this Is the proof of the unity of man, 
and demands as a component In the proof observed needles 
and flesh. I.e. observations which th© disjunction of the 
two substances makes meaningless, sine© th© unext©nded 
mind cannot observe. Fhrther the disjunction la logical 
or conceptual, the "cannot" a logical "cannot". Likewise 
th© "joining" ia logical - th© mind must be united to the
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body, must be united "pain feelingly" or«!'thing peroeivlngly" 
united. hy must It be? aecauae.otherwise,.in Descartea* 
pliraae, *o should not have a Real Man; we should have no 
possibility of observing. . , c
The partIcie-statemCnt ml#it be held to be clear and 
distinct to someone who has grasped the necessary...prinolpies 
"all bodies are mad© up of extensions", )"bodies may b© of 
any shape", and *!any gross behaviour mustib© explained by^ 
the particular flgur® of minute components". But In any 
cas©', th© particular figures being unobservable ..by anyone, 
there is no point at all In my saying oth©r than "little^ 
particles may b® of any.shape at.allY-until I^hav® discovered 
true descriptions of ph©nom©na that need to be explained.
I.e. gross bodies. These not only guarantee the *|reallty" 
of the explanatory shapes, but constitute the only reason 
for saying either tliat particles ©xlst as bodies do, or^^ 
that splinters and not llttl© ball a, corkscrews = or^  a olid 
triangles ar© mlcro-exlstents. «hat this n^ans Is that7 
even the statement "there ar© mlerosooplc^bodies" demands 
an argument whose Initial premise is that gross and_.@_,. 
observable bodies'©xlst, that bodies can b© discovered to 
b© somewhere somewhen. And If the argument,holds,,If we 
do to the tongue and the body what w© do with sea.vurotfr, 
th© relation of penetration Is no longer ne©die-llke, no 
longer simply meaningful, and w© seem to have a gap which
A  i  V ,  ' ^  . . f c  .
n©lth®r obaOrvatlonal facta nor principles can brldg®*
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Divided extended aubstanoe leads on to no world - and it 
does not lead back to a mind, a thinking .substance, but 
further and further away from It, unless "divided extended 
substance" la what the thinking substance morolv thinks.
Granted human observât las and factual experience, the 
particle thesis may be useful, and we might well regard the 
utility and the process of justifying the thesis by argument 
as establishing Its factuallty. Pragmatism and rationalism 
hare, as usual unite. If not loss uneasily than usual. 
Descartes' difficulty la that what Is clearly and distinctly, 
and necessarily, true, when related to the facts, which make 
It really so, becomes only possibly or probably, so; and 
the further difficulty is to show that the p which explains 
q Is In fact compatible with q. I.e. how. If the physical 
world Is a system of particles, or merely figured extensions, 
there can possibly be a familiar world and an.observer of It, 
And the answer seems clears there Is no familiarIworld, no •
observer of a familiar world. hence.follows a theory.of
<
perception which cannot be stated'intelligibly but,which 
"proves" that the familiar world Is a private Illusion of 
a featureless mlnd.^ " * « «
We must note how different this Is from the claim that 
molecules exist - we can see them with microscopes » or the
1. % e  Illusion, the familiar world, la assumed, of course, 
to be public; only recently has the cartesian seed 
flowered In full;
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claim that wo could aoe atoms If certain conditions wore 
fulfilled# or ovon the claim that atoms could never be-4 
aoen.becaufi© of actual conditio: a#, Our, concern Is now 
with what la observable and the conditions of observatlaa; 
our problem Is of the systématisation of .ti'utha about 
particles and truths about gross bodies, bodies bigger than 
particles* ve have no reason for saying that particles 
alone exist oecauae they cannot be observed, and nothing . 
can be observed because only .particles exist. Microscopic 
and macroscopic bodies are related to man, the observer, 
exist Independently of man in thé same world as man. There 
la no compulsion to deny that salt water la hot something ' 
observable, which ’bites” the tongue'when we take a moutliful 
of It.
' hat really Is Doscairtes ' position? At least twofold* 
First, the whole familiar world la Illusory, is mental or 
unreal, a system of "Ideas" or "states" aroused In minds by 
existent particles and motion; second. It Is not to be 
related to minds at all, but to the Intimate-un ion, thou^
In the guise of "sensations", (Vide Principles I.XLVIII).
-a. ‘.■-,.'Vn?aî.,v
It la the now conventional ambiguity of "sensations" wiiloh
'.Ïï.s «ah
enables Déaoartee to preserve Ideas for the mind and
thinking or thought, extensions for physics, and the
,Z 'Sh i- : J- V' Atfamiliar world for man. iiut "man" disintegrates again under
the consideration of "science" or metaphysics; the thesis
of Brltiah fitoplrlciflm'appears to be that minds# not men.
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are the aubjeota of all aensatlon-statoraents# As we 
proceed with the unravelling here we begin to understand 
v.»hy it seems Intelligible to men to aak whether sensations 
are mental# are physical# are neither or ar both; we begin 
to see the possibility of treating "minds’^ and ^partlclos” 
as components in conceptual or explanatory systems which 
are totally inadequate for tlie purposes tl^y are 
phllosophically held to serve; we begin to grasp scxnethlng 
of the role of “man" in fact-systems and In philosophical 
and scientific theories#
(b) When doing metaphysics# Descartes preserves the use 
of pronouns in a way that aeoma foreign to science because 
the ”1 ’^ refuses simple universalisation without losing its 
firat-personal character# But the metaphysics depends upcm 
this universalisation# upon there being a plurality of things
4
capable of using the pronoun "I" and recognising each other, 
sc having a us© for the pronoun "we". This dependence is 
important in a variety of ways, not the least of whitih la 
indicated by the statement that if I alone exist what la 
called metaphysics is meaningless to me, or the statement 
that if I can never "know" that anything else tlmt can think 
exists, I can never understand metaphysical arguments.
This becomes both clear end important if wo look at what 
Descartes wrote (assuming, in doing so, a familiar world) 
instead of presenting our own form of necessary solipsism 
or dualism as Cartesian or as a translation of Descartes.
V / 00#
What, for example, Descartea offers us'In Principles 
I.VIII Is a conditional argument! if and ?dille we suppose 
that there is nothing existing apart from ourselvee, we  ^ ^
I-
must suppose that any statement about ourselves which 
includes a predicate not "supposed" to apply to ourselves 
does not apply to ourselves* Qui omnia quae a nobis diversae 
aunt aupponimuB ftilaae esse * “supponitnus" falls completely 
outside what is supposed. What Veitch presents us with la* 
"while supposing that there la nothing existing'apart'from 
our thought". - and he ia following in hla own fashion the 
French vers 1cm.."oui sommes persuadés maintenant ou'11.n'y vj 
JL i"l©o hors de notre pensée gui aol t ver it ableroent ou » qui 
existe". ’ hat is common to these radically different 
atateraenta is the plural pronoun used in the ordinary language 
fact statement "we suppose that..;".which is not a"rhetorical 
façon de parler but the foundation*of,the argument, ^
■ve are familiar enough with philosophical- westlinga 
with the problem of “other minds",,<it being taken for granted 
that we are familiar with.,.... \ « • vs ‘ « -
-  Ü S -  . - r f i  v ;  ■
Dut the problem cannot be thus stated* » "I am*familiar 
with the other minds problem* it being taken for granted that 
I am familiar with my own mind and with other bodies which 
are called 'man * " , Yet this does «not work, eitear. ^The ** i
t
"I" and the "we" both belong together and fall apart. Put 
in the form* "How do i know ,that other men or other animals 
experience what I experience,,feel pain and see coloured
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things, foal and sense as I feel and sense?", the problem 
is intelligible, can be formulated by any man, can be 
discussed by many.men * "I" and "we" fall naturally together,
and our difficulty is to see why or how the terra "minds" 
ia to be introducod at all» somehow, only when "I*am 
a thinking thing even if there is nothing else in the 
world" has been transformed into "I am a thinking thing 
even if there are other things in the world", and "I am a 
thinking thing" has been expanded into "I am a thing that 
can sense and imagine andlemember",with the entailment 
that there are things which can be sensed, docs the plurality 
of "we” become meaningful. But at the same time "I am an 
animal with organs who can observe other animals with 
organa" seems to have been asserted*
Pull consideration of the Coglto and its expansion must 
be postponed; but the expansion is presented without 
argument - "1 am a thinking thing, i#e, a thing that doubts, 
understands, affirms,, denies, wills, refuses, imagines and 
perceives" (in Meditation II). with the addition of "knows 
a few things, is doubtful of many, loves and hates" (in 
Meditation III - "loves and hates" appearing 6nly in the 
french)* It is true that Descartes seems to want to 
restrict these in the name of necessary truth (or of personal 
incapacity to be mistaken - a different matter for any but 
a Cartesian), to façons de penser, to What Cartesians call 
"modesof consciousness" (preserving one systematic ambiguity)
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or oven to "seemlnga to be such and ao" (thua permitting 
another ayatematic ambiguity, which bedevila Rmpirioiam). 
These ambiguities, which present ua with the "choice" 
between "no thing can ever :)e an object of awareness" and 
"everything which is an object of awareness is a thing", 
are primarily responsible for the length and detail of this 
thesis*
nut even taking the expansion simply the complications 
are markedt
(i) All of these "modes" are, qua distinct occurrences 
or types of occurrence, contingent in relation to the 
principle* Descartes states them, and he cannot deduce 
them, unless they are recognised as species already related 
generica11y by the "I" who arrives at the Coglto.
(ii) The expansion is through the use of "I", not of 
"thinking thing". Veitch slides naturally into a use of 
"thing who" - but the alternative "thing which" begins *
"I am a thing which", and passes to façons de penser. ' 
cogitandi modi, which _! can be sure exist in me, along 
with the ideas which X, know are present to my mind, or are 
found in my mind. - ■
(ill) *4hat are asserted are classes or types of activity, 
not individual acts, and, amcmg other things, this indicated 
how much is assumed by treating "I" as the subject of the 
whole set, and as known to be the subject of the wlx>le set.
It is notorious enough that those who begin with a simple
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cognitive and oelf-cognltlvo aubjeot run Into apparently, 
Inaoluble problems of poraonal Identity; and It, should be 
equally notorious that the parallel argument to the "wax , 
argument" is that the simple concept of substance, extended 
or thinking, is a matter of Intellectlm and reasoning, not 
of intuitive acquaintance.
(iv) Descartes appears to assume that we can give 
a meaning to "seem to see” which replaces all uses of "see", 
dr that "seem to see" can be given a meaning independently 
of "see". At least he asserts that so far as the indubitable 
claim is concerned, there is no difference between sensing, 
imagining and dreaming. ' i - ,,
Two argufflwits seem possible, if we accept it that the 
rest of our language is unaltered*
(a) All sensing is Just as we take it to be qua , ■ - ^
"experience*, but all "awareness" is of something "mental" 
by a mind-tblng. There is nothing existing in the "world", 
that can be sensed - and nothing in the world which can 
sense. in other words, can say ;^ "If « nothing is ever
sensed which is a thing in .,the world, and sense-organs and 
bodies can only.be aensorily observed,:then for a,thinking,: 
thing there can never be a world in which it is",; For,a 
thinking,thing, it can alone exist, And onlytby^a hang-over 
of the naively realistic ordinary language vAiioh it could 
never! use can the thinking thing think",of sensing, - 
dreaming and imagining.
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Daaoartea, like no many others, treats the expansion of 
"thihking" into species of cognitive activity as not 
entailing any corporeal features on the part of the thinking 
substance by assuming that the familiar concepts and language 
are available to a "mind" which could make no distinction 
betv/een dreaming, imagining and sensing - and is it not 
clear that it is the denial of the ability to distinguish 
between these activities wiiich is the basis of the meta­
physical doubt and the proof that minds are the only 
cognitive subjects?
But when, as an after thought, "loves and hates" are 
added, any attempt to make these in sny sense relations 
between a thinking thing and "ideas" or "mental objects" 
seems nonsensicalj and Descartes himself la destined to 
prove, and to repeat his proofs, that imagining, perceiving, 
remembering, having appetites and passions and sensations, 
arc impossible unless the agent is bodily, even if the w<n*ld 
is never perceived as it is. - , , . , *  ^,
(b) The second arguioent leaves it open that we should 
be able to gain limited knowledge of the world by sensing, 
as distinct from illusory perception, imagining and dreaming, 
but insists that ve might on any particular occasltm be ' 
mistaken. God, who created us bodily, guarantees by his 
goodness the truth of "x is extended" If we are awake #ien 
we sense, judge and assert. At this stage we are clearly
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"iiiTO". And we might note a sense in which "extension” is 
fundamental - there is an initial plausibility in arguing 
that we could not he men unless we had the shapes we have# 
our organs had the shape and the apatial relations - the 
structure - which they have, and that colour# smell# taste 
and sound are irrelevant in the sense that they could all he 
different and yet men function as they do function. But it 
reiaains that if we deny "sensible qualities" to he qualities 
of bodies# we deny knowledge of any bodies# of men or of 
ourselves as bodily.
Descartes* physics of particles# his reduction of the 
"physical world" to particles and motions# of perception to 
effects of motions (even if we admit "on organs and brains")# 
appear to be completely incompatible with the thesis of 
occasional error or of veridical perception only of shape; 
but at least occasional veridical perception is essential to 
his general science, including his anatony of animals.
In the case of either argument we find that somewhere 
must be included the notion that the agent is bodily, and 
Descartes knows full well that he is bound to a thesis that 
sensing and inuigining are impossible unless there are sense- 
organs and brains and nerves and muscles and objects which act 
upon them, just as he knows that the motivation of his philos­
ophy and his science is to enable men to gain the greatest 
control over a useful world of things edible and usable. The 
seeds of this are present in the Regulae. already growing.
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Daacartaa knows quite well that he is going to assart 
that there are many men, men who can speak to txie another, 
whose bodies he can anatomise, «ho are born and die as the 
result of the union of semens and*the failure of some part 
of a system of organs, à failure which it ls*hls aim in 
medicine to postpone. Ho knows'quite well, since he has 
proven this as well as the un-souled cliaractor of the non­
thinking brutes, that the soul la not lodged in the body 
as the pilot is lodged in a sliipi that "it is necessary for 
It to be joined and’united more closely tothe body, in 
order to have senses and appetites similar to ours] and thus 
to constitute a real man", he has shown in the Discourse 
(Part V). ■
The oddness of this language escapes Descartea, as it 
has escaped his followers ând'Üia criticsj what also has 
escaped his readers is the extent to^whioh this doctrine 
reads like a rejection of the thesis that there is a rational 
soul tdiich la quite distinct from tha'body of man. The way 
up, the way of hyperbolic doubt, is to arrive at a first 
principle, but a first principle'in orderly philosophising. 
The way down is different from the way down, synthesis from 
analysis, just because it is ordered and reversed.
Everything follows after the first principle, but nothing 
follows from it. Even if it is a rule of method, the 
truths to be methodically ordered have'to'be known.
This leaves us with further problems of logic and *
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methodology; but the Jjnmodlate question Is the nature of . 
the "real man",• It‘Is man, roal man; who la Desoartss* 
problem; constituting "man" is one aspect of the problem 
of relating metaphysics and ;Aiyalos to the world they 
"explain"« For the thinking substance, unless it ia k 
mistaken in thinking that that ia all that it ia, there^ 
ia no problem of a dualism. If minds need no bodies to 
sustain them, need no bodies to examine in any vmy, they 
have no need of bodies. Indeed, we have no difficulty 
in giving an account of minds if we confine ourselves to 
what they do and refrain from asking how they do it or what 
they are, accept a definition and ask no qisstions of what 
is defined or of what defining amounts to* ^  can give
an acoount with equal facility of bodies if we have
carefully removed minds, and all familiar things in the 
world as not really bodies, from physics. Bodies are 
limited extensions, mutually in contact and filling space. 
Both minds and bodies can exist in the same World, a
’ I
conceived world# without any problem of dualism even for
I
ua, since‘unextended minds can exist anywhere in extended 
body or bodias. ' *' ' ■ ‘
' Since I want to argue that the problem of dualism arises
because the world is not like this# that It arises for us 
because we cannot fit ourselves and our world Into the
metaphysical or the metaphysical into ourselves and our
»
world, and that the question oagt,'only be ours; and since
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I want to argue that the Coglto as reached by argument fails 
to reduce the subject of "is sometimes deceived by the ; 
sensoa" from "man* to "mind" because,It Ignores thejsubject, 
and 9c never gets beyond a familiar world, familiar language 
statement, ti*ue of all men at all times (which does not , , . 
mean "always true of all sensings"), lot ua examine this 
man-duallsm In aomo detail# . n ^
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Chapter IV.
Man and Hie Dualiam.
li there were only particles and minds $ there would be 
no problem of dualism for minds » particles or God.
1. The problem arises because hum?m beings think and are 
related to bodies of which they are ciwarOf the condition 
of this being that they are bodily.
Our modes of talking about senses and sense-organs Is 
confused. The treatment of organs as “apertures*,or as 
"ways In" or "v ys out", must be related to facts of gen­
eration and blrto. I.e. to "biological" science, and to 
social and political science. Descartes takes these 
sciences for granted, but his main thesis Is Incompatible 
with them being possible sciences.
He Is bound to recognise three classes of stateiaents, 
viz. about minds, about bodies, and about men. The only 
agent who can verify all statmnents is man - Descartes* 
"Intlmr te union".
2m (p.116). But this "whole man" appears to be logically 
li^posslble. Descartes* appears to recognise this clearly in 
a letter to Elizabeth. Ho has one proof of absolute 
separability, and another of actual inseparability, of 
mind and body, and the conclusions are conceptually 
incompatible. This is related to the absolute distinction 
maintained between sensing, imagining and conceiving (or 
sciontiflc and metaphysical reflection). Descartes* 
confusion and contradiction can be illustrated at length.
It is suggested that Descartes took formal 
principles to be "material", on I that Aristotle did not 
mnke this mistake.
(p.31). Substance and Subject.
Accepting propositional fact statements, we can 
frame a number of stot%ients about subjects and predicates 
which are purely formal.
This is elalx)rated and (with "substrnce" identified 
with "subject" related to Descartes. If, as he does, we 
insist that "substance" i£ a subject, (a) we connot 
preserve our ordinary language, (b) relations between 
substfuices are empirical, and not necessary, or (c) we 
surrender predication, althou^ the foundation of the main 
argument is thfït predicates are "known" and thot substances 
are*lin3mowable" - they con inferred via a "principle".
The nature of this "principle" will concern us below.
"lhat is why the first thing of which I disapprove Is 
your saying "Man has a triple soul". This word is a 
heresy in my religion, and it is,religion apart, strongly 
contrary to logic to conceive soul as a genus, whose 
species are mens, vis vep:etiva and vis motrix animalium.
For you should understand by the sensitive soul only the 
motive force (vis motrix) unless you confound it with the 
reasonable soul (nisi illi^ cum rational confundas). But 
this vis motrix is not different from the vis ve^tiva in 
species; both belong to a genus other than that of the 
soul."
Descartes, in a letter commenting on and
correcting a thesis of Regius. May 1641.
"In man the soul is one, and that is the reasonable soul; 
one should not count..(as human?)., any action except one 
which depends on reason. But the vis ver^etandi. the via 
corporis movendi. which are called the anima ve^^etativa et 
sensitive in plants and brutes, are also in men, but they 
should not...(there?)... be called souls because they are 
not the first principle of action; they are of quite 
other kind (^gnus) than the rational soul".
Ibid.
"Passions (effectua) have their seat in the heart, in so 
far as they are related to the body; but in so far as they 
affect also the soul, their seat is only in the brain".
Ibid.
"I thought I took sufficient care to prevent anyone thence 
inferring that man was merely a spirit that made use of a 
body; for in this very Sixth Meditation in which I have 
dealt with the distinction between mind and body, I have at 
the same time proved that the mind was substantially united 
with the body; and I employed arguments, the efficacy of 
which in establishing this proof I cannot remember to have 
seen in any other case surpassed. Likewise, Just as one 
who said that a man's arm was a substance really distinct 
from the rest of his body, would not therefore deny that 
the arm belongs to the nature of the complete man, and as 
in saying that the arm belongs to the nature of the complete 
man no suspicion is raised that it cannot subsist by itself, 
so I think that I have neither proved too much in showing 
that mind can exist apart from body, nor yet too little in 
saying that it is substantially united to the body, because 
that substantial union does not prevent the formation of 
a clear and distinct conception of the mind alone as of a 
complete thing".
Descartes, replying to Arnauld.H and R.11.p.102
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Man and His Dualism.
Suppose there were a world of particles, and of ninds 
which occupied no space and went on thinking in their own 
pisculiar way, ignorant of their location or of their 
relation to the particles of whose existence they were 
ignorant - the "inner light" does not shine into the 
extended darkness.
What philosophical problems could there be for such 
minds? Certainly there could be none of the relation 
between minds m d  bodies. And what philosophical problems 
could there be for a god who, aware of the location of the 
minds and of their unextended thinking, is also aware 
of the particles in wlriich they are located, aid can assert 
(a) that they are thinking substances, (b) that they are 
not bodies, and (c) that each is vdiere it is when it is?
What meaning can we give to "thinking" in the case of 
such a substance? To seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, 
smelling, imagining, willing, desiring, loving, hating, 
being angry, doubting, denying, judging, being aware of 
itself?
I have no answer. Nor am I assisted in "understanding" 
the model by Descartes* accusation that I am trying to 
imagine minds; what I should do, seemingly, is to imagine 
the "world" and then conceive minds so rapidly that somehow 
the two combine into one "world". Or I should conceive 
them both, by using the words I have used above, in
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presenting the world of minds and particles, understandingly• 
But "understandingly" is what evades. I am saturated 
with the prejudices of ray childhood, and can reduce neither 
myself to an unextended thinking substance wiiich "thinks 
Just as I do", nor the familiar world around me to a world 
of particles in motion.
I can, if 1 say it quickly enough, give a meaning to 
"when you think and dream you are not aware of yourself 
as extended, and the unextended minds are Just like you 
and think Just as you do". nnd if I go on very quickly 
I can add "emd the problem for minds would be to Justify 
the beliefs they had that certain of their thoughts were 
true, that certain of the things that appeared to them 
really existed". But I have to go very quickly, or I 
find myself thinking that this is almost the reverse of 
my own case, since what the mind would have the least 
evidence, no evidence, for believing, I think that I 
have every evidence for believing; and unless the mind 
happened to think of the world as a system of particles 
in motion, without having read Descartes, the mind would 
in fact be quite in error in thinking that anything'it 
thought was true, that anything it thought of existed.
The mind, supposing that it could as I cannot, conceive 
itself as an unextended thing whose only attribute was 
thinking, might find a duallstic problem in trying to 
relate its self to its objects, i.e. its ideas, or what
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It thinks or thinks of. What it cannot find a problem is 
relating its ideas, or thoughts qua what is thought, to 
what it knows to be not-thoughts, not ideas.
Perhaps I am wrong in trying to find a problem here, 
because this sort of thesis is a solution to problems, not 
itself a problem. Certainly it is the sort of thing which 
is held to be proven, and proven in a variety of ways, by 
philosophers and scientists. To understand the solution 
wo have to understand the problem. And what seems implied 
by this I can understand; the philosophical problem, the 
problem of dualism, arises because this mind-particle is 
not the human situation, the situation of any man or any 
philosopher.
1. It arises because (a) human beings, whatever they are, 
both think and are aware of bodies with which they are 
related, and (b) human beings are bodily, this being the 
condition of their awareness of bodies around them and of 
the bodies being so related to them that awareness of the 
bodies is possible.
It is because man is born with eyes and ears and a palate 
and a nose and a body sentient to touch, to heat, to cold, 
that he is capable of awareness of a world which is not 
himself. Let us recognise immediately the difficulty we 
have in talking about this situation at all without 
suggesting that the man is somehow independent of his
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t>ody, his sense-organs.^ Our everyday expressions can 
be treacherous, can lead us into apparent contradictions 
and nonsense, though they have not driven us as yet to the 
heights of talking about minds as having ears and noses 
and palates - that minds have eyes is perhaps on the way 
to this, but we can still say, with Descartes, "but of course 
they really haven’t eyes".
Our modes of talking about senses and organs is, never­
theless, a subtle and intricate mess. We think of the 
eyes as tools or instruments, like little telescopes which 
we bring with us for the purpose of seeing. It seems 
plausible enough to say that men can be born without eyes 
yet with a sense of sight that needs only the provision 
of eyes to be exercised, and a defect in the optic nerve 
that could be remedied would be like the temporarily 
stuck eye-piece shutter of a telescope. If the ears and 
nostrils and the mouth were blocked, the man would still 
be a man, only he would hear and smell and taste nothing.
The ancient thesis still holds - nothing would be able to 
get in. The man, the person, contrasts with his bodily 
parts and orgfiins, and so with his body. The body is a 
house, a prison, in which he is confined, but there are 
certain windows. We still have, however, the visual 
story of the man looking out and the other-sensory story
1. And, similarly, independent of his mind.
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of "something" coming in.
The two stories have entirely different conclusions, 
but in one point they agree. Accepting the prison or the 
house model, each leads to the admission that a man cannot 
he in a man, and what is inside is really the man, who is 
really a person, a mind, a sodl, a self. And, seemingly, all 
we have to do is to treat the "visual windows" as letting in, 
instead of as apertures for looking out, and the man-mind-self 
is an unextended thinking substance in a world which, so far 
as he-it is concerned, contains nothing whatever.
In that case what I am now going to argue is nonsense. 
Babies are b o m  with component parts defective or missing 
entirely - real babies, including those who comply with one 
of Descartes* criteria for objective existence, that they 
appear to their parents against their parents* wills. But all 
too frequently they are b o m  in such a state that it is not 
possible to think of them as human beings, just like ourselves 
except that they lack eyes or sight, middle-ears or hearing, 
palates or taste or smell. It is no longer, once these are ’ 
considered, easy to say "Ko baby is more or less of a baby 
than any other". We can no longer say "No eyes and no vision, 
but a very intelligent man - intelligence and being an 
intelligent man do not depend upon having eyes", and extend 
this uncritically to the general statement that "thinking" 
and intelligence do not depend upon having sense organs.
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We are brought face to face with the complote collapse of 
our talk of babies as if they were human beings who had or 
lacked, brought with them or failed to bring with them, 
certain useful but dispensable bodily parts, when we 
contemplate the cases where many parts are missing or 
useless, or when we try to think of a baby who has none 
of the senses - we approach the situation, the impossible 
situation, of thinking of a baby who is born without any 
body at all.
Aristotle found the Pythagorean notion of "any soul in 
any body" ridiculous, absurd in the face of facts.
Descartes, too, claims that ignorance of our bodies has 
distorted our beliefs as to what the soul is and does, and 
the claim is meaningless unless the account Descartes 
proceeds to give of the animal and human bodies is literally 
true of bodies which exist and can be examined, dissected, 
and described. Both are in those connections asserting 
that there are right and wrong accounts of the soul as well 
as the body, and Descartes* account of the body is not in 
terms of particles and vortices (except in odd cases when 
he is explaining what it was before itbecarae what it was) 
but in terms of bones and muscles, sense-organs, hearts 
and lungs and arteries, blood and spirits and chyle. His 
claim that the behaviour of animals can be completely 
described without mention of sensing, perception, feeling.
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appetite, emotion, or life (in its ordinary connotation) 
is a further question.
Both, moreover, raise questions of generation, of semen 
and fertilisation and Intra-uterine development, so that in 
considering either we are entitled to consider how man 
becomes a man, as well as the contrast between the dead 
body under the anatomist's knife and the living creature 
who looked and listened and spoke, who perhaps thought 
and reported his thoughts and led philosophers to think 
that considering the thoughts reported was studying some 
individual substance in its entirety.
It is because men have organs and powers of sensing that 
the "world" half of the dualism is discovered. But it is 
also because men have stomachs i^ich make possible ingestion 
and digestion, have complex structures of tissues which 
make possible being in pain and a state of no pain or 
pleasure (at least we have no evidence of toothache on the 
part of those who have never had teeth), because men demand 
sustenance and shelter, are capable of association with 
other men,and woman, of loving ^ d  hating and breeding 
and fearing and desiring, of anxious apprehension, of 
discrimination and focussed attention, of developing a 
language,^ a science, a religion and prejudices and doubts, 
that Descartes the man could exist as and when he did, be
1. A conventional interpretation of Descartes. It is 
in fact not difficult to find sections of Descartes 
in which the opposite seems to be assumed.
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educated, become Interested in traditional problems, devise 
a method and begin to order his own knowledge.
Descartes can scarcely be held to deny these features 
of the human situation, of his own situation. He takes it 
for granted that these features apply in his account of his 
own development, in discussing his scientific and 
philosophical activity, just as he takes for granted a 
community of interests and language (the latter being a 
proof that huiman beings have minds vhile animals do not). 
Certainly it would be lllegimate to insist on the historical 
development of Descartes himself and of the social and 
scientific systems of his day in considering a particular 
problem that he raises, of the nature of substance or tlie 
formula for a conic section - we do not solve-problems 
by turning our backs upon them and considering other matters. 
But Descartes* general problem one of development and 
history, of how.we think and,how our knowledge develops, 
of minds and bodies as existing things"which are associated 
at one. period of their histories, and that period of 
association is a period when the union of the two is held 
to constitute men, who themselves have a history. ^
Our talk of men is based upon this ’historical feature 
of their existence;^ it enables us to make avast series 
of statements about men as social and political animals 
which cannot be translated into the mind - talk or the 
body - talk provided by philosophers (or by scientists).
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Yet obviously such talk of men must be relevant to the 
problems philosophers raise of minds and bodies, just as 
it appears in their treatises alongside talk about minds 
and bodies. For Locke it is "mankind" that is perplexed; 
it is men who think,or do not think, always. The Regulae 
present a method for men, all of whom are capable of 
thinking and so of doing science. Dualism becomes a problem
not because there are minds which are unextended and bodies 
which do not think, but because there are "intimate unions", 
because there are men - and it is too easily forgotten that 
Descartes has a proof of the intimate union, admits 
(Principles l.XLVIII) that appetites of hunger and thirst, 
emotions such as anger, joy, sadness, love, and all the 
sensations - pain, titillation, light and colour, sound, 
smell, taste, heat, hardness and other tactile qualities, 
must be predicated of the union and not of mind or of body.
In the Discourse as in the Traite^ de l'Homme we find the 
same stress on Medicine, upon the curing of ills and the 
prolongation of life (of man); and a central theme in the 
Traite de I'Hormme is the error we make in attributing far 
too much to the soul. "It is because of our ignorance 
of anatomy that we have judged dead bodies to have the 
same organs as the living, and that all that was lacking 
was a soul, i.e. all movement was due to the soul"
(Section 11). "All bodily movements not felt to depend 
upon our thought must be attributed to the disposition ,of
114
the bodily organs and no more" (12). The supposed statue 
or Machine de Terre was to be constructed by God "in such 
a way that he not only gave it on the outside the colour 
and shape of all our members, but also he put in it all 
the pieces requisite for making it walk, eat, breathe, and 
finally to imitate all those functions of ours which can 
be imagined to proceed from matter, and to depend only 
on the disposition of organs". (Premiere Partie).
Examples can easily be multiplied, and as they multiply 
we become less and less certain as to which Cartesian thesis 
provides the background of the statements. We seem far 
indeed from the simple notions and necessary relations of 
the Regulae, far indeed from the physics or from the 
Principles. What must be stressed is the triad of 
assertions which makes for a problem of dualism: "if x
thinks X is a mind, and x is not extended", "if y is 
extended, y is extended and incapable of thought", and "if 
z hungers, thirsts, desires, feels anger, joy, sadness, 
love, sees light or colour, hears sounds, feels hardness 
or heat, then z is a man". Metaphysics provides the proof 
of the necessary existence of immaterial thinking substances 
independent of bodies, substances in their own right; it 
provides a proof of the existence of purely extended things, 
possibly even of the particles of Cartesian physics; but 
it can provide neither passions, .sensations, gross bodies, 
animals nor men. . In the Meditations.in the Principles.
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Descartes makes passions and sensations forms of thinking, 
and relates them to "thinking substance" (though, as I 
have indicated, he also relates them specifically to the 
union and not to the thinking substance). The doctrine 
of the "intiioate union" seems to make it necessarily' true 
that if X is a man, x is extended and x thinks (and it is 
when the Rational Soul is added to the Machine de Terre 
by God that we have a man and the first possibility of 
awareness and thought) . And while this may not be very 
clear, what seems clear is chat there is a contradiction 
involved of the central metaphysical "necessary truth", 
that the extended cannot think, nor can the thinking be 
extended.
I am not concerned to deny the facts, the gross empirical 
facts, of human states and activities which force us to note 
(a) how little importance self-conscious thought has in 
most of'our activities, or (b) the way in which our thoughts, 
reflections, decldings, anticipatings, moral, decisions, 
and sudden fears appear as our Interfering with autonomous, 
non-reflective behaviour, or (c) that Descartes recognised 
these facts, sometimes very acutely. But a metaphysical 
dualism does not derive directly from such facts or any 
facts# It derives from special arguments, and in 
Descartes' case the arguments seem to arrive directly 
at a series of logical contradictories all of v&iich must 
bo affirmed. We are familiar enough with instances of
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two things so related that they act as one in a way in 
which neither is capable of acting independently,of the 
other, of things describable as composed of parts whose 
interrelated actions are different from those of the 
whole, but this is possible because we can identify the 
component things ^  parts, i.e. as related to each other 
within a system.
If the relation of minds and bodies were like this, 
tlien Descartes' claim would be intelligible enough that 
statements about minds, statements about bodies, and 
statements about men (unions) and ordinary things are 
(a) quite distinct from one another, so that no predicate 
of one could be a predicate of another, (b) equally true 
and clear and distinct, and (c) verified in different 
ways. But verification demands different types of 
knowledge in each case, different powers and exercises 
of such powers, and the only single agent that can verify 
all three types of statement is the "intimate union", 
the man# It is "man" which corresponds to the "we" of 
Cartesian discourse, the author and reader who discuss 
theories and arguments with regard to the structure and 
operations of man seeking inf ormation in a world#
2. What Descartes also seems to claim is that such typos 
of statement cannot be related into a single system of 
statements because it is logically Impossible for there 
to be such a relation between minds and bodies that the
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union constitutes a single thing or substance. The 
claim is not made exactly in tliis form - it is rather that 
there must be minds and there must be bodies, and there 
must be a union, but while we can grasp each of these 
"truths" clearly and distinctly, it is impossible for us 
to understand how they can all be true. And the position 
seems to be that if science is to proceed at all we have 
to recognise that "man" is a subject for all three types 
of statement (that men can do ^ metaphysics and physics as 
well as inspect the world around them) or we have to forgot 
all about metaphysics and physics. At least for metaphysics, 
doing it "once in a lifetime" is adequate.
The claim in question is clearly made in a letter to 
Elizabeth of May 21, 1643,^ and the subsequent assertion 
is rather astonishing even after a close acquaintance 
with Descartes. It can be presented in a single sentence, 
which reveals at the same time Elizabeth's difficulty: 
she has been completely convinced by the Metaphysics of 
the absolute distinction between mind and body, and can 
now not grasp the "union" at all.
"I have come to the conclusion that it is Meditation", 
writes Descartes, meaning by "Méditation" the application 
of his method for grasping the utter difference between soul
1# The second of that date.
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and body essences, "which has caused you to find the notion 
of the union of soul and body obscure, rather than the 
thinking which requires less (close) attention: it seems
to me that the human mind is incapable of conceiving very 
distinctly both the distinction between the soul and body 
and their union, at the same time, because in order to do 
that it would be necessary to conceive them as one thing,
and yet to conceive them as two, which is a logical
impossibility" - (ce que se contrarie).
This, I claim, when we consider the background of 
statements and arguments in the letters and elsewhere, 
amounts to asserting that in our familiar dealings with men 
and the world we see men^ treat them as men, as organisms
and as agents, just as we treat horses as horses, roses
as coloured and scented flowers, and that we are right in 
so doing. In the realm of fact statements and experience 
of occurrences, there is no room for the metaphysical 
miiad-body distinction at all, as there is no room for 
fact-statements in metaphysics. The metaphysical 
consideration establishes necessarily that mind and body 
are unutterably distinct, and for metaphysics it is 
necessarily true tiiat mind and body cannot bo related 
(unless this is a meta-metaphysical truth) .
Somewhere between the realms of metaphysics and the 
realm of facts is matter for an argument (necessarily; 
valid, producing a necessary^conclusion);, that minds and
’C-
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bodies must be intimately connected: I see my t o m  flesh
(although the account of perception - the raotaphysical 
"scientific" account - establishes that nothing like 
"tom flesh" can be seen, or really e, 1st to be seen) 
and I feel pain, pain which is caused by, or occasioned in^ 
me by, the tearing of the flesh (a causal relation which 
is inconceivable at the level of physics and iriathematical 
extension, but clearly and distinctly grasped at the level 
of ordinary experience and ordinary speech).
I cannot regard what is said in the letters as either 
ad hoc supplementation or an aberration, since I find it 
involved in the whole Cartesian procedure. Further, I 
hold, if it can be proven "necessarily both p and q" and 
"p and q are incompatible", either one or both of the 
arguments is sadly astray; and here it is the doctrine 
of substance that must be cons id ered if we are to find 
what has gone astray.
. Put In a slightly different fashion, Wiat is admitted 
is that mind statements and body statements are completely 
distinct from one another (along with the substances go 
their predicates and modes), eind both are distinct from 
general fact-statements in the ordinary tongue - this last 
claim being maintained by many later scientists.
1. Doubts about whether Descartes was or was not an "occasions 
ist" seem to me have little ground. In general he uses 
"occasion" as a verb equivalent to "cause" - the mystery lie 
in the causal relation. Whether "occasionalism" was ever 
better than this is a further question.
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Translation Is impossible from the ordinary tongue to 
the scientific or metaphysical tongue and - as one 
consequence - minds and bodies, thinking and extended 
substances, cannot be said to exist in the same sense as 
each other, or in the same sense as that in which we say 
commonplace things, including men, exist. No human mind 
can (and if angels and God are in a better position to 
embrace contradictions, we can never know how they do so) 
grasp both the distinction between, and the intimate union 
of, mind and body, minds and bodies, or the relation between 
their modes of existence and the mode of existence of 
their union, namely man.
But in large part this is what Descartes, in spite of 
his stress upon "one science", upon the unity of mind, 
upon the singularity of its essential act, and the one- 
level sameness of ideas, was trying to prove from the 
beginning of his metaphysics. Senses deceive, mathematics 
and physics (imaginative conception) are almost certain, 
coglto-conception is absolutely certain; souls are 
eternal substances, matter is eternal substance, if not 
in the same sense that the souls are eternal or that God 
is eternal; ordinary things are not eternal (as things 
are not really what yet they are what is for the 
senses). Midway between what we sense (what seems to us 
to be) and what really is (particles in motion) are the 
forms of particular.substances as primary-qualitied
121.
systoms of moving particles, forms which corne into being and 
cease to be as the structure of the particle system changes, 
except that in the case of man the soul (which is not 
experienced, and not qua soul observed at all) goes about 
its own incorporeal business when (as the senses inform us) 
the body ceases to function or (as science tells us) the 
fire goes out in the heart, or the structure of the particle- 
motions changes - and what the precise change is the human 
mind can never know. At best it can conceive of possible 
changes of position of related and moving imagined particles.
 ^ I I ■
Such is the simplicity of the philosopher of the clear 
and the distinct, who introduced the doing of philosophy 
by considering one's own ideas and simple notions, and 
the writing of philosophy in the ordinary tongue. Let 
Descartes speak for himself at some length, and show how 
the Regulae doctrine lies throughout at the core of the 
exposition:
"(You) give me an opportunity to draw attention to 
the things I have omitted (in my explanation), the chief, 
it seems to me, being that having distinguished three 
kinds of ideas or primitive notions which are each known 
in their own particular fashion, and not by the comparison 
of one with the other, i.e. the notion wo have of the soul, 
that of the body, and that of the intimate union between 
tho soul and the body, I should explain the difference 
between these three kinds of notion and between the 
operations of the soul by which we have them, and state 
the means of making each of them easy and familiar (to
frasp); next, having stated why I used weight as an illustrative) comparison, I should make it clear that 
although one wishes to conceive the soul as material - 
and this is what conceiving its union with t he body properly 
amounts to, one should not cease to recognise that it is 
separable from it.......
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Firstly, then, I mention a great difference that there 
is between those three kinds of notion; the soul is 
conceived only by the pure understanding; the body, that is 
to say extension, shape and movement, can also be known 
by the understanding itself, but it is known much better by 
the understanding aided by the imagination; and finally 
those things which belong to the union of the soul and the 
body are known only obscurely by the understanding alone, 
only obscurely even by the understanding aided by the 
imagination, but they are known vary clearly by the senses.
It is because of this that those who never philosophise 
and use only their senses never doubt that the soul moves 
the body, and that the body acts on the soul, but they 
consider the one and the other as a single thing; that is 
to say, they conceive their union, for to conceive the 
union is to conceive them as one thing.^
The metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure 
understanding, serve to make the notion of the soul 
familiar to us; and the study of mathematics, which 
exercises principally the imagination in the consideration 
of figures and movements, accustoms us to form very distinct 
notions of body; and finally, it is through ordinary 
experience and ordinary discourse only, while abstaining 
the imagination, that we learn to conceive the union of 
the soul and the body
If wo revert to the first letter of the saiae date, 
we find the same pattern of repetition of earlier doctrines 
and a clearer indication of the failure to provide a relation 
between them.
1. Surely uhls is,double-talk? Apart from the reification 
of the senses, which is more than a modus loquendl. those 
who never philosophise cannot grasp the notion of soul at 
all. They say "It hurt me and I hit it", "I felt afraid 
and I ran". Descartes credits them with saying "one thing , 
acts on another thing and yet there is only one thing" -
a riddle, not a sense-experience.
2. The stressed sentence is loosely translated: "c'est en ' 
usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaires .^
Kemp Smith gives: "it is by relj^ing exclusively on the 
activities and concerns of daily life" (D.P.W.p.274) . The 
point is that what is familiarly (sensorily) experienced can
be thought and spoken about, and Descartes defends the ordinary 
modes of speech as meaningful. If they were not, his claim as 
to the nature of thinking in all men would be nonsensical. We 
should have clarity only with a technical language.
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"For there are two things in the human soul upon 
which depend all the knowledge we can have of its nature; 
one is that it thinks, and the other that, being united 
to the body, it can act and suffer with it. I have said 
almost nothing of this last (in my published writings) and 
paid attention to making tho first only clearly understood, 
because my principal design was to prove the distinction 
Wiaich exists between mind and body, to which end only tHe 
first (thihking) was useful, and the other would have been 
harmful^ .^
(My stress; "l'autre y aurait été nuisible". We 
liave two pieces of evidence only about the soul, and one 
of them we ignore completely because it will not fit with 
the conclusion which we are determined to draw. Only 
thus do we generate a contradiction immediately - Descartes 
does not want to prove that the soul cannot think if it is 
united to the body) .
"I shall here endeavour to explain the manner in which 
I conceive of the union of mind and body, and how mind has 
the force to move the body.
First, I consider that there are in us certain 
primitive notions, which are like the originals on the 
pattern of wMch we form all our other objects of awareness 
(connaissances). and there are very few of these notions.
For after the most general notions of being, number, 
duration, etc., which apply to all that we are able to 
conceive, we have only for body in particular the notion 
of extension, from which follows that of figure and movement; 
and for the soul alone we have only that of thought, in 
which are included the perceptions'^ of the understanding 
and the inclinations of the will. Finally, for the soul 
and the body together, we have only that of their union, 
on which depends the notion of the force which the soul 
possesses to move the body, and the body to act on the soul, 
causing its sentiments and passions, ("ses sentiments et ses 
passions - both sentiments and passions are bridge terms 
which enable sensations to^  be treated as activities of
1. perceptions. Presumably in "the strict sense". But this 
must be related somehow to what perceives when we sense. Are 
mere perceptions not "of the understanding" for Descartes?
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attention and discrimination and yet aa states of "soul"; 
it is by this means that secondary qualities are 
assimilated to pains which have no bodily location. I 
do not want to discuss tho matter).
"I consider also that all genuine human knowledge 
(toute la science des hommes) consists in soundly 
distinguishing these notions, and not attributing any one 
of them to things to which they do not apply; for when we 
wish to explain some difficulty by means of a notion which 
does not belong to it, we cannot fail to be mistaken; as 
also when we wish to explain one of these notions by 
another, for, being primitive, each of them can only be 
understood by itself.
And in as much as the use of our senses'" has made 
the notions of extension, of shapes, and of movements, 
much more familiar to us than the others, the principal 
cause of our errors lies in our ordinarily wishing to 
make use of these notions fbr explaining things to which 
they do not belong, as when we wish to use the imagination 
to conceive the nature of the soul, or when we wish to 
conceive the way in which the soul moves the body by 
conceiving the way in which a body is moved by another body".
Known in different ways, yet all conceivable; a soul 
which can only be conceived and a body,a real body, which 
can only be sensed and imagined in a manner quite different 
from that in which mathematical figures and motions are 
imagined; yet soul and body somehow "grasped" as related by 
a notion that amounts to "are united so that one affects 
the other in a way neither conceivable nor imaginable".
If these are not contradictions, what could be? And 
finally, two paragraphs from the second letter:
"But when Your Highness remarks that it is easier to 
attribute matter and extension to the soul than to attribute 
the capacity to it of moving a body and of being moved while 
not being material, I beg her to attribute this matter and 
this extension to the soul quite freely, for doing this is 
ohly to conceive it as united to the body, and after having 
conceived it thus and having well experienced the union in 
herself, it will be easy to consider that the matter she 
has attributed to this thought is not the thought itself, 
and that the extension of this matter is quite different 
in nature from the extension of this thought, in that the
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first is determined at a certain place from which it excludes 
all othor bodily extension, which is not the case with the 
second; and thus Your Highness can return easily to* the 
knowledge of the distinction of the soul and the body 
notwithstanding that she has conceived their union.
Finally, I think that it is very necessary to have 
thoroughly understood once in one's life the principles 
of metaphysics because it is those which give us knowledge 
of God and of our soul, and I think also it would be 
extremely harmful to busy the understanding with meditating 
about them, because we could not then attend (as we should) 
to tho functions of the imagination and the senses; the 
best thing we can do is to hold in memory and belief the 
conclusions once drawn, and to employ the rest of the time 
we have studying those thoughts in which the understanding 
acts with the imagination and the senses".
Again the stress above is mine - we switch suddenly 
from the soul to la pensée, from the substance which thinks 
to the substance which thought is. i.e. the thought- 
substance which contrasts with extended-substance. And
after these several pages of contradictories vhich seem to
result in the assertion that so far as science is concerned 
it is what is familiarly experienced and described, 
including the human beings wo always experience ourselves 
as being when we "do not philosophise", that merits our 
attention, vrtiat is the philosophical problem we are left with?
It is scarcely that of finding Descartes' solution,
since it is apparent that he has none. We could,
presumably, follow Kierkegaard and the Existentialists, 
claiming to have found the essence of mind as "incapacity; 
of resolving necessary contradictions, and searching for 
"abysses" across which we "see" a God iho proves his own 
existence by contradicting himself. If, however, we are 
interested in philosophy, we can ignore "souls" and say.
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rather like Descartes, "We think, we can thihk, so let us go
i
on thinking; we can investigate, so let us go on investigating".
!
But we have then to discover the connection (or the 
disconnection) between facts, science and metaphysics, to 
establish them as specifically connected or as completely 
separate from one another - in which case, I claim, metaphysics 
and science are at best phantasies, and of interest to 
psychologists and philosophers of mind. If, instead of 
ignoring "souls or minds", we take seriously vhat is said 
of them, we are confronted with the problem of a soul or 
mind which conceives (metaphysically), imaginatively conceives 
(scientifically) and sensorily observes (factually, 
familiarly, empirically); and we are threatened with the j
paradox of "the mind is one and the mind is at least three"- j
ce que se contrarie. j
If we make viàiat seems to be the obvious move and say:
"There is one mind, one thing, one substance, which conceives, 
imagines and senses, activities which are completely distinct |
. j
from one another, and all we can say about the mind is that 
it acts in these different ways", then we must at least face j
these questions, all of wtiich an Aristotelian must ask: "I |
I
admit it to be true that men do metaphysics and science, and j
chatter about a familiar world in which men have arms and 
legs and brains, eyes and mouths and a variety of organs, are |
emotional and angry and ingeniously constructive and 
inquisitive, like animals in some ways, unlike plants in that 
they are alive euid grow and are nourished, and unlike granite
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and sand particles except that they occupy space-time and 
resist pressure, can be chemically analysed. Wien you say 
that i^nds conceive, imagine and sense, if you are saying 
that men do not really do these things, what sort of thing 
is it that so conceives and imagines and senses? Who and 
what are you who "knows" conceiving and imagining and sensing 
in a way that is none of these, since its objects are all of 
these? The argument from ^conceiving«occurs” to "there is 
a conceiving-thing”, from "imagining occurs” to "there is an 
imagining-thing”, and from '^ sensing occurs" to "there is a 
sensing-thing", cannot justify a claim of one thing which acts 
in these three ways if no connection can be shown between the 
activities# Surely Descartes’ proof in the Cogito and its 
development depends upon all such activities being species 
of a genus and successive acts of the same thing, at least; 
and if difference is the essential relation between the 
activities surely* this demands essentially different agents?"
Again we approach ce que se contrarie in Descartes, though 
years and many pages may separate the explicit formulation of 
the contradictory assertions. "There is one essential and 
self-same act which the mind "knows" itself in and as 
performing, which is thinking, perception, intuitus; "thinking" 
is a generic term for the class of acts which includes 
perceiving, willing, loving, desiring, conceiving, doubting, 
etc....and some of these are absolutely distinct from one 
another and'are not " know able" by one mind or as one mind’s
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activities, unless tliere is one special and yet different 
act of mind which enables the mind to observe all of them 
as acts of that of which it too is an act. Imagining cannot 
be observed or conceived; conceiving cannot be imagined or 
sensed; sensing cannot be imagined or conceived".
The strength of the Aristotelian position, as indicated 
by the questions above, is that its implied assertions are 
clearly intelligible and are verifiable by detemined and 
determinable techniques. The reply to the charge that the 
assertions do not explain how men think is that explanation 
is meaningless unless what is to be explained is a true 
proposition, and the stated truth is not intended to be its 
own true explanation. "p explains p" is a logical phantasm.
The reply to the charge that "men think" is not necessarily 
true is simply to admit that it, and its fellow fact-statements, 
are not so true, and to assert further that no propositions 
are necessarily tnue except in the sense that we speak of r 
as necessarily true when we claim it to be guaranteed by p 
and q, themselves "merely" true. The Aristotelian interest 
in the Cartesian position is metaphysico-logical; it is not 
concerned especially with the question of what minds and 
bodies are really like, it being assumed that there are minds 
and there are bodies, but with the reasoning process involved 
in inferring substance-agent-things from observed acts, in 
contrast with the observing of things acting. It must be 
specially interested in the inferring of agents from classes
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of acts - "thinkings occur" In Descartes’ generic sense - or 
from an act wliose object is a class of acts or possible acts - 
"I think now that I do or can think", where ’do" and "can" ind­
icate not specific acts but "potential!ties".
As "potential thinkings" they are treated by Descaxtes as 
showing "mind or soul" to be, like "this wax", "potentially a 
variety of forms", but as potential acts of an agent they raise 
the question of what is involved in all our discourse in which 
we sajf that A, which acts in manner B at this place and time, 
and in nuinner C at that place and time, is the same A, or that 
A which here and now has different features from those it had 
then and there is the same A. I say "involved in" because 
the inferring of agents (thatnit was Tom who, that it was the 
cow which, broke the gate) and the use of "same" (this same 
Tom, this Bime cow) are not, as such, to be questioned; all of 
our discourse depends upon the latter, which appears in its 
strongest form in our terming the infant b o m  after a foetal 
development and the man who died as a mature, ugly, much loved 
and much hated philosopher the one and same and only Socrates.
Here wo can follow philosophical discussions of "personal 
identity" through paths and by-paths; we can follow Hegel with 
his dialectic or others with their many pages on identity in 
difference; or we can study the Cartesian re-assertion of the 
pre-Aristotelian conviction that A at p^t^ and A at can
be the seme A only if A "contains" an Identical and unchanging 
A-thing, a substance, a substratum, a matter or stuff-essence, 
whether A be man or mind or body. This last is ^hat I propose
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to do, believing that Aristotle did reject, and correctly 
rejected,' the "necessary" self-identical stuffs and subst­
ances and subjects which distort philosophy and science 
and forever bar them from logical relation with fact statements 
which, as truths of the familiar historical world, are 
inevitably "about" things which are complex and changing, 
end stuffs which are complex and changing (at least v^en we 
study them seriously).
Aristotle seems to me to have realised that formal 
principles are formal, and related to fact statements by 
their being formal; Descartes seems to follow interpreters 
of Aristotle in declaring formal principles to be material 
or factual, and having ^  be related to fact statements, 
though the relation is eternally evasive. In clarifying 
the logic of substance, and in considering Descartes* meta­
physical arguments in detail, we come to understand why 
Descartes was convinced that "there are minds" and "there 
are bodies" and "minds are related to bodies" are 
"extraordinary" truths, and why, on his own argument, they 
could never be "ordinary" truths.
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Substance and Subject.
So far we have made as little mention of a source of 
Descartes’ necessary truths, a source of a principle which 
underlies all his arguments, as Descartes does in the 
Meditations. Many statements have been made, and their 
relations argued about, but Cartesian metaphysics stems 
not so much from the relations between statements as from 
the analysis of statements or propositions, i.e. what is 
stated to be so. In a sense the dualism comes also from 
an account of statements, together with an analysis, the
H It
statements being denominated thoughts. We might present 
the case loosely in this fashion: Thoughts are ontologically
distinct from things thought about, "the horse is black" 
from the black horse (which we can ride). Analysis of
"the horse is black" produces entities called "ideas"; but
?
no corresponding analysis of the black horse is possible.
Nor have we horses ih mind. "Horse" appears in mind, in 
thought, as the thing to which the properties or attributes
V
are "applied" - or "intimately united"; literal relational 
terms are as difficult to find here as in the case of all 
metaphysical entities. A sentence has five different 
words for five different properties, each different from the 
word for the thing which is the subject, and which is not a 
horse or "horse" because it is distinct from the properties. 
"Horse" corresponds to the whole sentence, whose subject is
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an uncharacterised "thing" or "substance" or "subject". But 
if our thoughts are to be of anything, our statements are 
to be meaningful, the horse must somehow correspond to, be 
represented by, the complex sentence or statement or thought.
Descartes’ position is somewhat different from that of
philosophers who have wanted to say something like: "A
sentence is a big linguistic unit made up of little linguistic 
units", or "A judgment is a big thought-unit made up of little 
thought units, a complex idea made up of little ideas, a big 
meaning made up of little meanings", although the doctrine of 
simple ideas reduces to something like such a position. He
is not prepared to run counter to his mentors and deny 
predication outright, converting it to a simple relation of 
"addition". Hence he seems to claim that analysis of thoughts 
presents us with attribute terms or ideas attached to "thing" 
or ingredients in "horse", i.e. in "thing which is black, 
quadruped, animal, etc.". But the argument, it seems, must 
run: If thoughts are to bo of horses, then horses must be
like this, must be composites cT thing-sub stance and attributes. 
The subject of all statements, of all thoughts, qua idea, is 
"thing"; the subject of all attributes, which sustains them, 
is thing or subsuance. It is thing or substance which exists, 
persists, is one, and is related existentially to other things 
or substances. There is a metaphysical relation between 
occurrent attributes and the substance to Which they adhere
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(thing) or the substance in which they inhere (horse). And 
at this point predication must disappear. (We can, according 
to Berkeley, ride complex ideas, but not propositions).
If we accept the argument as meaningful, the consequences 
are extensive - how extensive we shall see as we proceed.
It seems to follow directly that substances (and their 
existence) can never be perceived. This Descartes claims.
It also follows that there is no distinction between any 
one substance-subJect and any other. This Descartes denies, 
though he professes to admit only two substance-subjects. 
Almost all post-Cartesian philosophy can be characterised 
as accepting the first consequence, the Cartesian denial 
of the second, and refusing to consider the logical doctrine 
which gives rise to the consequences.
The logical distinction of subject and predicate can 
obviously be made throughout what I have said and quoted 
above, as , it can be made in the case of any assertion in 
a familiar language. The identification of subject and 
substance or thing demands that we consider a sub-class of 
intelligible statements, a sub-class of propositions, but 
no more than this; such will be the argument below. 
Anticipating argument and conclusion, I state in"" summary 
form what I suggest is the logical role of "substance" as 
subject. If I am correct, all of Descartes* doctrines 
can be given a meaning, the world is not completely 
transformed by a consideration of what we discover it to be.
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and none of the metaphysical consequences of the doctrine 
vtiich, it must be stressed, Descartes takes over unquestioned 
from his predecessors, in fact follow# We lose thereby a 
number of necessary truths and metaphysical arguments, but 
we lose also a number of necessary contradictions; we lose 
an easy way to science, but are able to claim that fact 
statements may be true and scientific statements meaningful 
in relation to the world of which fact statements and in 
which fact statements can be made.
(1) "Subject" is meaningless except as a correlative 
of "predicate", and is a logical term.
(There are many uses, directly and indirectly 
related to this use, perhaps independent of this use.
Subject of discussion, of a thesis, of experiment, of a 
country, of an indignity... .these uses are valid and 
important, but we are not denying them in asserting a 
technical use in logic).
(2) The term is useful, and fundamental to a science of 
logic which is concerned with common features and relations 
of propositions. "  ^i
(3) Our only way of talkinguabout things is propositional 
and in a familiar language. The only things we encounter 
are things of a kind related to other things of a similar
and of different kinds; and there are many kinds,of relation 
between things of the same and of different kinds.;
(4) Propositions vdiose predicates are quality-terms 
determine, and are determined by, systems of classification 
of things.
(6) If we accept the technical word "term" for subject 
and for predicate in a proposition, then there may be 
intelligible questions to be raised of the relation between 
terms, words, ideas and occurrences or things. but these 
are not questions to be answered by reference to a logical 
analysis of propositions.
■'
(6) The logic of subject-predicate is concerned with 
the examination of fact statements in a familiar language, 
and within propositions the distinction of subject and 
predicate is an initial logical distinction which can be
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demonstrated dlrectlv# We have neither discovered nor 
created a new "thing* when we have learned that the subject 
of "Socrates is wise" is "Socrates", that the predicate in 
the proposition is "wise". Nor are we confronted with 
the problem of discovering how a predicate is related to 
a subject, an attribute to a substance, or wisdom to Socrates.
The following statements are equivalent to Descartes* 
central and often repeated logical principles:
(a) If X is a substance-term (a subject) it is the 
subject of a proposition which contains at least one 
predicate term. Such a proposition cah be stated with 
any common noun in a language as subject, and hence with 
any proper noun which names an individual of a recognised 
kind. (If there are nouns to be rejected from a language, 
as we might wish to reject phlogiston, Mumbo Jumbo, or 
fairies from our language - or from a class of subjects
of fact statements in our language - the rejection will be 
on non-logical (though not illogical) grounds.
(b) If p is a fact statement, and "x" is the subject, 
then "x" will not only be a possible subject for a quality 
classificatory statement which declares that x is a kind 
of thing, but it will also be a possible subject for a 
statement of a relation between x and y, where "y" can be 
a subject of a quality-classificatory proposition.
This is what is meant by saying that substances 
exist independently of one another. But unless we 
understand the technical terms as relating to propositions 
which have real terms, statements about actual things with 
actual qualities and actual relations, we have failed to 
grasp the meaning of the technical terms, which do not 
replace ordinary language terms. Without attenroting a 
justification, I point out that of any familiar thing a 
number of classificatory or quality statements can be made, 
and a number of relation statements can be made. I shall 
attempt later to mhow that this is entailed by "the tiling 
in question is classifiable" or by "this kind of thing 
can be named by a common noun in our language".
(c) Any sentence whose grammatical subject is a common 
noun and which is used to make a true statement entails a 
non-specific or a specific existential claim on the part 
of the thing or things indicated by the use of the common 
noun. If "x" is such a subject-substance, then it may
be said that x exists; but this is equivalent to (b) in that 
to say "x exists" is to say "x is somewhere and somewhen", 
and this is equivalent to saying "x is spatio-temporally 
related to other kinds of thing".
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I am not laying down the conditions of there being a 
world of a particular kind or a language of a particular 
kind, except in the sense that I am asserting actual 
features of a familiar language used of and in a familiar 
world. That I am prepared to commit myself to answers 
to questions about possible worlds and possible languages 
which can be related to the familiar world by means of our 
familiar language, and that I can give no meaning to possible 
languages and possible worlds not so to be related, are 
further questions.
To many metaphysicians, and logicians, the summary 
above will seem unduly restrictive. I am not denying that 
it can be expanded, but asserting it as a minimal condition 
of there being a subject-predicate logic in the established, 
if sometimes maltreated, sense of "subject-predicate" and 
of "logic".
I want further to claim that logical statements, i.e. 
statements in lofiic, which employ the tems "subject" and 
"predicate" are statements about statements about things, 
statements about fact statements or propositions, and that 
this whole statement is not itself a logical statement.
It is a statement about the nature of logical statements, 
or about the relation between logical statements about fact 
statements and those fact statements. Thus I must argue
(a) that fact statements can be made in a language whose 
use and criteria for truth and falsity and meaningfulness
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are determined prior to any formulation of logical distinctions ' 
and logical statements, although the fact statements have 
logical features and admit of the distinctions and logical 
statements in question; (b) that the formulation of such 
logical distinctions and statements neither displaces nor 
amplifies fact statements as fact statements; and (c) 
statements about logical statements neither displace nor 
amplify fact statements, and are meaningless unless fact 
statements are meaningful and true.
The importance which attaches to this rather conç)licated 
formulation of what otherwise appears obvious is that it 
runs counter to what seems implied by Descartes* logic of 
system, his metaphysic, and later theories of hypothetico- 
deductive systems. Admitting an apparent over-simplification
f v
in stressing three "levels", what I am asserting is that 1;
:
given fact statements and arguments we can proceed to ij
statements about kinds of statements and validity of
.  I
arguments, to logical theory and to formalisation and 
consideration of such theory. At a certain stage we can |
"order".In reverse, presenting statements about the theory, |
* J
the theory, and then the propositions with which we began; 
and our first "principle" might well be "At the most general 
level of logic, and considered only in relation to truth- 
falsity, all propositions are of the subject-pradicate form". 
Because we have been up the ladder, we can introduce 
statements involving variables, and proceed to statements in 
which f values c: of variables appear.
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The opposite thesis is rather that we can begin with 
the most general statements, with rules for the use of  ^
variables, without having either variables or a use for 
"variable", and then can proceed to "invent" variables arid 
finally to *ïnvent" instances for the variables and achieve 
a language. And having achieved a language, the difficulty 
is only to find a world to talk about. If the "harmony" 
is pre-established, we have one; if not, we have to try and 
do as Descartes is forced to do, infer or deduce one.
On the opposite thesis, there is no disharmony.
To meet a Cartesian objection that logic or metaphysics 
has to do with thoughts and not with statements in words, 
all that it is necessary to do is to write "thoughts" instead 
of "statements" above. There is no need to alter any
;v
statement made about propositions, since these can be 
treated directly as "what is said" or."what is thought".
We find Descartes himself using pronunciatura as what is 
said or thought in Meditation^II. -  ^ re -
It is quite open to a metaphysician to claim that in 
talking about substancoa and attributes, uhlversais and ,
relations, he Is* not making statements about logical . '
statements about fact statements* With suohLa claim I * 
have (except Indirectly) nothing; to do here*J What 1 am”' -'’*-'
asserting Is that If subject-predlcate distinctions and
substanoe-attrlbute distinctions a ^  logical distinctions.
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then such statements as "there are subjects" and "there are 
substances" are quite different in kind from statements like 
"there are bears" and "there are beavers"; and I am denying 
that any logical analysis of "bears are animals which eat 
honey and live in caves" will prove that there are really 
no bears, or that bears are only collections of attributes, 
or that there is something in a bear which holds the 
attributes together. As with "there are only universale", 
confused logic is mistaken for ontology. Later we can 
give a meaning to the statement that the "world" has a 
metaphysical structure.
In very brief summary:
(a) If X is a substance, "x" is the subject of a fact 
statement in which x is asserted to be of a kind.
(b) Nothing can be a substance term which has no attributes. 
(This is a version of a central Cartesian principle: it 
reduces to "Nothing can be said of that of which nothing 
can be said". Its converse is "If anything can be said
of something it can be said of something").
(c) If X is a substance, then it may be said that x exists, 
is somewhere and somewhen, and is spatio-temporally related 
to other things. Dating is possible for any^individual x.
(d) If it cannot be said that x exists, then x is not a 
substance. '
(d) may appear to insist on a distinction between subject
and substance; but all that it admits is that there may be
statements which are not fact* statements. It is not denied
that there are fictional statements as well as logicdL
statements which can be meaningfully made. I have delimited
a classfof statements, not provided a definition in a
140.
Russellian or Cartesian sense; or, it might be said, I 
have offered a definition of "substance" in terms of 
undefined concepts, e.g. "true" and "fact-statement".
The last is not strictly true, since "fact statement" has 
a variety of uses which demand further consideration.
2. How does this general position connect with the problem 
of dualism as we have considered it above?
(i) Mind, or thinking substance, if minds are things,
if "mind" is a common noun, satisfies (a). It is the
subject of a set of statements whose verbs are species
of the verb "to think" in Descartes* generic sense, and
these species are ordinary language uses.
(All specific verbs here have objects, and the range 
of objects is complicated; we have difficulties when 
Descartes introduces special uses of "sense"; we have 
further difficulty when we consider "thinking" as a 
differentia correlative with "extension". But we are 
considering how Descartes uses the word "mind" herev.
(ii) Body, or extended substance, if bodies are 
things, if "bodies" is a common noun, satisfies (a).
"Body" is the subject of statements whose predicates are 
"extended" and "moves" (auid again there are later
difficulties).
(iii) Both "mind" and "body", if they admit of plurals, 
satisfy (b), (c) and (d)•
And, as I have argued, we have no problem of dualism -
we simply have two kinds of thing-substances in the same
\
world, Sind their relations are spatio-temporal. There 
is not even a problem with "sensing" - all we have to
141
do is to give it a moaning such that "minds" could do it, 
and to that end we need deny only that things are sensed 
and assort that sensations or sense-date' are sensed and 
have no relation to bodies. If what the minds think 
happens to coincide with what ia true of the extended 
world, this is interesting,^ but it makes no more 
difference to minds or to extensions than does the failure 
of the thoughts to coincide with anything in the extended 
world. As long as we keep outside, there are no problems 
here for us or for minds.
(iv) But if there are statements which can be made of 
"men", i.e# statements of sensing, of passion and emotion, 
of feeling pain and hunger, then man satisfies all the 
criteria for being a substance•
vJhy should this give rise to problems? It is apparent 
enough that in any of the languages with which Descartes
was concerned, as in English, it is possible to speak of
'
"man" as doing or suffering all that Is in question.
A proposition with "man" as subject and the predicates " 
mentioned can be stated in each of several mutually 
translateable languages. It is also apparent that in 
any of the languages it is possible for any man to refer 
to himself as an Englishman hoes by using "I"; and any 
man can (must, on Descartes* view) admit the Cogito
le To us, or to God.
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as an argument, admit that he can doubt, cannot doubt that 
he doubts in doubting, can think that he thinks and cannot 
deny that he thinks, if he speaks the language in which 
these arguments can be presented.
There is, strictly, nc problem here that arises from 
the purely logical doctrine of substance-attribute. "Man", 
like "mind" or "body", can be said to be of a kind, to 
exist, and to be spatio-temporally related to other 
substances, i.e. admits of relation statements. That 
two substances are related in such a way that they 
constitute a third substance presents no logical difficulty - 
unless we.have "created" a logical relation between the 
two substances such that no empirical, no actual, relation 
between them is possible ..such that they can combine in 
the way required. "Man" and "car" satisfy the criteria 
for being sub stance-terms, and statements can be made about 
"man-driven-car" which cannot be made about the man alone 
or the car alone. We accept fact statements-about hearts 
and lungs as well as about men; we accept statements about 
batteries as well as torches; and with our attention 
directed to these different situations we may well feel that 
important distinctions are being over-ridden by talking 
about substances or subjects at all. . '
But when we discover complications and investigate, we 
use common nouns and fact statements, and the logical 
distinctions still apply. The illustrative examples
I
il j IJ.
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abovo employ toms as subjects which satisfy the logical 
requirement», and provided that we have some notion of a 
relation, perhaps not very specific and certainly non-logical 
unless it is a vague version of "parts of à whole", which 
I shall argue presents us with special bgical problems, 
between an x and a y which we can describe independently 
of one another, we can grasp the combination of x and y 
into a composite unit# We can grasp that they are combined 
and ask how they are combined, with some hope of finding
must be insisted upon is that no logical analysis of a 
statement that Z acts in a certain way will enable us to
say "Z is a system of X and Y"; no logical analysis will
\ •
enable us to say "X and Y are so related that Z does so
act" even if we also know that X and Y are the only things
present in 2. On the other hand, we are familiar with 
substance-sub jects of which it can be said that they are 
structured and how they are structured - hence most of 
our empirical science.
(It is vital here to note a distinction which will 
trouble us for many pages, that troubles Descartes 
throughout. When we think of "substance" in connection 
with actual and invèstigable human bodies, we think of 
flesh and blood and bone, not of "things" like hearts and
lungs and hands and eyes.
"We must think of the force (vis) by which we are 
properly said to know things as being purely spiritual.
1. Not, obviously, if x and y are "concepts".
1an answer if we can discover relevant facts. . What \i
I #
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and no less distinct from the whole body than blood is from 
bone, or a hand from an eye", writes Descartes, in 
Régula XII. The sense in vAiich we speak of "blood" and 
"bone" as substances is not the sense in which we speak 
of "hands" and "eyes" as substances - we do not accept 
statements like "x is made of hand", "x is made of eye".
This distinction is roughly between "thing" and "stuff", 
which is not not a distinatlon already included in the 
Bubstance-attribute distinction. The relation between 
"thing", "stuff" and "structure" will concern us for 
a chapter and more below. It is apparent enoiigh that 
in the 6ase of a multitude of familiar things, being a 
thing is not incompatible with being structured, and even 
being of many stuffs. Simples are hard to find.)
(v ) To the statements made above about "man" as subject 
of types of prédicats, Descartes adds: Mari'is an intimate
union, is so from birth, experiences himself as such, and 
prior to death no man is other than an intimate union.
Hence h e ’seems to maintain that all statements with "man" 
as subject regarded as meaningful and true in ordinary 
circumstances, and having predicates like "senses","feels", 
"is angry with", etc., are actually meaningful and time.
If this is so, then he can argue that "mind" and "body" 
must be united to make an agent because there ^  an agent 
made of mind and body. But the statement that mind and 
body are substances united to form a substance is not a 
logical statement; it is a fact statement about substances 
as things. We are presented with logical problems because 
the same predicates are assertable in ordinary discourse 
of "man" as Descartes asserts of "mind" and of "body", 
while it seems equally assertable that what is predicated 
of "mind" by Descartes, namely that it is unextended, cannot 
be meaningfully asserted of man at all. Descartes seems
146.
to bo forced to argue that If man Is extended, then man 
cannot be said to think, while in general usage "x is not 
extended" entails "x is not a man".
The further puzzle is part logical - it is intelligible 
to ask "What are the minds like which do this thinking?", 
and completely unintelligible to ask how these minds are 
related to bodies of any kind until we have been given an 
answer. The insistence that minds can only be conceived
demands that we give an account of a relation between a 
concept in one field and an encountered body in another 
field; the insistence that bodies too are concepts removes 
the question from the empirical realm and leaves it to the 
conceiver to explain what Irie is talking about.
• That Descartes has these difficulties forced upon him 
is evident in the letters to Elizabeth, as I:showdd above.
kTiat he seems to attempt to show elsewhere is:
• *
(a) That all we can aver say of mind isthac it thinks, 
ia not extended, and is complstaly different from body - 
vdiioh loads inevitably to a stuff sense, l«e. nothing 
made of body oould think. When it does so lead, the 
"relation" is ignored, and mind tends to become a system 
of thoughts and ideas, rather than a thing which thinks. 
Mind is what man is said to do, or what results from 
nan* s doing.
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(b) That all atatemants about man can b© reduced by 
scientific investigation to statements abèut minds and 
their thoughts and statements about the complex structures 
and movements of bodies and parts of bodies, i.e. physics- 
physiology and introspective reports exhaust léiat can be , 
said of what is unscientifically labelled manl Descartes 
was frustrated in all of his attempts to extend physics 
into biology.
Fui^ther, he is at least consistent in s tating as a 
central metaphysical truth
(c) that no substances can be directly known, and all 
substances are inferred (if infallibly) from encountered 
attributes.
None of those statements are logical statements; and 
all involve fact-assertions and scientific dlaims.
(c) demands a now logical thesis regarding substance, a 
new analysis of propositions, vhich Descartes uses to 
establish the reduction of "man" to "mind and body" - 
although, I shall argue, it establishes nothing of the 
kind. What it demands is the surrender of all the common 
nouns in the language being used, and the insistence that 
"thing" is the only substance-term required. But it also 
requires that we should treat all attribute-terms as 
substance terms, and predication as a relation.
Chapter V.
The Major jz^ ath to Thinking Substance.
The Cogito is widely accepted, ml sunders too d and
"Interpreted”.
"Ego Cogito, ergo Kgo Sum", In appropriate translation,
iB Intelligible to all thinkers, holds of all thinkers,
and need worry no one. But It worries Descartes. It la 
obvious In the Hegulae, repeated In the Discourse, the 
Iledltatlons. the principles, but as Descfirtes proceeds 
arguments and more arguments seem to be called for.
(p.164). The primary argument Is in terms of cogito as 
a verb, of thinking as the act of an agent. Butwhat is 
true or false is a thought, not an act. What we have to do 
Is to unravel the confusions of "I think p", "p Is true", 
and "a thought Is In my mind", and relates these to the 
Cogito.arguments.
The Cogito Is complex, confused and vacuous.
2. (p.172). The arfcument above Is developed to show that 
"I am certain only that I am a thinking thing" Is not 
equivalent to "I am certain I am only a thinking thing" 
(Gassendi’s point), and leads on to the question Descartes 
himself has to ask: "What am I who thinks?"
Descartes’ rejection of "I am a man" is 
neither justified nor Is It the real basis of the argument, 
which depends upon "substance" as Inferred subject and 
"thinking" as a necessary (principal) attribute.
The liApllcatlons of "principal attribute" 
must be considered later. We lead on to a study of how 
Cogito as act becomes Cogltatlo as object In Descartes’ ' 
nrguiaents: tlie essence of mind is no longer act or power 
of thinking, but thought.
(We consider thoufdit In the next «flinpter. It will 
later he argued that Is Is thought which, in contrast with 
bodies, is Descartes* mental, immaterial and unextended 
substance qua stuff. But before this can be discussed we 
need to study the "mental atomism" of the doctrine of 
"single notions" which begins in the Heftulae and is never 
surrendered).
"AT. M0t WO men nude up of body end eoul? 
There le nothing else, he replied.
" The lovera of knowledge know that Wh«i phlloeopl^ 
receives Uie soul, eho le fast bound In toe bodt/, and 
fastened to It* she Is unable to oontnqplate vdmt is, 
by herself, or except through the bars of her prison- 
house, the body; and she le wallowing In utter Ignor­
ance. And philosophy seee that the dreadful thing 
a out too IngirlGoiment Is that it is caused by lust, 
and that toe captive herself Is an acconpllee In her 
own captivity. Tlie lovers of knowledge, I repeat, 
know that philosophy takes the soul vdien she Is in 
tills condition, and gently encourages her, and strives 
to rolnase her from her eaptivity, showing her that toe 
perceptions of toe eye, and toe ear, and the other 
senees, are ïUll of deceit, and persuading her to stand 
aloof from toe senees, and to use them only vAien she 
must, and exhorting her to rally and gather herself 
togetoer, and to trust only to herself, and to toe real 
existence which she In her own self appréhende* and to 
believe that nothing which Is subject to change, und 
which she perceives by other faculties, haa ary truth, 
for oucli tilings are visible and sensible, while what 
she herself sees Is apprehended by reaoon and invisible".
Socrates, In the Phaedo (OmrCh),
"What kind of thing Is liable to suffer dispersion, 
and for what kind of thing have we to fear dispersion?.,
V
how Is It not the owApound and composite idilcdi Is 
is naturally liable to be dissolved in toe some way In 
which it was compounded? And is not what Is unoompounded 
alone not liable to dissolution. If anything Is not?
Ibid.
"Aujourd >'hui done quo fort à propos pour ce dessein j»al 
déllvr*^  mon esprit de toutes sortes de soin, que par 
bonheur je ne me sens aglt^ d'aucunes passions....."
Oescartes. Iledltatlon 1.
■One le One and all alone, and ever more éhall be so".
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W'.'
-  , - . v
msyisaLXi 
Th±miaua&j
. ; ; ■•.... V'v? -f,-,,. ,r '
■ ■:■ ;■;£■ , ■"'■'.J* A:!.' .... :■* . . ; ' -
. . . . r;rs» ar
.-*-
_ \^i
L49#
The Major kath to Thlpklng Substance.
In the if r^ecodjng chapters I argued that there was no  ^
probleiu of dualism If there were unextended thinking things 
scattered through a world of extended particles, and that 
Descartes, whatever his necessary proofs of such a state of 
affairs, was both concerned with the familiar world and able 
to prove that zalnds tind extended substances of a certain kind 
or form were intimately united and, as intimately united, 
constituted a special but single substance. Stress was laid 
on the letters to Elizabeth in indicating the difficulty of 
finding a place for "man” in the realm of necessary truths, 
and hence in metaphysics, and a number of "minor" writings 
were also mentioned. But it remains true that philosophers 
have in general paid little critical attention to those 
writings, while devoting attention at length to the Discourse 
and to the Meditations. It is there that the main argument 
for the independent substantiality of minds and bodies is 
presented, and it is from these that that the main estimation 
of Descartes derives.
The straightforward argument to "thinking substance", 
intended to apply to all "mental phenomena", to which attention
Is directed, is the faiaous Cogito. It is widely accepted, as
■* ,
widely misunderstood (on Descartes’ own adiaisslon It does not 
amount to "Cogito,ergo unextended minds exist"), and as widely 
"interpreted" in various ways. What Descartes seems to do Is 
to prove that he, Descartesj exists whenever he thinks that he
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thinks and exists, a "fact" that he régards as eiiaijly and 
obviously the case in the Hecculae and the Principles, 
and he draws the conclusion that a thinking thing exists, 
that he exists as a thinking thing, a thinking substance#
Why should we, why should anyone, want to challenge the 
assertion that Descartes does (or did) think, or the existent­
ial claim that goes along with the fact statement thr;t 
Descartes exists (or existed) whenever he thinks (or thought), 
or the yet different claim that if he did not think he cquld 
not think that he existed? Ego Cogito entails Ego Sum. "He 
is thinking" entails "he exists". If you are thinking,then 
you too exlot. The Cogito is unassailable, in many raodes.
In any language with words for "I", for "think" and for 
"exist", for anyone who can utter the Cogito.
Why then is Descartes’so concerned? For concerned he Is.
In the itegulae the truth of the Cogito Is so plain that It -
requires only indication; the Discourse Is more elaborate, and 
produces the curious argument In Part IV that "if I had only 
ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had 
ever imagined had been Inrenllty existent, I would have no 
reason to believe that I existed" - the stress is mine to 
show the nub of the argument; and this, together with "I 
could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world 
or place where I might be, but I could not therefore suppose 
that I was not", and with "from the very circumstance that I 
thoufîht to doubt the truth of other things, it most clearly 
and certainly followed that I was", produces the conclusion
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* that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature cons­
ists only In thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need 
of no place, nor is ^ dependent on any material thing, so that 
•*I”, that is to say the mind by which I am what I am,^ is 
wholly distinct from body, and is even more easily known than 
the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, 
it would still continue to be all that it is".
In the Iieditatlons the stress is on "cannot be doubted", 
the doubt is specifically labelled "metaphysical", and the 
method of doubt seems designed to show as a practical imposs­
ibility what has already been established as a logical imposs­
ibility," no one can doubt that he doubts ^ e n  he doubts".
The principles repeats the intuited obviousness, the doubt- 
impossibility. Yet we find in the Meditations, and in the
1, What can "by which I am wViat I am" mean here but "if I did 
not have a mind I would not be the kind of thing that I am, i.e. 
a thing with a mind?" The point is the "substance whose essence 
or nature lies wholly in thinking". What Descartes is doing 
illustrates his odd trea-baent of "principal attributes", of 
which every thing has one. He converts "if a thing lacks the 
attribute X it Is not a Y" into "if a Y lacks (or loses) the 
attribute X it does not exist 6or ceases to exist)". If by 
man we mean a "thinking thing", then when a man ceases to 
think he ceases to be a man - an awkward expression only when 
we refuse to say "the man died and became a corpse".
We can recggnise here that "acting" or "doing" is differ­
ent from having a "quality" - m d  that what troubles us is that 
"no longer thinks" is taken to mean that something else has 
happened as well to the man. Descartes hopes to prove the 
immortality of the soul by proving that souls have only one 
attribute,"thinking", and that it is meaningless to say that 
that could lose it, while nothing else could conceivably 
happen to a soul.
What further must concern us is that if thinking is not what 
I do but a process going on In me, to say that thinking has 
ceased is to say that the process is no longer going on in me. 
Process raises special problems of substance; and so does the 
attempt to treat thodght as act of me and process in me.
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^ 9 quite a battery of further arguments still 
apparently designed to prove that Descartes is a thinking 
substance.
Almost at times one suspects that Descartes was not 
quite sure that although "doubting" was a species of thinking 
it was equivalent to both "think not" and "not think", was not 
quite sure that "thinking not" and "cannot think that not" 
were the same as "not thinking" and "«annot not think".
There is a reason for the uncertainty: the Cogito 
provides an answer to Descartes’ search for metaphysical cert­
ainty in the form of an indubitable truth with an existential 
entailment on the part of the subject, and this entailment 
brings the truth into line with ordinary fact statements; yet 
it is denied that any further positive assertion can be made 
about the subject, that any further description of it can be 
given, and this is not true of any other fact statement with 
an individual subject.
The argument jW the Cogito is in the familiar tongue, 
and as such would be admitted by anyone who understood it.
But there is reason apparent for saying that "I think" is 
a special kind of proposition, even perhaps for sjÿigg that 
it is a metaphysical one, reached by a special method of 
metaphysical philosophising. Indeed, metaphysics appears as 
a science completely stated with the one proposition so 
attained. Yet for the ordinary user of "I" and "think", the 
statement "I think" is a universal one in the sense that
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any thinker can think or utter it and it is merely 
ludicrous to say that "I think" is the only thou^t I can 
think, or the only statement that I can make, which is true 
of me,i.e. is true and has "I" as subject. It is as ludic­
rous ao the statement that all that can bo said about cows 
and giraffes is that they are extended.
Both "I" and "think" in fact "e:xpand" in a variety of 
ways. Unless it is possible to expand "I think" the propos­
ition is useless to Descartes; if it expands as the Dubito 
contracted it, it e^ qp ^ nds into "I am a mon who is sometimes 
deceived by his senses, who sometimes thinks cows are horses, 
that bushes are bears, a man who con suppose that he is not 
bodily and can argue from this that he is thinking all the 
time he is supposing and making false judgments or invalid 
inferences"; it must be allowed to expand in a restricted 
way if it is to produce the results which Descartes has 
decided that it is to produce, the proofs that what Descartes 
knows to be true is necessarily true, . .
It ie easy to Insist too much on Descartes' religloüs, 
convictions, but the Ileditations were advertised as proving 
that Ood exists, that souls are Immaterial and immortal} 
these beliefs are not prejudices Jor Descartes, because they 
ure known to be true, atheists who doubt them must be _wrong» 
The argument produced is to be the final refutation o f . 
all atheistical arguments - without any consideration of ^ ^  
them “ and it is not in the least dubitable that the-»body„ 
is left behind at death. For Descartes "I am a soul that
li
.if
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poBsesBOB a body and loaves It at death" is a literal mode 
of speech, and this Is why he can simply reject •! om a man" 
irom any consideration whatever while he doing metaphyoics 
-in-.the_p.rd 1 nary tongue» The reason why the lieditations 
appeared in Latin is not that Latin enables one to say things 
that cannot be said in iTench, but that caviar is not for the 
general. We shall see below the general effect of the method 
of establishing that true propositions are necessarily true,
i
and of the setting up of the method as the essence of science.
"I think" is not, in isolation, a necessary truth - if we 
can regard it as a "thought" at all. Any isolated thought qua 
thinking is purely contingent, like any other particular act. 
Kecessity appears only when the question of truth or falsity 
appears, as when someone challenges the statement "I think" 
made by Descartes or by someone else# It is difficult to 
phrase this - and hence part of the convincingness of the 
Cogito - but we can put it this way: an act cannot be true or 
false, though an assertion that an act did occur or is occurring 
may be true or false according as the act in question did or 
not occur.
There are many interpretations of the Cogito, many 
explanations of what it really means. But as it is presented 
In the lieditations "I think" states something that I do - 
it is an act, and dateable, admitting the adVerbial modifier 
"whnnever". It is on act correlative with "Descartes thinks", 
BDeocortes thought", "Descartes is thinlcing", and (although
...
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I profess to be familiar with a number of the difficulties
of this verb-use of "to think") I want to consider the 
arguiaent first of all only In these terms,i.e. in Descartes’ 
own terms. His goal is to justify the replacement, of "men" 
in "men think" by "minds",i.e. to justify "minds think".
What can be true or false is the statement that an act 
occurred, that an act is occurring; and "thinking" requires 
an object, something must be thought to be so, if it is to 
occur as an act. What can be true or false, if p is the 
object, is p. I shall use the symbol P below to indicate 
the class of thought-objects that may be true or false, 
and use p or the expression "value of P" to mean a specific 
and expressed or stated or formulated thought. What I want 
to avoid and to illustrate is the systematic ambiguity by 
which "a thought" is treated both as what can be true or 
false and as something that occurs at a particular time.
What occurs or is dateable is "thinking that p", not p; . 
thinking a value of P is an occurrence, but a value of P 
as object of "I think" is not. It is literally meaningless 
to say ’"Caesar is dead’ is going on now", whether in me or 
anywhere else.
If an act of thinking is the object, then what can be 
doubted is "I thought that p", or "I am thinking that^p" - 
the last being the crux of the matter for Descartes, who 
wants to show that if it is true I cannot be mistaken about 
it, and if it is false it did not occur to be doubted. If we
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as8umo,aB Descartes does, that-in our,supposing and doubting 
the whole vocabulary of our language is available to us, and 
can be used with full understanding (whatever this may involve 
in the idiom of "ideas"), then the range of values, of P is 
indefinite. Any assertion or thought must be a value of ÿ, 
nnd from this we can conclude that there must be a thinker 
in eveiy case where a value of P is thought, and the thinker 
will be an agent since thinking or asserting needs to be done. 
But the necessity of the agent depends upon a necessary truth 
combined with the fact claim that p was thought, and that any 
p should be thought at a particular time is certainly not 
necessary In any other sense than "thinking p was the necess­
ary consequence of a preceding circumstance".
Once we have recognised this, we can with the aid of 
the necessary truth which the natural light confims or 
supplies for us, that every act is of an agent, conclude that 
it is a necessary condition of the occurrence of a thinking 
that a thinker should happen to "think the thought in question, 
and that anybody should think a [articular thought is merely 
contingent in the sense that matters of fact are said to be 
continûment. -' The existential claim can follow only from a 
noted factual occurrence, an act which has as its object 
a value of P • and this occurrence will, when stated, fall 
"outside" the value of P which is its object, while only 
within a value of P, within a thought, can necessity be 
demonstrated.
As soon as the act is stated or thought, so that instead
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of "p" we consider "I thought p", we have a thought which is 
different from the previous thought, a new value for P.
The difference is indicated when values are specified: "There 
is a 49 bus" is denied by "It is not a 49"; "I thought there 
was a 49 bus" is denied by "You did not" - "you thought it was 
a 69", "you said it was a 69", give a context.
That values of P can be doubted is the whole basis of 
the method of doubt. That a necessarily true thought must be 
a value of P seems certain, since P is the class of "What can 
be thought to be so". What we are concerned with all the 
time are actual thoughts as what is thought or thinkable, and 
their truth or logical relations or logical status. We can, 
of course, reject sub-classes of P from consideration , and 
this is tbhat Descartes does. He dispenses with all thoughts 
or statements about individual bodies as existing things with 
the rejection of sensory evidence as not satisfying his requ­
irements; another sub-class goes with the rejection of imag­
ining - and both rejections are in terms of ordinary meanings 
of "sense" and "imagine". Yet either sub-class presents us 
with a number of necessary truths - bears are animals.. 
circles are plane figures.•••plums are not tetrahedrons..... 
That some values of P are necessarily true is irrelevant to 
the argument; they are just not to be considered. And what 
the rejection shows us is that the, necessity of a thought is 
not relevant to the necessary existence of the thinker, and 
that we are limited in our doubting to the sub-class of values 
of P which contains only thoughts or statements that individual
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things exist.
That values of P which constitute members of the 
rejected sub-class es were thought by rae, by Descartes, is 
not denied. If we deny it, we, deny the whole basis of our 
ar^^umentt I thought p, and p was existential and false.
We must have thoughts that can be doubted, classes of 
thoughts that can be doubted, occurrencoo of "thinking p" 
which are successive in time (and which can be remembered 
both as thinkings and as values of P), oth rwise "doubt" 
would be laeajiinglesB and metaphysics would never begin.
Vhat now seems clearly odd about <the Dubito is that we are 
t&iking lor granted that we ( each of us as I) persist as 
thinkers of many thoughts. But that this is the case is 
apparent from the first senxoncee of the Discourse, xhe - 
leditations, or the principles. It?4s cleaner in the last, 
because it is frequently re-stated in the headings to, and 
even in, the successive principles. Indeed, it is interesting 
to note that in translating principles 1.8. Veitch avoids 
the Latin version’s " supposing ae we now do that nothing 
exists which is different from us".which makes the argument 
clear and results in a non-sequltur, and adopts the 1 ranch 
version’s "that there is,nothing which truly,is or exists 
apart"from our thought", hors de notre pensee. ^ich throws 
a cloak of obscurity over the argument. -
Ve musj, I shall argue, have sheer incoherence if we 
attempt to present Cartesian arguments in terns of "we". But 
if the argument is conducted in terms of "I", then "I", seem
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to be a perolctent thinker of many thoughts who Is seeking 
to prove that he exists and necessarily exists* Indeed, I 
seem to be more - I seem to be a man who has thought many 
thoughts, a man who discovers that none of them had necess­
ary existential entailments, a man who has a moral obligation 
to doubt that things so thought of really existed; and I am 
also a man who is unable to doubt that he exists when he 
acts,when he thinks. Who cannot give a meaning to "I am a 
man who necessarily exists" but is determined to show that 
he necessarily is a mind and not a man when ho thinks that 
he exists. The persistence and existence of a thinker of 
many thou.^ts, then, is not denied or doubted; what is 
doubted is that I, the persisting thinker, am a man. The 
metaphysical doubt is to enable us to dismiss "I am a man" 
in each of our cases because we can, as I can, dismiss for 
the purposes of metaphysics at least all objects of sensory 
perception, and hence all bodies, as necessarily existing.
But I still have to prove that I necessarily exist.
The proof demands a thought, x^ich ad dts of universality 
and of necessity; but it requires also an act, a thinking. 
Which seems inevitably to be contingent. I need an indubit­
able thought that contains itself as an act which is necess- 
ary by virtue of its inclusion in the thought. I need a 
value of P which has "I" as subject, "thinking" as a verb, 
and an object of "thinkin^î" if the thinking'in question is 
an act; " '
Any statement "that I thought" is useless for Descartes,
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gince "If I thought then I thought and existed", while 
necessary as an argument, demands memory to guarantee the 
assertion "T thought" which anchors the argument (if p,q; 
and p) * iiJvon "a moment ago" is sufficient to destroy the 
full necessity Descartes is seeking, and what is demanded 
is "I hero and now thinking cannot ho mistaken in thinking 
that I think and exist here and now". "I think that p", 
as "I am thinking that p", gives as necessarily true "I do 
think that p, whether p he true or false"; and this, while 
Descartes wants it, is scarcely adequate, partly because it 
is a fact claim whose "incorrigibility" cannot be demonstrated 
though it may be widely accepted.
It is, in a sense, demonstrable, byf showing that 
certain occurrent thoughts would be impossible unless certain 
conditions were the cnee - and this is in part what Descartes 
undertakes in a section of the Méditations. But his argument 
does not prove a necessary intuition of oneeeîîf thinking in 
any thinking; it proves that "I think that p" entails "I think 
that p", the latter being analysed into "I think that p does 
not entail that p is true and hence does not entail that I 
must believe p". Even here the initial assertion is a fact 
assertion, and it is impossible for Descartes to claim that 
the only evidence neceosary for the fact assertion is "intuit­
ive perception", since if "I think and I exist" can be 
intuited, both substance-subject and existence are directly 
perceived. The whole structure of the metaphysics, as wo 
shall see, depends upon neither existence nor substance
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being BO perceptible.
What promlseB better lo »I think that I thlnlf that p", 
whore "thinking" and "thinking that thinking" are co-Instant­
aneous, and the existence claim Is co-instantaneous with 
the dual thinkings, "I am thinking now that I am thinking 
now and I exist now while I am thinking" seems to be a 
single, self-sustaining or self-contained, and self-guarant-
t
oeing thought. We can dispense with an alien p, because
"I am thinking now and I exist now" is an object, a value of p.
Why must "self-contained" and "co-instantaneous" be 
so stressed? Briefly, (a) because a thought must be one 
thought to be a thought and so to be true or false, (b) a 
single thought must be instantmieous to be "intuited" in the 
fashion of the i^egulae as true or false, and (c) because of 
Descartes’ metaphysic of time as discrete and self-contained 
instants. The consequences of apparently simple arguments 
follow for Descartes because thqy are interpreted in a 
context of theory of mind, thought, logic and general theory 
of space and time* (a) and (b) are especially iB^portant , 
here. In the Uegulae seeing truth Is for Descartes seeing 
connections of Ideas, and essentially making one clear and 
distinct judgment which has an individual subject. ^
The eoAphasis in the metaphysics is on the subject 
containing its predicate as an element In a complexity, but 
In the Mediae Descartes was on his way to rejecting universal
propo8itions,a0 relations of ideas only, by converting them
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into hypo the ti cals ("All x are y" into "if x then y") and 
finally to rejecting all hypothetical argumente and alll 
implication. What giveo meaning to a universal proposition 
is the encountering of Individual instances; the scientist, 
ae a good Baconian, is concerned with forms or predicates of 
individuals, which can be observed and compared as having 
degrees of the same form. But the metaphysical demajads 
prevent any taking for granted of observable individuals, 
auid their Implied existence, with the result that relations 
of ideas, universal propositions and hypothetical arguments 
are all we are left with. Descartes is quite correct In
■ i
believing that existential claims for,<individual things are 
the foundation of his science, however rational it may be, 
since he conceives of science as explaining and relating, 
end if no things exist there is nothing to be explained or 
related. m
There is much to be said here; but even in the  ^
iiogulae. and especially as the emphasis becomes more and 
more placed on mathematics, it is clear that scjentja tends 
to be identified with thought, with ideas and relations of 
ideas clearly and distinctly perceived, with notions and 
general propositions which are true whether any things exist
A *
or not, thus presenting the possibility that all scientific 
propositions may be true and yet that there should be no  ^
world at all of which they are true.
We have, as metaphysicians aware of this problem, 
many general truths: "nothing could think unless it existed"
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is true, but gives no guarantee that any thing thinks;
"if & thing thinks it existe" shows by its form that no 
existence claim is made; "res cogitans est", or "res cogitans 
cogitet ergo res est", are still universal, if obviously true. 
"Ego cogito ergo ego sum" is what is required, since here 
we have Universal necessity in the predications, and existence 
claim on the part of the subject. But the claim is not yet 
necessary, since I have to prove Ego cogito# that I think, 
and the only way of doing this seems to be to think and to 
catch myself in the act of thinking, catch myself here and 
now. Yet back we come to what the metaphysics denies is 
possible, the intuiting of a substance; and back we come to 
what the Hegulae has suggested, and the claim that "exist­
ence" and "thinking" are simple notions recalls to us, namely 
that no simple notions can entailMne another.
What is especially odd about the insistence on the here 
and the now, the immediacy which is necessary for an infallible 
perception, is that it seems to defeat Descartes’ end.^If 
"I think that I think", "I am thinlcing that I aan thinking", 
is a self-conscious act, and instantaneous, it has full necess­
ity (by virtue of "self-conscious", whatever else that curious 
term may mean here), but it remains "tied to the instant".
The truth is useless for Descartes, since it does not provide 
even for "whenever I am thinking I am certain that I am", the 
truth that Descartes wants to establish by discovering a 
necessary instance of it. He can no more get' from "x exists 
now" to "X persists" than variants of Cartesianism can get
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miiids froiiii disconnected acts, time from discrete instants, 
or minds and worlds irom discret® "perceptions", oven if 
these are treated as restricted values of Descartes can 
avoid this in part by reverting to syllogism - it is certainly 
tn^e that any thinker exists, I think now, therefore I j^aa a 
thinker who exists. But even if we accept this without 
stressing that his account of universal propositions must be 
altered cowipletely, it is still the fact claim that is vital; 
and how vital is indicated by the simple statement in Régula 
XII that "I cm therefore God exists" can be intuited as 
neceeearlly true. Descartes is founding thooloi^ as well as 
science, and God is the foundation of science.
"I think that p, now, and it is necessarily true that ,
I think that p, whether p is true or false", seesas to estab­
lish "I think p now and am", and it is in this form that 
Descartes preserves it in the HedltationB - "no matter if the 
Deîion deceives me,and ensures that p is îalse, it is true 
that I think p". But ve still require (a) that I do think 
p, (b) that 1 know that I think p,i.o* using Descartes’
Pieneric term, that I "think" that I think p, and (c) something 
to be done about preserving "p" as object, since "I think 
p" entails "I think p" only by the vacuity of "p hAplieo P" r 
as an argument this generates not an infinite regress but
a cerebral vibration.  ^ 4^ r
The clmaents in the ar^^ent are (I) an act as an
occurrence, a thinking, (2) an object of that act, a value
of P, (3) a strteraent or thought that the %ct is occurring.
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and (4) an entailment relation between the value of P ao
object of the act and tho statement tliat the act is occurr­
ing with the value of P as object.
We approach now the secret of the Cogito. If we 
substitute the statement that the act is occurring ("I ata 
thinking") for p, we get rid of p, and the entailment relation 
between statement of act and the object of the Initial think­
ing appears to be one of identity. Instead of the difference 
between "I am thinking" and "p", we have the identity of 
"I am thinking" and "I am tiiinking". We have thus logical 
necessity within the thou£$lit "I am tiiinking that I am thinking"; 
the first "I am thinking" is mi instance of the general 
truto which appears to follow from the second "I am thinking", 
the general truth that I am a thinking thing, and this just­
ifies the general claim that I exist because I am a thinking 
thing - because I am thinking now. Condense the two "thou^ts" 
"I am thinking" and "(that) I am thinking" into "I think",
Ego Cogito, and the instance is both instance and general 
truth, with a whole argument in a necessaiy nutshell. "I think" 
establlBheB that I am a thinlcing thing and exist necessarily
as such. /.f Ï .
This is, of course, not Descartes’ presentation of the 
argument. But it is the condense tion of the dual-Cogito into 
a single "I think" which masks the simple and obvious truth 
that the initial "I think" is a fact stateaent, w^iich can be 
regarded as necessarily true only while we regard it as an 
act, not as an assertion that on act is occurring. Descartes
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can give no necosBity to the assertion made now of a past 
act, and of a present act the assertion is merely true if 
what is said to be going on is actually going on - and we 
revert again to "I cannot be mistaken in judging that I am 
thinking when I am thinking, and I now so judge",i.e. to a 
principle of infallible intuition not of p but of myself 
as thinking p. . The introduction of the Demon is irrelevant 
to this - the best that tho hypotliotical argument can prod­
uce is a general conclusion, and this as a consequence of 
the hypothesis. And if the Demon deceives me into thinking 
that I am a man, within the supposition that there Is a 
Demon, the surrender of the D^on as a supposition (whether 
we substitute another "hypothetical entity" or not) leaves 
us undeceived, so far aa we know, in thinking that we are 
men. (The change from "I" to "we"^  is awkward, but the 
conclusion is to be in the plural, we are considering some 
other person’s arguments,and establishing that/man" is 
a meaningful term independently of "men" demands a special 
argument). ■
But the claim that Descartes exists as a thinking thing 
while he is thinking is not a claim that we wish to challenge; 
and it is a claim that Descartes the utterer or thinker  ^
apparently cannot challenge.. We seem to have a positive form 
of a pragmatic paradox,i.e. "I.am not thinking" is, if 
thinking is something \dnich I^do, a "self-refuting" thou^t. 
But it is an ordinary language paradox, in lahichron act is 
assorted or denied of an agent, and nothing is implied about
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about specific attributes vdiich the agent has, although it 
is taken for granted thot he has attributes which distinguish 
him as agent from other things. It is especially interesting 
since, if the thought "I am not thinking" is unthinkable as 
Descartes wants to establish it to be, the paradox could 
arise only if there were words over and above ideas; if it 
ia equivalent to "a thinking thing is not thinking", it 
seems to evade thoxx^t as a capacity of a Purely Thinking 
Thing. But it could arise for a man, for a talking thing, 
who is capable of giving a meaning to "I existed then but
A .
I was not thinking".
The full paradox is that the agent cannot both act and 
state that he is not acting if the stating that ho is not
• i
acting is an instance of the act which is to be both performed 
and denied. "In the instant" we have only "no one can both 
do and not do the same thing at the same time", and this is 
unimportant - it fails to distinguish any act from any other 
act, or to establish anything about agents who act, over ^ d
' .t
above tlie exiguous iTlnciple of Identity» It does not matter 
who or what the agent is in a particular instance, and the 
insistence upon "I" suggests that the question is one of an 
agent trying to act and trying not to act,and failing in the 
attempt. What Descartes ie seeking is a specific act which " 
is an instance of the generic truth, and the individual 
agent is siiaply provided - without the agent tho act could  ^
not occur. What he wants is to prove "I am a thinking thing"
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to be joeceesarlly true because the denial of it is an .instance 
of it - "I em not a thinking thing" is a think in:; which I
rh© generic statement "I am a thinking thing", has. been 
true all the time; I hove been throughout a thinking thing 
capable of various thoughts p and q and r which I have been 
able to doubt, thus learning to do something which I can try 
to apply to a special value of p. Moreover, "I doubt-think 
that I sense that p" is not a contradictory assertion, and
. 4 . ir
founds the method# We should have tangled detail if w© 
analysed this fully, since "sensing" is a species of "thinkingi; 
and evan if we differantiata "aenaing proper" from the claim 
tnat a aensed object exists, the latter claim is "thinking" 
in the pare sense of the word# Much of the Meditations 
depends upon this notion of "pure thinking" Which can be 
applied to the species,e#g# denial that I am senoing or . 
ramoiabering is coi^patible with asserting that I am imagining# 
V/hat I cannot deny is that I am, a thinking thing, that I am 
the sort of thing that cun or does think, because every time 
I try to deny, it I show ,that I am^ think l
If we treat "I am a .thinking thing" os a discursive 
tinith which has been verified, then this does work for., ■ 
Doscartea.bocBUse it is not tied to the act or to the instant#
”  ' c. .  •- -, 'L'Ji'! *■' »■-' i A-
The truth in question ic nov/ of the generic “I am a thinking 
thing", of "I cm-exist" as ni cxist-perslst", of ,tho.-entail- 
ment at the diacuraivo level of thinking-thing ,and, existence,
V . .  \  -  ' A .  :
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and of the verification of the generic in every attempt to 
falsiiy it# "I am a thinking thing", ao "I ^  think", can 
now be expanded into all the species of thinking and all the 
objects of thinking, without tithing îurther noeding to be 
said of the subject; but no thought can be neceosarily true 
in the some sense as can "I am a thinking thing"# And now 
Descartes seems to argue in two distinct ways, (a) that 
nothing more can be said of the subject, and (b) that 
nothing can be said of the subject whinh is true in the 
staue sense that "it thinks" is true#
Ego OoKito ergo, Ego 3uia is a condensation of "I think 
that I am a thinking thing and therefore I exist as a thinking 
thing"# In "I think that I think" the second "I think" 
means “I am a thinking thing", a thing which Descartes calls 
"a mind or soul", and this alone can be said only to think -
all we can say of it is that it thinks# The first "I think"
is a fact claim that an act is occurring, the statement r" 
implying that tho agent and the act are instances are values 
of "I" and "think" in the general truth# Instead of "(x)
X is a thinking thing entails x exists", we have "(5x) x is 
a thinking thing and exists"#
Both propositions are rather odd, but the second is
strikingly so; if "exists" cannot be witnessed as the thinking
can, it must be inferred by virtue of the first; and what we 
require is a formulation like "There is one thing, the thing 
here and now, of which it is true that it is thinking and
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that .it necesBarlly exists" » The contrast between this and 
"Thore in one thing, the thing here and now, of v/hicli it is
true that it thinko", indicates part of what is at issue,
since it suggests obviously enough that we should be able 
to recognise tho oxioting agont apart from our consideration 
of whether or not 5t 1© acting in a thinking way.
Though this question of recognition or discovery of 
agents and other "substances" is a central Cartesian problem, 
it can be ignored if wo note that the first requirement is 
still that an agent, vdiatever it is and however "known", 
should simply perform an act of thinking. If we examine 
tho Meditations c^rofully we find that all that is deemed 
necessary is that an agent should think that he exists,i.e.
think "I am, I exist". ..statuandum sit hoc pronunciatum
M^o 8um. Ego Exioto. quo ties a me profortur vel mente concep- 
itur necessario esse verum". "All things being considered 
maturely and carefully, it must be maintained that the prop­
osition "I am,I exist", is necessarily, true every time it is 
c3qjresGod by me or conceived in my mind".
If DoBcartes thinks or ©ays, if any man thinks or 
enys, that he exists, then he exists. If he does not say it, 
he does not say it, though he still exists; if he does not 
thin): he, he does not think that he exists. If he caiinot say 
it, cannot think it, then he cannot say,or think that he . g 
exists, as other men can. If being able .to say It or thinkg, 
it is a noconoary condition of a thing being a man, nothing
V
unable, to, say it or think it is a man. ^"In my mind" adds to
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"conceive", addc to concepitur. only that it is not
a iiiind that conceives but, in this C3.se, the zaan Descartes, 
who locates hlD "conceiving", by contrast with his "speaking", 
as In hie mind. The next step is to ask " i&hat am I who 
dourly kiiowc tliat lio cxiotsV", and the answer that Descartes 
rellises to consider is ’I ua a man". He prefers to talk of 
Hi© C0J4pcnent parts of q body which i am said to possess, or 
of body-in-gen oral which is more extension or mutually 
Qxcluding extensions, so tijat all that can be asked is what
relations there are between tho necessarily existing thinking 
thing and imaginary or other things.
I» am thinking..... there is at least one thing which 
exists of which it is true that it is a thinking thing. More 
briefly, "a thinking thing exists". Hob cogitans est. And 
this,as his critics pointed out, could have been argued 
almost as briefly as it can be stated, as it was already 
stated tar üt. Augustine. But Descartes is unimpressed, 
because he knows far more is involved than hie critics realise, 
and thon Augustine dreamed. The anchor of the rational universe 
is to be the neceesarily existing "I“. But if it is the "I" 
of tho first "1 think", then we know only one of its "attrib­
utes", that it tliought a particular thought at a particular 
time.
This thou^t is not self-contained, not self-adequate; 
tho "I" who thinks may be anything at all. But in the case of 
the second "I tliink", where "think" is generic, the idiol'e
t -V
tliought actually is thought. It is, for Descartes, a couiplete
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thought, and if It Is a complete thought the subject is 
wholly grasped# ( A y  he thought this, what this means, we 
will see below) # Instead of "I am thinking", a present 
tense, we have "I do think”, "I am a thing that thinks”, 
am a thinking substance"; "thinking" is the substance’s 
priAnipal attribute or essence. Nothing can be admitted to 
the essence which does not belong necessarily to it, and 
nothing but thinking does so belong to it.
2. What we have is a definition, as Descartes conceives 
definition, euid "1 think that I sm a thinking substance" 
establishes the existence of the thing defined. Descartes 
now proceeds to expand "thinking" into the species which he 
has already recognised, and leaves "I" as the thinking 
substance - a "thing" which Is to be considered only as. the 
subject of statements whose verbs are species of thinking.
The verbs have objects, are meaninglassly used without 
objects, and it is by thinking about the objects that a 
science of the non-mind world is to be founded. What Descartes 
wants here is another definition of a substance which, in 
addition to the necessity %diich attaches to any definition 
qua SGlf-conààined thought, has an additional guarantee of 
its existence.
The whole procedure, the whole argument, to establish 
the first substance, is almost farcical. The "I" of the 
generic, definitional "I think" is a continuing substance.
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or the stateiuent ie meaningloBs* Descartes begins with an 
assumed, a taken for granted, existing and persisting tiling 
with hie acceptance of the commonplace use of "I", and he 
actually considers, if only to reject them as not necessarily 
true, commonly accepted statements which ij^ ply that this "I" 
is bodily. In other words, the existence and persistence of 
the substance-thing is taken for granted throughout, and'the 
question is of determining vdiat kind of thing it is, or of 
proving that everyone else has been mistaken in their notion 
of vôiat is "indicated" by the pronoun "I" as it is ordinarily 
used. That is why Descartes purports to consider what other 
people have considered themselves to be; and the argument is, 
rou^ly, that it is not necessarily true that what a thing 
is conceivably, it is necessarily conceivable as being. So 
Descartes converts "is not neoessarlly so* into "is neoessarily 
not-so". No one can, ^eceotipa Descartes* rules. ^u>w that the 
thinking thing is a man, a spirit, a puff of smoke, a flame, 
a body - their only premise can be "the thing thinks", and 
all other attributes are non-principKL and un-"necessary".
In Régula XII Descartes has already recognised that "I 
think therefore I am* does not entail "I am,tiierefore I think"; 
idiat depends upon the thinking that I am is gy knowing that 
I exist, and what is inconceivable to me is that I should think 
and not be - the main point in the argument quoted above from 
the Discourse. "It is inconceivable to me that I should be and 
not think* can be maintained, only b/ twisting "inconceivable" 
into "I cannot conceive* and "I cannot conceive that-not". So
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to the pragmatic paradox again - 1 cannot conceive unless 
I think, BO I cannot conceive "that I do not think" without 
thinking. But ^ a t  is in question now is not conceiving 
morself as not thinking vdien, I, am thinking, and in fact I ean 
conceive myself as not thinking, as Locke demonstrated ^ idien 
he pointed out that we have very inadequate evidence for 
thinking that we are always thinking. Only if I accept the 
definition as a true description of me at all times will I 
accept the Cartesian argument, and Descartes believes that 
he is supplying reasons for converting "whenever I think I 
think and am a thinking thing" Into "I am always a thinking 
thing", What he fails to sKPply at, all are reasons for 
concluding that there is a thing which is thinking all the 
time and that I am such a thing. s .».
Locke's point is that I am not always awafe that I am 
thinking, and vhile he is prepared to accept "I exist contin­
uously" as binding together dreaming,» imagining and activities 
which involve no thinking he is prepared to accept an "I" 
which is a substance whose existence does not ent^ ail that it 
is at any moment thinking. The use of "I" here is in the 
ordinary sense with which Descartes begins, a sense in vhich 
we can say "I was b o m  many,years ago". , Locke so far has not 
begun the process of dividing the .•'myself" \diich is, used 
reflexively of "I" on occasions into "my" and a "self" whi^ 
persists independently of ge. Of course. When Locke states 
"the soul is agreed,on all hands, to be that in us vhich 
thinks", as he does in replying to Worcester, the case is
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very different, but in the Kseay itself the i>rimary question 
is framed as ehethor or not men think always, and the 
evidence is Personal testimony, evidence as to whether or 
not I am thinking all the time. Using ”I« in this ordlnaiy 
sense we can certainly say "I cannot think of myself as a 
thinking thing without thinking that I am a thinking thing, 
and if I think of myself as a thinking thing I can say "I 
would not be the thinking thing that I am unless I was such 
a thinking thing”. Thinking is essential to, is the essence 
of, a thinking thing. But this, ae it stands, is vacuous, 
yy essence derives from the fact that I think; and what we 
need for "my essence is always to be thinking” is the fact
i
•I am always thinking".
If Deacartas' claim is that the idea of substance ie 
that of a thing which persiste and endures, and that "thinking" 
is an attribute of such a substance, he can if he.so chooses 
label it an essential or principal attribute; but what he 
cannot do is to claim directly that such a substance is %6at 
is meant by "I". i ^
Gassendi pointed out^ the difference between "I can be 
absolutely certain only that I am a thinking thing" and
"I con be absolutely certain that I am only a thinking thing", 
and Descartes, in a letter to Clerselier designed to be a , 
reply to selected objections to the Meditations, insists that
r
1. Metaphysioai Disquisitions etc. pp.d2-4lL Quoted H and R, 
11. pp. 138-5.
2. H and H. pp. 132—3.
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he was speaking in the "strict sense" and meant certain 
only that", vAille not wishing at this stage of the argument 
to exclude "bodily" from the description of the thinker,i.e, 
mot wishing to exclude "I am bodily".
But in the "strict sense" all he is entitled to claim 
is that wh; tover he is, he can believe without risk of error 
that ^  he is deceived in believing that all the things 
vdiich appear to him to exist, and that all the propositions 
he entertains at any time are true, he cannot be mistaken in 
believing that he believes or in believing that he may believe 
falsely in all except this one case. But the "may believe 
falsely" is may believe falsely; what is meant is that vdiat 
he believes may be false, and there is no necessity involved 
here at all. He may, for all he knows, be a'ilame, a breath, 
a volume of spirits, or even a man.
The complications of the metaphysical- logic , which 
Descartes falls back upon in the Replies to Objections are 
not directly relevant here, since the question is: "To what 
noun does the pronoun "I" refer?" or "Vhat noun can replace 
the pronoun "I" in a sentence "I think"?" Our use of pronouns 
depends upon the possibility of substituting à common noun, 
a najue for a thing of a kind, or the proper noun which 
names such a thing, for a pronoun, Descartes rejects "I am 
a man" because it would prompt the question, if we are still
‘ I I ^
trying to answer "What am«I?", "What is a man?"; and "A man 
is a rational animal" would prompt a further question "What
177.
ie an animal?”* The full reasons for rejecting toe answer 
”1 am a man" must he .sought elsewhere than in the lieditatlons. 
hut what Descartes recognises is th^t our common nouns are 
interrelated in a complex manner, and that if we want to 
explain the meaning of a statement which contains nouns we 
must do so hy further statements and further nouns*
This needs elaboration, but if we insist (as I insist 
and claim Aristotle insisted) that our ordinary language is 
classiflcatory, we must insist that we can grasp the meaning 
of nouns (at least) only by discovering their relation to 
other nound# That I extend this, insisting'on discrimination 
and difference, to adjectives and verbs, maintaining that
t
they are meaningful as components in a classiflcatory language, 
is relevant but not essential here; it is relevant because 
Descartes is clearly using verbs^and adjectives in their 
common use, but rejecting the .common use of nouns*  ^^ 
Descartes does not want to deny classification, but he 
is convinced by the natural ,li^t that .unless, we could "know" 
individual things, and hence pri^rily one individual thing, 
we could never relate two individual things, and could never 
classify. This appears in an obscure manner in his repty to 
Gassendi*8 criticism, where; he takes Gassendi to be arguing 
"that the idea of Thing cannot exist in the mind unless at . 
the same time the ideas of animal,plimt,stone,, and of all 
universale are found there".^ *!ThiB is", writes Descartes, .
1. H and R. II.p*.214.  ^ '
J
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"as though in order to acknowledge that I am a thinking 
thing, I ought to acknowledge animale and plants, since I 
ou^t to acknowledge Thing.i.e. what Thing is”.
This is nonsense to Descartes: how can we know the 
many unless we first know the one? But if knowing the "one" 
precedes classification, then it precedes the use of any 
nouns vdiich derive their meeming or, use from classification, 
any nouns Wiich have a plural and can function as class 
names. An individual thing is just what it is, and dasands 
no sustaining relations with other things - a substance is
> . f
that which can exist Indepeiidently of anything else. So,too, 
for Descartes, the thought of a thing can exist independently 
of any other thought. All thoughts of ^ individual things are 
self-contained, and can he explained hy analysis, hy showing 
what is actually 8Uid already Included in the toou^t.
In the end the notion of any thing can he analysed into 
"substance" and. attributes - the quote marks around substance 
are necessary here because the term "attribute" never appears 
in a proposition or its analysis, while "substance" will 
always appear at least in the analysis - and the full descriptive 
statement \Ailch is the analysis will be "a substance-thing in 
which the attributes such and such reside". Before we have 
a "thing" we will need at least one attribute, but tee role 
of "substance" is plain. Throu^ it we lay the foundation for 
tee individual as one, as existing, as persisting, and as the
! f
sustalner of attributes. Nothing which we encounter and name
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will be a substance which has no attributes,'but the "mind" 
must be capable of grasping "thing-substance" in a single 
instance. And what the doctrine finally arrives at is that 
we never encounter substances at all; the mind encounters 
attributes, which it gràsps or recognises immediately by 
virtue of its innate capacity, and then it exercises its 
further innate capacity to infer the existmice of a sustain­
ing substance.
The doctrine is most clearly intelligible, and can 
be most cogently argued for, in the case of commonplace ^  
observable things, since there is a sense in which we speak 
of seeing the colour and the shape of a thing, a colour and 
a shape \diich can be duplicated in a painting lAilch we can 
mistake for the thing In question. I^t the plausibility and 
the intelligibility disappear, as we shall see in detail 
below, when we surrender men (or animals) as the subject 
of sensory-observation Verbs, sued follow the traditional 
path of making "minds" the subjects of special verbs whose
"encountered" objects are thaaselves "mental" %r "in mind" 
or "states of consciousness". For Descartes, doing metaphysics 
in isolation from the world and so confined to discursive 
thinking in the absence of objects'of perception," i.e. to 
"thoughts" and "ideas", the notion or idea of "substance" 
conjoined with any predicate, makes up what is merely a ' 
"thought". The Cogito is to provide an’Instance of such “a "* 
thought which guarantees for thought ari^d’by thought the^’"^-
è
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existence of a eubstnnce ( otrlctly, it provides a "thinking", 
an indubitable act, if the argument is to hold at all - we 
have still to consider the difference between "I think p", 
where "p" needs no analysis; "p is a thought", which leads 
on to one version of the theory of "ideas"; and "p means 
what it states", or "p can be stated in a language", which 
enables us to relate "thinking" and doing science or meta­
physics).
While we are concerned with encountered attributes 
and our modes of relating them to or by notions of "substance" 
we are, so to speak, below the level of common nouns and 
complex tilings which appear in our classifications. The 
thesis that all complex notions are composed of simple 
notions promised a list of simple notions which would enable 
us to record all the "elementals" in the universe; but the 
list is not forthcoming. In parallel here, all the complex 
things which appear in our classifications should be reducible 
to "substance" and simple attributes; but not attempt is 
made hy Descartes to show a coiaplete reduction of any euto 
cla88ifiable thing to •‘eubstance** and specific sli^ ple attrih- 
utoB* Such a reduction would enable us to understand how 
our con^)lex ideas were actually constituted, ^ what our nouns 
really meant or meant in full. What Descartes does is rather 
to assert the rule of composition of aubstance and attribute, 
assert an attribute, and by lawful combination of "substance” 
and that attribute he claim© to have constituted a "thing" 
which he can name and consider as existing#
eg#
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In our ordinary diecourse "I" belongs with conoplexpand 
classifiable things, and a noun can be substituted for it, 
e.g. "I am a man". Descartes rejects this substitution. 
Traditionally the definition of "man" was "rational animal", 
and "rational" was the principal attribute of "man"; the , 
two truths "all men are rational" and "no non-men are 
rational" established **men" as members of a class which , t 
was included in the class "animals" and excluded the class 
of non-animals# Descartes seleots "thinking" as an.attribute, 
and as soon as he adds, this attribute .to "substance" he has 
a "thing" to which he gives the nnme "mind", just,as later , 
he gives the name "body" to extended substance. But the 
attributes "thinking" and "extended" are called "principal 
attributes", a usage Which derives from classification.
It entails that there are other attributes of that whito has 
the principal attribute; and yet it is difficult to see
i- ■
how "mind" qua mind or "body", qua body can have any other 
attributes. " T.ni- r-€i;rj^ %S7m
On the other hand it is easy to see that if a part-
icular thing is a thinking thing or an extended thing, as
distinct from other thinking things or extended things, it
■ ' f
will have attributes vdiich distinguish it from those other
i
things, to see that members of/the class "minds" or things 
which think will differ from one another# When^Descartes 
reduces "I" to "a thinking substance" he is ^ establishing a 
special usage in which "I" belongs with mind-things and : 
body-things in a classification of two classes, and toils
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special usage can be maintained "only in the strict sense", 
i.e. the sense in which all that can be said of "I" is that 
it thinks.
And only if we accept Descartes* notion that thoughts 
or statements are logically independent of one another, so 
tliat an argument in one place can be completely indépendant 
of an argument in another place, will we fail to note teat 
in tee "strict sense" entailed by the Dubito, we should 
not be speaking of classification at all. "I" am, in tee 
full sense of "strictly", a thinking thing and there may 
be nothing existing except myself as a "thing vhich thinks". 
In so far as I am a mind, tee principal attribute is ray 
only attribute.
More immediately striking,however, is the fact teat 
Descartes is forced to admit that the special usage white 
equates "I" with "mind" is not incompatible with "I am 
bodily", and thus, until Meditation VI which "proves" that 
minds are not bodies, Descartes has no reason for rejecting 
"I am an animal". All he can claim is that we have as vet 
no reason for asserting it; and "as yet" means only test 
Descartes has not admitted tee question of teat attributes 
other than "thinking" an Individual thinking substance must 
have in order to be an individual,i.e. what other statements 
must be true of x if "x thinks" is true. Granted teatt
extended subetancee exist, all that can be asserted in the 
strict sense is that there are things which think and there
are things which are extended, and these two statements can 
readily enough be treated as obvious fact statements in the 
commonplace mode, . * ;
What he is required to prove is that thinking things are 
not bodies, that bodily things never think; and the poesib- 
ility of this being false, the need for it to be proven, is 
sufficient guarantee that it is conceivable that bodies 
should think. All that is inconceivable is that bodies ' 
in a special ("strict") sense should think, since these ' 
bodies are merely extended, (And,let us remœiber here the 
parallel arguments to souls and minds - it is inconceivable 
that "mere matter","mere collections of atoms", "mere collec­
tions of physical qualities", should think. The logic of 
much of this sort of argumentation is^provided by: - "substance 
is merely that in which attributes; inhere") « Nor can minds 
"in the strict sense? be extended, since all-that minds can 
be said to do is to think, all they can be said to,be is 
"thinking things". ' -
Yet the two cases of attribution*are not even^parallel. 
"Thinking" is, as Cogito, an act, which requires an agent, 
and the agent is the thing or substance; extension is; as ' ^  
an essential attribute, a quality as distinct from an act -
I ' '
**movoB” suggests such an act, but even When ^”extended subst­
ance”, the res extenoa# Is lopped into particles by the' - 
Divine introduction of motion into it, these simples seem 
able on^, to be moved ”by motion”# Descartes seems determined 
to remove ”bodies act” from the propositions of physics#
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It is Inconceivable that bodies in the strict sense should 
not be extended; but it is meaningless to say, in the ordin-
■i
ary sense, that cows or men or dust particles are not extended# 
It is meaningless in the sense that ”if x is not extended,
f.
X iB not a loan, a cow, etc." ie nn argument which always 
holds. It is this which justifies Descartes' treatment of 
"extension" as the essence of bodies, or of "extension" as 
included in the notion of "body". But it is not meaningless 
to say that men think, and that a man may at some time be 
not thinking, though the last statement might in fact be 
false; and we might well claim that it is meaningless to 
say "X is a man and x is incapable of thinking in the generic 
sense of thinking" on the grounds that the conjoined propos­
itions are contradictories. Nor is it meaningless to say 
that cows eat grass and breed, and jimvp over logs if not 
moons, that bodily things act in a variety of ways. The 
claim that gross bodily things are reducible to physical
J*
particles, and that the behaviour of gross bodily things 
is merely a complicated pattern of behaviours of particles, 
is a fact claim about the actual constitution of gross 
bodies and their behaviour, and the capacity of Descartes or 
or anyone else to conceive finite particles in motion is 
not in the least a justification for claiming that the 
reduction is possible, the constitution is such, or that 
the gross descriptive statements are ”really meaningless”#
That ”thinking” is not "extension” requires no
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proof; but the etat^ent that "thinking”, qua act or even 
qua procoBB, is not extended, is a fact statuent; it is not 
a relation of predicates, and it is difficult to dei%r 
becauBe it is difficult to give it a meaning. The ordinary 
sense of "I” with which Desceirtes begins pemits "I see”,
”i am an animal which can see”, ”I am an anjmal who reasons”, 
”I am an extended thing which thinks”. The question is as 
to vdiether I who think am extended, not whether my thinking 
is extended# But there was in Descartes* day an established 
use of "mind or soul” vhlch permitted ”I have, I possess, 
a mind or soul”; and in this sense "I am a mind or soul” is 
false, if not meaningless, although "I am a union of soul 
and body” is true, and ”I am a man” is true by virtue of 
the "fact” that men are unions of souls and bodies# And there 
is a further use of ”1" in which ”I possess a body” is 
permissible, and this is readily assimilable to ”I am a mind 
or soul” and "souls possess bodies”# It is this third use 
which aeans to develop into the question "Where is the 
soul in the body?”, a question which assumes that the soul 
ie or must be in the body.
Descartes preserves the three uses, and must presexnre 
them i# there is to be metaphysics and something beyond
- - ^  V  , -  ' ,
metaphysics which is science and something beyond science 
which is the system of facts which make science necessary 
and meaningful as science. Yet his metaphysics, derived 
by argument from facts and in terms of ordinary usage, is
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denying both facte and usage. V/hat he doee seea to maintain 
10 that do Inf: metaphysics Is not doing science at all, that■ ■ ;i rih '
a metaphysical truth expands into a scientlf 16 truth and 
later fact truths, and hence that the order of the completssd 
One Science ie Hetophyeicc, Physics, Special Sciences, and 
Description of the Kno\m World., ,
Fov,then, is the "first truth” that I think to he 
expanded? . In at least three ways, it seems.
(a) By expanding "think” into cpecies of thinking, ,
- ' ‘ - ' i-i'Ü-
and this concludes with "I am bodily since I imagine and ,
z.-': ■ ■ ef-." f/»#.
sense" or there is no physical world which is not merely 
conceptual, mere "thought". Hence the "intimate union" and....  },fe
the insictence that man is a real man, a single substance; 
hence also the difficulty that cognitive verbs are to be
 ^ ' '(/f;'0.. t j:, ;
used with two different subjects, "man" and ^ ind", a special 
difficulty when physics end pî^siology combine to show , 
that teat we ordinarily call,perceiving is the mind's being 
consciously affected by teat cannot be perceived,viz. p^ttêles 
inmotlon. .. .
(b),By asserting "I am a thinking thing" "^th«e 
are many thinking things", since unless^this_,^ls so there is 
only one thinking thing in the poele and in the world, itod^  
unless, I shall argue, (a) Is effected, there can be no 
reason at all for any subject thinking that there ots other 
thioklng mbjoots. „ ,, ^ --j
(c) By « a m w .  ao.ght.".,,,, ^
"thoughts are p and q and r and all the other thoughts I
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think and which are true cr false"; and here the "thoughts" 
are neither me nor my essence but the condition of there 
being a metaphysics or science. They are the condition of 
the Cogito itself being thinkable and "real".
It is by thinking of, by examining, thought done 
that Descartes develops his metaphysics and his logic; the 
thought with which he begins is thought in its ordinary mode, 
thought communicated by statements in the ordinaiy language 
teich precedes the technical language or vocabulary in white 
thoughts are to be discussed qua thouf^ts; and Descartes is 
bound to contradict his logic of substance as well as the 
conventional logic of ordinary language propositions in 
developing the Cogito as an argument.
If (a) is combined with the metaphysical doubt ^ d  a 
Cartesian theory of perception it produces "I am avrare of 
what is before my mind qua presentation or idea" and " that is 
all I can be sure of"; and this is the core of a later, 
necessity-ridden Empiriciem* The difference of this sense of 
"I" from the ordinary usage of "I saw a man", "I saw the 
accident" (where we accept as certain the gross characteris­
ations and are forever uncertain about the "data"), once it 
is recognised, leads finally to the denial that "I" belongs 
to the "mind" at all. The "I", as mind, is Bradley's 
monster. Hums's undiscoverable, a ghost without extension; 
it is allowed to slip back into ordinary equivalence with 
"man" or "person", though that slipping back does not assist
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ufl very much If we try to relate "I" with a mind telch is 
the sum of Its contents or the series of its thoughts.
(h), as I suggested, entails sollpaîœn, unless it 
is combined with (a),e.g. so as to permit “I can hear what
■ f . r
he says and understand it, so that I know he is ,a ,thinking 
thing, a mind, not a machine or brute". Proofs of solipsism 
begin with the denial of some such coop lex statement as that 
above,i.e. with an accepted language. That is 'Vhy the 
softipsist appears as a man Who proves in a human language 
that he is a mind which cannot speak foid vdiich he cannot 
speak intelligibly about. Only if we can give a moaning 
to ”we men” can we give a meaning to ”we minds”.
But it Is (e) which is ingportant for Descartes, for 
philosophy and for science. Philosophy, science, and their 
CQJtibination in our giving nn account of man, depend upon 
what we think and how wo think; and what we think we are* 
if this constitutes a special science, still comes under 
the head of "what we think” and "how we think”.
At the time of writing the Meditations Descartes 
has already a thesis with regard to the nature of thou^t 
qua "what is thouggit of things", a thesis with regtird to 
thinking as possible independently of experience of anything 
in th« world. He has discovered the nature of science, teich 
moves in an orderly fashion to the ■ complex from the simple 
and indubitable - and all fact-statements are complex.
Hence he has a method of thinking, of doing science, of
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reasoning or arguing, teloh applies to all fields, and 
who80 application he wants to demonstrate In various fields 
a& it has already in part been deraonstrated by geometers 
who almost grasped the philosopher* s stene* Hence he tries 
to show its opplioability to metapl^sico-theological problems, 
with a proof (that depends upon clear and distinct relations 
of ideas which o very body has) of toe immaterial immortality 
of too soul and the existence of God.
Until that point in his "career" he had been largely 
concerned with the ordering of truths vdiich converts the 
disorderly collection into an ordered science. How too 
truths were discovered, how toe thoughts came to be thought, 
was unimportant; what comes from toe ordering is not truth 
but necessity, proof by logical consequence. The truth toich 
is to be put into necessary order for metapl^sico-theological 
purposes is "I am. an immaterial and immortal soul", and 
the proof depends upon the "I-soul-self" being the thing 
which thinks; what it thinks is irrelevant in the sense that 
"I am a thinking thing whatever I think, whatever I believe"
must be true on Descartes* argument. The pr9of holds of
'
Gasosndl, even If Oassondi believes himself to be a man*
But it is thou^t as aot-and—idea, as thinking-what-is-thou^t, 
that characterises or is an attribute or predicate of "I"; 
and it is thought as what-is-thought teich contrasts with 
what—is—extended as thoughts—of-bodies contraWs with bodies.
) i
Once we consider what is thought to be identical
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with "ideas”, once we stress what-is-thought at all, then 
the Identification of "thought” with "simple thinking subs­
tance" is ixoposslblei the essence of mind is no longer an 
act of thinking or the power to think, but "being thou^ts". 
Hind is not thinker, but thought itself.
The Major Path to Thinking Substance leads us to 
the next chapter, Thou^t and Its Theory.
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Chapter VI.
Thought and Its Theory.
lo A survey of the thesis regarding the nature of thought 
in the Hegulao illustrates the first obviousness of the 
Cogito to Descartes, and also his notion of an argument, 
viz* the reduction of complexes to simples which, along 
with their relations, are intuited.
This is neither pointless nor simple - it has to be 
related, however, to both scientific and familiar thinking, 
and Descartes* (broadly traditional) distinctions of 
understanding, imagination and sensation.
Clearly the notion of axioms and postulates in a 
"geometrical" system is particularly relevant to the thesis, 
but such a science as ordered and structured and the actual
•doing" of such a science are not identical.
Further, questions of "notions" and of the origin or 
"getting" of notions demand discussion.
2. The results are puzzling. We seem to arrive at logical 
propositions, other types of proposition with different 
sorts of terms, and a theory of the structural relations 
witliin thought; and the distinction between predicates 
and attributes, subjects and substances, must be related
to the different types of statement involved.
We still have to consider the relation of notions to
minds, and this is obscure, as is the role of mind in
relatin/t notions.
3. Talk of notions and ideas is meaningful, and only 
meaningful, (a) in relation to statements about men thinking, 
sensing, etc., these being historical activities of men 
doing science (in a broad sense), and (b) in relation to 
statements \diich constitute sciences.
Qeometiy presents the strongest case for the claims as 
to the nature of scientific thought, but the claims do not 
fit geometry as it has in fact developed historically, nor 
an ordered geometry which has resulted.
Descartes* rationalism is not a description of science.
4. Geometry and "non-geometry" as the study of irregular 
bodies are related - the some terms appear in both. The 
non-geometrical demand observation. Descartes takes it for 
granted that observation is possible and veridical in all 
e^gperimental his ejQperimental physics, optics, anatomy,
as he accepts n science or sciences of man; but equally 
he proves observation to be lii%>osslble.
Is his rationalist piiysical "system" comiology, cosmog­
ony or "merely useful hypothesis"? The same question must 
be asked of the "mind or soul®. Each of the three seems 
to be accepted as an answer.
Does tîie bolaag, which in our dialectic we define a© 
moaning aosoluto existence, remain alwayei In cx^ictly the 
BOiae ot^  te, or doee It change? Do absolute eouallty,abeol- 
utc beauty, and every other absolute existence, a Wit of 
w y  change at all? or doeo absolute exi etwee In each cane, 
being eeuontlally uniform, remain the same and unchanging, 
and never in any case admit of anyicort of change %-.hatmever':
# # # * #
But have we not said al#o that* When the soul wgiloyo the 
body In any inquiry, and wkes use of the si^t, or hearing, 
or any other sonaa - for inquliy with the body EMSjaao inquiry 
with the Beneee - she is (iragged away hy it to the things 
which never remain the and wanders about blindly, end
becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing 
with things that are ever tennging?
Certainly.
But v>hen aha investigates any question by herself, she ^ e s  
away to the i«ure,fmd eternal, end.immortal, and unchangeabl@, 
and GO she coiaea to he aver wite it, as eoun as she ie by 
herself, and can be sot end then she rests from her wmder- 
ings, and dwells with it unc^ia^inffly, for she is deriling 
with teat is unchanging?»And is not this state of #*e soul 
called Wisdom? "• - . ^>1% ,
Socrates, in the x-haedo. {Church)
•The visible, he replied: that is quite obvious.
And the soul? Je that visible or invisible?.
It is invisible to son,'Socrates, hofoaid. î s- i i,»>
But we mean by visible and invisible, visible and ^  
invisible to men; do we not?,
Yoo, that ie teat we mean."
- „ h A'ià SSi ÏÏÏ'/'ÎWVÎ^’ SÏ-iï ? S.rî--5«'i?Sa
m u
•That th«y consider theîv own mind, and all those of its 
attributes of which thqy'ehmll find they cannot doubt,thw# 
tney may have etipposod that nil th^-over received hy 
aensce entirely faloe, ond that they do not leave off 
considering it until they have acquired the habit of conceiv- 
ine it dletinctl^t and of believing that it is more ea«y to 
know than any cori>ereal object" ^_    -  •
Descartes* jt^stelate K. Boi>ly to
gecqnd Ohjobtloimt
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Thought and Its Theory.
1. In connection with the nature of thought, the Regulae
elaborates a thesis that: (a) some thoughts are complex, and
may be false; (b) that complexes must be made up of singples;
(c) that simples are known with utter .certcCinty- and clarity
and distinctness if they are “known" at all - knowing X
entails knowing X completely if X is simple;^ (d) the simples
cannot therefore be false - there cannot be any element of
falsity in them, and this means in other words that they are
terras, and not propositions, so that it is meaningless to say
that they are true or false; (e) "thinking" is such a simple
notion, as is "existence", and consequently (f) anyone with
a mind, or any mind, recognises that he or it thinks and
exists, since (g) this judgment is a relation of simple
notions, and such relations are simple and just "seeable"
as are the simples themselves.
This summary of sections of the Hegulae (chiefly of
XII) illustrates how the obviousness of the Cogito is first
arrived at, and shows that it was, in fact, held as such by
2
Descartes at an early period. But it also illustrates what 
Descartes will accept as an argument, namely the reduction of
1. This use of "knowing" presents difficulties, in part indie- 
ated by (d). One of the general difficulties we will 
encounter at various stages in the thesis has already been 
developing - that of distinguishing "knowledge by acquaint- 
ance" in three forms: x in (ax) is variously treated as 
individual thing, individual attribute, and individual 
notion or idea or nature.
2. Unless we are completely wrong in our dating of the 
Regulae.
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any truth-claiia to terms which are irreducible to other 
terms, and whose relations are themselves simple, irreduc­
ible and obvious. , The Dubito, while a reduction, is not ^ i Ï
the sort of reduction which ^ is required, however, although 
it could be claimed that whatever is dubious is complex.
The pattern is clear enough. We begin with thoughts 
which are complex, observe their complexity, and this is 
sufficient to establish that there must be simples by the 
analytic "complexes must be of simples", "complexity is 
meaningless without simplicity". The test of simplicity is 
irreducibility, our inability to expand an idea into const­
ituent ideas.
It is such a principle that enables the analysis which
V  t  Ü  ^  k
is the keynote of Cartesian science to proceed to the 
establishment of "simple notions", and what needs to be 
discussed is the relation between this analysis (which others
' Ai L
have called abstraction - Descartes himself we shall find 
struggling with the distinction in order to prese^e the 
simplicity of "extension") and the. synthetic procedure
Î
upon which thought and science depend. It is the synthetic 
procedure which (a) never seems to work, (b) perpetually ^ ' .1 , '-_r .
leaves us with the impression that Descartes always argues 
in the opposite direction from wiyhody else,^ and (c) presents 
us with a series of statements about what must be so» what 
must have been so, or what ultimately is so, while stat^ents 
about what merely is so are reduced,to “seams to be so", the 
fate ultimately of what we reggrd as the familiar world as
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science and metaphysics develop in their "necessary" way.
The sense in which "thinking" is simple as a notion is 
not, I suggest, easy to arrive at. It can he so simple only 
as an act, and "x thinks something" is a necessary condition 
of X, whatever it or he is, thinking that x thinks, and so 
being acquainted with an act which is just an act and kind 
of act. What is simple as an act requires an agent who or 
which is simple M  an agent, i.e. some thing which is "one" 
as the act is "one". But the argument would apply to any 
act-assertion in the normal tongue, and would show nothing 
to deny an actual complexity to the thinking or to the agent; 
Descartes demonstrates that the idea of the act is generic 
as well as specific ( qua "idea" we have trouble,as I have 
shown, in giving meaning to the specific), and the full 
statement of an act demands an agent-substance and an object, 
an object which, as a judgment, is complex.
In the Regulae there Is no question of justifying the 
treatment of "thinking" as simple, a simple act grasped as 
such and named as such. What emerges is the notion of a 
simple intuitus or inspectio mentis which is concerned with 
awareness of simples; but initially the doctrine of thought 
and inquiry presented demands no reference to an "I" or to 
a simple agent; ■ Even when we are concerned with a "eertain 
number" of simple notions (Descartes sometimes insists that 
there are very many, sometimes that there are comparatively 
few) and their relations, these are presented in relation 
to thought qua science which results from inquiry. One
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section is concerned with an account of sensation and 
perception and imagination, but it begins as a "useful 
hypothesis" and clearly treats the agent too is doing the 
arguing in question as bodily; and another section Insists 
that we are going to succeed in science by using the under­
standing, the imagination and the senses - the traditional 
faculties or powers of men - and not by ignoring any one 
of them. In brief. Régula XII reads:
"Finally, we must make use of all the aids of under­
standing, imagination, sense and memory, whether for the 
purpose of getting a clear and distinct intuition of simple 
propositions, or for putting between the things which we­
ars seeking and the things we already know some fitting ^ 
connection which permits us to recognise them (as connected), 
or for finding the things which are to be compared one with 
another, without neglecting any resource of human industry".
I have tried to make the translation literal and yet 
intelligible - Descartes* simple language presents difficult­
ies. What he has in mind, on the model of mathematics, is 
a distinction between questions or problems and ,the accepted 
or established truths toich are the things which we already 
know. Solving problems is thus finding connections between 
what we know and what we have not yet "recognised" it is, 
roughly, analysing problems into parts which we do know, parts 
which we do not know, and discovering relations. As solved, 
the problem becomes part of what is known. "Reduce complexes 
to simples" is a rule of procedure, readily intelligible to 
anyone familiar with algebraic solving of, problems or doing 
geometrical exercises. The "simples" are ultimately either
1. "turn ad quaesita cum coanitis rite componenda"
I 195.
»
postulates, axioms and definitions or the indefinable terms 
which appear in them. (There are problems here).
The role of the senses, which enable us to compare and 
to measure things, and of the imagination which enables us to 
have "bodies" in mind, is ancillary to this formulating and
analysing of problems in a sense, but the "sense" in question 
depends upon whether we conceive a science as a rational system 
having application but containing no observation statements
(while admitting that experiment may be necessary at some stage
1
in determining scientific laws or truths), or regard observation 
statements as an integral part of any science.
Vhat I wish to stress is that Descartes, insisting on
sensing, imagining, remembering and understanding,. uses "we"
. • ■ ■ ■ ?
for the subjects who are inquiring and doing each of these 
things in doing science,i.e. in inquiring; and the insistence 
is on powers which we have and can exercise.as men. Thinking 
or reasoning is something we do, like investigating, and it is 
possible to investigate "man® the inquirer by using all the . 
powers. The thesis that there are minds and bodies is subseq­
uent to the recognition that men have the powers in question, 
and Descartes explains that he has scarcely space to present 
all the necessary "preliminaries" for explaining "what the 
mind of man is, and what his body is, how the body, is informed 
by the mind (mens), what powers there are in the compo sit e-man 
which are used ( Inservientes) in the knowing(of what is true) 
and what each of them in particular does". ,
So far as science and the structuring of science is
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concerned, these questions need not he answered; it is 
enough that men should be able to think and to record or 
communicate their thou^ts. Science is, in this sense, what 
men think, the truths men state, agree in, and record#
Scient la is La Pensee, and this "thought" is universal and 
objective, public to alii who do science. Study of my individ­
ual thinking, in which all sorts of things interfere and in 
which error is possible and indeed as frequent as correct 
concluding. Is only inyjortant in helping me to an underst­
anding of what accurate and adequate scientific thinking is,
SO that I can practice it and make it habitual.
There is no trace of assoclationism in the Regulae.
The rules are for. guidance, and what is presented primarily 
is an anatomy of thought qua science, or science qua thou^t. 
The notions are open to us all as elements or components 
in science. Descartes goes beyond this in justifying the 
rules as against other rules (e.g. syllogism) which he 
condemns as impediments and distractions because they demand 
unnatural thinking; hence he claims (a) that his sort of 
thinking is what everybody can do, (b) thàt it is the sort 
of thinking which in a confused sense everyone does do, and
(c) that by restraining the "will" and following a rule or 
rules become habitual everyone will think in a scientific 
manner. Ordina^ thinking may be bad scientific thinking, 
but the two are not entirely different kinds of thinking. 
Ordinary thinlcing especially lacks order, not in its sections 
but as a whole.
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Des Cartes thus puts the emphasis on order and on problem 
solving, insisting correctly that problems arise in terms 
of what we know already - otherwise problems are unintellig­
ible# But ij[ sciences are reducible to simple notions and 
siiAple relations, all thought will reduce to sii^ple notions 
and simple relations; that we have such notions should be 
easily demonstrable; that thinking depends upon having such 
notions should be easily demonstrable; and what is perfectly 
clear and distinct is that these notions and relations must 
be "objects of thought", must be what we (or if it is the 
mind after all which thinks, "our minds") know, intuit, "see", 
grasp or are otherwise related to, and if we cannot "acquire 
them" we must simply "have them".
Let us note, however, that the "slide" begins with "cannot 
acquire them". Most of the Regulae are intelligible within 
the framework of "men can sense,perceive, imagine, remember, 
think, do science, think about their thoughts, analyse and 
order them, and construct ordered science". It is only when
. f ;  -k
thinking is considered as "going on in one*s head", vhen 
ideas and notions as constituents of thoughts are regarded 
as mental entities, "things in mind", that the question
"how do ideas or notions get into minds?" must be asked,
&
and answered by "they cannot get in" because no one has ever 
managed to make the question intelligible.
The question and its uniritelllgibility we must consider 
later; whatever we do with it will not alter the fact that 
notions are related to what we think, whether science as what
198. I
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is thought is a phantasy which we think dreamingly and imagine 
we re.weal Lo others, or true of a world. An account of our !
(essential) process of thinking would he completed when the 
list of simple notions and relations is made explicit. The 
de te imination of such a list would, it seems, he the solution 
to most of a scientist * s problems ; hut it is never seriously 
undertaken. The Regulae goes little further than claiming 
that there are certain notions which apply to all things 
(unity, existence, duration and "the like”), and certain j
notions which apply to one or the other of two kinds oi thing ■
in the world (knowledge,douht,ignorance, volition and "the ,
like" apply to spirits; motion, extension etc. are "apprehended 
only in bodies"). Instances of. relations are "things which 
are the same as a third thing are the same as one another",
"things which do not hear the same relation to a third thing 
are in some way different from one another". And, suddenly, 
all simple notions have a corresponding simple notion which 
is a "negative or privative" - "nothing", "instant" and "rest" 
are as genuine qua intuited "notions" as are "existence", 
"duration" and "motion".
Insisting on the simplicity of privatives, Descartes 
claims, is udeful in helping us to maintain that all non-simples 
known to us are coxz^osed of these simple notions; it enah&es 
us to say, when we judge that a shape is not moving, that our 
thought is "somehow conKPosed of shape and rest". With the 
exemplification, discussion of privatives is complete.
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But what the point? Descartes is seemingly aware of 
difficultles with negation as it figures in our actual 
thinking; it seems to demand relation, and he wants to deny 
any relational element to the exercise of our faculty of 
intuiting simple notions. Negation, like affirmation, is 
to he restricted to the exercise of our other and distinct 
faculty of judging, which i^ relating. ^Motion" and "rest", 
if simple, must he intelligible in complete independence of 
one another; their logical opposition is an"external" relation; 
hut what the example appears to show is that when we judge 
"a shape is not moving" what we really think is "a shape is 
at rest", and this is tantamount to a denial that there is 
a class of "negatives or privatives" at all.
All simple notions are positive, and when they are 
related logical relations, whether of equivalence,contingent 
connection or necessary connection, can he intuited,i.e. 
just "seen". Exclusion can equally he just seen. Is this 
in any way discordant with what I have argued above in 
connection with thinking, notions and science?f The notions 
are objective, and belong to what is thought qua science. 
Logical relations are objective relations between notions; 
we do not create them. Intuiting is something we do when 
a simple notion "appears" or when we reach it by thinking 
analytically about thou^ts; judging is something we do, and 
then we can inspect the judgment and see if the relation 
is of this or that logical character. We have no explanation 
of why we think, why notions appear or judgments are formed.
2 0 0 .
why a predicate 0 makes its appearance as a predicate of 
X on a particular occasion. The primary truth is that we 
do thiiik, do do science; a notion is a notion "because it 
appears in thoughts, and sim.L>le because thinking about it 
reveals that it is irreducible; "1 have a notion in mind" 
means that it does appear in my thoughts, that I understand 
statements containing a certain term, no b that there is a 
thing somewhere which I can look for without knowing what 
I am looking for. Treating "science" broadly, it is assumed 
that we do science, that our developed science can be studied 
and analysed to produce (a) a theory of science or science 
of science, (b) a re-ordering of science, and (c) a set of 
logical principles or truths about the relations of terms 
in statements which justifies the re-ordering and guarantees 
it. Until we raise the question of "who does science?", 
thus asking a special scientific question, there is no point 
in talking of "mind" at all.
Descartes assumes an answer to the question in under­
taking to present rules for the guidance of men who have a 
variety of powers relevant to inquiry and act in various 
ways relevant to inquiry. They explore the world inquisit­
ively and record observations and conjectures, thus constit­
uting sciences. A study of these sciences, a theory of the 
structure of these sciences, based upon a studjr of these 
sciences, is a plausibility, and the test will be success 
in demonstrating structure and perhaps re-structuring.
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The results of Inquisitive (and other) activities are 
recorded in hooks, in beliefs that achieve no inking or 
pencilling, in the modifications of the ordinary vocabulary 
and in the more fluid changes in technical terns. If wo 
crawl into a ^ elected shelter and in complete isolation 
re-consider the results of inquiry in a langurige which we 
have learned there is no point in assuming that we were 
really in isolation all the time, and hence that we did all 
the science on our own, devised the language on our own; 
and even if we do assume this, assume that "thinking" and 
"thought" have a meaning which we never grasped before, 
and undertake to give an account of what thinking is, we 
still must make our account fit the thinking we have done.
2. Let us list some of the puzsling features of the ?. . 
doctrine of "siinple notions"; j
(a) The pattern of simple notions and relations is held 
to be the structure, and in some sense the dynamic, of our 
thinking, but of neither the pattern ,nor the dynamic are we 
ordinarily aware. Descartes professes to have discovered 
it; one person at least professes not to understand it as 
as account of his thinking, and denies that what he under^ 
stands of it Is an.account of anyone’s thinking. m:.
(b) The relation statements are. made in terms of "things" 
equal to and different from one another; here "things" is
a class tern, "thing" a variable if we use the hypothetical 
formulation.^ I shall try to show below that no such state­
ment is meaningful unless^the variable has distinguishable
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instances, and the instances may he scientific entities 
(particles,triangles) or fact-things (horses). Neither 
"equal" nor "different" are meaningful unless the "things" 
have specifiable attributes. "In some respect" is an Integ­
ral part of the meaning of "equal" and "different".
(c) The "mental" predicates, as verbs,i.e. as "know,doubt, 
do not know, and wish", eppear in ordlnaiy discourse in 
familiar fact statements, though as verbs they are difficult 
to grasp as simple, and as abstract nouns they are philosop­
hical headaches.
(d) Descartes exemplifies his rules for the direction of 
the "ingenium", of "1’esprit", or of the human inquirer, in 
elementary mathematics; after his initial statement that 
extension and motion are "apprehended only in bodies",i.e. 
that extension and motion are features only of bodily things, 
his further statements are utterly foreign to anyone but a 
mathematician. The I'ulec, however, are to be so universal 
that they apply to all sciences. Mathematics illustrates the 
working of the rules in a special field; and applications^to 
other fields are difficult to find.
(e) The use of "things" as a class term for two and only 
two kinds of thing is as unfamiliar to most men who think as 
are the logical and grammatical rules; the use is of a diff­
erent order from the logical or grammatical truths, since it 
contradicts and is contradicted by ordinary thou^ts - no 
thoughts can contradict the logical rules. .
(f) In (a) and (b) we can see the possibility of an
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arguiüont that anyone who has done any science at all, any 
thinking at all, could grasp imraediately what is meant hy a 
stated rule - he is grasping or understanding what is obv­
iously exemplified in his thinking. The relation statements 
appear in elomentary logic books or geometries; the terms 
in this sense are teclmical and foreign to ordinary discourse, 
but they apply to such discourse in a special way.
What I shall tugue hero is that if p is a logical 
proposition which states truly a feature of a thought or 
any thought, it. is not a component or ingredient in that 
thought; nor is it a rule of composition of thoughts which 
must be known prior to the foimulation of a thought. The 
argument that a prepositional thought can bo analysed into 
a formal or applied thought X and a material or stuff-thou^t 
Y depends upon the possibility of unthinkable thou^ts - 
at some point we have "thoughts v/lthout form" and "thou^t 
without content". - v
Ï \
Descartes* attempt to treat all inference'as linear is 
In fact Incompatible with logical propositions or "relators" 
being other than superfluous in reasoning; but'as operators *  ^^ 
upon simple notions they would be contained "in" all 
monts in a variety of i/ays. Argument would then be unpacking 
"thoughts" we had already packed.
(g) The vdiole présentation depends upon' a distinction 
between predicates or attributes (notions which^*apply), and^—  
subjects or substances*(that to which notions apply).
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Most of Descartes’ metaphysics depends upon the notion of 
attributes Inhering in a substance knoim only as that in which 
they Inliere. Here sinjple notions are related by addition to 
the notion of "thing", and the consequences will concern us 
at length below.
The distinction of subject-substance and predicate-attr­
ibutes might well be claimed to be the first "truth" of a 
science of logic, and the first truth of a science of thought 
in the sense that logic is a science of thou^ts. But even if 
this were admitted, terms of physical science, terms of a
science of minds as agents, terms of fact statements, do not
1 ^  .
appear in a science of logic; and on the face of it a claim 
that "attributes are always of a substance" is a first truth, 
which everyone recognises before thinking other thoughts, is 
merely ludicrous.
;•••••.........
Two points begin to emerge: first, the simple notions 
are terms which can figure in factual statements (men think, 
rabbits are extended), in scientific statements (minds think, 
particles are figured, bodies are extended), and in logical 
statements ( these sinjple notions can be attributed to "thing"), 
and these stateraents are radically unlike one another; second,
simplicity and universality or maximum range of application
/
are identified.
Thus at the level of facts, if this is a theory of 
thinking, we seem to have a doctrine of universalia ante re», 
which elands into a doctrine that ideas of things are addit­
ions of ideas of universels and (with maximum neglect of
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argument) that things are structures of simple universal
^  .
thjn&B. At the level of sciences, the prepositional state­
ments of relations are the eternal truths of previous meta­
physicians, hut they are truths about complex ideas or - 
things "held in idea" or just plain things. Logical truths 
about substances and attributes are,however, in a different 
case.
The issue to be considered here is the role of the logical 
and eternal truths in our thinking. It may well be argued 
that we can give meaningmto them, and that our thought would 
be meaningless unless our thoughts were in accordance with 
the truths. The notions involved need not figure explicitly 
in our thinking, and yet may figure iinplicitly. But if this 
is so, and they can be exhibited by an analysis of thoughts, 
we have a doctrine of unconscious elements in thought, and 
especially of thinking as something ^ Ic h  goes on "in mind" 
or which "the mind" does, and of which we know nothing/
All that is clear and distinct about this is that the 
conclusion can be seen to follow from the premises, and the 
historical light reveals clearly that Descartes and his. 
successors close their eyes firmly when the entailment appears. 
"That nothing can exist in the mind.in so far as it is a
thinking thing,of which it is not conscious,seems to me
self-evident", Descartes claims in replying to Arnauld.^*
But if this holds, what is in my mind at any" time is vdiat "
I aia conscious of thinking at the time; and it is meaningless
1. H and R. II. p 115.
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to talk of notions not Included in the thou^t or principles 
or. truths not part of the thought,i.e. actually thought, as 
in the mind, inished home, since Descartes is aware of the 
thou^t "that nothing can exist in the mind of which it is 
not conscious" and it is self-evident to Descartes that it 
is a true thouglit, the claim seems to make reference to minds 
and "in minds" superfluous.
In the odd cases of "relating" which Descartes considers, 
he seems clearly to treat the relations as somehow operative. 
They are the conditions of our just seeing that two crowns 
equal in height to a tliird crown are equal in height. Ve do 
no need to state or think the formula in order to draw a 
conclusion; we compare the things directly as having one 
quality or degree of a quality. The Interest is rather in 
a Baconian logic than in minds, unless we want further to 
say that minds are sorts of things which are so constructed 
that they can so recognise and compare, rejecting "men are 
such that they can learn to perceive and relate what is 
perceptible and related" or positing that minds are so 
constructed and related to men that men are in consequence 
able to leam to perceive etc.. Granted,anyway, that we can 
do this sort of thing, the general relation can be stated as 
"if a thing is equal to etc." because the "idea of thing" is 
correlative with the "idea of things", of crowns and columns 
and cones. ¥e have no difficulty in understanding how single 
notions apply to all things of a kind while we have knowledge 
of different things which can be recognised to be such and so.
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we have considerable difficulty In discovering how we can
be said to be aware of (to “know") the simple notions at all
is
unless what is meant^that we can understand true propositions 
in which they appear, and Descartes is later to treat the 
important notions as predicates, and predicates with entail­
ment s, in propositions, replacing both "minds” and "bodies" 
by "thing". No one, as I suggested above, would want to deny 
that Descartes thought, or that men think and are extended 
things, if these statements are in the general tongue; no one 
would want to deny that many sorts of thing were extended and 
were distinct from one another, distinguishable by, specific 
shapes and kinds of shape. Declare "men think" to be meaning­
less because men are extended, and a class of statements is 
transferred from "men" to "minds", and all the other distinctions 
and attributions are unaltered. • "Thinking" and-"extended" do
t
function as predicates, and very general predicates. Their^ 
universality is thus patent; and the universality is meaningless 
unless many different things can be the subject of the same 
predicate.  ^ ^
But does it not follow, as many have claimed, that the 
many Instances of 0 could not be recognised as instances unless 
a first instance was recognised, and that we need to have ‘ 
the notion of 0 in order to recognise it in the first instance? 
And must not 0 be Identical In each instance? I shall show 
below that the simplicity of 0 is delusory if 0 is a predicate 
term in ordinary use; but the "first instance" argument entails 
that prior to any experience of an instance minds are capable
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off or are so "natujjed" that they are capable of, recognising 
0-neos. If this 1b what is mennt by "having an idea of 0"i 
then the idée, of 0 le 0-ness a.s a notion, am that of which 
the mind is aware as we are aware in recognising later 
instpjiceB, or it is a power or capacity of which the mind is 
as unaware as we ore until actual recognition takes place.
In either cace we revert to a doctrine of unconscious ideas, 
since (a) 0 is not in mind as a "consciousness" all the time 
unless we are unaware of what is in our minds, (b) 0' is only 
one of many notions which cannot all be in "consciousness" 
at"'any one time, while (c) minds'or men" csji be aware of 
powers only in exercise,i.e. in recognising 0 instances, or 
"thinking" 0.  ^  ^ -
The thesis that "thinking" and "extension" are in a 
special sense ultimate entities or mental entities, things 
out of which the things we recognise and talk about or the 
"complex ideas" we have in mind of such things are "constr­
ucted" depends upon complicated theory of unconscious 
elements or ideas and/or powers, a theory which nobody has 
attempted to worlc out even in broad terma. are led not 
to simplicity but to acute difficulties of understanding " 
Descartes’ theory of ideas,and of how such ideas are related 
to "minds" or "thinking substances" or to men. - -
What I am claiming is that all such questions are-meaning­
ful within and only within a framework of statements about 
men thinking,sensing, r e a s o n i n g ,  doubting, doing science and 
thinking about thinking and thoughts. There is little in
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the Regulae which is not In accordance vdth this claim, and 
the claim that notions belong to science, to thought as what 
is thought (and this, in the case of observation or of 
statements related directly to obserbable,^ situations, is 
what Is before object of my attention). In a sense all 
scientists and philosophers agree with me; but in sticking 
at the agreed level I am left behind by the scientific and 
metaphysical band-waggon, with its destination "Reality". 
There are probably millions of books and. articles now in 
studies and librarieo full of infomation about minds end 
ideas, as well as the books on matter and physics and mathem­
atics - are we to dismiss thorn as nonsense?
Some siaall number I have read and understood; many I 
would never be able to understand, being what I am and the 
age I rm; very few could I claim as within, my, capacity to 
write; a certain number I claim are.nonsense. But the real 
point is that men wréte the .books as a result of training, 
study and thou^tful consideration, whether they were doing 
physics, mathematics, logic or metaphysics; the multifarious 
activities are part of what we can .call "History"; "man" and 
thinking" are concepts which are central to our notions of 
tho historically developing world, and until we have been 
presented with a coherent account of minds and ideas which 
con be related to our account of man-Vv’orld-history there con 
be no question of claiming Reality for minds Fmd ideas.
The model Descartes has in mind in the Regular, the
i  i  . • *
problem he is considering in the Hegulae, has, I suggest.
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nothing to do with the question of minds and mental elements 
and the relating of elements in or loy minds. Apart from the 
fact claim that there are minds and there are bodies, whose 
predicates exclude one another ("It is certain that we are 
unable to construct any corporeal idea which will represent 
to us what knowledge is, what doubt is, what ignorance is, 
or what willing is qua volition" - i.e. we cannot draw 
knowledge,doubt,ignorance or willing), we are presented with 
truths and notions which are propositions and terms in 
logical, scientific or ordinary discourse. Descartes is 
doing two jobs at once: he is expounding the structure of 
a particular science, and at the same time trying to show
I t  ' i  -
that all the sciences, because they must have the same 
structure, can be malgamated into one science. But he is 
unwilling to regard "structure" as in question; he wants 
to show that all sciences have the same matter or substance 
or content, that all thoughts are made up of the same sort of 
notions, that one set of elements will do for metaphysics, 
physics and the branch sciences of the tree of knowledge. 
Metaphysics, he declares in the preface to the Principles, 
is to reveal all tho "clear and distinct notions that are 
in us", and for "in us" we need only write "that can be 
discovered by analysis of thoughts" in order to attain
intelligibility.
The whole complex of theorems which is Geometry (at 
any stage in its development), Descartes thinks, can be 
shown to develop from initial simple notions. These seem
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to include terms, axioms and definitions, though there is 
room for argument as to whether they are all "notions"; what 
he wants to do is to determine the simple notions which will 
serve for a science which is the whole of science, and of 
which Geometry is only a part. Thus he could reply to the 
criticisms I have offered of his metaphysics earlier that what 
I say of man is doubtless true enough, but raising this as 
an objection to his statements is as pointless as insisting 
on talking about quadrilaterals and polygons and rectangular 
solids when the question was of determining definitions of 
points and lines upon which the whole of geometry depends.
It is this which lies at the back of Descartes’ Irritation 
when critics of the Meditations go beyond his statements 
and developments of them to conclusions, and point to diffic­
ulties of extension - to what, for Descartes, he has not 
yet attempted to explain. The criteria are intelligibility 
and coherence in orderly development. Science is like growth 
or construction.
This rationalist programme is plausible in the case of 
geometry, where there is no recognisable terminal point, but 
even here the plausibility is limited. It is true that we 
cannot criticise a proof of a circle theorem by showing that 
it does not apply to ellipses - which strictly have no place 
in geometry until the problems of ellipses have been solved, 
i.e. until geometry has grown to include them. Historically 
geometry does show a plece-meal development, and Descartes’ 
criticism of contemporary mathematicians is that they worked
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In a plece-meal fashion. There will he a certain order in 
any section of mathematics if the section is in any sense 
science, hut a well-founded science is ordered all the way 
through. Descartes believed, since his own case demonstrated 
it, that once principles of order were discovered it was easy 
to solve mathematical puzzles. The logic of order, instanced 
by mathematical series in the Regulae. is that of filling in 
the gaps in an order (finding the missing term) or of extend­
ing the order in a direction (finding the next term). This 
is clear enough; but it depends upon an initial ordered number 
series, and a problem- series with sufficient terms for a 
special order to be discernible, and it is difficult to find 
sciences in which we are presented with this double feature.
What rather m i ^ t  be claimed of other sciences is that 
an ordered section reveals a principle of order, which demands 
extension in two directions - onward, which is making new 
discoveries and embracing other sections, and backward, which 
is determining principles or first truths. It seems true that 
only if an order is apparent in our "knowledge" can analysis 
begin and the search for principles be undertaken.
On the other hand, we might well recognise that out of 
land-measurement, building and other activities of men, a 
familiarity with figures and the properties of figures can 
lead to a section of formal geometry in which it is true 
that figures are bounded by lines and points at which lines
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meet, while yetbthe "leading to" is neither necessary to, 
nor a precedent of, the recognition of figures and their 
properties. If we "assume!' a congruency theorem, we can 
prove many theorems; an unproven theorem may in fact he 
true as a statement and a goal for analysis and the attempt 
to prove it, even if we do not want to call it a theorem 
until it is proven; the move from one theorem to another 
does not follow from first principles, hut seems to demand 
an acquaintance with circles as distinct from triangles.
What owe conclude with as a result of a set of triangle 
theorems is a set of true statements about triangles, all 
of which are just true and none necessarily true except in 
the sense that q is necessarily true if it is the consequent 
of a valid argument "if p, then q".
There may at this stage be no statements about lines 
and points; an analytic procedure may lead us to talk of 
lines and points (we might well get to this stage by argument 
about exact boundary markings and corner positions), lines 
and points which we define in part by their mutual relations 
and in part by their relation to triangles. Ve need some 
such proposition as "all triangles are figures bounded by 
three straight lines intersecting at points" to get lines into 
geometry and from lines to triangles; these connecting 
definitions" are both essential at various^lstages and a 
point of mutual involvement of meaning of defined terms.
The definition of points as having position,but no 
magnitude and of lines as having direction but no .width has
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broken the hearts of pedagogue and pupil for many years: as 
first thoughts, unrelated to a science of geometry, they are 
utterly unintelligible, and the impossibility of giving a 
meaning to "position" and "direction" without reference to 
complex situations indicates why. To the geometer there is 
no problem - the definitions represent â negation of features 
of points and lines in constructions,i.e. in drawn figures.
Nor is this unconnected with a transition from statements 
about measurable and located bodies with geometrical features 
to statements about regular shape, "pure" location and "pure" 
direction , extension and dimension. Geometry is thus describ-
' i.
able as an abstract science of space - a simple description 
which presents a variety of problems when we try to work out 
its implications.
Without the connecting definitions,however, geometry 
neither starts nor develops; there is nothing in the definition 
of points and lines to give surface or figure or triangle. 
Descartes recognises something like this in Régula XIV.
"This (discussion above) throws much li^t on geometry. For 
almost all geometers go wrong in conceiving quantity as having 
three species, line,surface and body. As we have said, line
. O '  ■ - ^  -
and surface are not to be conceived as really distinct from 
body or from one another. If considered simply as abstractions 
formed by the mind they are no more truly species of quantity 
than "animal" and "living" are, in the case of "man", differ- 
ent species of substance". He goes on to point out that 
length,breadth and depth are equally lengths, and "have a
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real basis in every extended thing". This .is to found his 
physics of body or extended substance, and what is to follow 
is the claim that solid geometry ^  physics. Subsequent 
criticisms of his physics can be presented as pointing out 
that his "extension" is equivalent to "volume", and that this 
is an abstraction from "body" or "extended thing".
The same sort of criticism can be levelled at those 
who claim "mass" to be adequate to bridge the gap between 
"volume" and "thing with volume"; but the chief point here 
is that the passage from bodily thing to length,breadth,depth, 
surface, line and point is intelligible, a form of thinking we 
can learn to do, and understanding this is understanding the 
reverse order, while the synthetic process, without the grasp 
of "bodily thing", is completely unintelligible. This is 
obscured, like much else, in geometry^ because of the stress 
on construction, even in "Problems", as "making up of" rather 
than "marking out".
¥e can in fact dispense with "line" and "point" in much 
of our geometry - they are essential only for talking about 
the constructing of figures - and the relation between points 
and lines, considered in isolation from figures and constr­
uctions, has been a metaphysical puzzle since the Pythagoreans.
It is difficult to see that "How many positions are there in
»
a finite direction?" is a geometrical question, if it is a 
question at all; the paradoxes of points and lines are 
paradoxes which arise from conceptions of continuity and 
discontinuity, of geometry’s "length as limit of the contin-
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uous" and arithmetic’s **numérosity of units of measure in 
the measurable".
Until we have given "point" and "line" a geometrical 
meaning, it is impossible to say that they are features of 
any geometrical figure; giving them a geometrical meaning 
involves concepts like "direction","no width","position", 
"termination", so that their "simplicity" is complicated; 
and while,once the geometrical meaning is established, 
they "apply" to all figures, it is impossible rto maintain 
that we could not have the idea of any geometricalLifigure 
unless we had previously had the idea of point and line.
This is as unlike arguing "no one can have the idea of 6 
unless he has the idea of 2 and of 4" as the latter is 
unlike arguing " no one could have the idea of I unless 
he had the ideas of ^ and i because I is always two halves 
and 4 quarters".
The latter differs from the former as division differs 
from addition; addition and the number system seem to have 
priority, and it is true that we ^  leam to count and to 
add before we learn to divide. But must we? Our search for 
the foundations of arithmetic is a search for precisely the 
foundations of arithmetic, and if "I" and "addition" provide 
it, we have the foundation. I am not denigrating the search 
for foundations in declaring that this is all we have, nor 
am I declaring that "I" and "addition" are the -foundation.
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What we will have discovered Is not (a) that we had 
arithmetical ideas which we did not know we had, (h) how we 
actually do arithmetic, or (c) a "scientific" way of doing 
arithmetic better than our old ways of doing arithmetic.
Our concern is not with establishing foundations of 
either arithmetic or geometry, but with general features of 
the structure of a science, and what either arithmetic or 
geometry seem to share with other sciences is that their 
structuring is a complicated matter of relating the proposit­
ions, or of ordering the propositions, which are stated in 
that science. Something at least of subject matter and 
order precedes the search for foundations, and when we begin 
to look for them we encounter both the difficulty of saying 
what foundations would be like and what foundations are in 
the particular science in question.
There is, in one sense, no difficulty about "princip­
les", since any science will have numerous rules and laws; 
our difficulty is with "first principles", since it seems 
of them that they must be true, must be unprovable (or there 
are prior principles), and that the science must somehow 
follow from them. "Here is a first principle which is of no 
science" seems to be nonsense; and our procedure seems to be 
in accordance with this, namely carguing; "the propositions 
of this science could not be true or necessarily true asnthey 
are unless p" - whereupon others proceed to argue against 
"p" as first or as principle.
Taking Descartes’ criticism of geometers seriously, we 
should argue that geometry is concerned only with statements
218.
about the shape or extension of things, whatever other 
statements about such things are insisted upon by other 
sciences. It is true that on a strict interpretation of 
geometry we seem never to find things with geometrical 
features, find nothing perfectly rectangular, triangular 
or circular, but Descartes’ point holds that encountered 
things are extended and limited and figured, just as they 
have position and move in directions; they are measurable, 
have measure in the same sense that geometrical figures 
have measure. If there were geometrical figures which were 
of existing bodies, those bodies would share many features 
with non-geometrical bodies,i.e. some descriptions of them 
would be exactly the same as the descriptions of non-geomet­
rical bodies.
The concept of degree, which makes measurement meaningful 
and a number series applicable, not only applies to both but 
serves to relate the regular and the irregular, especially 
when the latter comes to be regarded as irregularly regular 
(one thing more nearly circular than another). Indeed, working 
with triangulations and ^ trigonometrical measurements, we ^ n d  ^
(a) perfectly geometrical situations, and (b) find, with the 
claim as to observational discrepancy over large distances,
' an insistence that our "rational geometry" is falsely bound 
by attention only to the near; while in the case of a weight 
moving on the end of a fixed string, we need special instrum­
ents to establish that the path is not perfectly circular.
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Geometrical truths are related to truths about the things 
we manipulate and measure and to our procedures in manipulating 
and measuring; certain terms are common to both. Vhat Descartes 
is Insisting dn is that the notion of "body" is what converts 
"length" into "length,breadth and depth" - and hence geometry 
is primarily physics. Vhat I am insisting is that three-dimen­
sional extension is a feature of familiar things, that "length" 
involves direction, continuity and limit, and "length,breadth 
and depth", as a concept, "relations of direction", so that 
"body" analyses into a complexity of inter-related concepts; 
and the "geometrical world" might as well be regarded as the 
encounterable world pushed out of shape for scientific purposes 
as the irregular world be regarded as the geometrical world 
pushed out of shape by an Irrational Something interfering with 
Geometrical Reality.
One of the difficulties for rationalist science is 
precisely that the Irregular has full claim to existence and 
historical reality, and the irregular world has to be got rid 
of if the Rational is, in this case, to be Real. But calling 
geometry "rational", a science of reason or understanding as 
distinct from observation, does not reduce it to a scienee of 
"things in mind", of "ideas" as distinct from "things". Nor 
does it leave us with a science of "observation" which is 
neither rational nor intelligible.
4. What holds geometry and "non-geometry" together is the set 
of terms common to descriptive predications in both.
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Descartes, insisting on "extension" here, Is clearly ri^t, 
and his insistence on three dimensional length as involved 
in "extension" is equally justifiable. In calling the three 
lengths "abstractions” he is insisting that they are pred­
icate terms, not "things" - existing things are three-dimens­
ional and 80 bodies. Saying that "the mind abstracts them" 
is conventional manner of speaking, using "mind" as the 
agent for all thinking. His illustration of a more obvious 
"abstraction" is that of "living" and "anhi^al" in the case 
of "man", i.e. as predicate terms in the statement "aman 
is a living animal".
The insistenee on "in the "statement" is mine. Taken 
in isolation outside a statement like "a man is a living 
animal", which might look convincingly a first principle 
in a science of man, neither "living" nor "animal" are 
simple as concepts, and "animal" is both a substance term 
(with an article added) and an attribute term. Descartes 
is to encounter extreme difficulty with both of these terms. 
But, accepting the obvious, we can stress that so far as a 
rational science has application, in so far as its truths 
are apjilled with any degree of success or failure, to the 
world, the science must be known by the agent who applies 
them, who observes and calculates and manipulates.
The Rogulae. I have argued, begin with the obvious ^
acceptance of men as inquirers, men with various powers
*
all of which must he exercised if there Is to he genuine 
science.
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Neglecting the coiAplexlty of "siaples", and using the test 
of "unless" to check whether a statement is a possible princ­
iple, we can argue:"the science that we know could only exist 
if there were men able to observe and to reason, and %Aiat was 
observable had rational features". And what this means is just 
that men should be able to make true observation statements 
which have logical relations. Why does Descartes not accept 
this? No simple answer can be given, since he not only accepts 
it and proves it necessarily so, but he refuses to accqpt it 
and proves it necessarily not so.
On the side of acceptance we can refer:
(a) To the first several Regulae, in which the inquiring subj­
ects are "we", and to the first part of Régula XII, where 
the division is made as obvious between "ourselves vdio 
know and the things we are engaged in knowing".
(b) To the letters to Regius, and the violent reaction to the 
suggestion that mind and body in man are "accidentally 
related" - man is a real man, a single substance,one agent.
(c) To the letters to Elizabeth, Wherein it is admitted that 
the proof of the substantial distinction between mind and 
body is presented without recognition or mention of a furt­
her truth that establishes the unity of man.
(d) To the proof that mind is not a thing in the body as a 
pilot is in a ship, in the Discourse.
(e) To the justification of the method of Doubt as a proced­
ure to be employed by men,, in respect only of certain 
beliefs,i.e. to the exclusion of moral,political, general 
social and religious "truths"; and to the connected use of 
"we" throu^out the early Principles.
(f) To the recognition in the Passions de l’Ame that the Sopl 
cannot be understood as in any one part of the body rather 
than in any other part.
(g) To the whole general scheme of medicine and science as an 
undertaking for man by man, designed to overcome ills, age 
and inadequate control over the physical environment.
2 2 2 .
(h) To the recognition of a science of morals as well as of 
a science of medicine.
(i) To all Descartes’ experimental science, including anatomy 
and optics and related theory of perceiving.
His reasons for rejecting it are clearer and more
complicated. He accepts:
(a) A theological doctrine of an Immortal and immaterial soul, 
which has to do something to he worth anything at all.
(h) A traditional doctrine that the soul thinks, and he treats 
this most of the time as identifying the personal soul and 
the "rational soul" of metaphysicians.
(c) A Socratic doctrine that the rational soul has only the 
faculty of reason and of intuition of the entities with 
which it is directly acquainted.
(d) The necessity of "Socrates cannot douht that he doubts if 
he doubts", and the Cogito version of this, based upon the 
scholastic thesis that "looking within" revealed a unique 
and permanent soul-self, sdbject of all acts said to be its. ^
(e) The obviousness of a rationalist doctrine that thought 
begins with first principles or eternal truths and ideas or 
notions which are known prior to any sensory or imaginative 
experience - either of these being, on the general thassis, 
so unlike thinking or thought that they are substitutes 
for neither truths nor notions.
(f) The validity of arguments, like those of the Theaetetus, 
corresponding to the Platonism of the Phaedo, that percept­
ion is not "really" veridical or "knowledge^.
(g) With qualifications, a materialist metaphysic of mixed 
kind, a legacy of Pythagoras, Empedocles and even Panaenides.
(h) The rational structure of sciences, and of one science, in 
which "first thoughts" are to be treated as "initial 
thoughts of an individual" as well as "first in science" 
and "unprovable but transparently true".
We can add "and the like", since there is no obvious
limit to the "reasons here". All of them seem to point in one
I
direction - "man" cannot be a term in a first thought, because
"man" is a complex (and complicated) term; and if "man" cannot
223.
appear In an Initial and Intelligible thought about what 
reasons and reasoning, ’’man” need never appear In science 
as a thinking agent at all. If we begin with the facts to 
be ordered and the acceptance of man as a thinking thing, 
we have to get rid of "man” as agent to establish the first 
principles and rational science; if we begin with first 
principles, and a "thinking mind”, then man can only figure 
as an object of science and not as a doer of science.
Descartes, I am satisfied, believed that there was no 
incompatibility between the assertion "minds think" and 
the assertion "men think” as principles stated separately; 
one can occur early on an ordering, and the other can occur 
later, just as we have definitions of points and lines and 
triangles at one stage, and add definitions of circles and 
ellipses later. On the subject-side of "thinks" he thus 
introduces later an "intimate union", a "real man", vdio or 
which is a single subs tance-agent; on the object side he has 
to do something parallel in order to get the materialist world 
of physics into the observable world. But just as he is 
unwilling to permit souls to be absorbed into men for theol­
ogical reasons, he is unwilling to let the physical world 
be absorbed into the observable world for scientific reasons. 
The observable world is "unscientific", refuses to obey the 
dictates of reason. It is the refusal to let "thinking thing" 
really become "man" and "science" to become "what men think" 
which converts the familiar observable world (which includes
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men) into an illusion of minds, while minds and mere extens­
ions alone belong to what really exists* It is,however, 
extremely difficult to see how "intimate unions" are 
introduced at all unless our problem is of expanding principles 
or ordered truths to include man and facts about men and their 
observed world. It certainly would be difficult to convince 
anyone at all that we had determined principles pf all 
science and could not relate the principles to any statements 
about men and birds and beasts.
It is, argues Descartes, the idea of "body" that 
enables us to give meaning to "point", "line" and "surface"; 
in no sense do we make bodies out of things called points 
and lines and surfaces. Similarly, we do not make rectangles 
out of triangles, and circles out of either. When we frame 
an account of a chiliagon, imagined or not quite imaginable, 
our account will contain terms like extension, side, number, 
and specific number. All our accounts of figures will 
contain "extension" and vary the attributes vdiich distinguish 
one figure from another. Gross bodies have attribute-terms 
in their accounts which do not appear in geometrical accounts. 
If geometrical bodies are extended substances, we do not 
get from one substance to another by adding substances 
together, but by varying accounts, and we can call this 
adding or changing attributes in thought. "Complex and simple" 
work in terms of notions, not of substances and their relat­
ions. It is only when we want to relate geometrical bodies 
and non-geometrical bodies, a geometrical world and an 
observable world, that we have to raise the question of
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substantial relations, which are possible only if both kinds' 
of thing exist in the same way in the same world. The question 
"Cosmogony, cosmology or useful hypothesis?" nqist be asked, 
and the answer determines what else is to be said. If it is 
"cosmogony", then we have to explain how the regular bodies 
became the irregular; if it is "cosmology", we have to explain 
how the regular constitute the irregular; and if it is "useful 
hypothesis", we have to show that it is useful, that it explains 
without any question of the regular bodies existing in fact 
as do and in the irregular bodies.
These clearly enough are problems which concern Descartes, 
and the distinction between the geometrical bodies ^ich are
‘ i
to explain, however they do it, and the irregular bodies to be 
explained, depends upon a distinction between imagining or 
conceiving and observing or discovering, althou^ both what is 
imagined and what is observed are "thinkable". A claim that 
in "perceiving" we are really "imagining" is irrelevant to any 
real issue here. If minds are to do science as we know it and 
Descartes did it, then minds must be able to observe, and the 
condition of this is that they should be capable of sensory 
perception. They have, in other words, to be able to do *v^ at 
we say men do. If our first principle is "minds think of exten-
slons", then at some later stage we need "men think of partie-
'
ular extensions like horses and houses" ; and all that we need
t
to do is to add to "thing which thinks" the relevant predicates 
which convert "mind" into "man", esqpand "thii&s" into its 
species, and recognise all "objects". Thinking things, men, can
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observe. Unless something like this is true, we can give ' 
little if any meaning to "%uman bodies" and none whatever to 
dissection and anatomy. Ve shall see below that the e^gpansion 
of "thing which thinks" into "man" is completely in accordance 
with Descartes* logic of substance as an analysis of things or 
of thoughts. .
Can we, however,ask the question "Cosmogony, cosmology or 
useful hypothesis?" of the Cartesian soul? The answer is not 
so clear as in the case of "bodies", but Descartes does seem 
to say "yes" to all three. God creates a soul and "infuses" 
it into a body which it informs during the uterine period, 
and the body becomes human and begins to think at the same 
time; the soul is a substance which exists within the human 
animal body and can by exercising its freedom negate even 
the senses - whatever they may be - and act purely thinkingly 
in complete independence of the body, which equally acts in 
complete independence of the soul when the soul is not attend­
ing to what is going on around the body or in the body (or
' 1 *  i f ' i ' ‘ ‘ i - *  r'
what the man is attending to and doing) ; and the flna$ vindic­
ation of all the principles, which include definitional state- 
ment8 about the soul, will be the extenft to which problems 
are solved and facts explained. But the keynote is mind-soul 
as independent substance, and this Descartes never doubts 
whatever may be the consequences to facts or to science, and 
until the intimate union is proven - a proof which is "harmful" 
to the thesis of substantial independence, as Descartes admits 
to Elizabeth - the mind is a thing which knows nothing of
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bodies. What is the mind like? It is the subject of all 
the statements which I can make about myself which have 
"thinking" as the predicate-verb^rBut 'we have to restrict 
the species of "thinking", reject "sensing" by treating 
it as "dreaming", and (if the ambiguity of Meditation II is 
resolved by the doctrine that images are corporeal) then 
reject even "dreaming-imagining".
i •
What remains at this stage is difficult to determine, 
but the point here is that if it is in fact true that I am
i
an intimate union, a man, then "I" is co-extensive with 
"the man that I am", not the man or the body v/hich "I occupy". 
Whether or not this is a first truto, it is a truth; it is 
embodied in ordinaiy usage, and as such is used throu^out 
his writings by Descartes. It is because this usage is 
distinct from the use of "I" in "I am a mind", although it 
is not in the least incompatible with the use tff "I" in "I am 
a thinking thing", that we have to manoeuvre in such strange 
fashions when we attempt to clarify or to criticise the "mind" 
thesis. "I am a man" is completely in accordance with the
-■
thesis that an infusion of soul into a foetus occurred and 
thus a man was created, and in this sense "I am a man" has 
been true, whether I thought it or not, from the mysterious 
moment when I came into being. In this sense "I am a mind" 
is false, and "I was a mind" is equally false.
It is for this reason that when the statement "I 
cannot understand what you mean by "a mind thinks"" is answered 
by "you must understand, because "mind" is equivalent to
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"I who think the question asked", we seem to have been told 
nothing at all. Similarly, when the protest as to inability 
to understand what is meant by ideas is answered by "You 
understand what is meant by your question, and this is having 
ideas", we seem to have been told nothing at all. What is 
required is information about minds and ideas which enables 
them to be treated as entities or things which are different 
from the man who asks questions and the things he thinks 
he is asking questions about.
Since I want at various stages to claim that the mind, 
as Descartes describes it or purports to describe it, could 
not do what it is claimed to do,i.e. what I recognise that 
I am able as a thinkinr: thing to do, because the description 
Descartes gives of thinking seems flatly impossible as a descr­
iption of the thinking I do, and since the distinction of mind 
and body as substances is vital to any Cartesian claim as to 
what is ordered and by whom or by what in the enterprise of 
ordering any or all science, let us look at this with some 
care. If it is geometry that is being ordered, then it matters 
not at all what we are who do the ordering - all that is req­
uired is that "wo" should have acquired a knowledge of geometry 
But any science which demands observation is different, and 
any science concerned with man is different again - the latter 
will contain statements about "ourselves vdio know".
The vital point in the development of the Cogito is 
the rejection of "I am a man", i.e. of "man is a thinking 
thing". It is rejected as not clear and distinct, as complex
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and complicated, and the rejection amounts to a refusal 
to consider it. "Stric;^ly speaking”, he is to admit, \diat 
is certain is that as a result of an argument that doubting 
is possible and operates in the ways presented, all that 
Descartes can be certain of, all that anybody who follows 
the method through can be sure of, is that he is a thinking 
thing - whatever else may be true of him. Descartes wants 
to prove that he is an immaterial and immortal substance, 
but üntil "doubt that there is anything perceived,even vdien 
I think I see my arms and legs and trunk" is converted into 
"It is absolutely certain that I see nothing existing etc.", 
nothing is proven of this. The back door is left open for 
the proof of God*s existence and goodness to establish that 
Descartes is not mistaken in believing that he perceives, 
for science thus to be founded as a science of existing 
things, and for science then to close the door once again.
Yet the truth "I am only a thinking thing" is a first 
truth of metaphysics, not of science. Framed as Descartes 
frames it in proving it, it is a truth to a thinker of it,
A
and cannot be universalised on the side of the subject; with 
the doubt-rejection of sensible existents goes everything 
except the isolated thinker, including the thinker»s body. 
The soul-thing*s theme-^  song is not "If I were the only 
thing in the world" but "I am the only thing in the world". 
But of eourse it l£ universalised, through the use of "I" 
and "we", and the operation of the Meditations,like the 
Regulae. as directions to,and arguments directed towards,
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readers. The Heditatlons opens with an autobiographical 
sketch in which "I" is Descartes.
In the first two paragraphs of the Synopsis to the 
H e dj tat ion 8 the "doubt" is declared (a) to deliver us from 
all prejudice, (b) to provide a path by which the mind can 
withdraw itself from the senses, (c) to make it impossible 
for us to doubt truths later discovered, and (d) to cdlminate 
in the second Meditation in the mind*s supposing "that no 
object is, of the existence of which it hasithe^sli^test 
doubt" and finding "that it must itself exist". It is on the 
universal side that argument produces "minds think and exist"; 
in tends of particular experience the doubting "I" doubts 
and rejects and concludes "it is certain that when I think 
I exist". Only by the declaration "I am a mind" can the 
exi/erienoe of the Dubito be declared to be the ejgperienoe 
of a mind, and “I am a mind" is a "first thought" &s presented 
here only in the sense that this is the firet time in history 
that it has been thought and that Descartes was the first 
thinker of it. But if I am in fact a man, even an intimate 
union, the ej^erience is mine, and the conclusion false, and 
there is, on the fusion*thesis, no time in my history vdien 
it would not have been false. I, as a man, cannot cease to 
be a mrm to have a special "ejq)erience", althou^ I can see 
the force of the arguiaant, see that "if 1 doubt that I have 
a body" entails that I must think "I have no body", just as 
"I doubt that I have a body" entails "I can doubt that I have
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a body"; but I . can also see that saying^  "I have no body" 
is not doubting, while doubting that I have a right leg 
(which seems meaningful as a doubt because I know what 
it would be like if it were true that I lacked a leg) has 
no effect whatever upon my actual anatomical structure.
As I have argued above, while we treat the Cogito as an 
argument which we understand, entailed by a procedure which 
we understand, giving some information about us, it is 
intelligible and acceptable. We can agree that "I am a think­
ing thing" is in some sense specially important, e.g. if it 
were false I would not be a scientist aÆ I The counter- 
factual is a counter of the factual. That "thinking" entails 
"not not thinking" is true. That we are under certain circum­
stances aware that we are thinking, and can, as adults, say 
that it is thinking that is going on and that we are thinking, 
is also true. But the claim that thinking that I think is 
the result of a self-contained intuitive process of perceiving 
my thinking or my self thinking, like the claim that trying 
to doubt that I think and failing is a special sort of 
self-revealing experience, which reveals a mind to itself or 
a mind to a man who is incapable as a man of having the 
experience, is at best false.
We conclude with a thought that I can think and a thou^t 
that I cannot think, and, in the idiom of personal pronouns, 
t w o  facts about myself - not my self. What Descartes hopes 
to establish from "IB exist necessarily as a thinking thing" 
is that a world of other things, substances independent of
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thou^t, can be proven to exist. "I exist" is a first truth 
in an existential or metaphysical science, as distinct from 
sciences idiich are merely "rational thou^ts". In order to 
complete his undertaking, once «I am only a mind v;hich thinks" 
is accepted, it is necessary (a) to show that this is meaning­
ful and false, or (b) that it is meaningless, unless "mind" 
is another name for what is Indicated by "I". The "intimate 
union" thesis serves both ends, and it is throu^éut Descartes 
the intimate union who is seeking and advancing proofs in 
terms of notions and relations.
There is a world of difference between us agreeing to 
suppose that there are things which are only thinking things 
(one class of notions in the Regulae) and trying to develop 
this proposition into science and a v/orld as we know them, 
agreeing to suppose that these thinking things are conscious 
of themselves as thinking things, and only as such, and agree­
ing to suppose that we are such things if the last is to enable 
us to say that what is true of is true of the things. ¥e 
might soy that supposing we had no bodies, that no bodily 
state lents were true of us as we familiarly recognise them 
to be true, and following out the consequences of the supposit­
ion, would provide an interesting way of trying to discover 
something about ourselves; but the game is difficult to 
start ("we" ceases to be meaningful immediately) and impossible 
to continue without our language e3q>loding into spécial uses 
and quoted verbs with cognate objects (typical philosophers* 
mind-talk) because the bodily statements have complicated
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entailjaents. They belong In accounts of the features and. 
behaviour of men and of animals and of men as animals, and 
in rejecting them we dislocate our language, and so our 
thought and the world as thought. The suppositional method 
has the virtue of revealing such features of . thought and 
language, but to Cartesians the virtue is a vice.
It is from the second supposition, that, there are merely 
thinking things vhich are conscious of themselves as such, 
that philosophers derive Self-consciousness, Consciousness 
as necessarily Self-consciousness, Minds as essentially 
Self-conscious, and a form of Belf-knowledge which is not 
really knowledge as science is knowledge - the result of our 
Knowing is not something that can be stated or described.
So we get the whole mystique of Selves which are Objects 
only as Subjects, and Subjects only as Objects.
The (unacknowledged) core of. this position is that if 
"only minds can think" is true, this must be thought by a 
mind, and the mind must be aware of itself - how else cquld 
it think the thou^t? If minds could think only un-selfconsc­
iously, there would be only science ipza what is thought, and 
we could not talk of minds at all. In so far as "minds" 
are purely "thinking subjects", I propose to argue (a) that 
there is only science qua what is thought, and (b) that we 
cannot talk of minds at all. .
Let us,however, clear away one confusion first. Althou^ 
prima facie we cannot argue to or about what is #ot object 
for thought, arguments are advanced in terms of claims as
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to "personal experience" and "subjective esgerienoe", both 
treated as our experiences of thinking and feeling. With 
the introduction of "feeling" we have many questions, of 
lact, ol terminé logy, of scientific ordering and philosophical 
untangling. But in so far we have to talk of feelings as 
experienced by men and reported by men, or in so: far as they 
can be discussed (i.e. thought) as features of the subject 
of "thinking" statements, feelings are irrelevant to the 
issue.
Hume, as noted in the introduction, rejected the mere 
self-substance-thinking*thing. Bradley rejected it© Both 
seem to run into insoluble problems of personal identiiy.
Fichte seems to have made the "thing" and its self-identity 
the core of metaphysics and of the universe, and to have 
denied that it was the individual person, thou^ he thou^t 
that the individual must be deducible from itî Hegel declared 
it to be purely universal, Thou.ght as Thinker. Kant - Kant 
did many things with it, including making it into Twins 
called Houmenal and Phenomenal. Hone of these help us much, > 
although they seem to be disagreeing in unison with Descartes.
But Descartes, when he denied that substance and existence 
were directly known, denied in consequence that self-conscious­
ness was possible for any thing at all; the Self must infer 
Itself from an act qua attribute of Itself. Ho thing of this 
appears in the Meditations, if we look only at the surface; 
only when we have examined in detail his thesis with regard to
1. See Wallace*8 note, p.393 of his "Logic of Hegel".
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"substance" and "thing" in all thoughts, as we will below, will 
we realise how the logical principles learned at La Pleche 
are the first principles of metaphysics and of science, and 
are to justify the claim that "a thing thinks" is a possible 
thought and an account of the "I" as mere subject.
Suppose, however, that we tnke the philosophically pecul­
iar step of declaring that men think, that thinking things are 
men, that men do science. % a t  follows?
If I am a man, then I am a thinking thing; "I am a think­
ing thing" at least Implies that I may be a man. Stating or 
thihking that I am a man entails self-consciousness. I have to 
know, have to understand, that I am a man. To understand what 
a man is we need to understand \diat an onimal is, argues Desc­
artes, and we should be led on to understanding what other 
things were - we should have to go on to "Inquire into" what 
other nouns meant, indefinitely, and Descartes does not possess 
"enough of leisure to warrant (him) \msting (his) time in 
subtleties of this sort".^ Why these matters should be subtle­
ties he does not explain, nor what matters of grave importance
2necessitated such haste in rejecting intelligible answers. The 
real point is, apparently, that it takes a long time and much
s
labour to come to understand the variety of accounts vdiich 
constitute an answer to "what is man", and something similar 
is equally true of all our ordinary nouns .... althpu^
1. Meditation II.
2. In Régula XII the reason for not Explaining all about the 
soul and its relation to the body is that the discussion 
is too limited to admit the e3q?lanation.
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It seems scarcely the case with "complex ideas". Descartes 
is about to put his finger on an essence, a thing with an 
essence, and a noun which can be understood in an intuitive 
flash. But unless we are talking to an inquisitive infant, 
it does not take very long to e^qplain what we mean by "men 
think" or "men do science"; unless we are infants there is? no 
long process of "inquiiy" necessary before we know what we 
"really mean" by these statements; it takes much longer to work 
out why we should turn our backs upon the knowledge we have 
painfully acquired in order to discover vdiat really is or 
really is so. Descartes has discovered a mode of argument 
which establishes to his satisfaction a truth about himself; 
he has not ceased to be Descartes and become a mind conscious 
of its essential self.
Self-consciousness is entailed by any statement 
including "I"; it is indirectly entailed by "men do science" % 
if this is a scientific thought and stated by a man, any mani 
But what this means is not that the man who makes the state­
ment must have manoeuvred himself or his single or simplified 
essential self into a comer and "looked" - Hume*s Complaint 
is not that his self always manages to get away when he tries 
to look at It. What it means is that anyone who understands 
the statement must be able to recognise other men as men like 
himself, doers of science like himself, as thinkers in the 
same sense that he is a thinker. Men do in fact use, and so 
can use, "I" of themselves as a pronoun, just as they can use 
"it" of an object of which they know in fact almost nothing or
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of which in fact they could write a volume. Recognition of 
oneself as a man, like recognition of any thing as anything, 
is not an initial act, a first thought, and learning to use 
"I" is not a matter of a foetal self-reflection, a mental 
mirroring without a mirror.
In stressing "learning to use "I"" no issues are being 
avoided - no claim is me.de that this is a simple matter, and 
what we are avoiding is the established technique of masking 
factual ignorance by a definitional truth.
Descartes rejects "man" and "animal" because they and 
their essences or definitions are complex and inter-related; 
he is looking, just as he looked in the Regulae for simple 
notions which are pure and unalloyed objects of an essential 
act of "intuition", for an essential act (self-intuiting) 
and an essential agent (spirit), each wholly grasped in being 
grasped at all. Agent, act and object cannot be described - 
they can only be "apprehended" and named. Must not complexes 
’be of simples? And must not simples be only nameable?
Men as scientists can study men as scientists; the 
subject of "thinking" in its specific and multifarious senses 
(inquiring, doing science, studying Descartes, discriminating 
mauve from violet) may be the object of study of science, of 
a host of sciences - anatomy, physiology, biology, biochemistry, 
neurology, economics, politics, sociology, psychology, and the 
various schools each claiming one of those labels as its own. 
That most elevated of metaphysical propositions, "Subject 
and Object are One", achieves an intelligible foimj "What
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thinks is what 1» thoufÿit" he comes Intelligible v/hen species 
of thinking replace the universal blur of "Thougiit" and "Think- 
ing", and we recognise that science qua what is thou^t of 
xarin as inquirer does not need a thinker over and al>ove the 
inquiring man. V/hatevor we discover to be true of man will 
aijpear as science, ^vhether as characterising the inquirer or 
what is inquired into, because for science and for thou^t 
there is no distinction.
I am using "science" in a special sense, an unfamiliar 
sense; I nm using it as Descartes uses "Scientia", as others 
have used "Knowlédge". To bring "sciences" into relation with 
the general principle we have to recognise distinctions 
between facts, laws, theories, between different sciences 
and different subject matters; we hnve to recognise distinct­
ions between pïîysical sciences, biological sciences, human 
sciences, mathoaatics, logic and - metaphysics# But the 
differences will be discovered by doing the sciences, getting 
some sort of acquaintance with the sciences and discovering 
what the "concepts" of the sciences are; the concepts or y
notions will be "acquired" before they are "clarified" or
> '{
"Illuminated" by critical consideration of the sciences, of 
relations between the sciences, or of relations between the 
fact statements of different, sciences#
All of these activities, observing and theorising, 
thinking ebout theories or relations between theories, between 
theories and facts or facts and facts, doing logic and 
metaphysics in thinking about what has been thought, arenmat
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we mean by "thinking" as men do it. "That man thought p", 
whether p is true or false, brings thinking into history - 
Cogitat works as Cogito works. The dated thinking of p, of 
the thought p, belongs to the history of science; p as true 
belongs to science as p, to a science to which p belongs; 
p as false belongs to no science, except as a component in 
"he thoujÿit p" which belongs to a science of "thinkers". 
Grammar, logic and metaphysics belong not to the science of 
thinkers; they are related to all sciences. Being self-cént- 
ained and yet necessarily related to something else is not, 
in the case of these sciences, an impossibility, a contrad­
iction. A "science of science" is meaningless unless there 
is the science to be studied, just as a science of things is 
meaningless unless there are things to be studied.
Vo get truisms and trivialities and tautologies here 
with the greatest of ease, because we have long taken for 
granted what is being presented as a "principle". Descartes* 
enterprise in ordering Scientia is Intelligible, since 
he knows what he Is ordering - the result is simple failure.
- I
His solution had been attempted by Socrates, and rejected, 
shown to fail, by Plato and Aristotle. At the universal level 
"there are thlnicing things" and "there are extended things 
thought about" are obvious truths, obvious to any human 
being who understands the terms used. If Descartes thinks 
these thoughts, he can relate them to other thoughts, and 
attempt to order science and sciences. It is only the thesis 
that the first thinker must be contained in the first thought
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as subject known completely by itself as subject that 
produces unintelligibllity and immediate contradiction,e.g. 
that "I think" is a true thought, and "bodies are extended" 
is only or may be only a relation of ideas.
The real foundation of Descartes* metaphysics, I 
shall show in the next chapter, is the assumption that a 
logical proposition "all attributes are of a substance" is 
an initial thought, intelligible as its stands, a fact 
statement about "things in mind", and that simple attributes 
can be added to the idea of "substance-thing" to get all 
ideas of things actual or possible. Logical analysis of 
statements is taken to reveal what really goes on in minds 
and what occurs as content of minds. A psychology of sorts 
replaces logic, and "I", as thinking thing, must be simple 
and naked "thing-substance" because that is all that can be 
named or indicated by nny noun or pronoun.
V
It is the "psychologising" of thought that denumds 
a thesis wjth regard to actual first thoughts, a thesis that 
is backed by a search for essential empirical self-experiences. 
Like a ghost in the shadows lurks the belief that the self, 
like any "substance", is simple ond unchanging, or all our 
uses of "I" {and nouns and pronouns other than "I") are 
meaningless. When we accept "man" as thinker, our uses of 
"I" and "self", and all Descartes* conversational writings, 
are clear enou^, whatever particular problems may arise.
But, the argument is advanced, when I say "I think", "man" 
is not contained in the thought at all; I %%ave no notion
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of "being a man" in mind, and when children say "I think" 
they may not have any idea that they are "men".
It is true that we are not born knowing that we are 
men, that many men in fact never know that they are men.
A child may leam to say "I am in pain" before he learns to 
say "I am a human being", "I am a man", "I am an animal". 
Nevertheless it is true that he is humaxi, and whatever 
meaningfulness we may feel is Involved in statwaents by 
humnn beings about a smear of feeling of "self" which is 
a sort of overtone or flavour to a feeling of "pain", our 
inability to consider these "experiences" (or even those of 
"pain") without using first personal pronouns does nothing to 
show that "primitive experiences" are experienced in the 
form "I am affected..." or "my sElf-^ is being affected". The 
use of "my" is indicative. A doctrine of "social reflection", 
which accounts for the use of "I" along with the use of "you", 
"he", "we" and "they", gives a meaning to personal and to 
pronoun, as well as being intelligible and fitting-historical 
facts - the "subject" is a developing thing, whose "uses" 
correspond to phases of historical development as a social 
creature. The doctrine of "internal self-reflection" fails to 
do any of these things; its logical outcome Is a solipsistic 
denial of meaning to "pronoun" and use to "you" and other 
pronouns, and correspondingly a denial of meaning to social 
discourse in which "person" has a meaning because "persons" 
has a meaning, and "possession" also has a meaning.
The complex procedures whereby "person" as a social
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concept is converted into an antithesis to "social" ("x is a 
personal matter" into "x has nothing to do with anybody else") 
and finally into "purely private" as contrasted with "public", 
cannot be considered here. But it seems nonsensival to claim 
that a child is b o m  knowing that its name is "I", and if we 
can stomach the thesis that because the child does not know 
it something in the ehild must know it; that it thinks, recog­
nises thinking qua thinking, recognises that thinking is an 
attribute and, with or without conscious formulation of a 
necessaiy truth that all attributes are of a substance, infers 
tlriat a thing thinks, exists and is the correct bearer of the 
name "I", we can stomach anything. And even if we can we are 
not out of the wilderness. What is being made is an historical 
claim, not a philosophical claim, and if we argue that the 
"infant mind" grasps itself completely in the inferring and 
naming (or "reflective apprehension") of itself as "substance 
which thinks", or by any other process, we are claiming that 
the "mind" is all that it knows it is: nothing more can be 
said or need be said, by it or by "us". Ve have to endow it 
with the knowledge which we have to analyse the knowledge 
and thus to determine "simple notions" which fill the mind so 
that it can think our thou^ts; and then we have to do physiol­
ogy and physics to provide our bodies and our circumstances 
and by a miracle or a mystery convert the I-mind into the 
I-man. When it is shown that the sort of thinking which can 
be done with simple notions as content cannot be the thinking 
we do as men, the I-mind and the I-man fall as completely 
apart as do rational science and empirical science.
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What holds rational science and empirical science together 
(apart from common terms, logical relations, and "e:gplanation&) 
is that thoy are thought and thought by the one agent, the 
one thinking substance, and the substance in question is man 
the rational observer. In more elevated terms, the concept 
of "man" is central to the human structuring of the universe, 
and "the human structuring of the universe" is the activity 
which which unites all sciences into Descartes* One Science. 
Thus the ancient "Han is a rational animal" becomes more 
than a useful example of a definition that fails to satisfy 
strict logical criteria of classification and definition, 
and Descartes* two theses appear, in relation to tliis, as 
(a) reasoning is done by a rational soul-thing in a bodily 
machine, and not by men, and (b) reasoning is done by a man, 
who is a fusion of soul and animal. What fits both theses 
into History is tliat they were thought by Descartes; what 
denies at least one entry into Scientia is their contradict­
ion. Wliat determines whether either one of them is to enter , 
Scientia is their relation, as tlxoughts, with what also is 
thought.
The initial test is coherence, but the coherence is 
of Scientia which Includes facts as well as principles. My 
stress on Descartes* difficulties over establishing the 
"actuality" of his necessary truths must be repeated. At tlie 
end of the Principles which he could not complete, Descartes 
moves from "possibility" to "morol certainty" to "absolute
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certainly" for his thought-cystem with the aid of God and 
his goodness in providing us with a faculty of distinguishing 
truth from error, and what is at stake is the establishing 
as true of the observation statements which are to be q3Q)1- 
ained. If magnets and their effects on iron things, if fire, 
ice and the freezing of water, rainbows and planets and tides, 
cannot be observed, there is no tiling to explain and nothing to 
show that "ideas of particles" are more than ideas. The 
beast-machine thesis is meaningless unless beasts are observable 
aniiSials, are the beasts of the familiar world; anatomy is 
meaningless unless animal bodies are observable; the science 
of medicine and of mon is nothing unless we note, and are 
related to, mon around us as social and moral aniifials. The 
principles are to develop into the trunk and the branches and 
leaves of Scientia, sciences of medicine and mechanics and 
morals, and sciences of man for man. ..We are men, the men 
who will be (at least more) coii^ pletely in later science, and 
as men we are ordering our knowledge. What the Cogitb entails 
is that we cannot call ourselves "men" in the first principles; 
and that is all tliat it entails.
caioptor VII.
i
Subject. SubBtance and Thlnnr.
J
Aristotle begins with true propositions in ordinaiy 
language, with logical distinctions within such propos­
itions, and leads on to a consideration of (a) types of 
proposition, find (b) the typos of proposition ^ich will 
compose an account of an individual thing. (This is to be 
justified in the final chapter).
For him, "S is P" or " gfx" would be formal propositions, 
or functions - S, P, and x would be variables.
Descartes claims to begin with attributes (values of 0) 
and to argue to a subject. In "(30 entails (3x)(Jfx)", x is 
treated as a constfrnt.
But this entails that there is one use of "substance" and 
one substance. This is incoi#atible with the claim that 
there are two distinct substances. By writing "0" for 
"thinking" and "0" for "extended" we can indicate vhat is 
involved.
By treating 0x and 0x as substances named "mind" and "body" 
Descartes is able to treat them as occurring in modes. This 
works, however, for "thought* and "extension qua bo<3y", not 
for "thinking" and "extension qua extended". And 0x and 0x 
are unanalysable.
2. (p.253). If "mind" is the name for 0x, and "body" is 
the name for 0x, we cannot say "minds think" (\*dilch would 
demand "0x is - or does - 0", nor "bodies are extended"
{yin i8 jO .
If "mind" is the name for and not for gx, then we 
have no means of distlngulEdiing "mind" frœn "bot^", which is 
also the n m e  of x.
If X is a variable, then the difference between 0 and J# 
as predicates or si)#&a notions, even in the framework of 
Descartes' confused idea of definition and division, cannot 
make (fx and J^ x into exclusive classes,
3. A section is devoted to a d tailed discussion of 
Cartesian doctrine, to show how vital the logical conihsion 
is to tiie plausibility oi that doctrine. Definition, 
classification and formal rules as principles are discussed 
in this context. %
4. (p.286) Existential claims in relation to Descartes' 
definitions - "existence" is simply assumed,
5. The discussion is related to Aristotle and certain jj 
metapygrsics, Descartes' Socratlcism is stressed.
"MalB quoique no faisant qu*un avec la substance, les 
modes et les attributs en diffèrent cependant, d*une 
difference qui, pour etre simplement modale ou de raison - 
modale, et par consequent non réciproque entre le mode et 
l*attrlbut principal, ^  raison et par conséquent réciproque 
entre 1 * at tribut principal et la substance - n* en doit moins 
avoir lin fondement ( fundamentum in re). Ainsi tout se 
concilie dans la conception de la substance, mais à condition 
de maintenir a la base, après l’analyse la plus poussée qu’on 
voudra des modes et attributs, cet Irréductible résidu 
qu’évoqué le mot chose".
Xean Laporte. Le Rationalisme de Descartes, p.185.
"On sait d’ailleurs que, dans la langue de Descartes, 
cBiose est exactement synonyme de substance. Et, par exen^le, 
en comparant les textes Latins de Descartes avec les versions 
françaises révues et approuvées par lui, en trouve souvent 
substantia traduit par chose, ou res par substance. Ainsi 
dans les Pglnclpes 1.8. ; cf. la traduction latine du Discours; 
rem quamdam sive substantial*!
Op. Cit. p.185 fn.
"In what would you say lay the first metaphysical genius 
of Descartes?
»  p
In discovering distinctions which previous philosophers 
had failed to make. So he recognises that Aristotle had 
distorted all phlloanphy by not seeing that Mind and Soul 
were completely distinct#
In what yould you say lay the second metaphysical genius 
of Descartes?
In denying that the distinctions \dilch others had failed 
to make were distinctions at all, as soon as opponents had 
been refuted and something positive was to be said. What could 
be more Ingenious than to refute a philosopher by Insisting on 
"A or B" as a substantial disjunction and distinction, and 
establishing one’s own case by insisting that "A or B" really 
means "A Id identical with B and It does not matter which 
word you use".
(A Dialogue that needs to be written).
"Je n’al jamais employee que...fort peu d’heures par 
an (aux pensées) qui occupent 1’entendement seul..."
Descartes to Elizabeth, May 21, 1643.
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Sub.lect. Substance and Thinp.
Th.0 firnt section below is intended to provide a foiBi of 
suiinaary of a central argument, in order to make clear* some 
guide posts in a discussion of questions which are always far 
from clear as they arise in Descartes» writings.
I am concerned to argue that, given a language in which 
true fact statements of the form ”X is Y ” can he made, we are 
able to make sense of many of Descartes» central statements 
about substance (or about what he means by ”substance’*, since 
in an important sense the word belongs to a logical or metaph­
ysical vocabulary, and so to a "meta" vocabulary, and cannot 
appear in ordinary fact statements at all - nothing can be said 
of it as something can always be said of chalk and cheeses) . 
This "making sense" demands that we identify "subject", "subst­
ance" and "thing", but we have as well to restrict "subject" to 
"subject of a particular class of statements". This class I 
have labelled fact statements, and the values of X will be 
limited to the commonly "named" existing things of which we 
speak in non-technical discourse, or those things which scient­
ists refer to by using common nouns after more detailed examin­
ations than we ordinarily make. Of any such things I shall 
claim that they are qualitied in various ways, and related
in specifiable ways to other things, and that statements of
quality or relation will be verifiable by accepted techniques. 
Fow this leads on to the question of Categories Is to be a . 
major later consideration.
"Things" thus appears, as in ordinary discourse, as a
class term for cats and dogs and t r e e s . . But I have
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Indicated that Descartes has several uses of the word 
"substance", and in one use the substance-subject-thing is 
declared to be unknowable but necessarily inferrable from a 
"perceived" attribute; and this involves our having the "idea" 
of Bubj ect-and-predicate, so that we are able to recognise pred­
icates to be predicates when we "apprehend" them, and able to 
judge correctly that when we do so there is a tiling with the 
attribute in each case. We not only recognise 0 but think 
"there is a thing which is 0" in each case.
This is, if it is to be taken literally, very different 
from the assertion that if 0 is an attribute, then there is 
a thing (a man, a mountain or a.••*.•) of which 0 may be truly 
predicated, although such sn assertion may quite well be formule 
ated as "no attribute is of nothing". If we do, as I propose 
to do, take the account literally, then we find special diff­
iculties when Descartes insists upon a distinction between 
thinking-sub stance and extended-substimce - difficulties that 
must arise in the case of any attempt to distinguish between 
substances on the doctrine that they are inferred from their 
attributes, that subjects as inferred from the perception of 
predicates.
The difficulties, moreover, are increased by Desc­
artes* attempts at special definitions, especially of "thinking" 
and of "ideas", and the uncertainly which attaches to his 
various uses of the defined terns, For are we assisted by a 
series of arguments which depend upon a variety of "necessary
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truths"; and here we have not so much a question of finding 
what justification Descartes has for using the truths and for 
clai/iiing to be necessary, since he offers no Justification
or appeals to the natural light, but of sorting them out and 
finding what justification there is for regarding th^n as 
either truths or necessary.
If, however, we accept a language of the kind indicated 
(and Prench, English, Greek or Latin satisfies the require­
ments) then many of the necessary truths follow directly.
Each of these languages ei^ ploys common nouns in making fact 
statcvaents about distinguishable things; each of these languages 
is tlius classificatory and e^ gpands, for an Aristotelian, into 
a scientific classification of tilings, or a system of such 
classifications, and the logical criteria for this classific­
ation and its e^q^ansion are already clear in the use of the 
language. For Aristotle, I shall argue, "S is P" is the form 
of propositions whose terms are real, have intension and 
extension, and all subjects of such propositions will have 
existential entailments. Thus any true proposition **x is y« 
will entail that a thing of the kind X exists - that there is 
a thing of the kind X which is y; and for any value of X so 
appearing in a proposition it will be necessarily true that 
"X” can be given a meaning by a statement of the form "X means
2" or "All X are Z"; and "Z" here may be a complex term.
\
That the same argument could be used of predicate terms 
is a further question; at first sight while we treat predic­
ate terms as attributes, these can be classified only into 
classes of attributes - although this will give us univer-
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sal propositions, as will any classification; but Aristotle 
accepts conversion, and this means that any predicate term 
will Ifinction as a subject term. Thus in his "first figure" 
middle terms are both subjects and predicates - which is 
sufficient to show that the interpretation of universal propos- ,j 
itions as having no existential entailments is quite un-Aristo­
telian. What I want to argue later is that the initial dist­
inction between subjects and predicates ia in relation to their 
function in syllogism, not in relation to an analysis of isol­
ated propositions in a search for "ultimate elements".
It is from the logic of syllogism that Aristotle moves, 
and has to move, to a consideration of categories, and not 
vice versa as subsequent philosophers asrjumed. The problem of 
categories is primarily intelligible in relation to propos­
itions which appear to be fact statements yet v/hich will not 
function in syllogism with fact statements. This leads on to
-•r ■
the further categories-question connected with the system of 
propositions which we regard as an account of a thing, and the 
false inteiprstation results in an absolute distinction between 
"the thing" and "its account" which is never intelligible.
1. Descartes appears to be arguing that if 0 is an attribute, 
then it laoy be asserted that "wherever 0f there is a thing 
which is 0", this being treated as if it meant "(3 0) entails 
(3x)(0x)", where x is not a variable but a constfint.
If this is taken to be on analysis of ordinaiy prepos­
itional assertions which provides us with an alternative 
form , then it suggests (apart from obvious quantification
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difficulties) that ordinaiy statements and arguments can be 
readily transiormed, while our classification of things will 
be the same as an Aristotelian classification ; any ordinary 
assertion ("A rose is flower") can be re-written ("There is 
a thing which is a rose and the same thing is a flower") 
provided we can durther elaborate the new formulation in such 
a way as to get rid of the nouns. ¥e should have to arrive 
at "There is a thing which has the attributes abc ("rose" attr­
ibutes) and ab are also "flower" attributes". Roses can still 
be planted in flower beds and entries made in botanical note 
books.
The final fonaulation demands the conversion of "rose" 
and "flower" into attributes and adjectives; the intermediate 
position simply puts "rose" and "flower" into the predicate.
The latter is obviously not enou^; and by using symbols I 
have indicated only what the conversion would be like if we 
could make it. It is when we try seriously to give an attrib­
ute account or adjectival account in which more is done than 
giving the noun an adjectival form ("roseish" for rose) which 
may already have a different use, that we begin to discover what 
is involved in giving values to variables in special calculi, 
in putting into effect the claim that we "construct" a world 
of things from perceived attributes, or in making good the 
claim that our "ideas" of things are complexes of simple not­
ions of "attributes". There is at least no obvious point in -
f ■
surrendering nouns and substituting "thing" for each, although
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it is clear enough that instead of any noun in at least 
single statements we can write the one word "thing". And it 
is clear that if we can give a meaning to "there is an attr­
ibute" (where "there" is locational) we can give a meaning to 
"there is a thing" we can give a meaning to "the thing has 
an attribute". Much post-Cartesian philosophy can be described 
as endeavouring to give a meaning to these three statements.
But what we have to reconcile with the claim that we can 
assert "(9x)(0x)" wherever 0, and treat x as a constant, is 
the Cartesian claim that there are two predicates ( thinking 
and extension, which I shall denote by 0 and 0 henceforth) 
which are of a special kind or status. As determining 
summa genera. 0 and 0 are class-terms or class determinants, 
and Descartes wants to treat "thing" as substance and 0x and 
0x, 0-thing and 0-thing, as substances. Both figure as the 
sdbjects of statements, and in fact the only real subjects of 
statements, and we are then able to dispense entirely with 
our original (3 0) and (3x)(0x) and to write directly "0x is 
a" (where a is an attribute other than 0 or 0, and indeed any 
such attribute until we have excluded other attributes from 0). 
Both 0x and 0x, moreover, figure as substances of which all 
occurrent things are modes or forms.
In the first case asserting (ax) and (ax)(0x) would be 
equivalent to saying "if 0x is a is true, then 0 occurs and 
there is a thing which is subject of 0" « and this would give 
"0x is a entails the existence of a thing which is 0 and
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also aV Provided that we are concerned with a distinguish­
able class of statements of the foim is a", i.e. provided
that there are no statements which have the fomi and do not 
admit of the entailments, then if X is the name of 0x, the 
existential claim can be made of X in any true proposition 
"X is a". This naming, which corresponds to Descartes’ "the j] 
substance in which 0 immediately resides is here called..",
S ' :
however, presents to us as a major question whether we name 
X or 0x - and it seems evident that if we name x we need only .
one name,"thing". Both why this seems trivial or nonsensical, |
•!
and why it is important, needs to be shown. If it means only
that for any noun in our language we can write "a thing which j
is of a certain kind" (for "a manft,write "a thing which is !
human"), and have all the justification we need for pointing | 
to distinguished things as existants, we can continue with our j 
ordinary modes of discourse and discovery. We can translate |
from ordinary forms to special forms whenever we can find or 
devise adjectives. But Descartes draws quite different concl­
usions about Reality.
The second treatment,of 0x as "a substance", seems to
depend upon the treatment of 0x and not x as a thing, i.e. 
upon 0x being an individual."0x" is the name of a mind, "0x" 
is the name of a body, and we recognise 0x^,0x^,0x etc. as 
different minds, etc, as different bodies, and
each set as a set of Individuals, Attributes like "a" In ”0x 
Is a" will be the qualitative differentiae of Individuals as 
members of two distinct and exclusive classes. But the real
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test of individuality is spatio-temporal distinctness - being 
at diiierent places at one time, or possibly being so; the 
notions of "individual existent", "spatial location", and 
"date" are inter-dependent - and when we talk of individuals, 
saying that 0x^, 0x?, 0x^...are modes of the same individual 
(thing) is claiming that either x or 0x ia a located continuant 
with different features at different times. Descartes is 
uncertain whether to say that what is continuous is x or 0x 
or 0 itself - uncertain whether to say that what remains 
constant is the thing which continually thinks,i.e. acts, or 
that it is the act which remains constant though modal (sensing, 
imagining, feeling etc. are all forms of thinking, of a 
continually exercised act), or that it is the "thought" that 
e^diibits different foims while remaining an individual "thought" , 
throughout (La Pensée, ma pensée). He compromises to the 
extent of saying them all at different times and places, and 
even at times suggests that x is absolute and unchanging, 0 
is absolute and unchanging, and what is different at different 
times in any individual case is the pattern of "objects before 
the mind".r
It is the notion of "thought" as persisting in different 
foims which introduces an apparently distinct treatment of 
substance in which spatio-temporally distinct individuals 
are declared to be not only ( or not) identical in kind but 
identical in substance, to be modes of the same substance; 
and this seems to demand the argument that x or 0x is spatio- 
temporally discontinuous but substantially identical wherever
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It occurs. Thus we seem to have the old problem of the One 
and the Many in the case of substances instead of attributes# 
But what we run up against is the difference between 0 or 
0x and 0 or 0x when considered as substances, and our 
difficulty is in finding any sense in which Descartes» "mind" 
("thinking substance" or "thought substance") and "body"
("an extended substance" or "extended substance") can be 
treated "univocally" as substances in order to give meaning 
to the basic claim that the statement "there are two substances 
in the world" is both meaningful and true.
2. Our central difficulty can now be made plain# If "mind" 
is to be the name of 0x (any 0x is a mind), then it is 
impossible to give a meaning to "mind thinks", which v/ould 
demand "0x is 0" (or, recognising the full awkwardness of the 
verb-at tribute, "0x does 0") - and this reveals not only an 
important aspect of the Cogito itself, but the difficulty 
which will concern us later of finding a completion for 
"0x is...", i.e. of finding "qualities" for minds# Given that 
0 Is an act-pradicate, there must be an agent-subject, an x, 
an individual; but if we call the thinking-thing "mind" any 
occurrence of "thinking" will be an occurrence of 0x, an
occurrence of mind. We seem to be halfway between the two
• -
different positions (a) "Thinking guarantees a thinking thing", 
which is equivalent to a Russellian propositional function 
”0x" in which % is a variable, and"there must he an agent" is 
equivalent to "in any instance of (f, either an A or a B or a 
C " is thinking", where "an A or a B or a C..." is a
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disjunctive list of possible values of x in the function, 
and (b) "A thought is a form of a substance" - a form of 
a substance essentially different from body or extended 
substance. The first position is implied by the insistence 
on "I think and exist", which is compatible with the 
claim that it is true for and in the case of any thing which 
in fact does think (God, angel, man or beast); the second 
is implied by all talk of "thought" as in mind or thoughts 
as contents of mind,i.e. by insisting on "p is a thought" 
rather than "x thinks p".
These positions are radically different from one 
another, although a statement in ordinary teims with "the 
man" as subject,e.g. "Descartes thinks p", considered as 
what is stated and not as a thought^ seems to present no 
acute difficulty - the peculiarity of the present tense 
is a minor point. The agent-thing is the man Descartes, the 
act-predicate is "thinking p". But it is precisely such 
statements that Descartes wants to reject and prove should 
be rejected.
Descartes wants to treat modes as modes of 0 and not 
of 0x, since the latter would indicate different 0x, differ­
ent minds; but by ignoring the question of different minds 
altogether, and considering only one mind, he slides easily 
from the unity and persistence of "I" as identical with the 
unity and persistence of x to the persistence and identity of 
0x as a modal continuum. (Idealists and British empiricists 
alike follow him in (a) using expressions like «I think".
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"minds think", and (b) treating "mind" as equivalent, and 
the "I-8elf" as equivalent, to "the developing modal thought 
»in me»" or "the temporal series of thoughts »in me»".).
The "modal continuum" illustrates the traditional role of 
substance as the unchanging substratum-thing which makes 
changes of an individual possible (or explicable, the ground 
or the explanation, the cause or the reason, the hidden 
identity within the observable differences). The wax, in 
Descartes» example, is such an historical modal continuum, 
and there the "substratum" is the material identity of all 
the phases; it is equally the material identity of all members 
of a class "bodies".
But if we consider "thoughts" and hot "thinking", 
what Descartes presents to us in the wax analysis is a series 
of thoughts of what is. a series of thou^ts which are what 
we mean by "the modal development of a piece of wax". Just 
as "extended substance" is the material identity and support 
of the historical wax, "thought-subs tance" is the material 
identity of, and support of, the historical thought "the wax 
is.....". This "material" is identical in the case of thought 
and wax only as "metaphysical matter" - so Descartes protests 
to Hobbes - and we shall have to examine the many ways in 
which "metaphysical matter" as "material" or "substantial" 
is taken to mean "factually material or immaterial", "really 
substantial or insubstantial". But once we begin to consider 
"thought" or "thoughts" in this way, we very clearly are not 
considering acts of thinking and their agents at all; and it
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is difficult to find a way in which to talk about the mind or 
anything else as an agent.
In any case we are doing something very different from 
considering fomiliar instances and problems of agents and 
acts, since in such cases the agent is identifiable because 
it has other descriptions than "acts thus" (and has other 
descriptions because it is identifiable) - it is distinguishable 
from other agents, however similar in kind, because it has 
such descriptions (and again vice versa). In these cases we 
recognise a plurality of agents, a plurality of agents of 
different kinds which constitute classes eadhof the game kind, 
and any such individual is a possible value of x in the 
i'unction "x acts thus". Indeed, it seems the case that it is 
because we are familiar with situations in which things of 
different kinds act in the same way^ things of the same kind 
act in different ways, and things of different kinds^act in 
different ways, that we can give meaning to the terms "acting 
thus" and "acting", and so to the function "x acts", which 
we can regard as indicating a class of propositions with 
ordinary terms as both subjects and predicates.
How "x acts" is a peculiar "function"; it"says" less 
than is said by "x acts in manner Y", which contrasts with 
"x acts in manner Z". "Acting in manner Y" may be compatible 
with, Indifferent to, or entailed by, "acting in manner 2», 
though either in some sense "entails" "acting". "Actings in 
manners" together constitute a class of "acts" or "actings"*
But with what does the class "contract"? Or, in other words.
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(a) oi what lu the clasB a BUb-classV, and (To) What are its 
CO-classes?
Inability to find an answer to (a) resulted in the 
declaration that "acts" constitutes a summa genera. Difficulty 
in answering (b) resulted in the declaration that Aristotle» s 
Categories were classes of "things" along with subst^^nces, 
relations, qualities.•• • The latter seems to me to be imposs­
ibly Aristotelian and both seem completely‘ wrong.
Wiiat at least we can say is that the class of acts is 
a class of occurrences of which any member can be stated in 
the form "x does y" or "x acts thus". Every specific acting 
will be a value of the function or "xEC^ " or.. . . ., where
K^f K^.....aro verbs in a non-technical vocabulary, and each
of the functions etc. will be a function-value of "xK", |
(i.e. "x acts"). The statement of any specific act will 
have as its subject a value of x,i.e. "a of b or c or.....", 
where a,b,c etc. are individual members of a complexly 
patterned classification of things which do act according to 
their capacities for specific types of action. Only when the j
individual value is supplied have we an historical act-statement. 
The function of functions (Æ) is equivalent to "every act 
has an agent", or "if an act, then a thing or substance as 
agent". Any function "xK^" is equivalent to such a "tautology" 
as "every thinking has a thinker", i.e. species of "every -ing 
has an -er". Either is, I contend, equivalent to Aristotle»s 
"there must be a substrate" in the case of acts, and the 
subject of a statement of an actual act is the necessary
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substrate.
irom K. or we can "Infer" x, for every "-ing" we 
know by the nature! light there must he an “-er", ^ Whet 
we cannot infer is the value , and unless values are known 
in instances we can give no meaning to the statement of the 
instance as on act. Thus "inferring the agent" in any 
particular case is meaningless: the agent c m  only be 
discovered. The doctrine of "unknown substance agents" makes 
the very t e m  "act" meaningless; if we have no idea df possible 
values of x, is a meaningless iXinction. (Gentile’s
thesis, embodied in the title of his book "Mind as Pure Act", 
is roughly: "thinking" is an act, it must have an agent, there 
is no agent, therefore mind is its own act. But this would 
mean "mind is a process", Vmind is an activity" - and he shies 
from this because he cannot give an account of the process 
or processes without using subject-substance-agent tems) .
When Descartes identifies "body" with "extension", which 
iayplles that different extensions are different bodies, he 
also wants to assert that body extended substance ("body" 
is a nime for "0x") and .that bodies are extended ("0x is 0"). 
Mind, as I or self, is an agent whose thinking has modes, 
whose acts are species of the generic "act" whose connection 
in a series depends^upon their being acts of a persistent 
thing or upon actual continuity of act (and the meaning of 
"act" in this continuous sense is Gentile’s problem, Descartes’ 
problem, though Descartes, like Hume, tends to stress the
L. The terminology is that of Lloyd Morgan and Alexander.
In Arist.Proc. Hov.19.1951, I have discussed agent-act in
f more detail.
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"necessary agent", which. Hume cannot "locate". Hume’s use 
of "porceptions" is not a help in this - I tried in the 
paper mentioned above to show how "perceiving" and "what is 
perceived" are involved in it). But the modes of thinking 
suhr.tnnce are either Individual minds (differently located, 
historical things. distinguishable by what they do ^ or can 
think, do or can "experlmnce", states they can or do assume; 
Aristotle’s "potentiality" and "actuality" have to be called 
in here, and the choice is only between understanding it 
and failing to understand it) or they are modes of thou^t, 
forms of what is thought, connections and successive connections 
of "actualised" ideas. The latter pi’oduces, I claim, a con­
fused formal logic or a confused science, not a study of 
either substance or self." Modes of 0x, however, are (1) 
actual bodies, or (2) phases in change of actual bodies; 
the form of any statement about a body will,be "0x", with 
adverbial (degree or quantity) modifications of the^three-dim­
ensional 0, or changing modifications of such dimensions, 
but the values of x in 0x, or any modification 0^x, will be 
"this particle", "this sphere", "this apple", "that piece of 
wax", if existential claims hold in each case. ^
There develops a parallel between the physics of part# 
ides and the "physics" of mind as soon as "substance " is 
given a different (or differently mixed)^use. Extended 
substances are particles which, under the influence of motion • | 
(a principle, and "immaterial", no more extended than "exten- 
siorf is extended except in the sense that "extensions" are 
extended in three directions) constitute a world of bodies
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and a bodily world; ideas or individual simple notions are 
"mental" subs tances \ftdiich, under the influence of a principle 
( thinking) or of principles of connection, produce a world of 
thought (or for mind). Ho notions or connections of notions, 
quite obviously, can be "extended", though science is imposs­
ible unless "what they are of" is extended. And the further 
problem is then to find a place Jn the "system" for a familiar 
world, and to relate (a) minds with particle systems, (b) 
particle systems with the familiar world, (c) minds with the 
gross bodies of the familiar world, (d) thoughts with any of 
these, (e) ideas with any of these, (f) ideas with thinking, 
and (g) principles with anything at all.
Descartes gives us little assistance in any case, but 
just as we turn to ordinaiy discourse and familiar statements 
which make up our account of "the world" in order to find out 
what technical statements about subject and predicate, or 
about substances and attribute and modes, actually mean, we 
must turn there to find common ground with Descartes, and to 
find any reason for thinking that the various "things" are 
related and that there are problems at all# . It is there that 
we must seek both Descartes’ problems and any validation of
his logic. '
If we accept such a statement as "men, doing science, 
observe and reflect, think and make statements p and q and r 
which are factually (or techAÊcally) true or false", we can 
at least see where the problems of connection arise. Part# 
ides, if they are chimed to exist and to constitute gross
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bodies, are related to "thinking" (a) because they are "thought" 
and (b) because what thinks is a gross body. If the particles 
are like the physicist’s micro-atoms or molecules, the way in 
which micro-substances constitute a human body is a matter for 
science and, I want to show, a matter for several sciences ond 
for philosophy in part at least because of this. (Broadly, 
the stages are physics, chemistry, bio-chemistry, physiology, 
anatomy, biology - any direct attempt to constitute a man from 
atoms or molecules is a perverse form of "rational geometry", 
and no more, and at best biology has the right to include 
statements about "thinking". The "ordering of sciences" is 
not historical, though it is partly so, and the thesis that 
the advance from physics to biology is deductive is nonsense). 
"Hinds" are associated with gross bodies by the statement 
"men think, observe etc." and statements about other organisms 
sensing, desiring, feeling..... Relations between p and q and r 
as thoughts or statements may be logical and give rise to 
Logic; as components in a system of "natural history"; or as 
laws, liypotheses and observation statements in a systematic 
science, their relations are extra-logical; and only vhen 
instead of p and q and r we are concerned with "x thought p",
"X thought q", "x thought r", i.e. with statements of^thinking, 
is there any question of dating or locating "thou^ts". At 
this stage we can talk of the thinking acts or successive 
thinking acts of one agent-substance, one individual man,^ 
who is one, historical, coiKplex, object of study of many 
sciences, and not reducible by an analysis of propositional
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assertions, or a misunderstanding of propositional functions 
or functions of functions as fact statements of ultimate 
reality, to an "unknown substance" which is what all our 
G tat omen ts and all our accounts which include "man" in them 
are about.
In the full sense that this "about" requires, no 
substance can be knov/n, and even the particle-physics is 
impossibly stated. In order to show how central the notion 
of the necessity of the function of all functions, "xP" (where 
"P" denotes any predicate), and of the necessary deduction of 
functions ("0x", "0x"), is in Descartes, and how the hope 
is further to continue the deductions to include all statements, 
we must turn to texts. What we encounter repeatediyis (I) the 
insistence that substance as subject is never to bè known,
(2) that Descartes can distinguish the two different substances 
which exist in the world, (3) persistent confusion in uses of 
"substance", and (4) the assertion as definitions of seeming 
fact statements which are peculiar in form and content, and are 
designed to protecttthe "first thesis", "There are souls and 
there are extended bodies".
3. I cite, then, a number of sections of Cartesian texts, 
in order to locate problems which require detailed discussion.
I shall make little refernce to specimmns already quoted,e.g. 
from the Principles, thou^i most of them are repeated here in 
the Reply to the Second Bbiactions. (Section numbers are Descar­
tes’).
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I. ^  the t a m  "thought" (cogltatio. penaeo) I compreh^d
^  mt that we are Immediately aware of
It. TiUiB all the operations of the will, the understcand—
Ing, the Imaginâtion and the senses, are thou^ito#
(Voluntary iuotions have their source or principle in
"thinlcing of" is followed "by willed action, such
as walking, but walking is not "thouglit". But "I m. walking"
mny be only a though^.
 ^!her words, I (or anybody else) may think that he 
is walking when ho is not walking. What, now, is the force of
"thought is all that is in us"? Let us rememiber that this is
a definition, not a casual remark, and Descartes’ definitions 
are designed to an end, namely rejecting "men think" or "I 
am a man", and establishing "I am a soul", "souls tîiink". It
is to bo literally true that there is in man a thinking thing#
But no matter how wo twist it and turn it, the statement 
"thoughts are in us", "thoui^ts are in mo", cannot be made 
conformable with the thesis - it can be made (or thought) by 
a man only if mon is a thinl'ing thing, and it is meaningless 
as a thought by an un extended soul.
In the whole of what folloivs, the use of unusual prepos­
itions and metaphoric language, not necessarily devised py 
Descartes since it was in many cases the jargon of the period 
among philosophers, presents the same sort of problem to the 
careful reader. If ho translates to fonas which are intellig­
ible, the conclusions do not follow; if he does not translate 
no tiling is intelligible),
II, By the \.*ord "idea" I understand that form of any thou^t 
by the immediate perception of which I ass conscious of that 
s^me thought: so that I can e^qjress nothing in words, when 
I understand what I say, without making it certain, "bytthis 
alone, that I possess the idea of the thing that is signified 
by these v/ords,
( I comment onlj: that this is a source of acute difficulty, 
not of clarity I  it v d l l  concom us below. Definition is here 
of words by reference to facts familiar to us. We who are 
spoken to exist as Descartes exists, third: and talk as he ctoes, 
use words as he does. Whenever we say "p" and understand 
what is meant by "p", and undorstnnding "p" is equivalent to 
"having the idea "p"". The definition of idea is designed to 
establish the correlation bet./ecn words and meaning, sentence 
and statement, and "thou^it". But the correlation is distorted 
by the refooaice to "thing" and "signified", as it is by the
use of "idea of",
"Of" Byiiibolises effectively the demand for a spatio-tmp- 
oral relation betwenn "things in the world" and "tliou^ p&ts in 
us" which causai theotfes, occasionalfst theories, or pre-est­
ablished harmonies are held to specify) *
J
264.
Ill* Every tiling In which there irajT}.ediately resides, as in 
a suhjeot, or by which there exists any object we 
perceive, that Is, any property, or quality, or attr­
ibute of which we have in us any real idea, is called 
substance. For we have no idea of substance, accur- 
atel^ r taken, except that it is a thing in which exists 
formally or eminently this property of quality which we 
perceive, or which is objectively in some one of our 
ideas, since we are taught by the natural light that 
nothing can îiavc no real attribute.
(Hero is the naked doctrine, which is consistent with the 
subject-predicate logic which gives rise to its technical 
vocabular^^ only in insisting that predicates arc inconceiv­
able independently of subjects and vice versa* "Ideas" are 
now of terms, not propositions, of univcrsals or predicates 
and not of things to vdiich thoughts "correspond". A "real" 
idea is an instmitiated universel., these are what we "perce­
ive". "Immediately residing in", "existing formally or 
eminently in", are metaphorical and meaningless ways of 
stating the relation between a perceived universal and an 
"unknowable" substance).
IV* The substance in which thought immediately resides is 
here called "mind" (mens, esprit) • I here speak, 
however, of mens rather tTux^ml^, for the latter is 
equivocal, being frequently applied to denote a corp­
oreal object.
(A3id so, of course is esprit, and the doctrine of animal 
spirits is in part alchemical, and in part closely connected 
with "anlAal passions". Compare "high spirits", "a spirited 
horse", and the more elevated identification of spirit with 
vitel force. "Spirit" runs the gamut from material breath 
and life principle to the soul of souls and the Holy Ghost, 
end the alchemists had already cstablishod it as "concentrated 
essence" and "power".
Descartes is not arguing that it is pointless to give 
this or that name to substances Imovm only as universal resid­
ences; he is reverting to statements with subjects vdiich are 
distinguishable and arguable for or against. But he is doing 
something as well - here as elsewhere he re-defines a teim in 
common or scientific or mixed use, and proceeds to mcdce 
philosophical, scientific and fact statements which include 
the defined term. One of the central instances of this is i
"Rational Soul"; and he includes within the "defined concept" all
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fonas of mental activity which were careihlly excluded from 
«rational" by those who coined the term or established its 
pre-Cr^rtenlan use. Ab a counter thesis, what is assorted is 
that there is one soul-agent and not several, and that all.l 
forms of activity of n mentnl kind are generically identicsl.
Whether anyone actually held that there were several 
souls in a mem is a further question; Descartes talks of the 
Will,the Understanding, the intellect, the Senses, in exactly 
the tems which his predecessors look as if they thought
there were several such souls. If the definition is a redescr­
iption of a correct description In the general tongue,then 
it mounts to rejecting a number of expressions or statements 
in the general tongue; anJ ju&t what axprescions hpve to go, 
v/hrt other words have their meaning and application altered, 
noedo close con£^ id€?ratiort.
If the iefinltlon lo claimed to bo a part of science, 
part of a body of def initions,r»xiomB etc., whore all that is 
said is related to everything else said ija the science, then 
other uses in the ordinaiy tongue are nov questioned - the 
science is not concerned with all the facts about the things 
its studies, but come only, If it is concerned with facts :at 
all. Above I presented this as a problem part-recognised 
by Dopcartos when he considers the geometric "method" - if 
what is established is established lawlblly from axioms, then 
wo hove nocessary connections but no "tiniths" which are "real" 
until we. have established a relation between the scientific 
stateraente and facts. If the truth, comes from the definitions 
alone, then they are synthetic, are fact claims in the 
ordinary pre-techirical tongi^ e and able to be challenged in 
that tongue.
What doef? seem apparent is that the various attempts to 
determine the number of souls could be discussed only in the 
range of the meiy true statenente v/hich could be made with 
"I" or "we" or "man" as the subject -"I think","! perceive",
"I sense","! imagine" etc., since other"!se there is nothing 
to stop me defining a multiplicity of souls in my "science". 
Descarten ^^roceedp here in the Appendix and throughout his 
replies to speak in terms of what w  do before giving his 
definitions. Thus he 1b raying "one soul","one self","one I", 
in oil such stateiaents. But it is equally true emd obvious 
that ho speaks throughout of the I-self as willing,as moving, 
as walking, eating and being in various places and postures, 
e.g. uses "I walk,I think that I ifalk,! can thin]/ that I walk 
when I am not wallcing, I can think that I touch the earth 
"hen I do not" even in key arguments. Unless the definition 
permits of "the mind walks" then the identification of "I" and 
"rational soul" or "purely thinking thing" cuts right across 
the usage which enables it to be framed and which serves to 
permit argumento /or ilie rle?lnl tïorT.
Descartes is in fact forced to assert in Principles I.IX 
that only the mind can know that walks.
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I etroüs this because It Indicates the sort of problem 
that at some stage confronts all scientists who pin their 
hopes on definitions, or who hope, to develop a scientific 
language which consists in part of rigidly defined concepts 
and in part of uncritically preserved ordinary language 
terms.
I stress further that in V here it is clearly asserted 
that wc see attributes; VI implies that thought is an 
attribute, and the reference to "residing in a subject" 
suggests with vy that It lo minds which thirJr, while the 
first definition suggests that it is we who think, just as 
wo perceive end wo dlocuso and ^  ronT*boo3co, v£ raake and 
understand etutemente in a language and thereby prove that 
ve have i.doas.
There is much to be said about the way in which the 
technical term "idea" Ic bo given a use).
VII. The substance vhich is the imr;iodiate subject of
local extension, and of the accidents which presuppose 
this extension,as figure,situation,local motion etc.
« 1b called "body". But whether the substance which is 
called "mind" is the eaiae with the substance which is 
called "body", or whether they are two diverse subst- 
arfices, is a question hereafter to be determined.
(So X in 0x and x in 0x may not be the same x; and this 
is to say that x may not be a constant, but may be a class 
teim - or it is an adiaission that "substance" is either a 
term for the class of all classes or a class t e m  for the 
only two classes that exist.
Descartes knows very well what he is going to assert, 
what must be true, that there are two exclusive classes of 
substances, but he is endoavourizxg to arrange principles 
which prove what he Imovs and bcîiieves to be true. But 
what Is emended at least is that the x in 0x and the x in 
0x should be dietimtuishable by other then 0 end 0. The aim 
of the Meditations,iike the aim of the geometrical method, 
is to chow that those xs must bo different - yet it is also 
clear on examination that it is shown that they are differ­
ent solely by reference to the difference between 0 and 0 
and species or modes of these.
But the difference is discussed by reference to 
what we do and to familiar objects vdiich we take to exist 
"outside u b " In rome sense of "us" that enables Descartes 
to speak of "thoughts" as in us. This raises general 
questions#
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In definition I, thought 1b "what goes on in ua"* The 
subject in which thought resides appears to be "us", and 
this is In accordance with the assertion as a fact claim that 
such "things" occur within us and we "perceive them" as there 
located# But this is quite distinct from the logical doctrine 
and its use of "resides" or "inheres", and produces two 
distinct uses of "I" and "us" which are,in crucial instances, 
not equivalent but Incompatible. The thinking substance 
of Egp Cogito derives from "I do think", from the necessity 
of a verb having a subject, an act having an agent. In our 
ordinary dtecourse, the values of x in 0x may be I, you, he, 
any person; Descartes wants to assimilate person as agent 
and mind as agent, and any use of "person" which is other 
than equivalent to "mind" is illegitimate, x, inferred from 
the occurrence of 0, is not 0; it "does" 0.
But as going on in me, thought is a process, and as a
process it may be said to exhibit modes# It is in me and
noted by me as in me, and it is this thought qua process
which cannot be spatially extended, cannot be divided spat-
.if  ^ rr-.
lally into parts beside one another. Each mode is a mode
of thought, and successive modes 0x^,0x^,0x^# • • .are modes
of the thought-Bubstance x, not modes of an act or modes of
me. We can only identify thought-substance and self by 
writing "I am a series of thoughts, I am thought-ln-raodes" -
and hence Hume’s problmi of self-identity, since "I am aware 
that I am a series of thoughts" seems an Impossible thought
for such a thought-substance, and "I am a continuous series"
' ^   ^ -r--
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seems to be flatly contradicted by all evidence. Ego 
gO£L4,M» as successfully as Locke’s intelligible chall­
enge to "I think always" or "the mind thinks always", or 
Descartes’ admission in the :ie-:ulae that "I exist" does n 
got entail "I think", establishes the difference between 
thought-series and thought-modes and the thinking subject.
I have already suggested that the question of distin­
guishing between x and x in 0x and 0x is meaningless if we 
insist that substance is inferred from the occurrence of * 
attributes. There is no way of telling, no way of indicating, 
that there is a difference, since the distinction would 
have to be made in the form "x is b in this case and c in 
that case", and x would be inferred from the attributes b and 
c. We can, in fact, give a meaning to distinguishing things 
or substances from one another only by recognising that there 
are different things and different substances, and this 
entails that "substance" in "any attribute is of a substance" 
will be a class term or variable. And if it is a variable, 
it will be meaningless to talk of it as having qualities or 
attributes; what will have qualities or attributes, and will 
necessarily have them, will be the values of the variable, all 
the things which,because they can be spoken of or thought ^  . 
about, will be subject-substance-things. " v:
The whole doctrine of attributes presupposing - extens­
ion deioBiids propositions of the form "0x is figured,located 
and moves",i.e. "bodies are figured etc.". The force of this 
rests upon "bodies" meaning "any.bodies,arywhen and anjrvdiere",
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and upon these bodies being different from one another and 
capable of being discriminated as different bodies. What 
Descartes wants to show, has to show, and cannot show, is 
that "thought" and "extension" can never occur or reside in 
the same substance, in the sense that both can never be 
truly prodiCcited of tho same thing; all that he can show is 
that "thou^t" and "extension" are not the sfuae thoughts, not 
the same ideas, that "thought" is not "extension" - and in 
this sense, that they are different ideas, terms with differ­
ent meanings, words in a familiar language with different 
uses, everyone will admit.
But this is not equivalent to admitting that thoughts
qua activities are not extended, or that what thinkgt is not
extended; even if we can make sense of a statement that
thinking qua act (or any act qua act) is unextended,i.e. that
■- : " ' v -  - r
either "extended" or "unextended" "have a use in this sort of 
context', it does not follow that the subject of an act is 
extended or unextended. i?: Kh#
"Extended" and "unextended"^ it seems,' are in the same 
case as are all attribute terms - it is meaningless to try to 
upply them to "substance" in order to assert a difference of 
"substances". What we have, in fact, is the abstract counter- 
part of the ancient mi sunderstanding of classification as 
attaching a differentiating attribute to a genus in order to 
determine a species. What determines the species is the 
possession of an attribute by the members of^the genus, the 
individuals of the genus-class; What is concealed by talking
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of "adding the Idea of Y to the Idea of genus X to get the 
species XY" is the neéd for "All Xs are Y"# The Cartesian 
procedure is rather to try and get classes by adding attrib­
utes to members which are members of no class,i.e. are just 
"things", and as such are not discriminable. Combine the 
two accounts and we have intelligibility, have an account of 
operative thinking and of classification, and we can give 
on account of (i.e. think of) the things which we classify 
and in classifying present part of the possible account of 
the things in question.
Broadly, the claim is that by accepting,and only by  ^
accepting, propooitional statements in the ordinary factual 
mode, can a meaning be given to the technical or special 
assertions of metaphysicians (and of scientists).
VIII. The substance which we understand to be supremely 
perfect and in which we can conceive nothing that 
involves any defect, or limitation of perfection, is 
called God.
IX. When we say that some attribute is contained in the 
nature or eonnept of a thing, this is the some as if we 
said that the attribute is true of the thing, or that it 
may be affirmed of the thing itself.
X. Two substances are said to be really distinct from 
one another when each of them may exist Without the 
other.
(}Iy stress on the last^phrase. Descartes wants the- 
modal "may" because his proof of the mind-body distinction is 
conceptual - they are distinct substances because they can 
be conceived independently of one another. Indepexixlence in 
fac^ in actuality, he cannot establish, in part because he 
con prove th t we could never encounter one independently of 
the other; men are men, men are intimate unions, we are intim­
ate unions; our sensing, our imagining, our experiencing, is 
of and as men. ."Conceiving" is something completely different 
from sensing,imagining,experiencing - and the resulting 
coiAplete severance of concepts from things which exist in the
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familiar world is one of the reasons why Descartes is faced 
with all the prohlems of universels and instances, or of 
particulars and individuals, knov^ n to long-suffering 
mankind) # ...i
If Descartes is concerned with conceiving his own world, 
recognising that he can think "thoughts" of complexes which 
have no existential claim, then criticism of his complex 
"patterns" or "notions" and his claims as to how he relates 
the constituents is pointless. But clearly this is not what 
he professes to he doing.
He professes, openly and apparently, to be a man along 
with other men, with \*diom he communicates using the familîâr • 
pronoun "we"; he takes it ïor granted that they think, that 
they have "ideas" in some sense of "ideas" that is entailed 
by their thinking, that they can use words understandingly 
which enable discussion of familiar worldly events and of 
things notg80 worldly - Godais the name given to such a not bo 
worldly thing. ‘
 ^ What is to be observed is that this is not a case of 
a concept or an idea which is held to be named; what is éo 
named is a thing or substance. The defining statement i s %  
that God is a thing supremely perfect, a substance in which 
we can conceive nothing that involves any defect. God ^  a
perfect thing to which we^give the name God. If we take>
VIII along with IX, which asserts that what we mean by 
"contained in" or "residing in" is that a predicate may be 
truly ^ asserted of a subject, that the subject is a thing of
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which the predication holds, we can dismiss the reference to 
what we ctm or cannot think, and can write as equivalent 
versions of the definition of God, "God is supremely perfect", 
"All perfect attributes can be asserted truly of God", or 
"Any assertion that God is z, where Z is an in^erfection, is 
false".
The pattern of argument for the existence of God ^
demands that we can make an assertion that is meaningful
‘
and which can be discovered to be true; if it is true, then '
God exists# The argument from the concept of perfection to 
existence is a special way of showing,subsequent to the 
formulation of an assertion, that the assertion is true and 
entails the existence of the subject; that it is a way of " 
"discovering" is made clear by the argument "If x is perfect 
X must exist,since if it did not exist it would not be perfect". 
But if it is a way of discovering a truth, or of proving a 
truth to be true, "x is perfect" in the case of God entails 
"x exists". This,I claim, is equivalent to saying that ^
"God is perfect" is a fact statement logically like other 
fact statements in entailing the existence of the subject, 
and it is meaningful as a statement only when "God" replacass
«X".  ^ .. " . -T. r.«
To discover whether a thing exists is to discover that 
an assertion about the thing is true.^ (There are complicat- - 
ions here,and many would prefer to reverse the statement.* We 
have,in fact, something very like equivalence). In terms of 
Definition IX, we need not reject any familiar language
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We may have trouble defining the noun or the thing named# 
since it has many features# is subject of many statements 
and we may not be clear as to why we want to select one 
such statement as of special importance; we may have diff­
iculty in distinguishing the thing from newly discovered 
things which are more like it than the other things from 
which we distinguished it before# Ko one# Descartes admits# 
doubts except metaphysically that there are manifestly 
numerous things which are different from each other# Logical 
analysis applies to all the st/^taaents about these things# 
and if thing or substance is the ultimate subject# that 
which we know only as that in ^ich attributes reside, Aether 
perceived (Def# V) or conceived (Def# VIII), it is no part 
of Descartes* thesis that all names are names of the one 
substance, that "I","mind","God" and "body" are muaes of . 
the one and only thing# ^
No one really doubts the existence of manifestly 
numerous and different things. So,Aristotle would claim, i 
having encountered and ordered many such things, we have  ^
determined classes, definitions and essences, nd have a 
language which works because we have established meanings 
for words in familiar use. You and I know what we are talking 
about, can tell in certain contexts what our nouns refer to 
or do not refer to (the use of "refer" is loose), can disting­
uish \jhRt need not be questioned from the'questioning ^ich 
our language makes possible (and even necessary). r
Bec^ use some anifoals we meet Ccin think, we call the .
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thinking things "men". Because this is not the only state­
ment that can he made about men or animals, our assertion 
that some animals think and that all thinking things are 
animals can be challenged. More statements, more truths, 
are to be sought, and related to what we already have asserted 
by argument. Our concern is not whether the things we are 
talking about exist, but whether .certain s tat omen ts we wish 
to make about the things are in fact true. Satisfactory defin­
itions are difficult to arrive at, in part because we are 
continually discovering new facts and features of things 
which are relevant to classification.and definition, and at 
the same time our classificatory purposes and classificat­
ions are altered. (In the Posterior Anàlytics,U.S. we can 
see Aristotle struggling to make clear how the selection 
of a defining true statement depends upon facts, argument, 
and a system of organised truths called a science).
Scientific classification,fully ordered classification, 
begins from the classifications already established irregul­
arly but effectively in our ordinary dealings with the world 
in which we exist and in which our language has developed.
"All horses are animals and none are dewdrops or mountains" is 
a constituent complex proposition which can be presented as à 
partial classificatory system. The least of the scientists* 
worries is the question of whether the things which he 
familiarly so distin^^uishos exist or not: toe criteria for 
existence claims are clear enough for a sufficiently large 
number of dletlngulehable things, and when existential doubts
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are raised they are raised in a complex background which 
ena.blos them to be sustained or settled, depending upon 
information available. That I cannot find a centaur to 
ride to work does not entail that no centaurs exist; but 
that I can find a horse to ride entails that horses exist.
Trite and obvious this is, but Descartes* main problmi 
is to prove that x exists because I am related to it in a 
way other than "I think of x",i.e. that x exists independently 
of mo. What Definition V. really ax/iounts to is that "I see 
entails "there is before me that which is 0,namely x"; 
and this is equivalent to an ordinary stat®aent "x exists 
because I see x" and a further assertion "x really means 
a substance and the 0-attribute which inheres in it". The 
"analysis" is to get necessity as well as an occurrence 
claim into the fact statement, and in the analysis the 
existential (occurrence) claim is transferred from the 
subject to the attribute - although this is actually the 
last thing that Descartes wants to do. "Seeing" is the 
relation which guarantees that x exists as I exist; in this 
sense no attribute can be said to exist or it would be a 
substance. And doctrines of different ways of being, of 
different degrees of reality or of being, derive their 
meaning from this simple sense of existence and independent 
relation.
% ' K ‘
There is ar class of propositions whose truth is a guaran­
tee of the existence of the things spoken of in asserting 
the proposition; such propositions enter science by way of
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"What Is this?" and the working out of b precise description, 
one of many descriptions, precjsion being demanded by the 
determinate structure of a particular complex classification 
and the (generally) indeterminate structure of the set of 
descriptions which we call an account of the thing# Once we 
recognise this, we can recognise how our language, how our 
discourse, and our thought or inquiring,functions, can recog­
nise what problems science and philosophy are confronted 
with. We can find a moaning for the terms used by logic­
ians, methodologists,metaphysicians and grammarians, as I 
shall demonstrate in some detail below. We discover at the 
same time how close is the relation between Arlstotle^s 
treatment of subject and predicate as distinctions within 
propositions syllogisticnlly related, within propositions 
which cnn be variously systematised, and the actual process 
by which subject-terms and predicate-terms function meaning­
fully in thought or discourse, wherein alone they ctxn 
function meaningfully. - ^
We take it for granted that the things we classify - 
exist independently of ourselves, of one another, that thqy 
exist, persist,are ones and are multi-featured. Descartes 
prefers to talk of "obvious" or "clear and distinct" and of 
"attributes common to all things", but the result is the 
some if we recognise that the "list" incipiently presented 
in the Hegu&he is added to elsev^ere directly and by implic­
ation. The taking for granted is like my taking it for 
granted that we speak a meaningful language,make fact state­
ments sometimes truly. Neither "taking for granted" is like
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"supposing that" in the case of frsuning an hypothesis to * 
"explain" something, for on obvious reason. It would be 
related to such a supposing as "suppose there is something 
to be explained" is related to "suppose there is something 
which explains". Accept both, end we deny all meaning to 
"supposing" or we reach an isolated Ego by the road of the ' 
Cogito, surrendering all science and most, if not all, of 
the language in which we do science and argue.
Suppose that what I took to be facts were only supposed; 
that my answers to questions raised about them are suppositions 
about supposed facts and .things described in such facts;'then 
I clinnet be supposing that I question and exist, cannot 
suppose that I am a supposed substance. .1 am a 4supposing 
substince; I do suppose and I exist,really exist. But %^at 
I cm supposing is that I do not exist in a world which 
contains anything at all, although, I .have a language which ' 
pemits me to describe in detail the supposed world %diich I 
do not occupy and to say that I expose it in fact; and this &- 
is of no philosophical importance whatever except as indic­
ating that (a) the "supposing" is meaningless unless it is 
related to at least one fact statement, so that ^ "suppose" i 
depends upon there being a meaning to "is not supposed" and
f
"do suppose", and in consequence that (b) philosophy and^^t^ 3-v 
science can be understood*as concerned with what is not 
supposed, but what is so, while (c) it directs our attention
f . ^
to fact Btateiaente by which Descartee attempts to justify 
the metaphysical "supposing". , ■
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(b) But what of "centaurs are human-tor so ed horses"? Quite 
apart from the fact that this statement is a full candidate 
for being a supposition, and that one use of "mind" is to 
provide a grazing-ground for centaurs and their like, is there 
any reason for rejecting this as true,and as an instance of 
attributes residing in a substance, of a substance conceived 
as existing Independently of other substances, on the Cartesian 
view?
Everything depends upon whether we are to reduce "is 
contained in the concept of" to "is truly predicable of"
(as Descartes does in Def. IX), or vice versa (as Descartes 
seems to insist in all the metaphysical logic, and as he must 
insist if the denial of a distinction between seeing and imag­
ining is to be maintained, along with a denial that I .can be 
related and know that I am related to horses in a bodily 
- spatio-temporal and active - relation). If "contained in 
the concept of" is primrry, then "centaurs are huiüan-torsoed 
horses" is true because the properties of being human-torsoed | 
and equine are contained in the concept of "centaur" (and 
all the properties of any centaur in the concept of that ^ 
centaur - Descartes tries to grapple with this at times,>«but 
in general, substituting analysis for classification, he |
can analyse only definitions which derive from classifications).
It is true that we can claim that we do not perceive 
the properties or qualities of centaurs,or have not, but ]j
: I
only ( a point which needs elaboration) by surrendering the. :
foundation of our metnphysic of mind and reatserting "perceiv-
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In6î" to be R seeing of "things" independent of me,i.e. before 
me, R reassertion which runs counter to the Cartesian 
doctrine of perception, that of representative ideas, and that 
of secondary qualities. "Perceiving", so treated, is assimil­
ated to "sun related to","am looking at", and this, I shall 
continue to argue, lo the ordinary use, the condition of thete 
being science at nil, and whether we need the concourse of 
God to Justify the use, the Justification is meaningless 
unless the use is in fact genuine.
Descartes did believe that there wore horses (in Holland, 
in Irance, in Germany, but not in his pools), r^d did not 
believe that there were contours. In the sense that it can 
be said "centaurs so describable do not exist" the attributes 
of centaurs do not entail,an existential truth, and this mmiQ 
to be equivalent to saying that they do not inhere in a 
substance as do the attributes of horses. Squally it is very 
like saying that the definition of "Horse" and the definition 
of "Centaur" differ only in certain attribute-tems, but that 
(5 x) cnn be asserted of horses and not of centaurs. Again we 
approach the contemporary logicians* claim that universal 
propositions have no existential entallments, can be true 
even if no things exist to be "grouped together" under "all".
Moreover, it is true that we could constitute a class­
ification of sorts by defining centaurs,hippogryphs, oozlum 
birds,slithy toves, boojumo, andany oddments derived from 
random combination of the terms developed in ordinary discourse.
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But tV>e lenPt we could say of eorae such classj fier who 
thou(ÿlit ho was doing biology would be that he was mistaken, 
and if he asserted that this was the only way of doing 
biology we should have difficulty in remaining polite. It 
seems iüu>OBSiblfc to deny that even here "some" would be 
introduced with every class division; and it seems clear that 
anybody who classified such things along with horses and 
tlgerg and ostriches would be either a fool or a philosopher 
intri^rued by the fact that the descriptions of the members 
of both "classes" (real and imaginary) were alike and perm­
itted the classification to be stated, and hence aware that 
the fonnal rules for classification did not provide either 
the truths upon which the classification depended or exist­
ential guarantees for things classified.
The imaginary class, or members of it, can be rejected 
from the biologist's classification by the falsity of the 
proposition "the members are epatio-temporally related to Y", 
where Y is any member of the classes in the biologist's 
determinate classification,i.e. the falsity of the claim that 
the members were somewhere and somewhen in relation to any 
existing thing. We can if we like make the Y "myself" or 
"ourselves" while we regard ourselves as men; and we thus 
make clear a quite intelligible reflexive relation between 
man as classifier and man as member of a class in the 
classification - a relation of some importance in giving a 
meaning to certain metophysical theses.
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The formal rules,however clear and distinct and necessar­
ily true, are not enough. If it is a matter of putting "ideas" 
together into complex thought-things, or putting words together 
into coiAplex descriptions, that concerns us, then we can 
recognise that only things with complex accounts can be class­
ified; but there is no meaning to be given to "exists" which 
will distinguish centaurs from horses. Such things as centaurs 
are in fact conceived of as extended end as thinking and 
speaking, and as existing. At this level "extension" and 
"thinking" reveal no incoa^patibllity; but neither do "unity 
as substance-thing" and "coi^plexity of attributes" or "complex­
ity of relations".
AxXty of these things can be subjects of thoughts or of 
statements which can be given a Cartesian analysis; all are 
values of the variable "substance-subject" in " all substance- 
subjects have attributes". They can be classified just as 
they can be distinguished as real and imaginaiy, and science 
depends in'large part on the distinction being accurately 
mad© even if we regard all "hypotheses" as involving "imaginary 
entities. Why then, apart from asserting for metaphysical 
purposes that horses and the world they occur in,along with 
men, may be imaginary, and so can be disregarded as things 
which exist as substances, does Descartes disregard both 
clasoee of things? - ^
Part of the answer lies in his treatment of the Y 
analytic coii\plex>»simple. V/hen in Meditation II he asks:
"What am I?", he rejects "a man" because this leads on to
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"What is an animal?", and if wo follow the classificatory / 
relatione through,even if we finish with the fine sii^plicity 
of "a hoing” we have a large number of attributes as well.
No noun in ordinary use will seinre his purposes,bocause 
no one of tiiem is, so to speak, "self-contâined". And the 
result,when he gets as close to simplicity as it is possible 
while preserving any suggestion that the result is "thinkable", 
is a single (and so simple) attribute and an inferred substance 
which cannot be named by a common noun at all. Once treat 
"mind" and "bociy" as common nouns and we are driven to recog­
nising that they admit of plurals and have complex descriptions, 
i.e. are subjects of many statements which are true. At that 
point the single attributes become classificatory character­
istics, and the claim is that all the things that ever were 
can be divided into two actual classes. The claim is a claim 
as to fact, not a claim as to our capacity to suppose that 
there are two completely exclusive classes and those only.
Descartes hopes ultimately to develop his principles 
to the point where dogs and horses and men can be included in 
science. In the "ultimately" lies the contrast with the 
Aristotelian procedure. Where Aristotle was convinced that 
in connection with discoverable horses and dogs and men and 
our discourse about them was developed our conceptions of 
thing,substance,subject,existence,persistence,duration, of 
predication, of qualities and relations, of facts and theories, 
of definition and truth and falsity and argument and validity.
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I.e. of science, logic and methodology; where Aristotle was 
convinced that our science demanded the rejection of earlier 
theeGG that what we Icnew was rational or conceptual or 
imaginary and that the "censes" revealed nothing that was 
material ^or science, Descartes begins with definitions, with 
necessary truths whose "components" nust be simple, with 
first principles, and turns his back upon all familiar 
things and their complex accounts. Ho turns his back upon 
a hoot of propositions which can be affirmed directly, 
propositions Which can be formulated as (ax)(x is 0), vdiore 
X and 0 are variables. The "logical analysis" which arrives 
at an x-subject for all propositions which is a constant 
gives an initial plausibility, which vanishes as soon as we 
discover that x is to bo treated as a variable with onlÿ' 
two values,viz. "mind" and "body". The logical analysis is 
not even an intermediate stage. Descartes* goal is the 
proof of a propoGition of precisely the form (3x)(x is 0J 5 
and the proof depends upon the possession of a language in 
a highly developed form, the assumption of the truth of a 
great n^imber of universal propositions whose terms are 
fmiliar language terms, and nrgumont presented in that 
language.
Descartes does not for a moment believe that God 
and minds and bodies do not exist. They are substances, if 
not uni vocally so ("no signification of this word can be 
distinctly understood which is common to God and to minds 
and bodies" is ©f firmed in principles I .LI - a statement
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which iB either iaeaninglees or makes much of the argument ^ 
in terms ot "BUbetmce" meaningless) • Descartes treats each 
of the subst^inces as "self-contained" and so necessary in a 
special sense — the predicates belong neceesarily to the 
subjects, which are unthinkable without thaa. We cannot .think 
of X vitliout a 0, of a 0 without an x. But,what exists is 
0x, the thing which is 0; and it is not coincidental that this 
is a generiil rule for fact stateiaents of the fcm "x is 0 %  
where x and 0 are both variables# lUrther, what seems m^if- 
est is "a thing does not exist" is meaningless, and "0 does 
not exist" is also meaningless, although we could give a 
meaning to "0 is not then and Jihere" or "there is not a ,thing 
which is 0 then and there". " - x/ a
It is worth noting that this issue is not onetthat 
Descortes is really prepared to consider in doing metaphysics. 
In a sense he is concerned ^ with dating the Cogito, but "now" 
is not stated in "Ego Cogito#Ego Sum" and strictly cannot 
be included unless we admit the^  contrasting "not now" and a 
remembered past. Location in space Descartes surrenders / 
willingly, since this involves relation to,other substances; 
but location in time should equally be surrendered, and the 
unconsidered difficulty is of giving a meaning to "exist" 
independently of either. The difficulty is the opposite of, 
the difficulty of proving that a defined thing does not exist 
because any examined possible location or Beries of ei^sting 
things leaves us with other places and. other things to be
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examined. "With perception denied, such a difficulty cannot 
arise; but it is by no means obvious that if this question 
cannot arise, "existence" has any meaning at all.
Definition appears to lend a special force. If Y is 
the defining characteristic of X, it is meaningless to say 
that an X is not Y, and correspondingly that XY, an X which 
Is Y, does not exist. But again, granted that we have a 
definition, and so have a classification determined, we have 
a formai rule for fact statements. Under these conditions 
the definition is one of many statements which, as a true 
description in each case, entails the existence of the thing 
described. We can deny the entailment only by denying that
the descriptions describe things which occur anywhere# and
%
having denied that, we have denied that our classification 
needs to be extended, that further facts need to be taken 
into account, that our definitions need supplementation.
Quite patently the argument above depends upon a
scientific procedure which is the reverse of Descartes',
and takes It for granted that classification is of encountered 
and distin^lEhahle indiriduals. This demands consideration, 
hut it leads immediately to the further point which Descartes 
is not prepared to consider in the "geometrical method", 
althou<îh he recognises it in passing in the Principles, namely 
that it is meaningless to say that an individual thing has 
not all the times at which it is considered all the charact-
istiOB and relations which it has in virtue of its being a
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thing at a place at a time. The logical role of the 
individual or thing qua individual subatance is to support 
all its attributes, not only those which it shares with 
other things,viz. the members of a certain class to which it 
belongs. That is why, in a strict sense, "thought" which 
begins with clear and distinct general notions Which can 
occur in a number of complexes can never reach an individual 
at all, can never got beyond a statement true of a class.
The claim that 0 can be perceived and so located, and as 
occurring entails the existence of "a thing"#begins with 
individuals, even if by way of the occurrence of a "partic­
ular universal" and inference of "the thing", and no quest­
ion of existential doubt can arise. For the Aristotelian 
the question is not of finding some way in whito these 
apparently opposed procedures can be related, but of studying 
the ways in which they are actually interrel&ted, and one of 
the results of such study is the discovery that predicate 
terms not function as "simples".
The Aristotelian's limitations must be recogniseds he 
can speak only of the language we actually use, the thinking 
we actually do, science as it functions and develops in 
a discoverable historical world.
4. Unlike the definition of "centaur", definitions of God, 
minds and bodies need comethlng further to be said; and 
unlike a statement about "a thing", they make possible the
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ytying oi coiictilvig furthor. The respective predicates 
Inhere in di i fur mit substances, since minds are neitlier bodies 
nor God, and we must, be able to say that these substances 
aro di fieront in kind and exist; there would be no point in 
a proof that they existed if in fact they did not exist, and 
argument is possible because \:e can moke more than one statem­
ent about God or minds or bodies. We can adznit that definit­
ion, as the putting together of "ideas" or "images" or "sign- 
ificcuit words" is not enough in these cases, and that we are 
doin,j Lome thing more.
Ic ir still not cleai' what wo are in fact doing in 
addition; it is cleiU' enouga that if defining were Just a 
matter of conceiving a thing of a kind and saying that it exis- | 
ted, then the best we could say of the defined things would be 
tliat ^they were possible". If any thing we conceive to exist 
is a possible existent only, our proof is to separate out the 
actual from the possible, and vhat we need is some truth or 
infallible principle that guarantees what is "known" to be of 
a kind and thought to exist actually exists. According to our 
procedure, the principle must be a rational principle, a clear 
and distinct thought; it cannot be a rule which involves 
perception of occurrences.
When Descartes begins his metapliysice, as in the £3d^SSHl2fi» 
under the aegis of the supposition that "nothing exists except 
Quy thou^ts", the peculiar use of "thou^ts" arid the hollow 
mockeiy of his taking for granted our existence not only in 
talking of "our thoughts" but in the prior use of "we"
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and the actual statement of the supposition as what we 
in fact do suppose as a limitation to our considerations. 
Indicates the two horses he is riding in order to make 
progress. But the some two horses are ridden throughout.
It is because q is true and the subject of q exists that 
explanation is called for, and the explanatory p is 
"actualised" by its being related to q. "Ego Sum", in so 
far as It is more then assumed that "Ego" exists as the 
subject of a series of stateanents that can be considered 
as factually true, derives from "thought must have a thinker"
and "I am iinraediately awfire of my thought as occurring".
"God exists", in the geometrical presentation, appears to 
derive from an entailment by "perfection" of "existence", 
neither of which can be "perceived", but the central proof 
derives from "I in fact have the idea of perfection". Bodies 
are denied either proof, because "extension" is held to 
lack both the entailment of "existence" and the possibility 
of perception.
That we can think of centaurs and horses is not 
denied, but the formulation ••(3x)0x* may be only a thoufÿit" 
confuses the issue here, even without .the addition of
the argument "(a0) therefore there is an x", which is  ^^  ^-
obscure because we have no clear meaning given to (30).
But if we ignore all the difficulties which arise from 
theories of perception and treat values of 0 as attributes 
of things which at least are \*^ ere the values are, then^
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on the side of definitions and ideas, «1 h a W  an idea'of '
0 as an attribute" does not entail that the 0-thing exists, 
though it does seem to jentail for Descartes "I have "an 
idea of 0-thing as possibly existing". Indeed, it seems to 
entail that I have Initially the idea "0-thing exists"'Ad 
then doubt it. To relate this with any actual thinking we 
do is difficult unless we specify for ourselves the 
particular question which we have in mind wften we " think of 
0 at all. By a series of not very subtle shifts Descartes 
avoids these difficulties and those that follow.
In Definition IX he writes "when we say that some 
attribute is contained in the nature or concept of a thing", 
and here "concept" and "nature" are not equivalent; "nature" 
is at least halfway towards treating the thing as actually 
an existent, towards what follows in the definition, that 
"contained in the concept or nature" is the same as "is 
true of the thing" or "may be affirmed of the thing itself", ^
where the thing itself is substance of real thing or existing |
thing which has a nature,i.e. has the characteristics without #
which it would be a differ A t  kind of thing’.
The concept mi^t provide, as à union of ideas, "if 
there is a thing x then that thing is y, since y is included 
in the cAcept of x"; but it cannot provide" "there is a thing 
X which is y". This must be provided if toe definition is 
to function in science, and the recognition of this is 
equivalent to Descartes' recognition that what is esgplained
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"gives reality" to necessary truths. In Descartes" defin­
itions there is no problem - because the definitions take 
the form "the name X is given to the thing which has the 
feature Z"i "the naiae "God" is given to the thing which 
perfect"; "the naine "mind" is given to toe thing which 
does toin%, substance in which thought does reside"; 
and similarly with bodies - "the substance which is toe . , 
immediate subject of local extension and accidents which 
pre-suppose it is called "body"".
In every case what is asserted is that a^toing exists, 
can be named, has an attribute such that the attribute can 
be truly asserted of the thing in question and of none of 
the otherwise named things. Except in the case of God, and 
without a reason being given, plurality of things which can 
be 80 named is aspumed. In so f ^  as "thing or substance" 
can bo relevantly used in the definitions, it is a variable 
and not a constant; the values are taken for granted to 
exist, and there is no question of adding characteristics 
to a constant in order to get different substrmcea. What 
is simply stated is that there are minds \diich think, 
bodies which are extended and have other attributes, and 
one God who is perfect. u
It would be a digression here,if a t o t i n g  one,, 
to consider how the ten definitions, the seven fantastic^ 
postulates, the ten common notions, and four propositions 
prove that mind and body are really distinct, and do so
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via the oxonipotence of God-because Descartes happened to 
begin with God, and not because "there is need^ of any f hi? 
oxtraordinaiy power in ordèr to separate the,mind from the 
body". Descartes is vaguely aware of the^rationalist's 
need for a system of propositions all of which are true 
and all of which aro so related by entailment that no one 
of them could be true unless each of the others were true. 
What concerns us directly is that even if our lani^uage is 
restricted to the three nouns "God",“mind" and “body", t h ^  
are as the only possible subjects at least different 
substances.
That they constitute the only kinds of thing, or 
(ignoring God because He creates substantial difficulties) 
that minds and bodies constitute the only two classes^of 
things, indicates the role of "thing" or "substance", (I) 
as a class term for the class of , classes, (2) , as a class, 
when the plural is used, which is the subject of a purely 
formal principle that all thing-substances have attributes, 
and (3) as the subject of any statement with the predicates 
"is one","exists","persists", "is related to","acts"..*• 
and a variety of others which are meaningful only, when the 
substance in question is determinate as qualitatively, 
distinguished from other classes of things or members of, 
such classes. We may note that in (3) ^"predicate" is used 
in the grammarian' s sense in which the predicate is the ^  
whole of the sentence except the subject, not in the sense
U
u
292.
In which tho predicate is restricted to the "adjectival 
corqpljaraent of the verb "to be", or a noun complement of the 
opxae verb# The logician's claim that statAents should be -" "  ^
put into logical form for logical purposes is not equivalent 
to a claim that they should be put into such a form for 
ontological or metaphysical purposes. ^
(5) If we write "x“ for "thing" in the sense of (3), 
while recognising that it is correlative with the senses of 
(I) and (2), one goal of metaphysicians can be stated as 
that of supplementing "(x)x is......." in'such a way that
the conu>lote statement is in fact true of all things which 
can be co-classified as members of the class of existants 
or "Beings". Roughly speaking, Aristotle posits the probloa 
(which he is forced to take over from"'his predecessors) as: 
"Definition and classification as the result of study answer 
the question "V/hat does it mean to be a kind of thing?"i 
but the further question is "Whet does it mean to be a^- ‘- 
thing?". \
Aristotle's anm^er seams to be that it means to be 
the individual "subject of a true proposition,^ and that there 
are as many things as there are such propositions. In * 
restricting or specifying the class of propositions in 
question, I am specifying what Aristotle takes for granted 
in presenting his exai^ples, that he is conceraed with prop** 
osltions known to be true, propositions established in or 4 
for a science. Both of us are denying that the t\ro questions
- . r.-WC
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can be asked independently of one another, both of us are 
asserting that unless propositions of the farm "thls^ 
existing thing is such" could be truly stated^there could not 
be any classification, both of us are denying that class if- " 
ication lo a meaningful procedure if there are no things to 
be classified,i.e. that it makes sense to say "classes have 
no members" or "monbers are not of classes". Both of usj 
I take it, recognise that classification does not include 
any statement as to the number of members of any"class; 
as to the location and date of any members, or as to the 
further historical fact stntements that can be made about % 
any member of any class. y
Both of us are taking it for granted that things itoich 
we classify can be encountered and discriminated one from ' 
another; both of us are able to move from actuality, from 
existing things, to possibility,e.g. to reports of observât-  ^
ions or to anticipations of observations which may be false 
or unfulfilled. Ve derive a meaning for "does not exist" 
from "does existj and are not forced.to derive a meaning 
for "does not not exist" from "does not exist"; aiid "may 
not exist" means, in part at least, "is not to be included 
in our classification of things until or unless further 
specifiable criteria are satisfied". ¥e start with snakes," 
not dragons# horses,not centaurs; men,^ not gods. . y i
Neither of us can give a meaning to there is a thing 
at place p at time t >toich has no attributes, 1 s not of any * 
kind" (thou^ we can to "not of any known kind"); neither of
I
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us Ccin give a muming *cc “there are ui tribu tes- them and 
there which are ol no thing", or "therenis a kind of thing 
Y which la at no place" (though either of us can reco(^lGe 
other uaes of "thing" and "exist" which in other contexts are 
intelligible.
In a senso tlieso claims can be regarded as obvious, as 
what all would admit, as what nobody would want to deny. But 
when Aristotle or myself insists on their validily, and upon 
the relevance of thoa to the "problem of Being", we seem to 
be uttering contradictories of many different propositions 
propounded by metapliysiciana, all of whom seem to be stating 
what Being is in such a way that statements like "men exist", 
"rabbits exist", are at best true in a peculiar manner while 
the things indicated, men and rabbits, oxlst only in a special 
and aomeliow Unreal sense. Further, Aristotle was quite well 
aware that he was contradicting or rejecting certain previous 
metaphysical theories. -, ^
He rejects metaphysical etat^ents like "if x is a thing 
that oxlets X 1b made of water", "if x is an existent x is 
a number", "if x is an existent x is a collection of atoms". 
What materialists se«tt to be asserting is that to be is to be 
matter, and such positions entail a set of claims (a) that 
there is no dubiety or difficulty in understanding, in the 
case of a statement like "the matter we name and specify 
exists" - although even if the description is given it does not 
touch the question "What is it to be?"; it gives a new subject
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to the verb "to be" or "to exist", end (b) that the things 
Aristotle <xnd myself regard as existent aro somehow const­
ituted of such things or matters, since otherwise the 
metaphysical thesis Is unrelated to the world which sets 
problems and determines the reality. In Descartes* sense, 
of the metaphysical "truths". Materialists assert a ; 
neceaaary truth - ”Belng 1» matter** or ••natter eKÎsts** - 
or a tautology which can be presented as ••♦Being* means 
•matter* ••; but the thesis seems In fact to be "all existing 
things are material In the sense of being composed of the 
matter, which we say exists", and It Is difficult to see 
how this Is more than a peculiar sort of fact claim about 
the things admitted to exist observably. The peculiarity 
Is only Indicated by tailing of "ultimate reality" or 
"ultimate substance", since "ultimate" has s scoi^lon-*lilce 
sting in the tall.
What makes the Issue particularly relevant to our 
discussion is the way in idilch Descartes tries to do metaph- 
yslcal Physics by asserting such a matter, and treats his 
thesis (a) as a cosmogonlcal account - what there was in the 
world before transformation resulted'in the world which we 
describe as ordinaiy men and explain as scientists; (b) as 
a cosmological account of vdiat there Really lU in the world, 
which Is totally different in kind from what we take it to 
be; and (c) as an "explanatory account" which is hypothetical 
and clear and distinct but merely useful as a fashion of
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considering what goes on In the world, a way of dealing with 
the world, without In any sense replacing the factual account 
of observable "goings on". The Cosmology asserts that 
what the Cosmogony dec&àree once went on is still going on; 
the "useful hypothesis** account admits that there Is no 
point in saying that either the Cosmology* or the Cosmogony 
io an account of occurrences. In the Regulae. for example, 
Descartes is clear that hypotheses may be useful without 
being true in a factual sense. But what he cannot reject 
is the notion that if the hypothesis works there must be 
"something more to it" than being a mere hypothesis; if 
the explanation explains it must be "real"; or, in more 
recently developed terminology, if the model works in 
enabling predications the model corresponds to what is 
really going on.
Against a materialist background, Parmenides appears 
as refusing to accept the reduction of Being to Matter, or 
the equivalence of "Being" and "Matter". Socrates, if we 
consider him as rejecting the Heraclitean endorsement of 
"changing things exist" (which is essential to the insistence 
on the validity of a biological classification or any 
recognition of historical things as the concern of science) 
appears as identifying Being and Forms. This,too, Aristotle 
rejects; but while Descartes* physics is purely materialist, 
whatever differences he can claim for his particles to 
distinguish his matters from those of Erapedécles or the
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JP^maeuB, hie theory of ideas is completely Socratic# I
Yet what makes either position intelligible as à . 
philosophical hypothesis is "x is material", "y participates !
in a form", where x and y are membero of classés of existing I
things neither Matter as such nor Forms as such. \ Not only I
do we need to begin with true propositions, with the recog­
nition of things of different kinds, but the metaphysical 
propositions themselvec appear to be merely true# Only 
ToTuiG ore sundered from things, only when the Soul is made 
a thing vdiose habitat is the wrld of Forms, do we get the ;
thesis that the things of the world ge encounter are Unreal, 
and the consequent claim that if the, values of x are things j
in the familiar world then is material",like "x is a Form", j
is either meeninglosB or false. Vo can see in the next chap­
ter how tills claim is related to the notion of dreams as 
insubstantial, to the assimilation of perception end the 
historically occurring to dreaming, and to a special notion 
of substance. - : ^
Bxamlned closely, xaoreover, : Descartes* argument to the 
nature of the soul and to the existence of *^e soul is scarcely 
distinguishable from Socrates* general argument in the 
Phaedo - it is a fact that I "know" Forms, it is logically 
necessary that there should be a knower of the Forms if the 
Forms are known. Forms can be known independently of things 
participating in them (if I/did not know the Forms, did not 
have certain ideas, I could not recognise any thing as 
participating in the Ibms, whi^ have no "falsity"; I can doubt
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existence of any thing which participates in or has a 
Iona, hut It is meaninglesn to say that I can also doubt 
the Pona) ; ergo, I a&i a pure knower of the Porms because 
I know the Ponas before I encounter things In the world, 
and (for Socrates), I existed as a pure knower before I 
entered this world, or (for Descartes, who has further 
information) I was croated when I entered this m>vld as 
a pure knower, and I am still a pure knower because I 
third: in Forms and can do this or could do this even if 
there were no things with which 1 could be acquainted. In 
either case "I",as pure knower, cannot belong to the world 
of complex things which can disintegrate and cease to be.
Both of the theses, of the pure knowing thing and 
the Real Matter, have to be related to a distinction 
between Substance as really existing and yet assuming 
various forms which are transient, and each of them is 
concerned with a subject which is construit and attributes 
which either change or "come and go". But In spite of 
Aristotle*8 rejection of both Forms and various Matters, 
an argued rejection which Descartes ignores con%pletely 
while ho serves up relics of his training at La Fleche as 
self-created and indubitable thouggits, when we try to 
contrast Descartes* general position with regard to 
subetance and attribute with that of Aristotle, the first 
difficulty is to find a difference.
II
Chapter VIII.
Simple Souls and Simple Notions.
The claim lu repeated that "substance" and "attribute", 
like "subject" and "predicate", are technical terms, whose 
meaning; can be indicated only by reference to meaningful 
propositional assertions in a language. gSXf as attribute- 
substance, corresponds to "x is 0", where x and 0 are varia­
bles whose values are "natural" nouns and adjectives or 
their equivalents.
This logical analysis is trivial but only if logic is 
trivial.
Natural language statements, which Descartes accepts 
in arguing, cannot be "reduced" via "complex therefore 
siiHi^ les". Descartes does not provide an atomic-language 
which can be related to our familiar-world language, and 
if Bouls think by relating simple notions their thou ht 
is unlike ours.
(p.302). Descartes misunderstands the conditions of 
classification, definition and essence-detenalnatlon. The 
contrast between Descartes* analysis of fact stataaents 
and those statements with their logical features has import­
ant consequencos, vhich are listed (p.305) and are to be 
discussed.
Descartes* claims as to our knowledge of substance, 
attribute and existence are denied by Descartes. We are 
claimed never to know "existence" directly - but the whole 
procedure collapses unless we have ^0 exists" - {B0) - and 
"(30) entails *x is 0*", and also "(3x)(0x)".
But the transition from (30) demands "0 is an 
attribute" and, like his successors, Descartes simply 
ignores this.
Given a statement of the form "0x)P, logical 
analysis gives us directly that the value of 0 is an attrib­
ute of the value of x that is the subject-substajrice. The 
"scientific" analysis of Descartes gives us two things, 
either values or a variable and a value of the other, which 
have to be related.
"^Inherence" and "adherence" fail to be meaningful 
as such relations. If the idea of "attributes are of a 
substance" is held to be regulative, minds and men think 
differently, or men are unconscious of the ideas \âileh minds 
have and the work they do In men*s thihking.
And unless the result is values given to both 
variables, the resulting thoughts are questions that must 
have an answer; they are not answers or statements.
2. (p.318). A detailed emmination of the doctrine of 
"BiiAPle notions" shows that if there were such, they would
fall outside our "thoughts". This has to he considered 
in relation to nouns and adjectives# Neither can he 
dispensed with, nor can prédication# Natural individuals 
ore unaccountahlo on the sii^ile-notions thesis.
Descartes works hy defining existing class?ifiable 
individuals which have a complex account - and the con#- 
onents of the accounts are propositions, one of which 
(qua definition) is true In a special sense. Neither 
definitions nor individuals are reached hy adding simples.
Socrates of the according to Plato (end Church).
"Then helore we began to see, and to hear, and to use the 
other eeneea, we must have received the knowledge of the 
nature of abstract and real equally; otherwise we could not 
hn.v# couKpared equal eonsi'ble objecta with abstract equality, 
and seen that the foxmer in all oases strive to be like the 
latter, though they are always inferior to it*..,.
Did we not see, end hear, and possess the other senses us 
soon as we were boxn?,.....
And we must have received this knowledge of abstract equality 
before we had these senses?.*...
Then, it seems, we must have received that knowledge before 
we were bom?.....
Our present reasoning does not refer only to equally. It 
refers just as much to absolute good, and absolute beauty, and 
absolute justice, and absolute holiness| in short, I repeat, 
to everything we mark with the name of the real, in the 
questions and answers of our dialectic. So we must have rec­
eived our knowledge of all realities before we were bom.
"Is it not rather the case that the man, vho prepares 
himself most carefully to apprehend by his intellect the 
essence of each thing which he examines, will come nearest 
to the knowledge of it?....
In every case he will pursue pure and absolute being with 
his pure intellect alone. Ho will be set free as far as 
possible from the eye, the ear, and, in short, from the whole 
body, because intercourse with the body troubles the soul 
and hinders her from gaining truth and wisdcKn.*
•The soul by herself must behold things as they are".
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SiixiiJle aouls nnd Simule Notions^
The chapter break is purely for convenience. The 
exploration and argument continue directly. So complex are 
the ramli 1 cat ions of the treatment of fact statements as 
analysable into "substance-thing” and "attributes” that it 
ie impossible to consider it briefly üiid lirectly without 
appearing to i/.giore problems, situations and arguaents which 
are held both to give the doctrine a meaning and to show tiiat 
it 1b necessary. Logic, theory of mind, theory of science 
and of knowledge, theory of perception, and ontology, all 
seem to come to pieces in our hands when the analysis is 
denied. Yet this should scarcely surprise us, since if the 
claim is that tiiere are in the world substances and attrib­
utes, logic etc. must also be claimed as sciences which, 
concerned with "what things there are", are concerned with 
substance-things and attributes.
If, as I clî^ im, "substance" fnd "attribute", like ‘ 
"subject" and "predicate", are technical terms whose meaning 
can be indicated only by reference to propositional statements 
in a language, then meaningful propositions^as thought or ^ as 
stated, precede any statements made about substance, attribute, 
subject or predicate. If the technical terms are logical terms, 
then a "logical analysis" of a proposition like "the horse is 
brown" will be: " "the horse" is a subject-subs tance"; " "brov/n" 
is a predicate-attribute". Subs tance-subject and attribute-pred- 
icate are related in the statement by the copula, the predicative 
"îîi". Correspondingly, grammatical analysis would yield us 
article, noun, verb and adjective.
3 0 0 .
All that we ciin think or say about the horse, after the 
analysis, is that it is brown. If the statement is true, 
then a brown horse exists; if 'it :1s false, no brown horse '
is before us to be indicated by "the"; and if the statemnnt 
is "just a thou^iht" (as it is here), we are concerned with 
a statement or thought which exemplifies logical or grammat­
ical features of statements or thoughts, with an exm#le 
and not a stntement-in-use. About loy mind, my knowledge, 
or the conditions of my understanding the statement, belAg 
able to "think the thought", we hrve no information.
If we are concerned with existence, encountering or 
perceiving, we are concerned not with "substance" and "attrib­
ute" but with horses end men and trees, shapes and colours 
and poi’haps sounds and smells. There can be no question of 
"knowing" rubstancec or attributes in any perceptual way. In 
Descartes* terms, the distinction between "substance" and 
"attribute" is n distinction of reason; and this, I claim, is 
equivalent to saying that the distinction is made within a 
propositional assertion or thought, which is to be related 
to what is perceived (looked at, noted, observed) via the 
assertion or thought.
Analysing "x is 0" into "*x* is a substance-term ?md*0’ 
is an attribute-teim" is not "substnntial analysis", not a 
discovery of "things". When we give values to x and to 0, 
and write "thé horse is brown", the "analysis" looks more ^ 
like making a logical co3m/ient about the statement, telling 
us nothing and ineffably futile. We could make the same
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comment about all the countless individual propositions 
which we can utter or understand when statements are uttered, 
saying nothing and learning nothing. And grammatical comments 
would bo equally possible, equally futile.
But the use of the comment is to be found in logic, in a 
special science which Descartes dismisses and never considers. 
"Attribute-terms are undistributed in affirmative proposit­
ions and distributed in negative propositions" is an import­
ant, intelligible, and far from futile statement, and (what­
ever we may want to say about its limits in relation to 
classes of actually meaningful assertions in a language) one 
that finds its meaning in the study of the relations between 
propositions which are components in arguments. That a logical 
statement should be meaningful only within a science of logic, 
terms should be meaningful only in propositions, statements
- ’ -  z  ^
within systems of statements, words within a language via M  [ 
statements possible in the language, is inconceivable to 
Descartes. A true "atémist", his model is "you cannot haw 
a house of bricks without the bricks". You cannot have a 
G duplex idea without simple ideas; if the "whole" is intell­
igible, it is made up of intelligible and irreducible units.
What emerges from the treatment of thing-substance as 
really distinct from attribute-predicate is (a) the sii^plicity 
of "thing", the identity of "thing", and a variety of arguments 
to a simple and unchanging soul-thing, (b) an insistence upon 
attributes as initially simple and constant, and these are 
the Socratic Forms with Cartesian simplifications. Descartes* 
Socraticism fails to provide a metaphysic or a language which
is\
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can be related to the spatio-temporal familiar world or to 
our human language.
Alternatively, we may say that if there are souls which 
think by relating simple notions, such thinking is totally 
unlike our familiar thinking; and this means that what they 
think can never be what we think. A soul*s concepts contrast 
in their simplicity with the plasticity of ours. With only 
"substance" and "attribute" the soul cannot think; even with 
substance-terms and attribute-terms the soul cannot think, 
without introducing the articles, verbs, pr^esitions and 
conjunctions which we use, there is neither a grammatical 
nor a logical structure to the soul's thoughts#
For Descartes, of course, "the soul" is **I" who thinks 
as I think, and there is no problem of the "source" of "ideas" 
other than of nouns and adjectives. The "ideas" are taken 
fer granted, along with a complete language; and it is concern 
only with misunderstood elementary logical distinctions that 
hides the fact that neither our thought nor our language 
functions "additively", that none of our words are meaningful 
in isolation from other words. "Complex therefore simple" 
fails to.be intelligible, and with its failure the Cartesian 
analysis of propositions, which.are treated as things and 
analyses of tilings, also falls to be intelligible.
Descartes is not alone or being original in mi sunder st­
anding the nature,of logieal statements, or in treating 
elementary logical statements as metaphyàical fact-statements 
and ontological foundations. Nor is he being original in
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his corresponding misunderstanding of classification, 
definition and essences. Given a determinate classific­
ation, even one inherent in a language of fact statements, 
we can make a host of statements of the form: "if and only 
if a thing is x and y is it a z" ; but this holds while x 
is a generic term, y a differentiating attribute within the 
genus, and z is a class term. The fact-form is "All z are 
xy", and the role of "thing" in the hypothetical formulation 
is illustrated by "member" in "any member of the class z is 
both X and y".
Descartes treats "thing" as a constant and "x" as a 
principal attribute; thereby he converts "essence" or "defin­
ition" into a single term, and because "x" is the only intell­
igible in "a thing is x" he reverts to a doctrine that 
"essence" is substance and unchanging. (0, not x or 0x, is 
what is identical in its modes). "Principal attribute" is 
meaningihl in, and only in, a classificatory syst^; 0 as 
principal attribute determines a genus to iihich a thing which 
is 0 belongs, as well as classes to which it does not belong, 
and it is only when we treat the classif icatory system a.s 
a rational and absolute structure without reference to the 
historical things which are classified that we even give 
meaning to Descartes* fundamental proposition, namely "if 
0 is a principal attribute, then a thing's ceasing to be 
0 is ceasing to be"©
If, however, it is possible to start with the notion 
of "thing" as one, existing and enduring, and treat "principal 
attribute" as that which the thing is necessjjxily at any
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time, provided we could create such a thing then ceasing 
to he 0 would he ceasing to he a 0- thing and a thing at 
all. Until we have created it we have only a "concept" of 
an eternal thing. By treating two real attributes, thinking 
and being extended, as principal attributes, Descartes 
conceives two classes, exclusive because he conceives 
the attributes to be exclusive, end he names the conceived 
things "minds" and "bodies".
The attribute-terms Descartes takes from ordinary 
language, but he is not concerned with what in ordinary 
terms are taken to be the subjects. The technical term 
"principal attribute" comes from classificator^r science, 
for which Descartes seems to have a contempt similar to 
the contempt he had for syllogistic logic, the source of 
the terms "substance" and "attribute". The procedure 
involved throu^out is (a) selecting terms from ordinary 
and technical vocabularies, (b) declaring the terms to be 
ideas or notions which are simple and belong to the same 
level of language so that statements can be made by adding 
any notion to another notion, and (c) treating the resulting 
statements as fact statements in a natural language, and 
necessarily true.
What makes ths statements apparently meaningful is that 
initially the technical terms are technical terms in logic, 
and their meaning can be exhibited by pointing to features 
of propositional statements. It is for this reason that we 
find difficulty, as I coimnented in concluding the last chapter, 
in discovering a difference between Aristotle and Descartes.
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It io this "correspondence" which gives plausibility to 
the metaphysical assertions and the claimed analyses; but 
when we examine Descartes* interpretation of the statements 
and the analyses we find that they contrast so markedly 
with ordinary language fact statements and their logical 
features that we seem confronted with a new world and a 
new and unintelligible mode of thinking by things in that 
world. In making this contrast clear
(a) we get rid of simple notions, simple attributes, and 
arguments from theia to simple souls, in our language or world;
(b) we discover something of the logic of "praedicatum 
adest" and "praedicatum inest", and of "universais" ;
(c) Discover that Cartesian analysis of comlex ideas is 
neither analysis of thoughts nor of anything at all;
(d) We discover why Descartes is in hopeless difficulties 
over individuals, and takes no account of history at all;
(e) We discover a central confusion which still persists
as a legacy of Descartes, that we perceive "attributes" only, 
and that these are ontological entities - while "sjrbstance" 
is a fiction or myth or unknowable, and familiar things 
"illusory"; and finally, more important than any of these,
(f) We discover that metaphysics and what the natural 
light reveals appear with relations of propositional thoughts 
or stateiaents, and not with analyses of them.
Qur first difficulty is of finding a difference.
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Th© claims (a) that we never know substance or existence 
directly, (b) that we know substance strictly only as a 
subject in which attributes Inhere, and (c) that the natural 
light shows us that no attribute can be of nothing — a prop­
osition which converts directly into "no thing can have no 
attributes", need only the alteration of (a) to "we can give 
no meaning to "thing existing" unless the thing is the subject 
of true attributive statements" in order to absorb (b) and 
to make it clear that the claims are readily intelligible 
as statements «about the logical features of any propositions 
whose subjects are nouns and predicates adjectives. What 
is being insisted upon is that we neither encounter or 
can think mere existence or mere thing or mere attributes - 
the verb "to know" is being tortured in the Cartesian . t;~ .
presentation with its suggestion that "substance" and "exist- 
nce" and "attributes" are things of which wa become aware y 
by our relation to them ^ d  by their relation to one another.
But it is equally difficult to understand Descartes 
metaphysics unless we can understand, as well as the claims 
above, (a) that we do know "thing" or "substrmce" independ­
ently of attributes, can understand (have an idea of) "a thing 
exists" independently of attribute terms, (b) that we do 
know "attributes" independently of things or "thing", since 
(30) preceded "there must be a thing"; and "a thing is 0", and
(c) that "a thing is 0" is, constituted by relating "thing" 
and "0",i.e. two different sorts of thing into a special
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relation. In (b) the point of transition from (30) to 
"there must be a thing" is, however, "0 is an attribute", 
anti this is something which the logical light apparently 
reveals to us, or grasps before revealing to us, that there 
is any question of a thin^. The point is vital to our 
understanding of much subsequent philosophy. Descartes, 
like so many others, takes it for granted that we see 
colours and shapes, hear sounds, smell odours etc., and 
in this sense "know directly" means "are simply aware of".
But as "objects of awareness" the members of the classes 
"colours", "shapes" etc. are merely objects to which we 
are related, and while this gives them a special status 
as "directly known", it provides no justification whatever
f
for caviling them "qualities" or "attributes" or "predicates".
It is logical analysis of propositions which produces 
a meaning for "subject" and "predicate", for "substance" and 
"quality" or "attribute", and logical analysis does not 
present us with any problem as to how subjects and predicates 
are related. It is when logical analysis is treated as 
a scientific analysis (for want of a better term I use 
"scientific" - what results is an account of different 
"things" as elements of thoughts, thing-elements which 
have to be related) that we are driven to a theory of "id®as" 
•> t,' which minds spend their time putting together in 
ways intuitively known; and it is when this is backed by 
an epistemological thesis, or a theory of perception, that
__
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we get a dual!am, which forces us to argue that our ordinary 
thought is meaningless and to continue the argument to a 
denial of the dualism as unthinkable* There may be an 
empirical problem as to how redness is related to the apple 
which is there on the table, but if so no one seems concerned 
with the problem ; the question "How is the red paint related 
to the pillar box?" is readily answered by "It adheres to it", 
or "to its surface", while "redness" adheres to neither box 
nor paint nor surface, nor surface to box; no analysis is req­
uired to enable us to understand "the apple is red", and the 
logical analysis of subject and predicate begins with the 
consideration of such an intelligible thought* None of these 
routes seem to lead to a logic of "adherence",i*e* to a claim 
that attributes are stuck onto, adhere to, an otherwise 
naked substance*
We cannot, empirically, find a quality "adhering to" a 
mere "thing"; we do not, in our intelligible discourse, const­
ruct thoughts or statements in which the subject is a mere 
thing and the attributes clearly distinct from and added to it# 
Motivation may be complex, but the process of logical analysis 
outlined in detail above that results in a doctrine of a 
substance-thing to which attributes are related has to invent 
some such terra as "adheres" because predication is no longer 
meaningful, and "attribute" means "the sort of thing that can 
adhere to a dubstance". It no longer means "predicate", and it 
is impossible to tell whether we are considering "red" or 
"redness"* Nor, granted that we understand "having"an idea of
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"thing" and an idea of "redness", can we make anything more 
of "adherence" of ideas, one to or onto the other, than
V
that wo must have done something with them in order to 
get the thought "a red thing" or "the thing is rod" in
tf-
vhich we can distinguish subject from what is predicated of 
the subject. That we do synthesise in this w^, and that 
we name after synthesising "thing" and "0" into "0-thing", 
calling the 0-thing X, I shall claim is not the case, nor, 
if "thing" and *^ 0" are simple,possibly the case. But it 
seems clear that the argument for the synthesis rests upon 
the truth of the account of the analysis, which is of X, 
not of "thing" or "attribute", and we have to convert X 
into R proposition or propositions before the analysis can 
begin in terms of substance and attribute.
Locke makes clear what Descartes does not state clearly, 
that the analysis is always of exx idea of a thing in the 
ordinary sense of a this or that kind of thing which we 
name, a thing which we can state to be such and such; for 
both of thœi the "idea" is necesuarily complex. The complex- 
ity enables a change from the logic of adherence to a logic 
of inherence, the first plausible eeemlngly as an.account 
of how the things we "have in mind" are made, the latter 
seemingly plausible as an analysis of named—complexes but 
flatly nonsensical as on account of the analysis of existing
things. t
"0" inheres not In "thing" but in "X", which is the
name of a kind of thing, not of an "idea". But it cannot
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inhere in a neae; it cannot Inhere in a thing n?3med; it ^  
can only inhere in our "complex idea of à thing". What .
Descartes wants to say is that "X is 0" is true and that
this io equivalent to "0 inheres in X"; and while we stress^ ^
"*X is 0* is true" we can cope with "*X is 0* is always
true", and so with definition. If the point of a definition 
is to he found in a classification, which justifies our ~ 
asserting 0 and not another quality as defining, then our 
justification is to be found outAihe any true assertion about 
X. We are not concerned with analysis at all. On Descartes* " 
analytic account,"SX is 0* is true" seems to be meaningless, 
since either "X" means "0-thing" or "X" is the name of the 
subject of any statement. Unless we can give a meaning to 
"thing is 0", we should have to say "0 adheres to thing",that 
"X" is the name of "0-thing", and then we can introduce the 
copula for "X is abc" where a and b and c are non-defining 
attributes. .
Descartes makes no use of "adherence", and takes it  ^
that "a thing is 0" is meaningful in any "case where 0 is " 
predicate tern in discourse. But the analytic account-is  ^ - 
very different from an account of our use of definition % 
which enables us to say "if any thing is XY it is Z","if 
any4,thing is a man it is rational and animal", and corresp­
ondingly that no thing which is not both rational and animal j 
is a mah% "Thing" here is a class tern or variable, and we 
have what we might well call governing rules for propositional
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thinking or syllogistic argument, or examples of the univer­
sal premises which are employed ta thinking and in argument.
Descartes* rejection of syllogism and of classification 
in determining universal propositions as definitional follows 
the familiar pattern; complexity implies simxlicil^, the 
task must he to analyse and so to reveal the simples from 
vdiich and with which we began, and the analysis is held to 
entail a matter of historical fact, a fact about actual thinking 
although we knew nothing of it. We could not think "x is y ” , 
unless we had the idea of x and the idea of y and then related 
them; the subject x can be different from the subjects,A and B 
only in attribute, so that we must have the idea of thing qua 
thing as subject or mere thing or substance. Analysis gets rid 
of all nouns, of % and A and B, leaving only "thing or subst­
ance or subject" - of vhich in isolation we con have no under- 
8tending at all. So all the wAight falls on "attribute"; but 
we do not seem able to grasp tae idea of attribute qua attrib­
ute, of mere attribute, any more than we can grasp "mere subj­
ect". When we try to think "a thing hem w  attritote" nothing, 
so to epeak, happens. Attributes, i^ether simple or coiaplexes 
of different simples, are what Descartes assumes all the 
time, and it is not "attribute" but specific attributes which 
appear as predicates in thoughts or statements. v  ^
iivi And what seems apparent to the natural li#it is that
until we discover that the specifics we «perceive" or "know" i^ ES
  . i  ^  . -A:' / \
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attributes, thinking is iMpossible. t % t M  -.: -
"Attribute", is permitted to be a class terra or variable, 
and at the same time "attribute" must be understood as i 
meaning "that which must inhere in a substance". Seemingly 
we can discover that 0 is an attribute by its cj^acity to 
appear in a proposition as predicate; and seemingly we^ 
should also be able to discover substances by exaraining 
propositions which have been thought or stated. But this 
would entail recognising that "subject" is also a class terra 
or variable, and the propositions \diich enable this recog­
nition are not what Descartes wonts# Actual thinking is 
a disguised form of real thinking; real thinking is the r 
relating of " thing-substanco-,subject" as a simple and a 
constant not with "attribute" as a class-terra or variable 
but with a particular attribute or attributes. But until 
we have grasped the ^ relation in relating^ them, neither 
thing-substance-subject or attribute can be "objects of 
thought". That we have so related them, that-we must have 
30 related thorn, is held ^ to be apparent because we ^  think 
propositlonally - we do think thou^ts of the form "x is y", 
these thoughts are reducible to thing is x and y “, 
therefore we did think "a thing is x and y". Because we do 
think "God is perfect", "minds think", "bodies are extended", 
we did think "a thing is perfect and its name is Ood«^etc..
The analysis is of thou^ts actually thought, and. 
the argument is that analysis shows.what must have been  ^
grasped as elements prior to the process of relating which
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iB the thinking. Yet clearly it is false that we do think 
in this way, unless we are entirely unconscious of the 
elements in our thought and the thinking that we actually 
do. liven if it is claimed that once upon a time we started 
in this way, we neither continue in this way nor, a fortiori, 
do we argue in related ways; and if the analysis holds of 
our actual thou^ts in such a way as to show that we began 
80, there is no reason for rejecting our "advanced thou^ts", 
for declaring that there is something wrong with t h ^  and 
that we should think in different ways.
Why should this possibility be raised? Because Descartes 
raises it in the Regulae. and his general dostrine emerges 
from his "discovery** of how we really> think as distinct 
from the ways in which we actually think, traduced from 
simple and mechanical and ixxypossibly erroneous relating of 
notions clear and distinct to the nataral li^t by the 
persuasion or authority of incompetent philosophers,or by 
those i%Q)erfections of the will which are desires for 
untruth, or prejudices absorbed from those around us vdio 
are not Descartes.
But just as clearly as It is false that we actually 
think in the way Indicated, just as clearly as Descartes* 
technical terms were learned %diile he was being tau^t the 
elements of a version of Aristotelian logic, his claim taat 
we do not know substance directly rests upon the statement 
that "thing-substance-subject" means that in which attrilwites
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inhere, and a TOlue of 0 can he gràfjped as an attribute 
only hy its being related to "thing-subatanee-aubject" 
because "attribute" meens « that whlcli ihheraa in a substance". 
"Attributes Iriherc in subs tances" io a special, oomehow 
regulative proposition, rnd Tfhat io regulated io thou^^t in 
"iftdilch oubjectr and predicates are values of "substance" f?nd 
"attribute", oven if the different subjects are only 
numerically distinct.
But if the inherence-doc trine holds, all subjocts are 
qua Eubstfince» cow  lex; "thing” Inheres in such e complex 
ns much as the attribute or attributes inhere; rmd this is not 
only in accordance with our ordinary usage in \vhich we say 
"X is a thing", but without It ve could not state the differ­
ence between "thing" and "attribute" in any instance of things 
and of attributas. I'urther, granted that we understand "3%;bs- 
tance" and "attribute" readily enough if we can relate them to 
tenas in thoughts alreadv thought and open to inepection, and 
thus can understand their use in relation to the propositions 
which DeBcartCfi asserts with "God", "mind" and "body" as 
subjects, there is no apparent reason Why we should reject any 
proposition which can be analysed, anÿ cojrplex term ^Ich can 
be uued in a proposition. Ve are no nearer to establishing 
necessary existence for one complex substance rather thsn 
arxy other, end we are no nearer to giving a meaning to the 
st^itement " attributes inhere in a substance" (or "substances")
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independently of propositional thoughts. As initially 
regulative the ideas of substance and attribute and Af the 
relation of substance and attribute are not only unconscious 
but beyond any understanding; nor is the relation between 
them the predication which they "regulate" when other 
ideas become thoughts. "Substance is attributes" is sheer 
nonsense until it is erected into a complete metaphysic 
by post-Cartesians,blissfully unaware that Descartes, like 
Locke, hangs onto "substance-subject-thing" because without 
it propositional assertions and all nouns disappear from 
science.
What, in a general philosophical sense, is important 
about the unconscious nature of "regulative ideas" is that 
it is entailed as a conclusion by any thesis of innate 
ideas if the thesis is to be related to the thoughts which 
we do think. In general the holders of such a thesis have 
not been prepared to push their thesis far enou^ to make 
the entallment clear, but granted the nature of ideas and 
the facts of thinking, even Locke* s talk of "the mind*s
■I
operation upon its ideas" points the way. (a) to the necessary 
existence of a mind which knows vhat it is doing though 
the "owner" of the mind does not, or which operates lawfully 
and unconsciously, thus justifying (b) claims as to the 
ultimate mystery of minds, which can be inferred necessarily 
but only from their modes of acting,i.e. from "attributes"
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which muetf ac we know# be of a substance. By a complex 
ari:^ uiaexit we separate mini and his zaind: he does think prop^ 
osltlonally# he has the power to think propositionally# to 
think in accordance with the rule “substances always have 
prodicate-attributes**# the rule must be known and since he 
obviously does not know it the mind which forms the thought 
must know It. Wo philosophers have the' task of getting to 
know what the mind already knows# and then#it seems# we 
can form thoughts rationally.
The analysis of the thought “this cow is red“ gives 
us only four ideas; cozqparison of a number of such thou^ts 
enables us to recognise two sets of ideas#and to make an 
entirely new statement which is about thought - “thought is 
propos!tional“# “subjects in thou^ts have predicates**. We 
can also say that different subjects have different predic­
ates. What subjects ve note depends upon the thoughts we 
consider; if we want to reject certain subjects from science# 
ghosts#goblins#centaurs or gods# we can do so by argument# 
hy pointing to criteria unsatisfied# before and without having 
noted tlie logical distinctions in thoughts. The logical 
statement can be interpreted as a relation between variables# 
a logical relation and strictly a relation, since there is/no 
question of predication. Variables cannot be predicated 
variables. But equally none of our original predicates can 
be asserted of variables, and Just as we should reject “subst­
ances are attributes” or “subjects are predicates* (vdiatever
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w© may want to soy about the role of toims appearing in 
different propositions)# we should reject ”a substone©-subject 
is red* or * this cow has at tribu tes Both appear to have 
an element of necessity over and above mere factuality# but 
the first corresponds to “here is a red thing - what sort of 
thing is it?*# the answer being given not christening it 
*Topsy* but by determining a common name for it as a member 
of n class in a determinate classification# by finding a value 
for the variable in accordance with rules; the second fails to 
complete “this cow is..##* even in the way entailed by the 
truth of “this is a cow*.
In either case# if particularity and existence are 
admitted# ve can recognise that the statements have a function 
like asking a question# a question vdilch we know must be 
answerable. We con treat the first as setting en empirical 
problem of finding what sort of thing is in question by finding 
out more about it# further true attribute statements; we can 
treat the second as assuming defining propositions and saying 
that other attribute statements must be true and are to be 
sought. In each case we are asserting general logical or 
metaphysical truths about classifiable individuals# truths 
which we “exemplify* long before w© can state them. Our dis­
cussion of thCT will culminate in the next chapter, 
fi. Much of what I have argued from an Aristotelian point 
of view in rejecting Descartes • Socrati ci am hinges upon
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the difference between the features and roles of terms as ’ 
they function in actual discourse and the features and roles 
of ideas and notions in thought. The question is not of 
a difference between grammar and logic or between speaking 
and thinking; what is at issue can be put in its boldest 
form by saying that none of the terms in discourse, and 
no “ideas* which correspond to those terms, are simple.
Descartes* claim is that an analysis of actual thoughts 
results in simples, and that unless it did, unless there 
were notions wholly grasped in being grasped at all, there 
would be no possibility of thinking. ^The simples are 
constants, and thinking is the addition of constants one 
to another; it is like elementary arithmetical addition, 
in which if we watch what we are doing, make sure ,we see 
clearly and distinctly what we are doing, there is no 
possibility of error. .Ur - ?
That we are unconscious of these “simple notions” 
when we are born, that we are unconscious of them in our 
actual thinking, that there is great difficulty in making 
any sort of complete list of them, does not perturb Desc­
artes. “Complex therefore simple” is an eternal truth.^
If X is complex, then the idea of X can be analysed into 
a set of ideas “thing”,“attribute a“,”attributer. b” etc., . - 
and the idea of a can either be analysed into “e“ and “f“ 
or,it is simple,i.e. unanalysable. If we attempt to preserve 
predication, as Descartes and Locke do at times - Descartes’ 
doctrine of "inspection and comparison of ideas" leads on to
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Locke's rei»lacement of syllogiaa by "intenaodiate ideas"
, 2 - .  -
which permit "connections" just to be seen - then we preserve 
"thing" as subject, ©nd the implication is that "a thing is
i.1 . . » •  • - ;  - ,  - f ,
0", where 0 is a sii%)le notion, must be thinkable, must be 
graspable or understood in isolation from any other thought.
Correspondingly "a thing exists","a thing is red", fa 
thing is perfect", must be intelligible thoughts in isolation 
from each other and any other thought, and this is what^I
deny. "A thing is red","a substance is red% or^  "a subject
has the attribute red" are meaningless ij[ "thing" is a, 
constant or if "red" is a sixApl© notion, or else this mode 
of thinking is entirely differemt from our familiar nwde. ^ 
Connected with this is the rejection of syjilogiem, which 
not only is unnecessary in the new "thinking" and the new
language, but will not work in the new language; and
connected with this is a contempt for classification, which 
appears as something anyone can do "in his head" - al'Uiou^ 
doing it in one/s head can never produce an existential
guarantee for any member of any claem.  ^ M - - i m# " -wc r
'What meaning the *i>rimltive pTOposltions" above have,
I claim, depends upon the terms being terms in a developed
i t  ;  "  . .  - Î  f '  ' #
language.
(a) It iB true that the question "Does X exist?",,when,"X" 
is a noun, can be formulated as "Is there a thing which is 
Y?«, althou^ the condiMon of this is that 
should be true; it is t r a e ^ ^  thl^^lps to 
negative answering in the form "X does not exist", which has
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worried philosophers because the existence of X seems to be 
asserted in denying it (this Indicating how widely is accepted 
the entaiIment of existence on the part of the subject of< 
any true statement) ; and it is true that “All X are Y« can 
be written as "If there is a thing which is X (or correctly 
called "X") then the thing is Y*. But the last “thing" that 
could be meant by “thing* here is a simple, attribute-less 
subject, end no simplicity is implied of Y. Part at least 
of what is being eraphasised in framing definitions or 
universal propositions is that no matter what characteristics 
things we encounter may have in addition to the defining 
characteristics which permit the name *X* to be used of them, 
or the *Y* which is true of all things X, "All X are Y* is 
true. The word * thing* has a use in our actual procedures 
which demand thinking, in our discriminating and classifying 
and defining. It is merely false that we “know* a thing to 
be of a kind because we conceive “thing* and one attribute 
as adhering to it, and can then wonder or do then wonder 
whether or not the thing exists; and such a "thinking* would 
have no relevance to our procedures of searching for things 
to determine whether or not such things exist or do not 
exist.
Even if it were an account of thinking, the principle 
"if 0 is an attribute then 0 must be instantiated" would be 
useless to settle our wondering - we need something more than 
a disguised prepositional logic. Granted that we know 0 to be
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an attribute, that we have an idea of 0 to correspond to 
the name "given to it" in our language, it would follow 
that 0 ie instantiated because all attributes, must be 
Instantiated, "There is a thing and the thing, is 0” would 
be necessarily true, and neither existential doubt or 
wondering would be possible. Seemingly we could be in error 
if 0 were complex, but being in error is dependent upon 0 
not being an attribute at all. .
Yet if a and b are simple attributes, are completely 
grasped independently of one another, there could be no 
principle which determined that a could not go along with 
b, which determined that a and b could not_ “adhere to“^  the 
same substance-thing. The assertion that they ^  not cannot 
be argued to from a principle, and entails that there is 
a thing which is a and another thing which is b. W% derqr 
the co-adlierence of a and b by asserting that no thing is 
a and b, or that no thing which is a is b. It is this double 
predication \diich,along with the existential entailment, 
makes it plausible to say that we can name, the thing and 
the b-thing “X* and “Y “ and assert “Ho X are Y“ w d  only 
now can we speak of inherence and non-inherence. ^
The denial that a thing is both a and b is in scaae 
sense a fact claim, oven if it is still insisted ^ that ^ ^  
“thing” is inferred from the non-occurrence tpgether of 
a-and b.  ^This is dubiously intelligible as a formulation,
 ^and suggests that the thesis wito regard^to thing® cannot 
accommodate factual disjunction or exclusion. It seœas to
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work only if we can give a meaning to "there is a quality 
in that place", and we will have none of the things we 
familiarly speak of unless we can also give a meaning to 
«there is a number of qualities occurring in that place". 
Philosophers do talk glibly enough in such a way, but while 
their language suggests a lot of "things* collected together, 
what is strikingly absent is any account of the relation of 
"togetherness* - they illustrate what they mean by statements 
like "the same apple ^  red and round and firm", i.e. by 
commonplace predicative utterances which, converted by 
re-formulation into "red and round and firm inhere in the 
same substance", gives an apparently empirical statements 
which is apparent empirical nonsense. The word "inhere", 
in the en^pirical mode, indicates a relation of substances# 
and in the "ideal" mode it indicates a relation between 
"ideas* which are distinguishable only as complex and 
contained in a complex.
An erroneous judgment about an individual, denied 
by "the thing which is x is not y", actually demands that 
a number of statements be also true of the thing \*diich is 
X, i.e. statements of all the attributes and relations which 
the existing thing has as an individual, statements.which 
need not be made although it is clear to the natural lig^ it 
that they must be makeable. What for the rationalist w h o % 
begins with simple notions is a sheer impossibility, the 
construction el a complete individual thing "in mind", appears
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to the real 1st-empiric!et as the impoBslhîllty of ever compi- 
etlng our account of an individual, the starting point being 
an observation stated by using indicators like "this","that", 
or "there" with "thing". The Empiricist proper^seems to offer 
a beginning with "the quality there". When Descartes denies 
that substance and existence are directly known, he rejects 
the realist- empiricist claim, but only by changing the notion 
of "thing" since "thing" there must be. Tlius he recognises 
the Empiricist claim, which promises via "attributes must inhere" 
a knowledge of individuals until the theory of perception which 
backs the initial claim brings attributes as collections into 
the mind or puts qualities into mind and leaves the thing 
outside and unknowable. i " "  ^ ^
In genera], philosophers \-dio talk of qualities as occurring 
present as a discovery "things are constituted of qualities" 
and presume that ordinary modes of speech remain unaltered - 
coiûpare the article^on Substance in the Encyclopaedia of Diderot 
and D^Alembert. Founs still figure in relation stëtdiënte^ 
e tistence statements, and statements like "a river is made up 
of such and such attributes". Rationalist and sheer empiricist 
are alike in offering an analysis of nouns in ordinary state­
ments, taking for granted that they are meaningful and operative. 
Each presents us with analytic necessity and synthetic w ^ e r y  
or in^osBibility; statements which are the result of analysis 
are necessarily contradictory in the sense that each of them 
can be presented as saying to the other "thou^t is ii2U>ossible 
if we can only begin as you say". Their statements ore intelligible
-_ w ù
3 2 4 .
and intelligible as contradictory while we can relate them 
both to accepted thought, and this 1© quite in accordance r ^
with a claim thatbthe tenus they: employ are teims in a .. < 
metamvocabulary, terms in either logic or grammar, which, 
would be meaningless unless there was a subject matter for
the sciences of logic and grammar and if the sciencos di/i not
truly describe features of that subject matter. The subject 
matters we can indicate broadly as "thought” and "language", 
and the procedure of either science obviously does not 
restrict Itself to "analysis" in the Cartesian laanner. It 
is a matter of history that the terms "substance","subject", 
"predicate" and "attribute", as well as others which are "
vital to Descartes* metaphysical discourse, derive from 
these subjects, and that the only analysis of" thoughts idiich 
could result in the isolation of these terms would be 
"technical thou^ts" which already contained them.
On the other hand, that "existence" should^have 
a use in relation to the technical terms would, ^ in terms of 
the nature of grammar and of logic, be rather surprising 
than not. At least we should eapect that it would need à  ^
new sense or use as against that* which permits of "horses 
and cows and qualitied things exist, while centaurs and 
hobgoblins do not"." If "things" as a class term for horses 
and cows does not belong to a technical language, then ^
"things exist" is clearly meaningful; and there is
reason for saying that the singular of "things" ..in^ this - -
sense is identical with the logical term "thing-substance-
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subject" of logic. Indeed, for the statement of logical 
propoDitiens we can dispense with "thing" and with "substance", 
and if we do dispense with "thing" we can recognise that 
it plays a special role, not in fact statements where it can 
also be dispensed with entirely, but in questioning and in 
types of argument which are essential to inquiry.
(b) Any individual thing will have a complex description. 
This statement is, I claim, meaningless as a statement in 
isolation from other statements, unintelligible as a "primit­
ive thought", and capable of illustration but not of analysis 
into simple notions. It is intelligible or can be mad© 
intelligible to aryone who is familiar with describing things, 
and this describing of things, whether we have to leam to 
do it or just "know" how to do it, preceded our ability to 
use the tern "describing" of the process or "description" of 
the result. How relevant is Ryle*s distinction between 
"knowing how to do" and "knowing that" in connection with 
"having an idea of" I shall stress below - that we do think 
propositionally, think thoughts in which there are predicate 
terms and subject terms, does not entail that we understand 
the words "subject" and "predicate", and for the sophistiaated 
the distinction between "thing" and "description of the thing" 
is bitterly difficult to draw. But what is to be stressed 
here is the clarity to the natural light of sny speaker of 
English past the stag© of earjy childhood of the statement*
"We can say of this apple that it is round,red, firm,juicy, 
that it is fruit, is vegetable, is on the table, in London,
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beside the orange with the cut in the skin....*
The "elements” in the descriptive statement are not 
"things" which constitute the apple in at least anything like 
the sense that the stalk, the skin, the core and seeds and 
cells are such things. There is, I shall argue, an in^ortant 
sense in which we can identify the apple qua individual 
witli the account which is true of it, or with the set of 
propositions which are true rnd in which the phrase "this 
apple" occurs; but a grammatical analysis of a complex 
statement or series of statements about on apple, which 
includes the distinction of verbs and prepositions as well 
as nouns find adjectives, is very different from the "material" 
analysis of the apple vhich can be performed in a laboratory 
with instruments, although the results of sucdi an analysis 
can be stated as part of the account which can be graromat- 
ically analysed.
The analysis of the "ides" of "this apple" corresponds 
to the grammatical analysis, not to the investigation of 
this apple in & laboratory, Rlthoufÿi the latter leads to 
an amplification of account and "idea"; and while it seems 
plausible to say that the framing of a statement is a synth­
esis and ordering of words, the grammatical coi%)lexity is 
enough to show that "addition" in a simple sense does not 
describe the process of synthetic ordering at ell, except 
in the obvious sense that there are many words in the account. 
The statement " a thing is round and red and fiim" looks 
like a synthetic ordering, but quite clearly (a) it may be 
understood correctly as a statement about any member of
_J
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a class that is much wider than tîi© claao “apples"; (b) It 
lo meaningful and an "anchor" to thought bocause it can be ^ 
eiqpan led into "this thing is i^ oirieifdiere, somevhen, related to 
other things, exists and persists...." just as "round" 
eJ^fuids into "has one of an Infinite variety of sises and none 
of an infinite variety of shapes", """red" into "scarlet or 
crimson or....", and "firm" into "when touched will yield 
only so (indefinitely) much". If "Ideas" are to work at 
all, then ideas will function as v/ords function" - and indeasd 
the function of words for the undcrstnhding is i^at is meant 
by the functioning of ideas. The latter are to relate the ^ 
oii%)le identity of sounds and signs with the variety of 
uses in contexts and situations of sounds and signs'. '"
Ve approach the identification of Ryle’s" "taliring about 
talk" ae "talking abou^ t words-in-use" or about "the uses of 
wrds", and the idealist’s "talking about thought" or 
"thinking about ideas- in thbu^ts"".^''But ttfe role of "ideas", 
serving to mike possible or to explain the relation between 
identical words or signs and the différents^ about %dilch 
thqy ere used, is no^longer possible when the ideas thmselveo 
are termed simple identicals. The ideas, in relation to 
"understanding", function very much as "participation" funct­
ions for Socrates in relating manifold predicates in propos- 
itiens, predicates'*given in ordinary use the same "name" and 
th, lhl»g T..11, n«n.a-.- 
- ' When Objective idcellBts claim that b predicate term is 
dlfferont^ln the^case of each different subject'tô vdilch'it
3 2 8 .
is applied in a true statement, what^ they have | in mind is 
connected with this. In the statement "some apples are red 
and round and f i m ”, "red r^ nd round and firm"^ applies 
differently to apples from the way^in which-it applies to 
billiard balls and balloons. We-canisay, if we like, that 
"rounds*“only applies roughly to apples, or^ that, we have to 
understand “firm" as "the way in which apples are firm", 
have to understand "red" as the complicated way in which 
apples arc red in contrast with the; "simple" way in which 
pillar boxes are red. If- the statement "some apples are 
round and red and firm" consists of words %diich are simple, 
correlative with statements like "apples are apples", - 
"round is round",""red" means "red"", or""red"? is the name 
of a single quality", then ideas have to take up the enorm­
ous amount of slack between the simplicity of the statement 
qua relation of simples end the aomplexity of what is under­
stood to be stated,i.e. what is effectively understood.
. Treat "ideas" as simple, however, and we have to have 
a new set of ideas to take up the sleek, or. "relations of - 
ideas" will not function in the thought vdiich is familiar  ^
to us as human beings. wj -
The idealist claim is over-eau>hatic, pushes a point 
so far that universality may be denied and with it the 
function of adjectives in discourse, but the general point 
is that if predicates are simple, and denote simple attrib­
utes, then either our statements describe, nothing or "what is 
described is nothing that exists in the world around us. -
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We can see the force of this directly if wo insist on 
the geometrical sense of "spherical", the physicist’s 
sense of "firm* applied to once popular atoms, end the 
limitation of “red* to a point on a colour chart: we must 
then assert that "some apples are red and round and fima" 
is simply false, and we should be hard pressed Indeed to 
discover any thing which could be described as either red 
or round or firm, let alone all three.
There is a moral here for scientists who, distressed 
by the "plasticity* or ordinary concepts, seek rigid concepts 
whose identity is clear end invariable. But traditionally 
the problem of "Forms* >for Socrates presents Itself as a 
denial that "perfectly 0* is true of any existing things, 
and the contrast between "perfectly 0* as idea and "0* as 
an attribute of a variety of things is the contrast between 
simple notions and the "ideal thinking" done by a soul in  ^
another world and notions in thou^t which functions in this 
world.
What is to be stressed in the idealist claim is that 
when the subi oct is provided as a noun in the language, the 
predicates function also. "This apple la round and red and 
firm", "this billiard ball is round and red and firm", "this
balloon is round and red and firm" the differences in
the predicates emerge from the seeming identities in the 
predicate terras as soon as the subject is given. It seems 
true that we can replace the nouns hy "thing* and reduce 
the nouns to names of thé things described by adding adverbs
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and adverbial pbraaoe to the adjectives, just as we can 
recognise the differences I have already indicated; but it 
is true that we approach a coraplexlty of discourse which 
throatons to become unioanageable, thnt when we luive made our 
distinctions there are still distinctions to be made further, 
and that however much the idealist’s phrr se “identity and 
difference” or "difference in identity" may fail to explain 
why our search for simples fails, it indicates cogently 
enou(^ a feature of our language in use. Our discovery that 
differences can be noted which we did not note althou^ 
our statements were meaningful and functioned a© statements 
is not a discovery that our language or thourdit functions 
imperfectly and of a new way of thinking or speaking, but 
a discovery of features of our thinking and speaking# One of 
the features is that "thing" functions as a class term, that 
apples,balloons and billiard balls are members of the class, 
so that wherever a noun which designates a member is written 
then "a thing" may be written.
Having discovered this, we shall not be at all tuirprised 
by the ease with which we can transform all statements into 
statements with "thing" in the subject; and we can then 
retrace our steps, put values for the variable, members for 
the class, and make strtments using nouns other than "thing", 
in accordance with our previous classification - in which 
the things are classified in terms of recognised predicates 
or attributes. This is precisely what Descartes does when he 
asserts two classes, "thinking things" and "extended things",
c i -
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minds (which do think) and bodies (which are extended), 
except that he ignores any question of an original class-
.1 n
ification, of words belonging to a language with complex 
inter-relations of meaning and function alreacbr established, 
and he fails to establish exclusive classes or classes which 
together constitute the class of classes because of his 
failure to understand the nature of real classification.
If he claimed that he was reporting as a matter of fact 
what a pre-natally known Platdnic heaven of souls and geom­
etrical bodies was like, he can scarcely be confuted, though 
it is apparent enough that we should want further information 
about what souls were like and the explanation of some 
geometric terms before we understood his statements as an 
account. "Thinking" and "extended" provide characteristics, 
but we have nothing as yet to classify. If we admit as 
coincidental that the heavenly language can be translated 
into ours or coincides with part of the vocabulary of our 
huizian language, we will be struck by the need in heaven for 
only three nouns and a limited set of verbs ("thinking", 
"being","moving") and adjectives ("extended","figured",
• >
"triangular") - with the addition of the name "God" and the 
adjective "perfect" for theological purposes; hut we will 
equally he strut* hy the need for a large number of prepos­
itions whose use in heavMi is clear to us (a priori?) » hy the 
use of "bodily" or "bodies" as a predicate or attribute of 
"geometrical particles" and of "these extensions", by the
i
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ease with which "minds" and "bodies" can be replaced by 
"things", by the way the nouns "refer" to different members 
of a class indifferently, the adjectives to different 
individual things which can be identically triangles, ident­
ically figures, yet different as triangles and differently 
figured as triangles.
And we will, if we are acquainted with Aristotelian 
logic, be struck by the facility with %diich we can now asa»rt 
that no minds are extended, no bodies think, although we 
cannot say that no things think, no things are extended, since 
we can falsify this by reference to minds and to bodies.
All that has been done, it semas, is to substitute a 
liuiited number of nouns for our galaxy of nouns, a limited 
number of adjectives for our galaxy of adjectives, a limited
: ' t
number of verbs for our multiplicity of verbs, while no 
immediately apparent restriction has been placed on preposit­
ions and conjunctions. Grammar and logic, moreover, appear 
to be unaltered, and what problems these presented before 
still present thmaselves. They present no problems while
1 r  *  X
we treat them as solutions, as principles whlch^ "minds" 
know how to apjkly in relating notions without needing or 
being able to formulate them. The principles are like 
faculties, not notions; they sre the faculties which can be 
in minds without the mind’s being conscious of th«a and 
which can only be known in or after exercise. That Is one of 
the reasons why they can be stated only as relations between 
variables, ond If the values are the simple notions of the
j
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RojjulB^f our statements may be held to remain the same 
only it we also recognise that what Is stated is completely 
different, that what we ordinarily say exist do not exist 
at all.
(b) Let U8 consider “A thing is perfect". This seems to 
be a meaningful statement. If I deny It,however, vdiat am I 
denying? Aa I saying that no thing can be perfect?
If 80, what I am denying is not "a thing is perfect" 
but "some thing must be perfect", although I am shown to be 
wrong when you produce some thing in which there is no "flaw 
or defect". But If you can instance such a thing, then 
whether or not that thing is perfect is a direct issue of 
actual attribution, and the issue is whether or not there 
is a flaw or defect. The production of such a thing is not 
made unnecessary by your argument that if there were no 
such thing "perfect" would not have a use, that "perfect" 
is not really an "idea" at all. Hy rejection of your 
instanced thing as imperfect, while it may be held to show 
that I "have an idea of perfection", have a use for "perfect", 
is adequately presented as a denial that your instanced 
thing can be described without any variation or modification 
in some specified or iz%)lied manner.
Once OUT attention is directed to such a claim it 
becomes rather apparent that our "slxaple notions" have a 
genesis which is unaccountable in terms of the philosopher’s 
established disjunction "universals or resemblances". Any 
attribute tern "0" just does describe,or is just part of the
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description, of a nuiaber of perceived things, b o that we 
are continually bein^ ç presented with thing© which are 
generically identical. Rulers,table edges, knife blades 
and kerbs are all straight. Trees and grass and cloth are = 
all green,and just green. But when we have discovered or 
been forced to note that there are relevant differences, 
that things are differently strai^t or differently green, 
our classes of straight and green things are restricted > 3 , - 
and new terms may be introduced or adverbial,modifiers ; - \ 
introduced. Developing discrimination enforces the devel­
opment of thought and language, from ,the rudimentary distinct­
ions which first demand thought and language. Initially ^
"rod” is contrasted with, say, "blue" and "yellow"^ as “coloured" 
is contracted with "black or white"; "straight"! excludes > 
"crooked", and "perfectly^" applies in^an odd fashion: once ^ 
we have noted< distinctions we,can say "we thought such things 
were perfectly, so, and we now know that we were wrong", r
although "perfectly" was no part of our earlier thoughts; 
and %diile, because of our geometrical interest in the regular 
we do not pay attention to / ^ perfectly crooked", we do quite_
•  V
obviously introduce "degree" when we talk of "very crooked" t 
and "this is more crooked than,that!*. ! va be or
 ^ We cannot, in. fact, give a meaning tc.^perfectly^redic?- 
crooked", and as soon, as begin the process^of. rejecting,a
I
this and that as not perfectly straight we rapidly approach
335.
a geometer’s definition of “straight” which is purely conc­
eptual and falls to fit even the most carefully drawn const­
ruction. It is not suggested that we have not many problems 
here, but what is apparent is that we do not start with the 
geometer’s concept, and that if we did So start we should be 
geometers from the beginning and would find “crooked" to 
characterise all things in the world around us.
“Simple notions" again fail us in accounting for 
actual thought. But the statements to which we give meaning 
here are “a line is perfectly straight", "something is perf­
ectly so". “Perfect" functions as a qualifier of, or as a 
predicate for, such subjects or things as circles, solutions 
to problems, works of statuary, functioning machines. “Perfect­
ly" functions as an adverbial modifier of "round", "straight", 
"executed", "functioning", if these are specifiable instances 
of roundness, straightness, executing, functioning, if they 
can appear in statements of the form "this thing is or does 
such". When we speak of "a perfect individual" we mean, and 
must mean, perfect in respect of some general features or 
feature shared with other members of a class.
"Perfectly" is concerned with the degree of an attribute or 
attributes which, if that are attributes, some thing has - in th 
the loose sense; strictly, some thing can be said to be them or 
do them. "A thing is perf ectly Y" has an intelligible predic­
ate as soon as Y is given a value; it becomes in a sense 
equivalent to "X is perfect" as soon as the value is given, 
since we can decide to give the name "X" to any thing which is
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Is Y. But If Y Is a single Instance which justifies the 
name, "perfectly'' Is meaningless; "this vdiich is Y is Y" is 
all that we say with "this which is called X is Y", and we 
have no meaning yet for "this X". And again, if Y is a 
simple notion, or on attribute which justifies the applic­
ation or use of a simple notion, then "Y" is perfect, and 
anything named in virtue of it will be a perfect X. If Y 
is a complex of simples, the argument will still hold; any 
thing which is Y and therefore abed will be perfectly abed 
and perfectly Y,
:  ^
This sort of discussion would perhaps be much more 
ImpressiTo, though it would not be altered, if it were
' A
presented in terms of conventional denials that a member 
of a class or species or a genus could be more of a member 
than any other member, e.g. that a man can be more or less 
of a man than any other man. This is not only meaningful 
but true; yet its only point is that degree is irrelevant 
to classification as it ibnctions in science, that class­
ification insists on the identity and disregards ai^ diff- 
erence or question of difference in determining classes, 
nothing is implied of the con«)lexity or simplicity or reduc- 
ibility to simples of the class-term or genus-term. We do
. ' '-T'. -.3
in other contexte talk of "a real man", of men as "scarcely 
human".
Shat Is clear is that "perfect" has no meaning in
■s. /:% t: .C - '-t ■
relation to simple notions, ^ich admit of no degree, admit 
only of assertion or denial by the assertion of a logical
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opposite# This is in large part the foundation of the 
"method of perfect thinking* in the Regulae, a method w  > 
which we can label "perfect* by contrast with familiar 
imperfect thinking; an extended thing can, if extension %  
is a simple attribute, be only extended and not in^>erfectly 
extended; a thinking thing is likewise impossibly an imper­
fect thinking thing. Of course, in the latter case Descartes 
has no hesitation in later indicating a range of species of 
"thinking*, or in insisting both that we all have the power 
to think equally with each other and that for various reasons 
we do not all exercise the power to the some degree.
Wo mere mortals, who think in mortal fashion, have a ' 
use for "perfect*, especially in the case of * thinking*, and 
from this Deucartes’ methodology and metaphysics take their 
departure; we have a use for ? "perfect* ^ again as soon as " 
"figure* is added to extension and we can talk of things 
which are so extended. In the heaven of ^ foras "perfect* 
has no use. Similarly we have a use for "participation in 
a form" wherever we can give a meaning to "degree", but in ^ 
the heaven of forms "paarticipated* would have no meaning 
or a different meaning - presumably there is a plurality of 
like things and the "form" is repeated identically in mary 4 
instances, and there Is no difference between "form* and ^ 
"instance". - '3:13.lag, 0% - °
Logical propositions like " "X is A" implies "X is not 
non-A" are not denied - they are common to ordinary discourse
!
3
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and to "Infallible thinking", the difference simply being 
that in the lirst case we give values to both X and to A 
in order to make statements and the "plasticity" of X and 
of A can be demonstrated in various statements containing 
both X and A in their instances, While in the second case 
it is presumed that there must be entirely non-plastic 
simple notions in the initial thoughts, so that we can 
never begin with values of X at all. Ve begin with "thing" 
and r m l  attributes, and all nouns are reducible to "thing" 
and such attributes.
It is not difficult to see how relevant this is to 
Baconian science or to i^latonist science; but it is equally 
easy to see that measurement can be related to such science
only if the forms admit of degree, and thus how a contradict­
ion must be engendered between the rationalist method and 
the empirical method, between the "ideal" and the "ac$mal". 
Thus we find contrasted the conceptual "such is perfectly
b o " and the empirical " you will never find a thing i^ich
is perfectly so", and the latter can be evidenced by innumer­
able exaiAples of familiar things which, for example, are 
called round but can be shown to be imperfectly so. The 
conclusion seems obvious: no nouns of ordinary discourse 
will figure in "scientific propositions" at all. We can 
try and mask this by talking of "application", the "necess­
ary error in measuronent", and "unknown" or "unmeasured"
factors, or by talking of statistical ranges and "probab-
-
iltty", but we must always fail, and we can always describe
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In non-technical terms the conditions and the features of 
observed things, thus providing an explanation of v;hy the 
Cartesian ideal is not ©25)erimentally attainable.
How the argument "if a thing or substance is perfectly 
tound then it exists" holds of any thing which is perfectly 
round, but it is not in any sense a contradictory of "if a 
thing is imperfectly round then it exists". The hypotheticals 
are instances of "if any thing is such then it exists", and 
the existential claim is suspended by the foim. Once it is 
established that some thing is such, then the hypothetical 
formulation loses all its force in the circumstances. Once 
we have refined our,concepts, as in a developed scimice, 
the scientist may well be ready to assert that if "X" means 
"a thing perfectly such" it follows that "X does not exist" 
is true. "X" is the name of a scientific entity, a useful 
fiction, not the name of a thing, and "X is such" is not a 
fact statement.
"A perfectly round thing is a perfectly round thing" 
maJcoB no existential claim, it may be argued, and yet it is 
a statement which is true and which in certain contexts may 
have a point; but "The perfectly round thing is a perfectly 
round thing" either does make an existential claim or is an 
abuse of language - it amounts to (a) the assertion that the 
thing in question exists and is perfectly round, and (b) the 
disguised tautology "’perfectly round’ means ’perfectly round’".
And this is exactly what we get if we name the 
perfectly round thing "X" and then say (a) X does exist
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and (b) "X" means "a perfectly round thing".
We got something very different .however, if we are 
concerned with questions of whèther billiard balls, balloons 
or apples are perfectly round. The things can be distingu­
ished from one another, con be discriminated independently 
of the characteristic which is questioned, and the same is 
true even if we ore concerned with Imagined or conceived 
balls and balloons and apples. Indeed, most of Descartes’ 
uses of "conceive", in spite of their association with 
"imagining" in the case of bodies, mean: no more than 
talking about things without sensing or perceiving them,, 
this naturally not entailing that sensing and/or imagining 
was not in fact a necessaiy precedent of,the conceptual (i.e. 
discursive) consideration of them. Once we include ,the 
nouns which are values of "thing or substance" we know 
what we are talking about, are ectually "thirling". We 
can give some sort of account of the things of which we are 
talking as well as understand what is being said about them. 
It is this "giving an account" which is both a condition of 
understanding and of the things in question being "real" 
things with a multiplicity of characteristics.
The statements "the thing called’*God" is supremely 
perfect".or "God is supremely perfect" preserve the exist­
ential claim, and are meaningful only if we can make^ the 
assertion that God or the thing called "God" is different 
from all other things - Descartes’ use of "the thing" 
iiqplies, if vaguely, that the thing is so different* (Part
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of the vagueness is due to the treatment of Gk)d and mind 
and body as substancesf and its being taken for granted 
that mind and body admit of plurality of number while God 
does not# •‘There is one God** is a piece of infonaation 
not mentioned in the argument). What we are to understand is 
that God is supremely perfect in the way appropriate to God, 
and not in the way appropriate to any other thing, or in a 
way appropriate to God and impossibly appropriate to az%r 
other thing. Alternatively, we could say that until we are 
told that it is God in question we do not know wlmt **supre- 
mely perfect** means here, or that until we have grasped the 
idea of God we have no idea what •*supremely perfect** means.
Descartes seems to sense the difference between the 
roles of **perfect** here,and in the case of either •*thinking** 
or **extended’* he is content to write of them “inhere in a 
subotfince**, a mode of e:q>res8lon which he replaces with 
“the substmce vhich we understand ^  be supraaely perfect**. 
If, as I have argued, “is 0** is the primary use, this 
matters little, since the technical use can be presented 
as “is 0^; but the change does suggest that “perfect** cannot 
constitute the coxAplete account of a thing, is not an
A -
adequate predicate if **a thing** is the subject. The same 
conclusion can be reached directly by recognising that 
“inheres in“ can at best mean “is part of the true predic-* 
ative account of“,i.e. that “inheres in “is not a substant­
ial relation, and this is true of “thinking* or of “ext«asion“ 
while we should feel inclined to add that “perfect* was
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Btlll somewhat differently placed since it seans to bo 
about the predicative account.
What the recognition leaves us v/ith is that if 0 is an 
attribute of a thing, it is one attribute along v/ith many 
others,i.e. "0“ is one term in a description that can always 
be given, and if “r thing is is meaningful and true,
“a tning“ indicrtes a subject of which an account can be 
given. We have the came situation as arises from the
to - “Whatever olee the thing is, it is 0«, "m&tever 
else the thing is or does, it thinks®, “Whatever else the
thing is or does, it is extended®, and (with a difference
again) “Whatever else the thing is it Is supremely perfect". 
What wo name if the statements are conceivably true or fatse 
is “the thing whatever it is“, vàiich becomes “the thing 
whatever else it is“ when the statement is understood as 
true. Even in proffering the definitions we seem to be 
asserting "unless it is perfect it is not God", “unless it
is thinking it is not a mind®, “unless it 1b extended it is
not a body"; we can state these as “no thing is X unless it 
is Y f.jid there are things (or is a thing) which are (or is) 
Y “. The definitions, in other words, seem to be concerned 
with classification of individuals whose existence is taken 
for granted and whose complexity does not demand mention, 
individuals which have a complex account. That such individ­
uals aro reached by a synthesis of vacuously simple notions 
I have denied; that they are reached by a synthesis of "thing 
or substance" and a simple,predicate tern is, in so far as 
it is intelligible, simply false.
Chapter IX.
qualities of Mind.
Descartes claims that qualities of minds are more 
clearly, find better, known than qualities of bodies* 
From qualities the existence of a substance is Inferred* 
What are the qualities in question?
The main aim of the chapter is to show that by 
rurmmging in all nooks and crannies of CarteBianisra we 
find no such qualities presented*
1* Acts, powers, do not qualify for being called “qual­
ities", nor do relations* Acts and powers can be discu­
ssed best in considering Aristotle*
Tlxe various uses of "mind, spirit, intellect and 
reason" as faculty, thing with faculty, act and object 
demand different answers to "what qualities have minds?"
3* In general it is what is thourdit that Is regarded as 
non- cori>oreal *
The difficulty of treating a thought "p" as other than 
"object" parallels the difficulty of insisting upon "I 
think p" or "x thinks p" and still talking about "thou^ts". 
But we can talk intelligibly about p and q and r as thoughts, 
and the thoughts belong to solace or possible science*
Yet it is difficult to give a meaning to "in the mind" or 
"not in the mind" in this Intelligible context*
4. The status of "to nothing no qualities or affections 
belong". It can be related to human activities, and to 
"ideas" if these are related to such activities.
b. The relation of "Inferred substance" qua idea to simple 
natural science and the things it studies. Phenomenalism 
and natural things.
Things and their accounts - and the relation of logic, 
metaphysics and science to such accounts. A meaning is 
given to "categories" as classes of st^^tmxents in the 
account of an individual*
6."In mind" and "in thought" in relation to Descartes.
Like "l*ame" and "la ponseo", t^ey are not interchangeable.
7. A plausible way of getting to things "in mind" or 
"forms of mind", with the preswqptions stated. Even when 
this is rein ted to a variety of types of cognition and 
cognition-statements, qualities are still of things and
not of minds. Beyond acts and contents we find in Descartes 
no attempt to indicate qualities of mind at all, and it is 
impossible to identify "mind" with "I" or with "objects" of 
verbs of which "I" is the subject,i.e. of "my" acts.
“ It seems not only useitil for the discovery of the causes 
oi the derived properties of suostances to be acquainted with 
the essential nature of those substances ( as in mathematics 
it is useful for the understanding of the property of equality 
of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to 
know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of 
the line and the plane) but also conversely, for the know­
ledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted 
by an acquaintance with its properties; for when we are able 
to give an account conformable with experience of all or most 
of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most 
favourable position to say something worth saying about the 
essential nature of that subject; in all demonstration a ^
definition of the essence is required as a starting-point, so  ^
that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived 
properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about 
them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectlcally futile®.
Aristotle. De Anima. 402b. (Smith).
“ It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing’s 
essential nature usefdl for discovering the causes of its 
attributes, as,e.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what is 
meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, aids us 
in discovering to how many right'"angles the angles of a 
triangle are equal; but also,' conversely, a knowledge of the 
attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a 
thing is. For when we are able to give an account of all, 
or at any rate most, of the attributes as they are presented 
to us, then we shall be in a position to define most exactly 
the essential nature of the thing. In fact, the starting point 
of every demonstration is a definition of what something is. 
Hence the definitions which lead to no information about 
attributes and do not facilitate even conjecture respecting 
them have clearly been framed for dialectic and are void of 
content, one and all."
Aristotle. De Anima. 402b. (Hicks).
"But what am I? A thinking thing,, it has been said.
But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts,
understands, affirms, wills, denies, refuses, that imagines 
also and perceives. Assuredly it is not a little, if all 
these properties belong to my nature....”
Descartes. Meditation II.
"....qui dgwte, qui affirme, qui connaît peu de choses, 
qui en ignore beaucoup, qui aime, qui haît, qui veut, qui ne ^
veut pas, qui imagine aussi, et qui sent   je suis assure
que ces façons de penser que J’appelle sentiments et imaginat­
ions, en tant seulement qu’elles sont des faqons de penser, 
résident et se rencontre certainement en moi...”
III. French version.
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Qualities of Mind.
According to Principles I. X, which reasserts the claim 
that qualities are observed and substances inferred or "guar­
anteed" by an intuited principle that attributes cannot be 
of nothing, the more qualities of a thing we know the better 
we know it, the qualities of mind are known more clearly than 
the qualities of bodies, and are obviously more numerous than 
known bodily qualities, since every act of thinking reveals 
qualities of mind* The whole principle I shall quote below, 
since I want to draw attention to many special features of it* 
Now it should be clear from the discussion above that this 
claim is of the greatest importance to Descartes and to 
theory of mind as substance, and I suggest thrt it is exceed­
ingly obscure what these clear and numerous qualities are 
supposed to be. If qualities can be indicated which could 
not be qualities of a man,i.e. if we can indicate adjectives 
which would not be intelligible as predicates in statements 
of which "man" was the subject, then much of what I have 
been arguing would be simply dismissed* Ve could then make 
classificatory state.aents about minds, and statements about 
their activities would, like the das si ficatory statements, 
be verifiable fact statements* iioreover, with corresponding 
intelligible and verifiable fact statements about particular 
bodies, we should be able to understand that certain types 
of relation between minds and bodies were necessary end 
capable of empirical discovery .i.e. we should be able to 
grasp certain relations as possible relations of mind and 
body.
3 4 4 .
Let UB note that while It Is true that Descartes can be 
said to leave us with the problem of "How js the mind related 
to the body?",* he In fact supplies us with a large number 
of relations. Only sheer ignorance of Cartesian texts can 
explain the perpetuation of the myth that Descartes thought 
the mind could not act on the body or vice versa. What is 
concealed by the conviction that Malebranche was Descartes 
is precisely the merit of Malebranche in seeing that the 
relations which Descartes himself found clear and distinct 
and clefrly and distinctly necessary were, on Descartes’ thesis 
with regard to the nature of the soul, unintelligible. He 
parallels pegius in taking a central thesis of Descartes 
seriously and accepting the consequences, and both men present 
what would be anathema to Descartes. Both indicate plain 
contradictions in the heart of Descartes’ theory; both perhaps 
saw something of the extreme peculiarity of Descartes’ proof 
of mutual interaction after the fashions (a) if I feel pain 
when I see my body is injured, then the action on the body 
must continue until there is action on the feeling-soul, or 
(b) if I will to walk and as a result of willing do walk, then 
the willing agent acts upon the body which is moved-in walking.
Both accept, as I deny, the intelligibility of the 
soul- account and the body-account. What I have argued is that 
statements such as those in (a) and (b) above are man-statements, 
and Descartes is in fact arguing that our man-statements are 
intelligible and true. It follows that e3Q>lanations of man’s 
activity must explain man’s activity - our mind-statements 
and body-statements, then, if—they are explanatory, must
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necessarily be related to our man-statements. From this 
point of view Descartes’ error Is simple enough* p and q 
must explain r if p and q are explanations; p and q are 
explanations, devised by Descartes, therefore they ^  
explain. Since they do explain, body and mind must be 
related, must act on one another. But must here, does not 
mean do; the necessity in question is the necessity of 
showing how they are related, what sort of action is in 
question, and until this is done we have no explanation.
My protest here is my protest against many rationalist 
explanations, , that the explanatory thesis is not, as it is 
claimed to be, "p and q", but "p and q explain r", and the 
crux of the matter occurs when the p-system and the q-system 
are conceptual and in fact derive their meaning from the 
statements in r, i.e. the commonplace fact statements.
The protest cannot, however, be directed in any simple 
fashion against Descartes, since he claims, at times, that 
the mind-statements are fact statements, and from this point 
of view we have several accounts of relations ; as identical 
with I, the mind can perceive bodies, the blade that penetrates 
my body and the body of mine which walks when Î will; as an 
unextended substance, attached to the pineal gl?md, the mind 
is acted.on directly by the gland, ^which is directly or 
indirectly acted upon by motions transmitted by li^t or 
bodies through bodily parts, and now it never sees bodies; 
and the mind, infused into the body, is related to the body * 
in an "intimate" way of union, a way which slowly but surely 
as we proceed to the Passions de l’Ame seems to extend the
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soul in such a way that the incorporeal may‘have extension.
A^fhat is clear, in any casej is that if the'soul cem he 
Bô.id to he a substance, its attributes must be specifiable. 
What are they?
(I) If we are concerned with powers and passions, or with 
distinctions between the species of thinking qua acts, we 
are concerned with factual truths which can be stated with 
"I" as subject, or with "you" or "that man" as subject, 
and (I have argued at length) there is no purely logical 
justification for the conclusion that it is not a man vho
■ ' :  1 *  t  ’ *
thinks and feels and has powers to act in certain ways, but 
a mind,i.e. that the thing-substance which is subject of all 
such statements is really a "mind". Descartes succeeds in 
providing no arguments which demand a substitution of "mind" 
for "man", and he gives, so far as we have considered his 
writings, no characterisation of minds which would enable us 
to describe the minds which so act, or can have such powers, 
or be so passioned. Briefly, he wants to replace "men think"
by "minds think", and he has not told us what the minds are
' . - . -1
that replace describable men. Accepting "privations or neg­
ations" as positive simple notions would be "udeful" here, 
but it certainly is not adequate: " a thing not-extended" is
. i  ' ■ 'I
as vacuous’as "a thing not-thinking".
With the logic and meaning of "power" statements I shall 
be concerned below; Aristotle was clear as to both, and they 
can be dealt with in connection with him. If there were 
space, we should go on to consider in detail how an intellig- 
Ible doctrine of faculties is developed, and perverted by
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the reification of faculties into "things"; how the pervers­
ion which once dominated philosophy persists in the work of 
important schools of psychology, members of which, correctly 
establishing tasks of different kinds and performances of 
those tasks, imagine that by a mathematical treatment of 
measured successes in performance of those tasks they are 
penetrating to "minds" and "qualities" or "constituents" or 
"factors" in minds. Spearman, for example, appears to 
vindicate Descartes completely, with his discovery of a 
fundamental mode of thou^t, essentially ordering or relat­
ing ideas or finding missing terms in relations of ideas; 
he establishes the persistence of capacities to perform 
such orderings in individuals, and of a statistical structure 
of such capacities in populations; but just as the point of 
departure is what individual humans do do, the point of 
arrival is what individual humrn beings can do, and the 
heading to Spearman’s work is "The Abilities of Maü".
(2) I have already indicated how Descartes, in replying 
to Hobbes, stresses that he usee ’mind, spirit, intellect 
or reason" for what is endowed with, the faculty of thinking; 
and he goes on to point out that the two first commonly, 
and the latter frequently, are used in this sense. He insists 
further that "thinking" and "walking" are disparate, because 
"thinking" may refer to an action, to a faculty, or to "that 
in which the faculty exists" - for thinking the Latin gives 
cogitatio* and the translation is difficult, because it is 
difficult to make sense in any language of what is being 
asserted.
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In claiming that Descartes treats "mind" as the subject of 
statements of the form "x thinks", and so with "I"; that be 
distinguishes species of thinking in a manner compatible with 
"thinking" being always an act of an agent; that"he talks of 
"thinking" as a power or a variety of powers; and that he 
treats "mind" as equivalent to "what is thought"; I have 
been expanding what is involved in the simple statement 
above. Thus "mind", or its synonyms, is thing, act, object, 
and power, and as object it is either Ma Pensée or La Pensée.
But the expansion is only the beginning of elucidation 
of difficulty. First, "attribute" means something different 
in the case of thing, act, power, and object, if it is meaning­
ful in each case. Second, the identification of "mind", 
"spirit", "intellect" and "reason" seems in any single sense 
quite unjustifiable - if each has the faculty of thought, and 
thought is generic, we should have to speak of the intellect 
willing, the reason sensing, the spirit imagining. What 
Descartes seems rather to mean by "thinking" is reasoning 
and understanding, and the core is a tautology like " the 
understanding (thing) understands (act) what it understands 
(object) because it has the power to understand"; we have 
alternative names for the thinking think, perhaps some 
species for the act and so of the power, and the objects 
will be the notions and relations of notions which is rational 
science.
When difficulties loom, Descartes can avoid them by 
reverting to "I" as the subject of "thought that p", and then
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ajJL species of thinking can be restored, and with them their
different classes of objects - things sensed, imagined and
dreamed. I have recognised that "I theikght that p" is
an attribute-statement in a very loose sense - it is part of
the historical account of me. I have also claimed that it
cannot be a complete account of me, and, correctly considBFed
as an act, is something which at a specific time I did. The
same holds whatever species of thinking is in question. This
is familiar usage, and there is nothing to make us surrender
our use of "man" as a subject, nothing to make us say that
"man is a spirit which makes use of a body" - a statement
which to me is nonsense, and to Descartes a meaningful
' 1
statement which he has, in Meditation VI, proven false.
The question I wish to raise now is a different one, 
and introduces us to a different notion of substance, one which 
is quite Incompatible with the, identification of "I" and
mind-substance. > -. ... .
(3) It is, in general, because what is thought is regarded 
as obviously immaterial, and as contrasting with corporeal or 
material existants, that it seems both plausible and obvious 
that the thinking subject is immaterial, and that thou^t 
as what is thought, as object, is substantial and immaterial.
The foundation of Cartesian metaphysics is the discovery that 
p, which is thought, is merely thought end a thought; and 
from "a thought is only a thought, and there must be a thinker," 
togèèher with *‘I who think p am the thinker", the conclusion 
is held to follow "I am only a thinker". Bodies are material.
1. H and R. II. p. 102.
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thought that p Is possible without any awa.reness of bodies 
even if p contains a bodily term, thoughts are immaterial, 
and I who think without an awareness of existing material 
things am immaterial.
The looming difficulty is the obvious possibility that 
bodies may be merely thoughts: for the thinking thing there 
can be no distinction between its thoughts and what they are 
of# By treating sensing and imagining as distinct from thinking 
and as providing the "bodies" which thought is of, Descartes 
avoids part of the difficulty, and leads on to a doctrine 
that bodily-images are actually cpiporeal structures in the 
brain. Until these are introduced and made objects of attention, 
the mind, in so far as its thoughts contains bodily terms, 
seems to be doing something very like using words which it 
could not understand.
If we follow philosophers and ignore these questions, 
the plausibility of treating thoughts as immaterial is easy to
t ,  <
indicate. No statement, specific or genetic, in Descartes’ 
two major classes of thou^ts as "thinkings", is complete 
without an object, and we have to say "I think that p" or 
"I doubt that p", where p is prepositional in form: if we 
are to talk about thou^t or reasoning or understanding, we 
can do so only by talking about propositional thoughts or 
statements. If anything is ^  mind here, it is the thought 
or thinking that p , the doubt or doubting that p, the argument 
or reasoning that r if p and q.
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If p Is a proposition like "cows are quadruped" or "the 
sky is often clouded" (since we do not need to bé aware of 
present skies or clouds in so thinking) then we can say, a.s 
with any thought, "p is thought", "p has been thought", "some­
one or some thing thought p". Without noticing any difference 
we can go on to say "p is a thought", "someone had the thought 
p in mind".
To be consistent with what I have argued at length above I 
should have to argue that the chief reason vAiy we notice no 
difference is that there is none - the final formulations 
are equivalent to the earlier. I shall be consistent.
The first formulations are directly related to the eternal 
truth "there cannot be a thought without a thinker", a truth 
which the natural light reveals to us as aoen as we have 
learned to understcuad that to say "someone thought p and yet 
no one thought p" is to talk nonsense - and this precedes our 
understanding that it is not nonsense but metaphysics; not 
someone and so no one, but a mind of someone, or, as in 
Berkeley’s case, = someone’s mind and God’s mind. The naked 
revelation of the natural light does nothing to preclude my 
general argument that in the case of any actual thought, that 
there must be a thinker sets us, if it sets us a problem, the 
problem of finding what man, what person did so think. Equally 
it does nothing to preclude the traditional philosopher’s 
difficulty over the iiApossibility of thinking without a p, of 
talking and thinking about thinking without talking and think­
ing about propositions and their relations, which does not
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seem to be talking or thinking about thinking at all.
Before any p or q or r, any member of the class of 
thoughts, we can write "I think", "or someone else thinks"^ 
and "thinks" is the only connection we can find between the 
"thinker" and any of his "thoughts". But equally there 
seems to be no "connection" -"thinking that p" is thinking,
I
and the only account we can give of thinking; reasoning is
I :  .
"thinking p and q and that r".
/  , ( I. - - !
If we considered this in,full detailÿ we should have to 
consider how "thinks that" tends to become "believes that", 
and how "x ttought that p" is related to "p is a thought now, 
a foundation of a science". "Belief" ties a thought to
t  * i
individuals, "thinking that" sets a thought free to become 
,a part of objective science - the odd expressions are forced 
upon us because of peculiar questions asked, and I am claiming
that there is no mystery about "x believes y" or "p is a sclent-
. : '
ific theory" until someone analyses them to make them clear.
r-- -"I - Ai - A- - A A A:'
One familiar philosophical path now concerns us. p and
- ,
q imply r; if I think p, I need not think q; if I think both 
I need not think r. Implication belongs to "thoughts", not to 
"thinking". As soon as we talk of p and q and r, of relations 
of succession in one place, or of togetherness in an argument, 
or of togetherness in a science, we are talking, it has s«med 
to philosophers, of "things", things which do not behave as
« f * '
do cows and calves and caterpillars. We are talking of things 
which occur in minds, and only in minds, viz. thoughts. They 
are things whose order and logical relations we can note, and
353.
both order and logical relations belong to the things, not 
to us. And so we seem to be led to, or driven to, talking of 
things in minds and contents of minds, of operations which go 
on in minds and "acts” or "processes” which are "mental" and 
"internal”.
These "thought-things" attract one another (for philos­
ophers like Hume who were impressed by Newton and physics), or 
they agree and disagree (for philosophers who prefer politico- 
human models) ; but Hume and Bradley, as I suggested in the 
introduction, agree that over and above the "contents" or 
"filling" of minds it is nonsense to talk of a mind. Taken 
literally, this is fiendishly obscure. If p is a thought, 
somehow we have to make a distinction between p and both what 
is. aware of p and the being aware of p; "p is aware of p" is 
neither intelligible nor helpful; and if we can talk only of 
p and q and r, saying they are "things in minds" is saying 
nothing. On the other hand, all the Laws of Association can 
be stated in the form "Whenever anyone thinks p and then thinks 
q there will be a certain relation a,b or c, between p and q"; 
and in so far as "x thinks p" entails *»x is thinkingjy aware of 
p" and does not entail "x is perceiving a thlng-p", "p is in 
mind" can be treated as equivalent to "p is thought"; so that 
accepting "men think" seems to throw light into deep recesses -
though not of minds. ,
If we follow the path, however, we are, confronted by the 
fact that even if "the cow is quadruped" is true, "the cow is 
quadruped" is a proposition, a thought, a judgment, and while 
red quadruped cows eat grass, propositions and thoughts
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do not. Since our distinctions of subject and predicate can 
be made only in judgments and thou^ts (subjects and predicates 
do not eat grass, occupy space) these seem to be "psycholog­
ical" tenas. Just what sort of "psychological" terms they are, 
just what th^ classify or name, is a matter for head-serat-
s
ching, and schools disagree, without being very informative 
in their disagreement. But there must be such things, and 
the subject-predicate relation is somehow intuited, a law of
mind or thinking, something which acts on..... but whatever
it is, however it operates, the result is that elements are 
related in a way that constitutes a "thought", a "judgment". 
These are indubitable existants, which can neither be seen 
nor dreamed nor imagined; they are inconceivably extended or 
bodily or "in the world".
If we contrast the thought "there is a red cow walking 
across the green field" with the confronting situation of a 
red cow actually walking across a field, however, we seem to 
need a distinction between subj ect-predicate and substance-att­
ribute to convey the difference between the thought inside 
and the situation outside the mind. Thou^t and situation 
correspond, or are structurally similar - only thus can we 
give a meaning to true or to real or to occurring. Elements 
in mind may not correspond exactly to the elements in the 
world when they are complexes of elements which do correspond 
exactly. Non-correspondence of elements-in-patterns is what
ft..
we mean by falsity.
We can find such interpretations of Descartes, not
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completely out of keeping with my detailed account of Descartes 
above. Dr. S.V^.Keellng, in his Descartes (p. 236 and fn), 
insisting on the importance of the Regulae doctrine in later 
writings, insists that "simple notions" are "ontal elements"
I ^ i ' *
which correspond to, are represented in, "distinct ideas", 
philosophers have not been slow to point out that the second 
or real occurrence has to be thought and "a thought" to be 
related to the first thought, and that the difference can only 
be "thinking that" in the absence, and "thinking that" in the 
presence, of an object which is independent of thought, add 
some have concluded that we can think only thoughts, and can 
never know that we are thinking about things. ¥e can, in other 
words, never know that our ideas represent, that our thou^ts 
correspond.
If we are minds then se^ingly this is true - that p is 
true we can never know in the ordinary (and perhaps illusory) 
sense of true. Descartes paves the way for Berkeley by using 
metaphysics and God to give a proof that this sense of true is 
not illusory after all; but even after the proof he seems 
clearly to deny that the presence of any relevant object can ' 
be known in the sense that is required to establish the differ­
ence between "absence" and "presence". Most of our ideas of " 
bodily features "represent" nothing, correspond to nothing, 
are not "ontal". He seems to deny, for example, that "there is 
a red cow walking across à green field and I am watching it" is 
literally true, to deny that we can watch such things.
' . I ■ I i
In fact h@ denies that such things can.be watched because
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situations like red cows walking across green fields could 
never occur. That there is such a thing before my eyes is 
an Inference I make which is always invalid; that there is 
some kind of thing so present is true, but it will not be 
a red cow walking across a green field. "Seeing red cows" is 
like dreaming; in recounting a dream I describe the "things" 
which, in their behaving, constituted the dream. Dream-objects 
"fill" the mind, differently ,from the way that thoughts fill 
the mind (if it is the same mind).
That anything exists except what is in my mind in this 
container sense is at least dubious, and if it is dubious, what 
is certain is that they exist in my mind as they appear to me 
to exist. They never, of course, appear to me to be in my mind, 
and so I believe that they exist outside my mind; but this 
is naive illusion, shattered by metaphysics, physics, ^md the 
identity of "objects" in ^ a t  (naively) we distinguish as 
dreaming and perceiving.
It will be remarked, at this point, that I have lost 
my "subjects" and "predicates", "substances" and "attributes"; 
in fact I seem to have lost thoughts end ideas. They are indeed
-, Ï "
extremely difficult to keep track of when we are concerned 
with thinking about things in the world or problems in science 
or sensing and dreaming. But that the conclusion in the 
paragraph above is a philosophical < eonundrum is evidenced by 
three hundred years of philosophical argument. ?
' 1-* ' A V" '  ' ' -K ii.. V-
' It is vi.tal to note that the method of'douTt- 
initially dn the differehce between veridical perception and
r i i ...
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dreaming, which, establishes that there is a meaning ato 
"the centaur does not exist" in the case of, though not in, 
a dream. Once the difference is denied, the only meaning 
we can give to exist in the case of bodily things is "exist 
as they appear to us" - in our language, for the mind, "to . 
exist" is "to be imagined or dreamed". The Dubito seems to
work in the wrong direction for Descartes - instead of the
»
existence of men and horses becoming dubious, the existence 
of men and horses and centaurs becomes certain in the only 
sense of "exist" possible to the subject 1^ the subject is 
altered by the denial of two distinct activities, perceiving 
and dreaiiiing.
My belief that a cow exists and a centaur does not, though 
both were "present to me" a few hours ago, is connected with 
my expectation that if I walk in a certain direction I will 
see, and can touch or kick or frighten, a thing of a certain 
kind called (in English) a cow. This is not ^at, or all that, 
the statement "I believe a cow is walking across the field" 
means or Implies, and there is much to be said here in consid­
ering many possible questions; but if no one could walk and 
see or touch and try to frighten or kick, the statement "a cow 
exists and centaurs do not exist" would be meaningless. This 
is at least part of the reason why it is meaningful to a man 
and meaningless to a mind, even if the mind speaks the language 
of men.
What Descartes in fact has to do is to replace the 
distinction between sensing and dreaming-and-imagining by an
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absolute distinction between dreaming-imagining and thinking, 
and thinking is the activity of a mind which speaks and r 
understands the language of men. If we look closely at the 
first dozen Principles we can see that he maintains this 
(apart from the abuse of the pronoun "I") by treating "men 
can suppose that they are minds and can follow out the logical 
consequences of this in the language in which the supposition 
is made" as if it were the same as "minds can imagine that 
they are men, and as the men they imagine th«*«^lves to be 
they can imagine other bodies and that they are variously 
and sensorily related to those imagined bodies". Only thus 
can he enable the "thinking thing" withalts language to think 
or speak about anything bodily at all, to have ideas vdiich, 
if bodily, are of anything.
What seems clear about these arguments is that however 
clear and distinct they are to minds, they are dubiously mean­
ingful to men; but this does not seem to be the case with the 
Principle with which we began, namely Principle X of Part I.
(4) "It is highly manifest to the natural li^t that to
nothing no qualities or affections belong; and accordingly 
that where we observe certain affections, there is a 
thing or substance to which they pertain (French version ^ 
dont ils dependent). The same light also shows us that 
y e  know a thing or substance mote clearly in proportion 
as we discover in it a greater number of qualities. Now 
it is manifest that we reach a greater number of qualities 
in our mind than in any other thing; for there is no 
occasTon on whivh we know anything whatever that are 
not led with much greater certainty to the knowledge of 
our own mind".
The stress on the pronouns is mine. Throughout,the 
early Principles assume inter-personal discourse in order to 
prove that it is metaphysically meaningless.
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What does the first part of the "argument" indicate?
You and I, men and women, Harry,Hawke, old uncle Tom Gobhei^ 
and all, know very well that if we say "is black" and forget 
to mention the night, the cat or the horse we "have in mind", 
then we say nothing. We know quite well that it is nonsense 
to say "I encountered or observed blackness (or quadrupCdity) 
as I walked up the road; I wonder whether there was anything 
there that was black or quadruped?" - though it is intelligible 
to say "I met or observed something black (or quadruped); î 
wonder what it was?".
We all know, if we can think at all, argue at all, that if 
someone can say of horses only that they have four legs, 
however clear this may be to him, he knows very little about 
horses; and if he says "horses have four legs" while running 
his hands affectionately over the legs of a table, he has a 
very indistinct idea of horses. If he never said "horses have 
four legs" when there were horses about, we should say he had 
no idea of horses; but if he Ignored tables and concentrated 
on cows and deer and rats when he made his regular utterance, 
we might day that he had a vague idea, an indistinct idea, of 
horses, that he was not very clear as to certain distinctions 
though others he grasped.
We do not mean, at this familiar level, that there is 
a little thing in him or in his mind called an "idea", which 
he cannot see very distinctly, or which he sees clearly and 
which is itself indistinct; or,, even a thing which needs more 
delicate moulding or colouring or strengthening with an infus-
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Ion of intensity from an impression or pressure from animal 
spirits to "fix" a pathway of channels in the brain. In not
meaning this we revea]., in an odd way, an understanding of
what philosophers’ uses of the word "idea" actually meant, 
and many philosophers have clearly failed to realise that 
this is what their usage meant. Thus "having on idea oitt X" 
is equivalent to "is able to recognise X" - just as in other 
contexts it is equivalent to "is able to think of X in relevant 
circumstances". Nowadays we tend to concentrate on "is able 
to recognise X and act appropriately in its presence", and to 
find or to fail to find problems with "is able to act approp­
riately in the presence of X",i.e. when "recognise" is omitted. 
Again we have a specimen of rationalism when "having an idea 
of X" is said to explain recognising or thinking appropriately 
etc.; patently there is no explanation, and perhaps this is 
what prompts talk of animal spirits and tubes, neural pathways 
and currents, or "mental entities", and the "models" here are 
always clear by the very contrast with the obscurity of how
they e%)lain anything at all.
If we could not teach him to do better than say "horses 
etc." in the presence of cows and deer, we should regard him 
as a natural fool; but if we believed that nobody ever obsmrved 
anything but qualities and affections and inferred the co-occ­
urrence of things with them, in so fa,r as he did use the word 
"horse" we should have to adiait that he had an acute logical 
mind which always correctly inferred "substance and not nothing 
is to what four-leggedness belongs", but that he, as distinct
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from his mind, was a natural fool.
What we would mean in saying that he was a natural fool 
is not that he thinks exactly as we do, all the thoughts that 
we do, and that he has not learned to talk properly or cannot 
learn to translate ideas into words, hut ths.t he cannot think 
in certain ways at all. We relate this to statements like"
"he cannot tell the difference between a horse and a cow" and 
not to statements like "he can observe all the attributes 
present in a horse or cow, but he infers the same substaneo 
in each case".
(Let us note the wide range of Cartesian theory: on the
lor;ical thesis, he can only infer the same substance,.must
!
infer it, and does so. validly. But suppose he is deaf and dumb, 
and uses no words to us. If he goes out to get milk, and sits 
beside imy quadruped that he first encounters, from a table to 
a horse, and continues to do this, he is a fool, cannot discrimin­
ate or learn to discriminate; but if he does learn to discriminate 
and ends by sitting only near cows, he "operates" successfully, 
is behaving intelligently and thinking adequately, on the view 
I am putting forward. "What", asksr Descartes^ "is he doing 
that an animal could not do?", and if we consider seriously 
a pup that learns to drink at one bitch’s dug, there is little. 
Hence his conclusion follows that this whole activity is 
purely corporeal, a matter àS mechanical reflexes, a series 
of motions, effects, fluxes of,animal spirits and hydraulic ,
pressures in muscles.
What receives insufficient stress in writings on Descartes
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is that he is prepared to recognise that we are much, if not 
most, of the time precisely in this situation - we need not 
he thinking or reasoning about what we are doing. In the case 
of the deaf and dumb person, for exactly the reason that we 
could not have infoimation about whether he did or did not 
think in the presence or in the absence of objects, we cannot, 
on Cartesian grounds, assert that he is more than a^imachine, 
i.e. that as well as being an animal he has a mind.
I have heard the deaf and dumb example offered as a 
negation of file’s thesis about thought as silent speech, since 
here we have an example of "thinking” where no speech is 
uttered or understood. Much of what I have said is like what 
Ryle seems to be saying, and a comment is demanded. Granted 
that he goes out to get milk, there is no reason for Ryle or 
myself to deny that the behaviour is intelligent, that it 
involves discrimination and learning to discriminate; no 
reason for either of us to deny that much of the time we are 
acting intelligently we are in this sort of situation, and 
not (as Descartes recognises) thinking or reasoning about 
what we are doing intelligently. If he does not go out to 
get milk, if there is no question of purpose, there is no 
question of intelligent behaviour, and on the purely bodily 
thesis of Descartes, there is no room for purpose at all.
Having a purpose, however, is not equivalent to saying or 
thinking "I have a purpose"; and it is when we get to the 
stage of saying or thinking «I have a purpose", that philosophy 
can begin to talk about concepts and meanings and logic. This
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Is the level of «mental activity”, the kind of «thougjxt”, 
with which philosophers have traditionally been concerned* 
Here one of Hyle's theses seems to me to he clear? if we 
discover logical features or principles as a result of 
excUûining stated thou^ts, it is neither true nor necessary 
that those features or principles were known to us prior to 
the thinking which exhibited them. To this thesis the deaf 
and the dumb, like the fool, are irrelevant, and it is the 
principles which concern us directly here).
The two principles, that no attribute is of nothing" 
and that the more properties we know the better we know the 
thing in question, muount to what? neither is a principle 
which the visual or sensory light could reveal to us^ though 
we say that we just see that a cow is red or quadruped* One 
way of stating what is asserted is that the principles 
recognise that thoughts, like statements, are, propositional, 
and that knowledge is proposition^ - that we measure know-
' ' * 1 * I' ■' * - 5 - -
ledge as an account by the statements that can be made truly 
by someone about a specified subject. If we were testing 
soiaoona’s knowledge of horses, we should certainly e33>ect 
statements in which "horse" appeared, and statements in which 
"horse" appeared as other than the subject. Unless we were 
dealing with infants wlio had been "taught a lesson" of an 
elementary kind, we should expect statements about riding 
and driving and feeding horses, statements of relation and 
possible relation; and once we get to a serious study of 
horses we should expect classificatory statements to achieve
364.
some detail and precision, and statements about the organs 
and skeletonic structure and musculature of horses to be 
included.
(5) At this point the thesis that the «substance” whose 
components as parts, and their constitutive relations, is 
being discussed is an «unknown” or «simple thing” inferred, 
from observed «affections or qualities” appears to be noneen- 
sical. The substance we dissect and after centuries of 
developing techniques and theory which converts a mass of 
meat and hard lumps and bones present in detail as an anatom­
ist* s horse is still a horse; and even we who know little 
of anatoiiiy would, if a "phenomenal” horse was punctured by a 
knife and immediately exuded a gas and collapsed in balloon­
like fashion at our feet, be quite satisfied that it was not 
a horse that was punctured. ,
Many things may be said of this. It„ is not "part of our
' ' "  w
idea of horse?' that within a surface it is materially uniform. 
Perhaps it was once, perhaps children think so, but either 
is extremely doubtful, and both are certainly wrong. Our lang- 
uage and its terms are saturated.with recognitions of complex 
structure in things classified. Organs, dissected out, are 
shaped things with colours, and in virtue of this they are. 
things with qualities, but they are not named simply as such. 
Ve have to strip even rudimentary knowledge down to the point 
of glancing at a coloured model or coloured plate with the 
name "heart” and no text on label or page to get ”thing shaped 
and coloured"; it is only the knowledge of accepted convent-
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Ions in the use of plates and models which enables us to 
fraiae the necessary truth "all hearts are liiaited extensions" 
or the peculiar truth "all hearts are so shaped", where the 
"so functions as a universal at best because of its extreme 
plasticity. Single-substance terms like "flesh", "living 
tissue", "protoplasm", or multiple-identical substance terms 
like "cells", are established and replaced as investigation 
proceeds; what iwas- once üniform for biology - protoplasm - 
was somplex for chemistry and its "instances" obviously 
distinguishable in form and structure for biologists. No man 
ever made a fire by breaking sticks, fashioned clay, ate 
animal food or even vegetable food, without discovering 
non-uniformity and structure within animals and vegetables.
This, as I have indicated earlier, seems to me of meta­
physical and epistemological importance. If epistemologists 
are genuinely concerned with a prdblem of knowledge, of how 
men come to recognise and talk and argue about things in the 
world around them, there seems to be little point in supposing 
that "what knows" is an undescribable thing which is capable 
only of "sensing" from the outside things already determinate, 
already having complex accounts and descriptions. There 
seems to be little point in assuming that "what knows" can 
always read an invisible label on "things", think "orange" 
and "snowball" and "horse", and must then undertake the task 
of analysing to show how it constructed "a horse" or a 
complex idea of "horse" from a shape, a colour, a touch, 
and perhaps a sound or a smell.
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W© can, in some sense of "Buppose", suppose that ve 
started on life*s Journey with a sack full of ideas, or that 
we were a sack full of ideas; but unless we mean by our 
Initial ideas such entities that the thinking we do is^as ve 
know it,meaningless, this need not prevent us from recognising 
that the verbs "touch”, "taste", "look", "feel”, "listen", 
have a meaning and use as well as the related and difficult 
forms of speech like "aware of a touch, a taste, a look, a 
feel, a sound". We need not be prevented from recognising 
that the active verbs indicate what we have to leam to do, 
along with discriminating, examining, investigating, observing, 
studying, and along with handling, moving «loser to, altering, 
wandering through and among, (uid along with eating and riding 
and cutting, and using for a host of purposes.
In particular, we need not be ^revented from recognising 
that the form philosophers insist upon has a place in the generi
language - the verbs take the same subjects as do active Verbs -
<
I see a "look" and I look at, a tree; men, are deceived \sj app­
earances, and men cen^ tell eggs from elephants. The trav­
eller >010 discovers after arduous hours that a mirage is not 
an oasis is forced to think and to change his account of what 
to him was obviously so» of vdiat previously "seemed so".
Making mirages fit into his world is a difficult business, and 
this is correlative with making certain stateiaents fit into 
an account with other statements, making "mirage" fit into a  ^^ 
functioilABg language. The traditional move of stating 
that ladragCB arc "things in mind" fails to help us at all
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because our difficulties in fitting minds into accounts,
"mind" into functioning language, are more acute than those 
of fitting mirages and "mirage". Indeed, at the level of 
"sensory presentations", the role of minds is to "locate" 
mirages, the location being necessary because we accept it 
as true that the statement "there are three palms and a pool 
two miles ahead and clearly visible" is falsified by an 
attempt to approach,i.e. by the contradiction between "appro­
ach" and "walking two miles ahead".
At the level of discursive thinking, the mind is 
the location of "thou^ts" and of "ideas", and as the location 
of thou^ts the mind is the location of accounts which are 
constituted of thoughts. The thought or statement "that is an 
egg" is intelligible; it seems to me to entail the truth of 
some such account as: "That was laid by a bird, has a shell 
and at least one yoke and * white*, and is the sort of thing 
that can be boiled or ftied or poached or used in making 
cakes; it is the sort of thing that can be bou^t in shops, 
may be fertile and capable of hatching, and will drop and 
make a mess if broken". On reflection, I realise that I am 
too much influenced by breakfasting; some eggs are laid by 
reptiles, some have a leathery skin, some are perhaps useless 
for cooking, maiQr species are not and never will be sold in
s^ops and if I am looking for ^  "essence", for a statement
true of any egg, anywhere, I seem to tend towards a biologist's 
definition in terms of a role in a breeding cycle of certain
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classified species, a rdle which "wind eggs'! fail to fulfil. 
Poll owing the Descartes of the wax argument, v/e can term 
this purely conceptual, hut the "purely conceptual" finds 
its meaning in complex accounts of species and breeding, 
not in simple notions. And even if we term all the prediaates 
of the statements included in the account of "egg" or "an 
egg” predicates or attributes, they are predicates or attrib­
utes of eggs, not of "minds".
Of course, if someone points to a hen*s egg on a 
table and I, being introduced to eggs, see only an ovoid
Ï
white solid, what alone I can think is "An egg is a thing 
which is white and ovoid"; I do not know that I am concerned 
with "one hen*s egg", and if, after seeing, i imagine a 
white ovoid shape, I designate it "an egg". The account is 
the same* "A thing white and ovoid". Suppose now we reverse 
our order, and make the imagining of a white ovoid thing 
first in time - what justification can there be for calling 
the imagined thing ^  egg, or a hen's egg, or anything at 
all? or for claiming that the account is of anything beyond 
"a thing white and ovoid"?
To something like this "imagining" epittemoldgists 
reduce "sensing"; and it is to accounts like those of the 
imagined egg, analysed into accounts of things with certain 
sensible qualities, that Descartes and Locke direct their 
attention. They do not hesitate to universalise, to convert : 
the account of "this thing" into an account of all things 
of a like kind, and Descartes is clearly headed for the
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reduction of all such accounts of bodily things to "ttiing 
and extended" or "thing with limited extension". Just as he 
is headed, with his logical analysis, to "thing and attribute", 
and with his identification of perception and dreaming to 
"image of", where "of" is meaningless.
If the epistemologist^s question is; "How do I infer 
from the appearance of this object from one or a series of
points of view in one or a variety of lights, though my
1. _
movements to different points of view and the variety of 
lights cannot be stated as part of the argument, and from
I
touch-sensations which must be stated without reference to 
movements of my limbs and fingers, that there is something 
which is correctly called - in English - an "egg"?", then 
he seems to be setting himself riddles in a language which
. .1 ■ .  ^ r
he already understands, and whose established uses he is 
rejecting. If what he isi concerned to show is that these 
statements of sensory occurrences, which include no thing- 
statements, are never enough to Justify a thing- statement 
or an existential claim, he should by now have very little 
difficulty.
What seems entirely mythical is the notion that 
anybody has managed to give a meaning to sensory-statements
I j  ^
independently of thing-statements in the ordinary fact— stating 
tongue. The arguments to the existence or occurrence of
entities corresponding to the adjectives of commonplace
, < , '
discourse which begin with thing-statements about bodies and 
organs, or about veridical and illusory perception, or waking
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and dreaming, are scarcely arguments if the conclusions are 
contradictories of the premises or if the argument takes us 
out of the language in which our premises are stated. , And 
as I claimed above, if we are minds which are directly aware 
of the members of the class "adjectives", of "red" and "round" 
and "cold", we have still to "discover" . that the terms which 
designate the experienced redness and roundness and coldness 
are adjectives. And so with quality, attribute, predicate; 
these are technical terms whose meaning is located in a 
thing-language and its statements, and once the directly 
experienced things can be labelled with the technical terms, 
our problems are solved. I comment only at this point that
Î
/sensation","impression", "datum" and "sense-datum" are 
technical characterisations; that "the observer can see only 
part of the surface of a body" is a sophisticated form of 
fact statement which accepts as primary a statement about 
bodies and iurfaces and observers; and that the technical 
uses, difficult enough to grasp in ordinary,circumstances, 
are completely evasive to discussion \dien it is added that 
what senses, is impressed, resolves a datum, or observes is
"a mind", and that all the terms refer to something that
•  ... ,
happens to, or goes on in, a mind. We have now some sort of 
thing-language, which enables relations to be stated, and the 
logical or metaphysical structure of what is now said in 
giving an account seems identical, with the structure of our 
ordinary discourse. , .
What does this mean? If we accept our thing-language
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as meaningful, whatever problems It may give rise to, 
what we are confronted with^in the case of the dissectable 
horse or the investigable egg, is the fact that several 
distinct types of statement are involved in the account of the 
thing. This enables us to indicate what is meant by one 
use of "categories" - our simple descriptive statements whish 
enable us to make simple classifications of things come under
I *•' '
the category of sub stance-quality, and they must be expanded 
into the category of substance-relation and into the category 
of part-whole, before we have anything like adequacy in the 
accounts.
If X is a particular kind of thing, then statements of 
these different types can be made about it, though the actual
, ' ’ I f  r '
statements of each type will be different in the case of 
different things. A china egg and a hen*s egg may have 
exactly the samè quality statements made truly about th®a; 
except for the complication of mutual relations between the 
two eggs, they may have exactly the same relation statements 
made of them if we are concerned with location or position; 
the part-whole or structure statements will be different, and 
discovery that these statements are true may be possible 
only If we are permitted to break or attempt to break the 
eggs; and historical relation statements will be different - 
hen's do not lay china eggs, though they may be devoted to 
them. Further, no attempt of a hen to hatch chickens from 
a china egg will be crowned with success - and the philosopher's 
treatment of this as "merely contingently necessa]^" and
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not "logically necessaiy", because he finds it conceivable 
that china eggs should be hatched, seems remarkably like 
tlie claim that the philo opher can do what the hen cannot 
do. The hen, of course, is not concerned with "conceptual 
ogéSs", and if eggs were only "things white and ovoid" then 
a hen*s sitting on an egg might have many consequences.
The imijiediately important point is that. Just as our 
logical and grammatical tenas are technical toms, the 
category terms are technical, and meaningless unless there 
are meaningful statements in which the technical distinctions 
ctui be indicated. Descartes* frequent identification of 
"substance" and "thing" points to fan h#ortant feature of 
our coimiionplace use of "thing" as a technical term which 
appears in familiar discourse in questions and not in answers; 
but it also draws our attention to the complexity of uses 
of "thing" as more than the logical subject of quality 
statements and as a class of all classes of existents. The 
technical terms have no tiling whatever to do with whether 
"p", whatever category it comes under. Is a thought or a 
stf tement, since we are concerned with what is thou^t, 
what is said, and there is no distinction between these.
If we are concerned with what is truly thought or said, 
then we are concerned with Scientia and with Reality. Ryle*s 
insistence on "doing logic" as "talking about talk" is logic­
ally indistinguishable from the more familiar insistence on 
"thinking about thou^t", or Descartes* "considering our 
thoughts", and his insistence is pointless except as an 
insistence that logic is not psychology, not an empirical
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rational science of what goes on in minds. With his insist­
ence should go a rejection of the mystical trinity of "things" 
which are named thoughts-ideas, sentences-words, and suhstances- 
attributes, a trinity somehow always contrasting in the 
richness of their contents with the poverty-stricken world 
of mere things, which can at best be spoken of or thought 
about and "have" attributes. In claiming that talk of . 
categories and metaphysics is also concerned with what is 
truly thought or said to be (and thus we have a foundation for 
necessary features of vdiat can be merely thought or falsely 
thought to be) I am extending the claim already made for 
logic; and I am insisting that neither logic nor metaphysics 
is a rational science of necessary truths which demands an 
extraordinary language or an extraordinary world to give its 
truths a meaning.
One clarification can now be made? the distinction^between 
subject and predicate or substance-term and attribute term 
can be made in the ca^e of any proposition, and the distinction 
is necessary for purely logical purposes at a very general 
level,e.g. when we are concerned with the proposition as true 
or false, or with presenting a formal schématisation of 
inference types which operate whatever the category of the 
proposition. There are strong reasons for refraining from 
using "substance" for "subject" when we are concerned with 
true-false or general inference; if we are concerned with 
inference patterns peculiar to certain categories (as, for ' 
example, with relation statements) the use of "substance" has
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some justification. We are equally advised to refrain from 
using "attribute" at the general level, and, for a similar 
reason, it is advisable to refrain from using "subject" and 
"predicate" when raising category questions.
But, whatever our decisions here, the terms are throughout 
technical, and at no point will it be intelligible to make 
existential claims with the technical terms. Things which 
can be said to exist are things of which accounts can be 
given, and logic and metaphysics are concerned with the 
nature of the accounts and so with the nature of the things 
accounted. The accounts themselves neither can provide.
(6) We began with the question of attributes of mind, and 
quite apparently are now talking of attribute-terms which 
appear in thoughts which are components in the accounts of 
things. And so far we have encountered no things which can be 
said to be in minds whose attributes are other than their 
own,i.e. belong to them and not to minds. Descartes* point 
has either been dodged, or we have shot past it.
The French version of the Principle in question reads, 
in the final sentence:
"Or il est certain que nous en remarquons beaucoup plus 
en notre pensée qu * en aucune autre chose que ce puisse être, 
d*autant qu*il n*y a rien que nous fasse connaître quoi que 
ce soit que ne nous fasse encore plus certaiAement connaître 
notre pensée".
Here as elsewhere we begin with "notre âme" in the 
heading, and encounter only "notre pensée" in the text. The 
Latin version tends to give mens throughout, but what we find, 
qualities or affections, are not mentis, but in mente.
375c
I cannot prove that these,alterations (and sometimes addit-
' ' ' ' ' , •
ions) were not just the responsibility of Ahhé Picot, hut 
Descartes knew and approved the translation, . and the changes 
are in keeping with one of the things in which Descartes is 
really consistent, namely insisting on distinctions as of
5 . 1 4
vital importance in an argument, and denying, those distinct­
ions or Ignoring them when necessary truths have to he given 
a meaning, variables given a value, in order to expand into 
science. Res slv© substantia, l*ame ou la pensée, l*Éme ou 
1*esprit, mens sive anima - sometimes these are the saiae, 
and disjunction indicates alternative use, sometimes they are 
so different that disjunction indicates false belief and 
true belief, obvious truth and nonsense. In the Regulae. I 
have pointed out, the Insistence is upon Notions and Scientia 
and îja Pensee; the Cogito depends upon penser, cogitare.and 
not upon 1^ pensee. cogltatio - except that la pensee and _ ^
cogitatio are, as in us, inmaterial. L*ame is "ce qui pense", 
"I" am a thinking thing, a .thing that does think and can 
think; whatever the thoughts may be, this is, true, althou^ 
for every thou^t "p" there can be a thought "I think that p"
which must be true. . ,
Now it is only in relation' to an "actual p" that the 
subject-predicate, substance-attribute distinction can be 
drawn, and it can be drawn no more relevantly to any p or q 
than to any other p or q. If we work from i"quality or affect­
ion" by the natural li^t to a substance, the existence claim 
derives from "actual quality here". .The argument^applies 
even If, in order to make the extension-argument more like
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the thinklng-arguiaont (in replying to Hobbes, for example), 
wo treat "extension" and "thinking" alike as activities
seeking qualities or affections or attr­
ibutes of mind, we are seeking meaningful statements of tho­
ughts of which "mind" is the subjecti just as if we are 
seeking qualities of "I" we are seeking statements which are 
meaningful and have "I" as the subject. So with any "thing" - 
we want predicates which can be meaningfully used with the 
thing as subject, or those which can be used with the partic­
ular thing (a thing of a particular kind^ and an individual) 
as subject.
If any proposition "x is y" is entertained 'and so in 
mind, the quality "y” Is thus in mind; but this is very 'differ­
ent from y being a quality of mind, and it is very different 
from y*o being a quality of thou^t. "Extended" is a quality 
which I have in mind Vhon I think "bodies are extended", but 
it makes no sense, on Descartes* view, to' "mind is extended" 
or "thought is’extended". In the Begulae the'question is of 
notions of attributes in us, notions of attributes which the 
mind (or the lan) attached'to notions of substance'In order 
to form' thou^tB. True, alongside the notion of bodies and 
bodily attrilnites there' are notions of minds and mental 
attributes? but' the posltlori' Is e^ xtroimely coa^ »iicated'. On'the
view I have argued for, all notions cm: be treated as concepts 
In Scientia, ^ d ’statements Inciuding them will* be part of 
our account of the world. The'notions we have, and'stataaants 
about mlndc and statements a^ut bodies will' ve simply true
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and each in the same sense of true. The objectivity of 
Scientia demands no statements about us in relation to it. 
Knowledge, stated, needs no reference to a knower, and no - 
notions qua notions. But the "purely Intellectual 
things" >iihlch are "called sitapla in relation to our underst­
anding" are presented as "knowledge, doubt, ignorance ..(and) 
the action of the will which is called volition", and we have 
to be victims of the Socratlc hypnosis to believe that this 
is simply intelligible.
Wo may say "the only subject of verbs like "knowing", 
"doubting", "being Ignorant of", and "willing" is "the soul"", 
r<aaœaberlng that for Socrates and Descartes alike the quest­
ion seems to be of True Knowledge, Justifiable Doubt, and 
Love of Truth Determining Acceptance; but "ignorance" is, if 
a state of the soul, a state of not knowing vfliat is true, 
and the possibility of Ignorance «establishes that what is true 
is Independent of the soul. What is to be discovered is what 
is so, and the result* of search and discovery is knowing that 
what Is 80 is so. Both willing and doubting are concerned with 
the acceptance of p as true or rejecting it as false, and 
whether it is true or false does not depwtid upon my willing. 
All the verbs are incurably relational, all demand a distinct­
ion between \diat knows, doubts, wills, does not know, and 
what is so and can be known to be so, - J.  ^' -
The relation, however; Is Intelligible only if we can 
specify the terms, end both terms. We hs.ve to be able to 
indicate, and so to discriminate, "vdiat knows" and "vhst is
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known”, "what is ignorant" and "what is unkno^^". And at 
this point it "bocomeo painfully clear that «what knows” 
and «what is ignorant" are not answers to «what knows?" and 
«what is ignorant?". Substituting "the thing or substance 
which" for "what" adds nothing, and without more ado "naming" 
the thing-which helps us not at all.
At this general level of discourse we rely on the 
natural light, and there are corners it reveals itself as 
incapable of negotiating. But the difficulties seem to 
disappear largely when we substitute "who?" for "what?«i 
while "knowledge","doubt","ignorance", "willing", lose 
neither force nor meaning. What Is nowadays called "their 
analysis" presents problems, but once we have really surr­
endered the belief that all verbs have one meaning and a 
different meaning from other verbs many of the problems will 
appear as solutions. We have no difficulty in understanding 
0, scientist who says:"This.......is the problem I am confron­
ted with, and I don*t know the answer", and the same scientist 
later saying;"I know the answer now; I worked it all out last 
night", or "I know the answer now; Peterson has discovered 
that the filters we were using were not the ones we had 
sterilised". "I", "we", "Peterson", appear as values, the 
statment of the problem,and Its solution, appear as values, 
in the statements of relations between variables "the knowing 
thing knows what is known", "the unknowing thing is ignorant 
of what is to be discovered", "the knowing thing knows that 
it is ignorant of#...", '
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This sort of argument might be regarded as irrelevant if 
"there are minds which know" find "there are bodies which are 
extended" are taken as scientific hypotheses; but the first 
tenu of the relation has to be characterised, has to be given
"qualities or affection" before the relation is intelligible.
1
But Socrates and Descartes alike do as I have done; they 
drop at will from the "abstract” statements to the use of 
the first personal pronoun, and this enables them to bring 
their statements into a host of familiar statements about 
themselves and the world, including statements about bodies 
and their own relation to them and theorising about them.
Both of them frequently accept as obviously true my 
statement "men use "I" of themselves in discourse"; both of 
them seem to divide statements with "I" as subject into 
three classes, those which have special senses of cognitive
f.
and volitional verbs as predicates (I - a soul), those which 
have ordinary senses of both sorts of verbs ("I love women", 
"I watch men go by my window", I - a man), and those which 
have non-cognitional and non-volitional verbs (I tripped,
I threw out my hand to protect my head without thinking)- 
and here "I am a body" tends to become "my bo^y diê it".
These are Descartes• three substances, souls, men and 
bodies. When the first is reached by the Dubito, we reverse 
the suggestion of the Regulae that notions belong to Scientia 
and that whatever is thought is true; we begin with udiat is
u .  :  r
»  f
thought to be true and, qua dubious, may be only thought.
By the time we have reached the purfcly thinking subject.
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all thoughts except "I think and exist as a thinking thing"
&re merely thou^ts, and none of them are independent of the 
thinking thing. Our general uses of cognitive verbs have 
been altered or rendered meaningless, and if we are to admit 
thoughts that a bodily thing is such (as we must), we have 
to treat the thought as something in mind, the belief that 
there is such a bodily thing independent of us as in mind, and 
metaphysics is to justify the belief that there is a thing 
in the world of extensions corresponding to the thing as a 
thought-thing. The thought is not a pattern of "notions”, but 
a complex "notion-of" made up of "notions-of".
Notions qua notions are undescribable, have no features. 
They ctui be grasped, intuited, inspected, analysed into 
notions only as o^. At the very heart of the simplicity, 
"having a notion of * extension* " is not "thinking * extension* " 
but being able to think it at particular times. What the 
notions are of, in combination, constitute "thoughts" which, 
whether there is or is not corresponding to them a "real occ­
urrence" which converts the subject of a thought into a 
substance, are "in mind", oTe "merely thoughts". If the 
thinking-thing of the Regulae is the simple soul reached by 
the Dubito, then what is thought is Thought independent of 
anything outside Thought and (difficult as it is) independent 
of the thinking thing which thinks them "one at a time".
My use of "them" is ungrammatical and intentional.
The relation between "thoughts" and "Thought" seems to be 
inexplicable. Admit plurality and temporal order, and what
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makes the succession possible is a persisting subject who 
thinks the thoughts; treat the thoughts as logically'or 
otherwise related, as v constituting a system or systems^ 
and they become self-sustaining within a system or systems. 
Once "thinking” becomes a kind of " perceiving by a mind", 
thoughts somehow must be considered as making up a world 
in the way that visible objects make up a world - we see 
them successively and in relation, but they just "present 
themselves to us" in relation even if the relations are 
not completely given. Similarly with dreams - we are confr- ' 
onted with things and events in relation, though not all 
the relations are given. >
(7) I cannot claim that what has been said in the previous 
section is readily intelligible; it represents an honest 
attempt to discover what talk of ideas and notions and minds 
and content of minds actually means in relation to à eyetem 
or systems of beliefs held by men and stated inf a language 
familiar to men. If we drop all notions of analysis,* of ideas 
and notions, and talk only of thou^ts, dreams and sensible 
occurrences, we can, I think, see why "contents of mind" 
appears to be meaningful. Ve can begin with what can be at 
least roughly called "experiences" which everybody has, and 
consider them only under the category of substance-form 
instead of s u b j e c t - pred!cate or substance-attribute.
The sensible world, considered only as seen, presents 
itself as coloured shapes, spatially related; and both the 
shapes and the relations (which are r aise volumetrleal) change.
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Wo can accept it that if all the extensions had different 
colours, or even no colours, the extended world v/ould he 
as it is; and each particular shape differs from other shapes 
only in fom. Space, then, is a uniform stuff which assumes 
and irregularly maintains a variety of. forms. They are forms 
of space as body.
This, too, is true of dreams, althou^ if we know they
are dreams the bodies only seem to be bodies. Until we discover
that we were dreaming, the bodies are to us bodies. And so 
with thoughts - they are substantially identical as thou^ts, 
different in form as thoughts.
True, we may have to pause now to get our breath back.
But we can then continue. The changing shapes in the extended
world can be explained satisfactorily by positing little 
extensions or bodies which do not change, but move and change 
their relations, so that contours of collections change. The 
changing forms of thou^ts can be explained by positing little 
unchanging notions which change their relations and patterns, 
producing different forms of thought. If we are troubled by 
the arithmetical numérosity of minutes as e3Q)lanation of the 
geometric, we can accept the geo letric as obvious, the plastic 
forms as we encounter them. Indeed, the little bodies are 
difficult with dreams; but if we neglect them, dream things 
are Just like bodies only not bodies, dreamingly extension in 
forms only, as images are "apparently extended".
If we are wrong about "perceiving" bodies, and in fact we 
dream them, then there are only "dream extensions"; and if the
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of this 1b accepted, we must accept it that the sensed 
foims a,re forms of "sense" whether or not they are also 
forms of "real extension", or aldn to dream-extensions 
while corresponding to real extensions. If "our senses tell 
us nothing of the reality in things", of the existing minute 
particles which affect us or our senses by their motions 
which act on the senses "as a seal on wax", then sensed 
forms are forms of sense, states of consciousness, "modif­
ications of mind" occasioned by God knows what; but being 
good. His Nature guarantees our belief that there is something 
"out there", perhaps even that Descartes* particles are 
out there.
Our crucial difficulty in understanding Descartes, or 
his succeseors, is that all the things in the familiar world 
which seems to confront us everywhere we turn, are forms of 
"mind". That trees and houses and men should be "forms of 
extended substance" I can grasp, since all are extended, ^ 
and we can quite easily treat "substance" as a primitive term 
in a science, largely geometrical,' compatible with our 
distinctions of wood and sap and cells, bark and heart-wood, 
timber and metal and slate and stone, flesh and blood and bone. 
Our proviso earlier, "only colour and shape to be considered", 
works as the Dubito is alleged to work, by a "suspension of 
judgment"; and what it does is to substitute for raapirical 
and even familiar complexity of differentiable constituting 
substance the blank uniformity of "extension"»'
It is this which makes initially plausible the insistence
384.
on the phenonenological identity of dream ajtid perception; 
dream things are "seen from the outside". True, we could
dream the anatomy of a centaur, dissect a centaur in a
dream - it is a "contingent fact" that nobody has; and we 
could quite well dream a set of springs and rods as the 
anatomy of a centaur, or little particles in motion. And ws 
can prattle in this way for hours without concealing in the 
least that thinking is utterly unlike dreaming as it is
unlike perceiving or sensing as "watching". "Mind" seems
to collapse into different "minds" as the contents fall apart 
into completely different sections, as the generic "thinking" 
falls apart into species of thinking which are related only 
by a vague common sense of "awareness".
Dreaming is unlike thinking rather as what we mean by 
seeing something go on, merely watching it, is unlike thinking 
unlike arguing and stating and supposing and considering and 
doubting "to oneself". After dreaming or seeing we can report 
that, consider that, argue that, believe that, state that, 
something was going on. We can imagine a blue box on a table, 
as we can dream it or see it, and say, or think, mistekenly, 
that we saw It or that we imagined or dreamed it. Ve can 
think wrongly, believe falsely, but dreaming is something
i
that we cannot do wrongly or falsely - though I can think 
.hat was dreamed did occur. When I dream that you came to 
my flat last night, the dream is not true or false; my 
statement "I dreamed that you came etc." may be false, but 
only if I did not so dream; my statement "you came to mÿ flat"
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Is false if I did only dream it, I dreamed that you came and 
in lact you did not come# And if l can never sense, and 
only dream, and "you came to my flat" is meaningful, then 
all "you came to my flat" can mean to me is the experience 
which is dreaming - though v^at the word "dreaming" would 
mean to some thing that cannot sense is difficult, if not
I ' ■ • •
impossible, to work out#
Yet if I saw you coming, what I saw was what was going
'
on, namely you coming; and if I think "he came along the
road past a motor cycle" what I think was, if true, just
h ,
what went on. Thought without its object or content, thinking 
without its object, are nothing# If I can report truly now 
that I saw you coming to my flat, what I saw can be stated; 
but "seeing" with its object implies discrimination and
■ - V  ’  -
distinction, noting and identifying# Force this line of 
argument further, and "seeing" is a kind or species of 
thinking# And so with dreaming, ' which Descartes, so far as 
I know, never Includes in his “species" of thinking.
We cannot, if thinking and dreaming are distinct, and so 
distinct that one can he about the other,'simply say that
i, '
thoughts are in mind as dreams or Imaginings 'are in mind#
' !
Only as "what goes on in us so that we are immediately aware
of it" do the species of thinking appear as identical, and 
then only in a vague generic sense If veridical perception 
is denied,i.e. if what I see is never what goes on independ­
ently of me and especially of my body, "Seeing" as "in me"
i » _ ■*
must be split away from "you coming do^ vn tlie street", and
3 8 6 .
then provided with a new "object". :
The list of "what goes on in us" is provided by Descar­
tes in the form of verbs, "to will","to understand", "to 
imagine", "to perceive" - "which are here the same as to 
think" (Principles I.IX). These verbs we familiarly use 
with nouns and pronouns as subjects, and a diversity of 
objects, and iiî doing so we make clear what we mean by the 
verbs. % e n  I dream that a centaur chases a goat, what I am 
aware of in the dream is what comes softer "that" in the 
statement "I dreamed that..."; this is all I was conscious 
of; it went on beside a stream in moonlight and shadows; " 
it was no more dubitable as it went on than is the moving 
of my pen on the paper before me and the marks’ which form 
behind the nib. There was no question of knowing that I was
dreaming, or of being confronted by forms of a substance.
«
When I dream I "know" ■vdiat I flreàm; when I sense I "know" 
what I sense; when I Imagine I "know" what I imagine; when 
I think I "know" what I think; and yet the obviousness of 
this collapses when we reflect that "knowing p" entails* 
the truth of p, and the account "of a dream is not a candidate 
for knowledge at all. The statement "I dreamed that..." is 
a candidate; it fits with other events, as well as other
truths. “ '
The certainty is not rational certainty - thinking, 
real thinking, metaphysical thinking,or scientific thinking 
with a. full guarantee, begins when I can say to myself "I 
think", say to myself "it was only a dream","maybe trees
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and pens and paper do not exist", "perhaps I am imagining 
and not remomherihg"; \^ hon I so think,there is no question ^
for me of "thou^ts" being things out there as in my
dreaming and sensing I "think" tbere are things out there. 
When I so think T do not deny that the centaur chased the 
goat, or that the pon raa,de marks on the paper; what I
doubt and perhaps deny is the existence of the centaur or of
the pen as spatially distant from me, the existence of things 
and the occurrence of events which I just seemed to witness 
as events in a space surrounding me.
The occurrence of "seeing" and "dreaming" is the condit­
ion of there being possible à critical doubt, a talking or 
thinking about the events and their objects; the doubting 
cannot be an asserting that the centaur did not chase the 
goat, the pen did not mark - it can only be that there was 
no centaur, no goat, no pen, v/hlch really existed, existed 
Independently of me as other than an "object of thou^t", 
a "mode of awareness", a "thing in my mind". This is ivhy the 
metaphysical doubt must be existent'ial, must take the form 
of (a x) o r ( 3 x ) , and why we should know beforehand all the 
words in a language capable of use in completing descriptions 
of tho X. Ve must be able to make all the descrijptive state- 
monts necessary to state that what is so does not exist, or
can be conceived not to exist.
The statements that moke up the account of the thing or 
event "witnessed" are not to be falsified; the account holds, 
but not of a substance as independent of me; it holds of
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a thing named hut not hodlly-suhstantial » and this is
our transition point to “Real Metaphysics" and our next 
chapter.
Let us note briefly, however, that in the Principle 
we began with, after all the talk of "qualities and affect­
ions", we conclude with "if I think that the earth exists 
because I touch it, neither I nor my body may exist, but 
I exist",i.e. with the ubiquitous Cogito. I exist - and 
Descartes proves to his satisfaction that I am a mind, a thing 
that can doubt the existence of all objects of sensing, 
dreaming and imagining} and of the thoughts which are 
correlative with these he can doubt the truth and the exist­
ence claim on the part of the subject. All objects are objects 
of thought in thought’s denial of their existence.
ïïgo Cogito can be expanded into "I will,I understand,
I dream, I doubt, I perceive..." because this is known all 
the time, and these statements were true all the time; all 
are statements of varieties of "thinking" by definition.
It is the "I" vho persists and proves itself to exist as the 
subject of the verbs, the agent or performer of the verb-den­
oted acts.
All such verbs have objects, all such acts have 
objects, and if we consider as we must the "objects”, what 
in each case is "thought”, what is dreamed or felt or iiaagined 
or thought...it is iiqpossible to identify ”1” with the 
objects, and no meaning can be given to the verbs without 
the objects so that "I" cannot be considered as identical
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with the acts. It is equally impossible to identify "I" 
with "mind" if such objects (or thé things which are named 
in the object-descriptions) occur in minds or exist only 
in minds as contents. "Mind" belongs somehow with the objects, 
on the opposite side of "am aware that" or "think" from my
■ V
side. And qualities and affections of mind e v a d e s t i l l .
If we juggle long enou^ with the "species" of thinking,
■
treating each in turn as a generic end a specific, we get 
a range of "principles" presented by various philosophers, 
each as vacuous as the other,e.g. "To be a thinking thing is 
to think thoughts, and to bqhânthought is to be thought ly 
a thinking thing - I am such a thinking thing", or "to be a 
percelver is to perceive perceived things, and to be a 
perceived thing is to be perceived by a perceiyer - I am 
such a perceiving thing". -
These, too, are unhelpful in providing attributes.
■ • ■ • t . ;  J  -■
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Chapter X,
Substance and T o na.
\/e extend our argument to a principle in which the 
ccnne of "subctance" ie akin to "etuff" or "material":
Any thing ie a f o m  of foibetance.
This has many applications. It can be applied to the 
claimed identity of what is experienced in dream and 
perception.
It con be accepted that people dream, and that an 
account of ivhat is dreamed may be identical with an account 
of vhat is at another time perceifed. From this an 
important Cartesian argument is held to follow.
Ve arrive at no attributes of minds. The account of 
a dream will contain no attriix*tes of "the dream". Hor 
will it contain any attributes of "images". Consideration 
of our use of "images" leads us to refuse to consider 
"things in dreams" as images.
3. (p.396). Talking, thinking, saying, reflecting, theor­
ising and other activities ore different from dreaming; 
but the word "dreaming" belongs to the same language as 
words for these, Ve omit a great complexity in simply 
saying "A is on account of a dream and may also be an 
account of a witnessable occurrence". We omit more if we 
1er ve out "A is on account", and by excluding all except 
"visual" features we arrive at the notion of a dream, which 
is "insubstantial", containing only fonas, but forms 
Identical with the forms of substantiel things which are 
witnessable.
(p.399). And now we have to deny our principle (forms are 
of a substance), or deny the statement (A is an account of 
dream or occurrence) which makes the argument possible.
A causal relation of forms "in mind" and subst­
ance "out there" demands an account of "I" or "mind" such 
that it can be causally affected, and such an account 
cannot be given by a "mind**. Perhaps the mind can argue 
in principles - effect, therefore a cause, the cause must 
be some thing, the thing must be a form of substance.
These modes of argument are employed by Descartes, 
Locke, Hill - but they are necessarily vacuous. We thus 
note a class of metaphysical arguments (p.403) vdiich begin 
with a principle whose terms are correlative; if it is 
taken in Isolation, the relation between the terms is 
iHysterious, and if it is uded to analyse an isolated 
empirical instance, a regress develops which can be stopped 
only by denying the principle and asserting an "ultimate" 
or "ultimates".
(p*404) We can in our previous instance preserve the 
principle and have two substances, or deny the principle 
ana assert forms not of a substance, or deny the distinct­
ion between dreaming and witnessing of events. If we deny 
the distinction, we destroy all point in our argument - 
t^f.^rinciple applies to all things in accounts, and leads 
neither to minds nor to physics.
It is meaningihl, however, to call dreams " in subs t- 
^tial and to ask, if the historical event and dream are 
both past, what is the difference to one Who remembers#
This leads to the question of the relation between substance 
find the v/orld-as-historical.
(^) (^) (^ ) # Prospère compares history to his pageant of 
spirits, and seems to declare history jnsubstantial. Types 
of metaphysical theory can be shown, by a developing arguîo- 
ont, to depend upon an acceptance of history, and yet they 
seem to deny the reality of history and the historical.
"Heal reality" is sought.
(7) The attempt to deny reality to history illustrated, 
and (8) the consequent confusion related to Cartesian 
•substance". History holds our problems together and makes 
theili intelligible. Metaphysicians reject coay^onents of 
our accounts of historical individuals.
(9) Category statements and necessary truths are related 
in detail to a type of historical statement - "Caesar swaia 
the Tiber" considered as a true statement. The relation of 
statements like "Caesar was a form of..", "Caesar became a 
form of.#" to "substance".
Sniauel Alexander cited as one vho moves from history 
towards a blank Space tmd a blank Time, and claims to be 
arguing in the reverse order,i.e. back to history#
(10) If we refuse these metaphysical paths, we recognise 
history and a host of sciences as mutually related. The same 
is true of History and technical terms in logic - the 
intenaedieiy between histoiy and logic is History (the subj­
ect, or science). History is related in detail to actual 
scientific procedures, claims and 8tat#ients.
(11) (p.448) Aristotle was concerned in talking of Categ­
ories with what is here presented as "the metaphysical 
structure of things". Metaphysics is not a natural science.
(12). Metaphysical, logical and historical stat^aents tmà 
their essential relations IndiC'ted. Metaphysical critlcim 
of metaphysical theories said to be of the form "If History, 
then as well as your categories, these categories....", 
where "categories" indicates classes of statements.
11 have to give a general formula applicable to
liXl kinds of 80ul, we must describe it as the first grade of 
actuality of a natural organised body. That ici Why we can
uxmecsscery the question v&ethor the soul 
M d  the b o ^  are onet it is m  meaningless as to ask whether 
the wax and the ehc^ >e given to it by the otcanp are one, or 
generally the imtUr of a thing and that of which it is the 
matter# Unity has many senses (as mai^ as *ie* has), but the 
proper andfundamental sense of both is the relation of an 
actuality to that of vdiich it is the actuality"#
Arlstotl». De Anlm^ II.I. (ïîmlth),
■I roa theee facts one might think that the only cause is 
the so-called material cause; but as men thus advanced, the 
very facts opened the way for them and joined In forcing them 
to Incostlgato the subject. However true it may be that 
all generation and destruction proceed from some on or ( for 
that matter) from more elements, tAy does this happtm and 
what lo the cause? îbr at least the substratum Itself does 
not make toe change; e.g. neither the wood nor the bronze 
causes toe change of either of them, nor does the wood manu­
facture a bed and toe bronze a statue, but something else Is 
the cause of the.change. And to seek this ,1s to seèk the 
second cause, as ^  should say - that from which comes the 
beginning of movement. Now thone \Ao at the very beginning 
set themselves to this kind of inquiry, and said the substratum 
was one, were not at all dlBoatisfJed with thmselves; but 
some at least of those vho maintained it to be one - as thou^ 
defeated 'hy thic seorto for toe aeoond cause - say toe one and 
nature as a whole lo unchangeable not only in respect of 
generation and destruction (for this is t% primitive belief, 
and all agreed in it), but also of all other change; and this 
view is peculiar to them. Of those who said the universe was 
one, then, none succeeded in discovering a cause of this sort, 
except perhaps parsienldes, and he only Inaimmch as he supposes 
that there is not only one but also in ««sae saase two causes. 
But for those vho moke more elements it Is «wro-peesible to 
state the second cause, e.g. for those who mska hot and cold 
or fire and earth, the elements; for they treat fire ae having 
a nature Which fite it to movo things, and water and earth and 
such things they treat in the contrary way.
Vhen these men end the principles of this kind had had 
their day, and the latter were found dnsdequate to generate 
the nature of things, men were again forced by the truth Ijkeelf, 
au we said, to Inquire Into the next kind of cmise..»•••
Aristotle. MetaphVBioe. 1.3. (V.D.Hoss)•
“Hothing that is has a nature.
But only mixing and parting of the mixed.
And nature le but a niwie given t h m  by men".
Enpedocles. Quoted in MctaphyBics V.4.
"Is second childishness and mere oblivion". _____
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Substance and kmrm.
The distinction of substance and form is valid, useifal 
and historically important. It is so wide in its a^'plleation 
that It Can, if with considerable variations in sense, be 
used to contrast sentences with sentences, propositions with 
propositions, men with statues, end statues with lumps of 
metal, tiometimes we want to stress identity of form and. v #
f
difference of substance (or matter, or content); sometimes 
we want to stress difference of form, and identity of subst­
ance ( or matter, or content}. And "form" has been used so 
widely that species of a genus have been said to differ only 
in form, just as "essence" has bemt called "substance”; and 
at least from Bacon onwards fform",was used in a sense^that 
was equivalent to "attribute". - s çf '
liy discussion here will be inadequate, but it is 
closely related to.whatihas,gone before. If we accept as 
a formulation "all forms are of a substance", dr "a substance 
occurs only in forms", treating the. terms as variables, we 
have a parallel to the subject-predicate, or the; substance- 
attribute, principles as I inoisted.on treating them above. 
That the principle functions at the level of fact statements 
and in science is clear enough,, and can be elaborated in the 
next chapter. I want first to consider here the consequmaces 
of applying the principle to an r accepted fact, claiming that 
the consequences (a) exenwlify bad metaphysics,, (b) «present 
either contradictions or vacuity, and (c). fail to assist us
, /
.-^ 4;
in our search lor understanding of "theories" of mind. If, 
however, we can establish common features to metaphysical
A
arguments, and especially arguments' to necessary substances, 
we are assisted in our search for an understanding of meta­
physics, science and a factual or historical world. '
(1) People dream, and report» their dreams., I^ as a dreamer, 
understand their reports correctly when they say "I dremaed 
that....."I I know that "I dreamed a centaur chased a goat 
around my room" is compatible with no centaur or goat being 
in my room, compatible with you, watching me, seeing nothing 
but a face and bed-clothes.' In dreaming,,! was not aware of 
being a man, being in bed, or being asleep. And sometimes,
\Aien I dream, what I dream and ma aware of in the sense that 
dreaming entails awareness is to me exactly like a set of 
witnessable and public events. -
(2) Whether we say that people report or describe or relate  ^
or give an account of their dreams matters little^for general 
purposes. It "is a fact that quite oftmf an account "A" may
be an account of a dream as what was dreamed or an account 6 » 
of what was witnessed as a wking spectator. So we can state 
Descnrtes* argument with regard to dreaming and perceiving, 
and it seems clear enough that if I were a mind, a mere 
dreamer, mere perceiver, any account "A" would fbe of vAat I
r ' /
was aware of, and nothing more to me. (If I have a use for 
"dream" and "perceive", I "am not such;a mind - but this is^afs* 
harmful'to the argument,» like so muto else).î- i W  W S  ' "îîrîas*
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iîy in&lstenca on "account" is not for general purposes, 
but for a particular purpose, ifhen I describe a centaur or 
a goat, I make statements about their forms, shnpes, colours 
and tones; loosely, we may add actions, behaviour, what 
happened to thorn. In this sense we do not describe the , , 
dream at all. Ho qualities in the description, no shapes, 
no colours, no actions, are predicates of "the,dream".p Eor 
are they predicates of the dreamer,
If we call the centaur ^ d  the goat images, (a) we are 
getting beyond the dream account or tiie dream experience, ,
(b) the qualities etc. are .sUll of centaur end^goat, (c^ 
we have no qualities for images, (d) have no qualities for 
minds, and (e) if by "images" we mean something over and 
above the dream- e%*erience, things somehow looked at, then 
the dreamer can know nothing of these. Ho one else, obviously, 
can be "aware" of them. By proportionate reduction ( ^ 6 ft
V :
centaur and 2 ft dog to centaur^threettimes as h i ^  ae.a dog)
^  ^  .L: r Y  ^
we can get Imagee into the brain ty single calculation# but 
nothing will get images of any, size into,,the *mind% ,..^ d 
we get them into the brain it is nonsense to call toem images, 
uni088 wo mean ? Imogea" likenesn^of ao paintings or drai^ * 
in&$8 or 8tatuoo aro likono8B08**of # » 4^:.***. -'ï 1^.-
«V Of such likenesses no one has ^managed, to give an intell-
5 ^ . Vi* Ç ‘ . - - O i ’ V  .
igible account. Ho one has, so to,speak, managed.to get 
beyond the reflections I see in,another's pupil or, loss, managed 
to get the reflections into the optic ne^e, and to the cortex. 
Many have, indeed, argued both reflections and things reflected
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out of the "world" entirely and Into minds, consciousness - 
or "senses". , ,
I do not wish .to labour the point at issue. Things 
in dreaming, centaurs or goats, are qualitied and formed, 
act and are related; the acc unt can be given, using nouns 
like centaur and goat and containing descriptions of caitaurs 
and goats. If we call the centaur and the goat Itmigetf*, as we 
can call all things in dreams "images", then we can add 
"and the centaur is an image", "and the goat is an image", 
to any statement about the centaur or the goat. We atoieve 
in this way another way of saying "no centaur, no goat, in 
the room and witnessed". Most of us are familiar with St.
Paul's, with photographs and paintings of St. x'aul's, with 
the numerosily of prints from one negative, reproductions 
from one painting, the remoteness of prints and paintings 
from the one and only and permanently located St. Paul's.
Ve can lo k at a painting of St. Paul's and at St. Paul's, 
comparing the two. We can say that ^ the building in the paint­
ing is coloured, or that the paper or cràvas is coloured. The 
painting is a good or bad likeness, perhaps the very image of 
St. Paul's - but note how odd, how strange, it feels if we 
say that all paintings and photographs are "images of St. Paul's", 
evsnif we see that they are all "like St. Paul's".
This is part, if only part, of our difficulty in turning 
•I see St. Paul's", "I am imaging St. Paul's", "I can see 
St. Paul's in ^  mind's eye, Horatio", into - etateaents alwut
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imcigee# or# accepting "I sea St# Paul’s"# turning the later 
stateiuents into statements al>out images# It is true that 
the conversion distinguishes the later situations from the 
situation of "seeing"# but that seems to be all that it does# 
There is no photograph or painting# and if there were we 
should have the same problem as before • I can imagine a 
photograph or a picture# True# this holds only of material 
photographs or pictures# where "imagining x" is somehow 
equivalent to# or is held jko entail# "forming an image of 
x"# and a fortiori "forming an image"# and "more fortiori"# 
"being aware of an image"# - ^  ^
I describe what I om aware of as# say# a building of 
coizplex colour and shape and surroundings# and label it 
"St* x'oBcras station”* Struck by "The massive dome, the
-  ' '' ‘ r  -, -  , f  g
glorious symetzy", in uy account, lay listener points out
that this may fit St# Paul’s# and not St#Paacras; equally#
I mry find that the imagined building is not an existing 
building, a building that has ever existed* What I have 
described, then, is an ioaginazy building, and if ve call "X 
the imaginary building an image, I have described an image. 
It is not a likeness or a photograph' or a picture; nor is 
it anything I look at, thou^ I can give a meaning to clear 
and distinct, blurred and confused, in relation to what I 
imagined w  *I can to seen pictures and photographs.
It is only if I want to talk of #iat is imagined as a 
picture or photograph, and gf some thing whether that thing 
exists or does not exist independently of the imagining, -
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that I have to find a ouhetitute for negatives# paper and 
canvas# and traditionally this ia supplied by consolouenees# 
8011808# oonoorlm# or imagination images are "painted on" 
thooe# 88 well a© being located in these# they aro forme 
ImpoBod upon these or fabricated within these. Any one of 
them can be epolcen of univocally as "that \dildh (and only 
that which) suetalns images". Extended to all the senses# 
most of this talk becomes a vague blur because "image" loses 
almost the whole of its meaning; while the etress is on
vision and imagined things shaped and coloured# the terms
♦
"consciouonesB","sense” and "imagination” are necessary terms
I
in necessary truths, designating necessary entities, and the 
meaning of the necessary truths is to he found in such as 
our Initial statements, "I dreamed that the c<mtaur I described 
chased the goat I described” and "there was no centaur end 
no goat in the room”.
The things imagined or dreamed have qualities; calling 
them "images" asserts that they are not world-things; only 
as images are they forms of consciousness, swse or imaginat­
ion - no one wants centaurs to chase goats round and round 
a mind; as images they are neeessarftly forms of conscioumsess 
etc., just as consciousness is necessarily that of whidh they 
are forms; and none of the qualities of centaurs or goats or 
any thing else imagined or dreamed will be qualities of images 
or of minds.
When we recognise that vdiat I dream or imagine may have 
a complex, ae-if-historieal account, the vdiole of whiUh has |
.a
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to be brought under the head of "dream", "Imagination" and 
"Image" - we cannot treat things in dreams as images which . 
really chase one. another around imaginary rooms - the necess­
ary argument vdiich has elements of convincin^ess at the 
level of thing, no thing, imagine, form In or. of*mlnd*^ seems 
scarcely to have bearin.q at all. It is submerged in a flood 
of facts and further necessary truths.
S (3) Talking, thinking, arguing, reflecting, theorising, 
like riding, chasing, eating and bumping, are different from 
dreaming, about which we con talk or think or argue or reflect 
or theorise. It is probably true that we can dream that we 
are doing all these, and that we con, while asleep, talk, think, 
reflect, theorise, even about dreaming. If, while asleep,
«.V ,
I think "Dreaming is the immediate intuition by a mind of 
itself as sensuous other, of its essoice as desire as what 
is desired", this will seem meaningful, may be meaningful; 
the activity may be called "dreaming^, but it Is difficult 
to see that it has anything to do with images, that an account
of the "dreaming" can be presented in statements about images.
'7,, ## '.a : *
If we restrict dreaming to "scenes" or "occurrences" which 
have an account generally the same sort of account as that of 
witnessed scenes and occurrences, the account is not itself a 
dream or dreamed - vdiether thought or thou ht and spoken or 
written, it demands a toought or thinking which is not dreaming, 
and thinking may, as in the case above, be of dreaming in 
general, and not of a particular dream at all.
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lurther, %dten we talk of *wltnes8lng% what we have in
'I ^  •' - -r A V i^r w
ai8<i l8 being confronted with things in complex action# 
things and actions which we recognise. It se^s pat^tly 
clear that children are incapable of the same sorts of
- i!  "  .  .  , 7 „ , .
recognition and witnessing as adults; end the more we reduce 
"sensing" to sensations of colour and shape, or to causal, 
relations which hold between any sentient and \diat effects 
it, witnessing becomes more and more a matter of something 
over and above sensations, or the, sensing of them. We have 
a special sense of "images? to use vhen presented on a 
screen with "things", vhito we cannot recognise, but familiar 
things we seem simply to recognise. ^
Recognising is one of the things we learn to do, ^ d  
do or fail to do, do correctly or incorrectly. It is one 
of the many activities which I regard as mine, an. activity 
which is extremely difficult to reduce to a ? thing" in me,
and seemingly it is a part or. element or "mom^t? in dreaming 7-.
.
as it is in witnessing. It seems^impossible to ireduce 
recognition to images - and vdien,we talk of "ideas" one^ 
class at least seems to reduce to "recognitions^ or "powers 
to recognise", rather than%vieo^rersa. ,tod "witnessing",as 
"just seeing", reduces,to "looking at", "being confronted 
with", only if we pack a great deal into "looking at"^ , or
"being «onfronted with". 
fe,. What I want to stress is the comple^ty ^ich is left 
,out when we say, simply, that A id an^^acco^t «fa dream and 
may^also be,an account of a witnessed occurrwco«« A dreamed
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picnic may be just like a real picnic in accoimt*. Recalling 
tlie dreamed picnic and the real picnic# or recalling the 
dreîüa vdiile picnicking# I may not be able to discover any 
diflorence# The experience# we may say# is the same in either 
case# Bnt vAien we come to consider questions of similarity# 
or to give accounts and talk of identity of accounts# we are 
doing something which is veiy different from the experiencing 
of èithor "picnic". This something different# like all the 
other différents# like presenting a dream and a real occurav 
once# or a hypothetical dream and occurrence, in order to 
stake a x>olat in argument or illustrate the application of 
a principle we are trying to underetand, we ignore whan we 
consider only *A may be an account of dream or real occurrence", 
"dreaming is just like perceiving".
Ignoring them, we can say all witnessable occurrences 
are identically occurrences, differing only in iom. preem 
occurrences are in form the same ae witnessed occurrences.
This is still too crude, too _ revealing. But if we confine 
our attention to the visible features of .the world, to the 
"visible world", then it appears,, considered as coloured 
extensions in a process of toange, as a piece of dynamic 
sculpture; it is coloured by a special process, but if a 
different process produced different colquts, the sculptor- 
ial features would remain the smse — colour is of secondoiy 
<Manrtn«p.a. All things are identical in being extended in 
the visible world. But the drecm vmrld JLs like this,toe. A 
dream, like a real situation (which may be dreamed) is a
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piece of dynamic sculpture, appearing as and ' described as 
the real situation appears and is described. I'oiras and 
descriptions are identical. And the dream, by contrast with 
the real situation, Itf we work within a framework of under­
standing of "% dreamed" and "% witnessed", is "insubstantial".
Wo have two objects on which our attention as thiiûcers and 
the subject's attention as dreamer-witnesser are focussed, 
two uobj sets :diich are identical in account, in form.
If perceivlns is just like dreaming, if we cannot tell 
the difference, if we are minds or souls or consciousness.... 
there are only for us forms which are insubstantial. Paths 
we have alre; dy traversed open up before us. Before following 
a new one, however, let us note lAiat we have done.
We began with a prin<iple which insisted that all things ", 
could be regarded as forms of a substance, and form and substance 
are correlative and correlative with thing. Now we seem to 
have separated forms so completely from subst&nce that toey 
are independently existing things which (a) can be related to 
their substance in the case of "real things" only by elabor­
ate theory Which justifies our belief that there are things 
like horses and dogs and real picnics, %dille (b) we have no 
substance for centaurs and drema-pionics, and (e) we seem 
doomed to duplicating real forms as both forms of things and 
forms in minds. If our explanation vdiich relates forms and 
substance "out there" Is causal, then our use of "I" or "we" 
is neither editorial nor vacuous, since we cannot be mere
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"coxiBCioitB thing»"# xaero "percBlverc of foxms" this holds 
true even 11 we deny p e r c e i v e d # " t o  things and allow them 
only conceived or im'tgined fozma# or talk of them as thing© 
with unknown form©; we must have something to affect the mind 
âjà£ mind# and correspondingly minds must be things able 
to be affected* Yet the mind# soul or consclouones©# supposing 
the ccusal theory to include it intelligibly in an account# 
cannot have a theory at all# and has not the slightest need 
for one* (Wild and non»wild data do not correspond to untamed 
centaurs and tamed horses# and to the mind the data would be 
without any sense#i*e* not sense#"data# but just data}*
We# who con have a theory# have asserted a principle# 
located a suitable fact ("the account A may be of etc*}# 
applied the principle# and as a result we have either denied 
the principle or declared to be meaningless the statement 
which made the application possible - and hence we declare 
the application to be impossible* We have converted into 
a problem# end evwi into an impossibility# the relation of 
form and substance with idiich we began*
This# I suggest# is the almost automatic result 
asserting a principle in idiich the terms are correlative • and 
this is #iat provides the "rational and necessary truth" of the 
principle - and treating the tenae of the principle .aa indic­
ating thimga \A»ich are IndepaSdent of one another and have 
to T%e related, or whose relation has to he discovered* Tn 
this case, substance cannot be related as bearer of foms to
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the A orme, and the parallel is close to the thesis of Descar#- 
tes and Locke (and Hill) that an observation statement (x is 
y) really means "something material (x? Ko# if «x« is a noun 
in use) is acting on the body of A and on the mind of A so that 
the state y is caused in (or of) the mind of A". It is true thnt 
sometimes th^ speak as if what was in mind was "that x is y",
80 that we have predication simply; but toe "sensation" is 
"X out there is y**# and with the denial of "out there" neither 
theorist could give an account of the x - as "in here" it is 
inogplicable# as "out there" it is indescribable.
Substance-"thing# as out there# can be guaranteed by 
guess and by God# or bf proving toe qualities to be effects 
and applying the caueal principle (I did not cause them# some­
thing else did); the qualities# except those indispensable if we 
are to say anything at all intelligible of substances "out 
there"# are spatially rœote from toe substance"thing. On the 
strict argument (vide Berkeley) the subs tance» thing can have 
no qualities and no form at all; and this seem© meaningless# 
until wo recognise that the causal argumeait demands a toing 
out there# not a stuff or supporter of attrilmtes. Once we 
have established the thing# we can apply principles and argue 
that toe thing is substance with attributes or forms# must be 
such# althou^ we# "locked in our subjectivity"# can never know# 
never give a value to# thing or. substance or attribute or fom. 
Thus we relate the disjointed correlatives of one principle 
by asserting another principle { the causal)# and then 
applying our initial principle to the (inferred) term we
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arrived at ty applying the causai principle, "hat is "out 
therô" for anyone vflio ie actually perceiving, i^hat le Before 
his eyes and persists A^ien he turns his eyes avay, is a thing 
which aunt he a fona of substance. He does not perceive it, 
does not perceive thing or substance'or form, since it is not 
the sort of thing that can be perceived (or •perceiving'* • is not 
the sort of "thing" we can do of thihge "out there"), The 
thing causes his perceptions, i.e. the yellow oranges and 
glowing red tomatoes, the cat chasing dogs he "thought he 
perceived". There must be a thing acted on, and. if'we call 
this "necessary thing" a mind Which can assume or be caused 
to assume different forms, the perceptions, yellow oranges 
and cats chasing dogs, are forms of the substance which, in 
a form, is a* thing which con be ^ acted upon once again. Dr asms 
and perceptions are both forms’of such'a substance; the 
difÎ erence is that perceptions are caused by external, and 
unknown substance- in-form things’,
This is a long w ^  from establishing that cats and dogs 
and oranges are either forms of toe "inner substance" or ^ 
forms of "the outer substance which, in a manner ®s unknown 
as the substnnce-in-foim or thing "out there", causes the 
inner substance to assume another form. Th’e modicum of fact 
and the vast deal of necessi^T^indeed, seem to establish little 
that is intelligible. But what I am interested "in is toe 
pattern of argument which sunders toe terms of a principle 
and "relates them again" by aeserting another principle, a
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principle which under ordinary circutaotancea we would say 
was relevant because we could indicate the values of the
tenaB,i.e, \dien we could say • such a thing acted in sudb
■ : - - ; 
c. way on ouch a thing that euch conoociuancoe followed"*
Subetance»fom# BubBtanc©»attrlbuto# 8ubject»pradicate# 
relata»relation# even causo»offect# are all principles %diich# 
When the correlatives are aundered a© distinct substimceo or 
IndepeiMont things# defy relation and produce a series of 
traditional metaphysical arguments# Each# if applied to a 
single fact statement of an appropriate foim# presents a 
logical distinction within what is intelligible » if we 
understand the statement# we can grasp the logical distinction. 
Considered without reference to instances# or considered in 
relation to an application to an instance \diich prochiees 
•x is a substance and y is a form", one can lead to 
the question "how is substance (or subject,etc.) related to 
f o m  (or attribute, etc.)", a question ’toich is, I contend, 
unless a request for information about the use of elcsaebtaiy 
logical terns, completely meaningless. Saeh, moreover, can 
be developed from an instance into an infinite regress which 
can be terminated only by contradicting the principle, and 
the result is ultimate substance, fom, agent, act, or relation 
according to our particular preference for one or other princ­
iple as "fundamental". Kadh, finally, can be applied to a 
statement bout "the world" to produce ultimate substance etc.
directly.
We need a statement of "vdiat is" to apply the princip»*
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and "arrive at" toat must be, %Aiat necessarily is, \dtat is 
Heal in contrast with what is merely real* The subject of 
our "what is" statement must be known, and the statement 
we need is "the known (sensible, perceived, familiar) world 
a f o m  (attribute, effect etc*)"; and if this is not a 
"known truth", it requires proof, proof by means of a truth 
and a principle, or a truth whibh, like the Cogito, is known 
truth and principle and proven by prianiples from the 
fact that dreaming is .lust like perceiving.
Having, as we did above, isolated the statement "the 
account A may be of dream or external event" from any context 
of statements about dreamers and perceivers and givers of 
accounts of what they dream or perceive, and declared A to be 
an account of loims. we arrive at two different subst tnces, 
neither ultimate, if we do not deny the principle; or we 
arrive at forms separate from substance if we deny the princ- 
iple; or we deny our distinction between drezms and witnessed 
events, and have only accounts vdiich we declare to be offorms, 
and we are bound by the principle to claim a substance with
the forms. Yet if we deny the distinction, there is no point
- .
in starting the argument or applying the principle. At best 
the principle will apply to all things in the accounts, all 
things would be forms of the same substance, and "forms separ­
ate from substance" is a logical impossibility.
We get neither to minds nor to physics. But it is still 
true that it is meaningful to call dreams "insubstantial";
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It iB true that an account A mey be of dream occurrence or 
of historical occurrence; vdiilo if dream-occurrence and 
historical event are past, what ie the difference far me?
Afi a man# the answer 1 give will be intelligible and 
complicated; as a mere rememberer, I find it difficult to 
give an answer; but the question which arises even from the 
men’s question is as to the relation between "substance" 
and a world»ae»historioal# a world in which the things 
come into being and cease to be.
4. "The cloud»C8pp’d>towers# the gorgeous palaces# _
The solemn temples# the great globe itself# ‘
Yea# all which it ixdierit# shall dissolve 
And# like this insubstantial pageant faded# '
Leave not a rack behind* Ve are such stuff 
As dreams are made of# and our little life^'^^^'
Is rounded with a^sleep"*^ . y ^
Neither Prospère nor^his creator are authorities on the
metaphysics of mind or of% substance# but the author of the
ÎV - f, 'A*-.- A5.V- -t- .. 5^S
Shakespearean ploystoas, like 'Webster,, em oecaeional^^hit 
of putting Into striking fora a traditional aetnphyslc^ „ 
principle and the consequences of Its, application*
prospère'B pageant, IV will, be rectaied, was possib^^ 
because he controlled a number, of spirits wW, or wMch, 
obedient to his magic-backed comand, assumed the forms of 
both hmr^n beings and gods of the Oreek variety, pre^^bly 
each of the spiritual rabble (Prosperq's pl^se) had^a fom, 
natural or Induced, before the,pageant, but eato was.trans- 
formedi. He. did not> cease to, exist, and thus ProspoM is not 
producing something irom nothing, though,his human audience
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may have thought bo* The spirits remained identical in 
substance throughout the transformations.
Had on© been turned Into a 8tone# he presumably would , ^ 
have lost identity and dubs tance » but this is the realm 
oi magic and miracle, if also the realm in vdiich phi lo a ophers 
may seem to claim that it is logically possible for the 
world to have begun two minutes or a ghost to become 
a mountain* We will not get details of information here, 
though w© can see how substance, form, in lividual persistent, 
and persistence as kind of thing or thing of a kind, are 
inter»related* The conjurer substitutes a stone for a man, 
and this is locomotion, change not of f o m  or of substance 
but of place* The magician transforms, and what persists 
is either (a) the individual identity of the spirit, who 
bears the same m m ©  throu^out, or (b) the same spiritual 
stuff, or (c) the same kind of thing, namely that vdiich Is 
called "spirit" or "spiritual". The different possibllitleB 
are not independent of one another, though in general we do 
tend to demand of a process of transfomatiqn that one of the 
"things" should remain constaût, nnd treat it as the reason
. - , 7 )
or ground or .possibility of the transformation of the others. 
Consideration of this enables us to see whp substance, as 
support or substratum or e%)lanatlon of change 
has been treated as Individual, as stuff, and as genus, defin­
ition or essence ( just as it helps to see why philosophers 
hare, when in search of individual identity, been concerned 
with darned stockings and re-built churches and serial thou^ts.
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and found common to all "identity" nothing hut tho hearing 
of a name)»
Had Procpero used mass hypnotism. Instead of spiritual 
engineering, his procedure would, in relation to hi a audience, 
been different; each would have given the same account of the 
pageant» If such an hypnotic state is like dreaming, each 
would have remained a constant agent, and dreamed what the 
others dreamed» The dream, as changing forms, would have in
each individual case demanded no spiritual substance "out
/
there", and the dreams would have been different occurrences 
in different places, thou^ in another sense they would have 
been identical# Such a possibility we may note and remember, 
since it is different from a case of spectators of the same 
occurrence#
Our dreams, like our eating and our reading and reflect­
ing we can date# Done, they cannot be undone; but they cease 
"to be" vhen done# We persist, and dream and ©at and reflect 
again; and we, it seems, have substantiality# We are forms of 
a substance# But Prospère speaks of the whole pageant as 
insubstantial, and then of the ^ole world as later to "dis­
solve", while we, parts of the world, are like the \diole of 
which we are ports, of the stuff that dreams are made of.
The world, we in the world, are not, on this view, gur dremms# 
All things in the world, like ourselves, are fated to cease
to be# ^
This can be stated without reference to substance at all.
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Hor need we refer to dreams and pa/i^ eants* The full metaphy©- 
leal argument about "substance", however, proves from the 
fact of persistent tonnge of things that it is necessarily true 
that a substance»stuff lasts eternally* Descartes also proves 
that he, as indi#idual substnnce-eesence, self-*experiencing 
In 2£E2ES£f also lasts forever# Trom forms or acts, from 
relations or common features of individuals as attributes, 
the argument is also via a necessary truth to a substance, 
stuff or agent \diich necessarily exists and, different necess­
arily from the forms or acts or relations or attributes, the 
substance cannot conceivably suffer the vicissitudes of forms, 
acts, rolA'tions ok attributes.
Variation of the truths or of their application enables 
us to accept the changing of historical things snd to prove 
that the attributes are unchanging and eternal, thou^ persab- 
ulatoryi from the necessity of the changing world, or of 
discontinuous time, being sustained, we can arrive at an 
eternal relation of sustaining or support, ahd an eternal 
act of support and agent of supporting acts; and denial of 
the necessary eternal!ty of the act or relation of sustaining 
does not deny the etemality of the agent-sub stance, who can 
merely cease to act and sustain » He can cease to "think" or 
to "dream" the world* There seems clearly enough to be a 
coimon pattern to the arguments, and which principle we apply 
to on asserted fact or facts seems to depend upon what sort 
of eternal substance we have decided beforehand we are going 
to prove necessary* \
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(5)» If Y lo a lozm, then there must be a substance X of 
.Alch it Is the ion*. Ai^ thing is à form of a substance#
T ■ f (YX) • Differences between substmtlalistst l*e. bet­
ween those vftio accept T" f(YX) « accept the category of 
subs tance-form as tbe vital category for metaphysics and 
philosophy and fundamental science, have always been differences 
as to tdiat different substances there were, or what the neeesa- 
ary Bubstnnoe was. With certain exceptions it has been e«n~ 
orally maintained that (a) we are always encountering femes 
of substance, and (b) that we never encounter substance - 
directly. The exceptions we must note: if, like Thales, we 
insist on water we are insisting that we encounter "substance 
in its actual purity, and we have a valuable «qpirical thesis. 
Our claim is •Oiat all things can be transformed into water,  ^
and it is valuable because we leam a lot about things in 
trying to transform things historically into water or water 
into them (of. the work of the Alchemists)« The scientist 
refutes us, however, ty showing water to be cœt©lex, by prov­
iding a subst; nee or substances which explain the changing  ^
of water; the metaphysician proves us necessarily wrong by 
lowing that we have no reason for saying that \mter is not 
a form of vapour, or that water and vapour are not equally *  
forms of earth, or of ttie substance of %Aieh they are all
forms. - . Il a## "j .
^  - if'If we try to write "substances"^^for *m*bstamce" in (a) 
and (b)^ above, we necessarily encounter the same difficulty 
as with Descartes* a t t w t  to provide two subject-substances
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and distinguish between thaai the differences cannot be 
”substantive” I and if they are formal we have no two subst^ 
ances, •while If there is one substance it cannot, qua subst­
ance, be said to have a form. What was argued above of x a 
and 0 and X» of 0x. and J^ x, raiaains true if we call 0 and 0 
forms instead of attributes.
In general matters, we maintain a plurality of substances
and forms by distinguishing qualities and forms, by recognis-
/»
Ing Bubstance-stuffs of different kinds, whatever forms they 
occur in. Without the distinction, we seem bound to assert 
that only forms are directly known or known at all. When we 
recollect that the unfortunate "naive realist" is bound Iqr 
certain philosophers with sense-datum axes to grind to a 
thssis that visual data are at best parts of the surfaces of 
"material bodies", and that most visual terms, like tactual 
terns, are closely concerned with forms qua shapes, our 
present consideration of past problems does not seem remote 
from post-Cartesian questions.
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that Proppero’s question, 
substantialist* questions, are necessarily bound up with 
questions of sensation and perception.
6. Keeping Prospers * s fine phrases in mind, and ignoring the 
things we meet and discuss and investigate tdiile considering
en bloc.all things that are and have bema, we can note meta-
. . ...
physical implications of a "one substance" thesis. Those 
Who speak lyrically of a material stuff-substance lAich is 
id^tical Mid unchanging throu^out the universe can talk of
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cho.xigef since they can ”x at was y ” and ”x at t^ was 
s”f v^oro X is the material substance and y and z are accounts 
of the foms of the substance and so accounts of the world at 
times t^ and t^# Presumably the accounts will be \diat we 
would call "phases of history” t and would take the form of 
tlie complex faci>etat€aaentB which we regard as History# All 
history is, then, a matter of changing forme, of forms %dnlGh
9 - '
com© into being and cease to be and can be contracted with 
and related to on© another, while the mattervsubstmice, by 
definition and indescribability, stays one and eternally the 
same#
Such materialists do not deny that men droam, or that 
dreams may be just like material reality in the sense thggt 
a dretmed picnic on the oahds seems to me, the dreamer. Just 
like tlie picnic we had on the sands at a material time and 
place# Dreams can be treated, as I have treated them, by 
insisting on the verb ”to dream* and *ms?n* as the subject; 
the penalty, however, is that *x is matter^.in»form* is campat*"^  
Ible with «X does y” for all va ues of *x* and *does y* that 
can appear in fact str?t«aents, and values of *does y ”, and any 
quality term which distinguishes a form from another form, 
indicate not ^orms of matter but qualities and acts of formed- 
matters - qua things. When we add further that our account 
of man in terms of structures of organa, nerves, muscles, 
bones, tissues, cells, blood and circulation.••no matter how 
far we carry the investigation, will always halt at forms 
or structures of forma of matter, tsôiile the structures
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ar« es&entlal to a Btatment of the relation hetwomi a ’ 
toim of matter and coqponont 'foras of aatter, ve nay well 
wonder Whether "substance"» as "matter", has' any neaning
all, 'VC. ;î-/. 3 . . . iS-PC :v v fvi
For seveiai reasons the matoriallst is happier talk:^g 
about history or #the world" than about evants and conmonplace 
things» and %Aieh he begins to specify his' matter ai atoms or 
extension or a phynieal stuff he has considerable difflcalty 
with dreaming or thinking. Re cannot, with any'facility,' 
alBtt>ly declare dreams and thoughts to be "foras" and just “ 
"immaterial" and, once the "matter" Is specified,' the quest­
ion "How can a specific fora of the specific matter think or ' 
dream?" becomes a justifiable critical attack. Descartes^ it 
will be recalled, argues from^the Impossibility of foras of *
extension thinking to the necessity of"things' hot forms of
extension; Ï-  V  '4
Those who maintain atwo-substance thesis can avoid*thé 
logical difficulty of «ibstance^less foras by declaring ^ 
dr earns to be foras of a real immaterial ^ substance — "inaaater- 
ial" ceasing to be a "negative or privative" term and becoming 
positive, * not-ji" becomes "Jf", end is "mind";
Accepting'the counter-thesis, we can obntrast the dreamed 
picnic with-the real picnic as "different substancos with idwt-
ical forms, whether or not we realise that wo are close to 
echoing an ancient theory of Pérc^tiôm InwWledge is tiie mind*s
being in the seme fora as that of the object; perception the 
passage of fora without iaatter-substance into'mind, the* reflect­
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ion or mirroring of what is before our organs* But if we 
cannot characterise the substances in any way, cannot **encoun- 
ter” them in their nudity or “conceive” them in their nudity, 
we can distinguish them only by reformce to the difference 
between dreaiaroccurrences and real»occurrences# This diff­
erence once recognised, we can claim that the substance diff­
erence explains it and must be so; but the distinction 
between dream and real which is to be explained is all that 
gives meaning to the explanation, to the argument to the 
necessarily so or the statement of the necessary conclusion#
The subs tance-difference, moreover, seems to be predicative.
It corresponds to “real” and “unreal”, “actual” and “fantastic”, 
“occurrent* and ”non-occurrent“# (If we believe,with Broad, 
that Reality can be divided into existents and uohf*existants, 
the correspondence would be with “existent and Heal” and 
“non-existent and Heal”)#
If we can Gay *x is material”, or ”x is extended”, we 
can say ”x is a form of matter”, ”x is a form of material 
substance”# If we can say ”Y is a dream”, we can say ”JF is 
a form of dream» subs tance”, ”Y is a foim of mind”# In this 
sense extended or material substance and minci-substance are 
utterly distinct “existences”# And if we close our eyes to 
difficulties wo can treat dreea-substance-foms as perceived 
in the same way as are extended-substance-foms# ,
(c^uite i\part from our need to moke statements about 
“minds” which are entirely foreign to dream-stuff-fcm 
notions, unless we insist on the purely visual or spatial
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relations between things i>erceived, relations between things 
are not material as the things are material, and actions 
are oven more troublesome. If we talk of the things ^  the 
dream, we have to talk of unextended centaurs being non»spat­
ially chased by unextended dogs, which is very; different from 
saying that dreams are unextmded, demand no space* Unextended 
things, centaurs or geometrical points, are inconceivably 
coloured or perceivable » and if we want to revert to "seem to 
be", we have to restore an "I", a thing vdilch they seem, 
give an account of and thm. sort out "Centaurs are forms 
of a substance and seem to be coloured and extended" from . ^  
"Centaurs are coloured and extended, forms of a substance and 
only seem to be" - even, it seems, vhen "perceived") * w m  
(7) If we consider the vast series of statements which we 
call History,-the materialist fastens onto,the nouns rather 
than the verbs and adjectives, prepositions and conjunctions 
and adverbs*? The strength of his position^ lies,in the fact' , 
that without,nouns no.stetements are,meaningful in History, 
and in the case of any thing the, fors^substance distinction 
can be made. Ifueh of our science proceeds in accordance with 
this "principle" •• Having establiehed that a and b and c are 
of the same stuff d, we seem to have grasped what a and b end 
o really are. Chemists, especially, are convincing here when 
they Change d frwa amfora to b-. form to,o-fora, : <aisnge smne 
thin}? from solid to liquid to gw; we.seaa really^ to have 
understood what is Involved in change vdien we realise that
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It was Just d all the time* Descartes, In a more complicated 
fashion, did this with his piece of vrax.
So with knowledge of the staff we get nearer to a grasp 
of Reality, of what is really so. But we \reuld reach "real 
Reality" vdien we managed to indicate the substance^'stuff 
common to all things - we have then oetahlishod what Really 
Is and Never Changes, in contrast with the merely changing 
or mere changes* Change is to he aigplained hy the Changeless; 
history is not explained by the historical, and history is 
a matter of forme or appearances or "phenomena", not really 
ocientific and certainly not philosophical* There is something 
wrong, something itratiomil. about time which involves 
processes and change, as distinct from Time, idtich involves 
neither. '
The "argument" flows,*’ end metaphysics is signalled by 
a rash of capitals* The category of change - process, alter­
ation, becoming; development, all statements involving these - 
is denied; but only at the level of Reality. •
Time and change and process are vital to the argument 
to Subotenoe, partly because they are held to necessitate 
the Substance-thesis on logical grounds, partly because 
without change we simply have classifiable things with diff­
erent qualities. The physicist's "indestructability of 
matter" is argued to from' change. And it is both change and 
the element of mere-time Which appeals to Prospéré who is, 
like his creator and Webster, much « possessed by %ea%* In
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a metaj^hyslcal modo of smooch, what concerna him is that if 
MSL present time the substance of the past Is present# 
then the forms of the past are at that time merely forms; 
and history# behind a fleeting present# is like a dream#
Like the centaur and the goat of last night# Prosper© cone^ 
ludes# we are the stuff that dreams are made of. Prospère ; 
seems to have substituted a rnlndmstuff which is immterial 
for the matter-subst^mce \diose forms are history.
If we forgot all about dreams# and think only of the 
historical world# we ca*i find this metaphysically Interesting# 
even exciting. If the past is immaterial and unreal# or 
real and non-existent (“existing only in memory"# “existing 
only in or for minds”)# and the future is immaterial and 
unreal and does not oxist^,oven in anticipation (except in the
I
gross guise of the Future, which is blahkly non-specific and 
not "logically nocessaiy';), all that can be material is the 
immediate pres«it; and if that is instantaneous and timeless 
it is nothing* (If the specious present has duration, it "is" 
veiy little, and specious anyway)* Thus, if«the material 
substance eternal, it must be co-exteneive with Space in 
its three dimensions and co-extensive with Time in its one 
dimension, BO that "material-substance" is identical with
"Space-Time"*.,
l’Yen prosper©*B point of»view, we begin with a consid­
eration of events in time,i.e* of history, and we reach a 
conclusion that what is historical is iauaterial, insubs tant—
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lal; Tram another (and Cartealaas) point of view, we reach 
a conclusion that ■vÆiatever is historical is a form of màtejo* 
ial substance, a fora of that \/hii<3i can only toe said to to#' 
extended and to persist—  we can leave for a moment the * 
objection that strictly It cannot toe said to be or do anything 
at all. Neither, presumably, wants or intends to deny that 
a gorgeous palace built of stone in 692 and razed in 1243 
ever existed, or that it does not exist now. Neither seems 
particularly concerned with the possibility of tracing out 
the history of "the palace" after 1248 - the vicissitudes of . 
the stones and fragments of stone, of transportation and 
alteration and weathering and decomposition. The point is 
that neither feels any cot^pulsion to d£ history as an ' '
accompaniment to esplalning i t . ' * '«« «: » - '
The palace, for Prospero, is gone, ^ and he, you and 
I will some day also be ^ne. We are insubstantial, imperm­
anent, forms of a* dreasa-stuff• Prospéré does not elaborate; 
but if the dreamer is God, and \diether or not the drema-stuff 
continues eternally as God dreams on forever, we are no * 
longer dreamed and no longer exist? If there is just "dream" 
and no dreamer, the dream-stuff continues forever, capable 
only of assuming new foras;*'®
Matter or Extended-Substance (Descartes» "Boty") 
is identical with -Space-Time, we can no more ssy that it * ‘ 
exists than^we can say ^Space-Time exists. We cannot say that 
it is arywhere, anywlien, or'not anywhere snytAen -"our guide
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is the naturol li^t, and at this point it Blng>ly goes out.
It malces no more sense to say that Space-Time existe than 
that it came into being or could cease to he. If we call 
Spucfj-Time "Real" or "Eternally Real", then only Opace-Tlme 
is Real; oven if we call "things* foms of Space-Time, all 
things vdiich we say exist or did exist are Unreal.
It seems to be true that having said this, we have said 
all that we can say; and that we have, if we have anything, 
further information about things vdioae general accounts still 
hold, tOfjether with odd statemaits about S^aco-Time. Descartes' 
insistence on particles ?utd instants is related to this, but 
very different. Particles are foms of extended substance, 
foms of body Which is identical with space because "unfilled 
space" is a contradiction. Particles persist forever, and in 
contact they constitute the res extenaa. while in contours 
they constitute gross bodies* Yet for a particle to exist 
forever entails that it has been created and is sustained 
instant by successive Instant by God, and sustaining is béth 
annihilating and re-creating. God is Substance in a special 
sense, since He is Eternal and Unchamging and needs no raipport; 
particles are both poraanant and impemanait, divinely 
sustained ty annihilation and creation; individual thinking 
substances are likewise permanent and ii^peraanent, divinely 
sustained in the way God has to sustain to satisfy Descartes' 
atcmic space-time theory.
What Descartes thinks is possible ie to assert these 
propositions in one context and then to forget thorn. Having
p i*
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forgotten them, the mind-things can be treated simply as 
persisting things, the particles can be treated just as 
persisting things. “Thinking* and “extension* become* essences 
and characteristics. But if gross bodily things are forms 
of the 2 gs extensa or of particles, they are Unreal because 
they are transient and diange; or they are Unreal because 
formed and changing, particles by contrast being Heal because 
they do not change in form; or the gross bodies are Unreal 
because formed and dionging and Real because they are body 
and 80'substantial, so that the things of history are both 
Real and Unreal at the same time. If bodily things familiarly 
noted in History are Really only configurations of maiQr peirtic- 
les, especially if the particles move in and^through them. 
History is Really a record of changing configurations, and what 
we call History does not apply rto the physical or extended 
world at all*
What we call History is just like a dream,-a series of 
dreem-stttff-forms. Unreal as changing and forms. Real as^ 
dream-stuff-substance, both Real.,and Unreal, but differently 
Unreal from the way, in particles are Real m d  differ«itly .- 
Unreal from the .way in which changing con igurations ^
- Unraol. The more that we insist on qualities of such.forms 
of staff and activities of such forms of stuff j^at cannot 
ibe qualities or activities of particles or configurations of 
particles, the more history .becomes for me my dream, or my 
perception ^ W^iich is dreaming - and the difficulties are, 
clear'if we want to:contrast iay “r«ttl'L dreams wildi my ig#
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perceptions Which are dreams. You and Tom and Bill and I 
have the same perception-dr earn, let us say; otherwise there 
is no histoiy. These dreams, we may say, are caused hy 
configurations of particles, real and unknowable forms of 
Space-Time, acting on minds. These causings are part of 
Real History; but what we call History is vhat exists only 
for minds, in minds, as dream-forms and memory of dream 
forms. Ko one has, I think, attempted to decompose the 
dream-form things into eternal elements as Descartes does 
both the res extensa and thou^t - the latter as changing 
patterns of ideas in combination. >
8. The complications are far from completely unfolded, and 
there are more Histories, more Relations, more Realities or 
Degrees of Reality to be elaborated. Even in terms of "subs­
tance", God as substance is unique, unclassifiable, eternal, 
individual, and persists as undianging in action. The 
Particles are eternal, individual, plural, classifiable, 
qualitied, move, and are forms o f ,the Res Extensa. The Res 
Extensa is a substance, is one, contraAts with Mind, is 
uncâianging in persisting, yet occurring always in foms vdiich 
are particles or (differently) things called bodies. Minds 
qua individuals are contrasted with particles, indepaadent of 
each other and of particles, and apparently unchanging in 
acting. Thinking-substances occur at different places, in 
different forms and siodes of individual occurrences of think­
ing substance. The thinking substance is also a modal succesion 
of combinations of ideas. Minds assd aggregates of pwtieles
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c.r« causally related in a system of mutual affecting and » 
being affected that explains history anchor is the real 
History vdxich underlies our history. Real History is Real 
Thought; unreal history is the effect of particles on a 
gross body with a mind, and the mind acts on such a body, 
moving that body in the Real World. And Hind, now, is to 
be known as either will or Will, lAich seems flagrantly 
different in all respects from Thinking or thinking or 
dreaming or drcaming-perceiving.
All these positions are Cartesian, and they represent 
difirent metaphysics of substance. They bear unmistakeable 
resemblances to pro-Aristotelian metaphysics which Aristotle 
rejected. Substonce-form is merely one of them. Why are % e y  
all possible, and what can be evidence for or against any of 
t h e m ? . v-i - ■ . V R- , « ;
. Remembering Qiat we have ne^ected, our original emti thesis
of dreau^»world and seen-world, and even our insistmice oH
the formal identity of the witnessed in reachin.' our contrast
of Prospère * s thesis and materialist thesis, let us return to
the latter. ®
Prospéré seems to substitute a mind-stuff for the matter
which gives substantiality to the materialist's world. But
Idle point seems fairlyt clear that, what we call history remains
the same on either thesis. Vhat I am now going to argue is
that just as fact statements are what enable us to give
meaning to different sciences end to philosoplQr, and to relate 
sciences to sciences and to philosophy, so historical statements
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give zieaning to certain scientific stateaaents and metskphysical 
these».
If “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is a true strtement# then 
both “substance” theories accept It as true# along with a 
host of other statements# and if no such statement» are true# 
there is no meaning to be given to “substance”# or of Space 
and Time - there is nothing to talk of at all. Whatever 
metaphysical statements w© may want to make# whatever state- 
ments we may wont to make about metaphysical statements or 
about fact stat%iienta# metaphysical problems have their 
source in coimaon-place fact assertions# in what we take to 
b e ,true and state a© true. Such statements include# without 
ceasing to be fact statuants# statements about relations 
between identifiable and dletingulshabl© things# and the 
relations include spatial relations between thing» and temporal 
relations between things; alongside these relation stataaents 
are temporal activity statements which are dated by means 
of tonses and specific dates tmd references to simultaneous 
activities. Among the much else that is included is a class 
of statements about “substance” and “stuff” # the sense of 
which would nuke “Oaesar is of the some stuff as a tomato# a 
pine tree# a piece of granite# a puff of wind and the very 
best bitter” nonsensical even to those who found it transparu 
ently clear that the whole historical world must be made of
one stuff or two stuffs.
History remains the same# and fact statements remain 
the some. Beginning here# we may get to problems about
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space and time or Space-Time; but we do not begin with such 
problems. If we can consider space and time at all independ­
ently of history, wo have no problems; they are “clear and 
distinct ideas”, wholly grasped in being grasped at all.
Take them to be “real existents”, and we can naively put 
our things in space and our events in time; we rest content 
until we are forced to recognise that ”in” will not woik, 
because our things and our events are “saturated” with both.
M .  a
Bather as Ideas and thoughts which are initially placed “in 
minds” become minds, things in space become space, events in 
time become time. When Descartes identified “extension” and
..'s .
"body" he was denying that bddies are conceivable as merely 
jjS space, and the denial is important for plqrsics and for 
philosophy. But it is not equivalent to denying that bodies 
re other than extensions or spues in space; it is in a 
sense equivalent to "bodies are in body" if the latter is . 
taken to mean "any two bodies will be separated by other bodies",
.f ■ *'*■
"men and mountains are separated by air and vmpour", "no two
bodies can be merely distant".
It is, however, clear that bodies and their distances 
can be considered as "mere extensions"; we need only to pay 
attention to the shapes Vhich identifiable things have, shapes 
which can be measured as their distance can be measured.
Two such things % and y cannot be regarded as "merely in space' 
because it is true of each of them that they are extended; we 
have to "reduce" the things to "centres of force", "centres
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gravity", and dony them extension in or«ier to got “pure 
epaco" cmd convert all our meamiremento into measurement a of 
distance, and until we have done this (perhaps with some 
justification as physicists) our science of measurement is 
a science of the world because the relation between things 
and space is not “external” but “intimate”. The intimacy 
is here “predication”, a logical and not a “real” relation; 
the things in question are extended - th ^  are extensions 
in the sense that any thing which is Y can be called a Y. 
Calling them “forms of extwsion” states the intimacy in
f
another way; "x la a form of extension", "x is a fora of 
extended substance", "x is extended", say no more than each 
other.
Familiar things like trees and men, iron bars and 
microscdpically observable fragments or unitiss-can be values 
of X in such statements. The scientist may want to "conceive" 
other values of x, to conceive things with dlfîerent descrip­
tions from those of familiar things. Until he provides the 
different descriptions he either says nothing or makes state­
ments about "X", statements not about "a thing" but all members 
of a class, an% thing which is in fact extended. And as I 
argued above, when he provides the descriptions the relation 
between the conceived things and familiar things is that 
between what is conceived to be so and what is otherwise 
taken to be so. If what is conceived ^ s so, the relation is 
matter of fact or empirical, and reference to "conception" is 
irrelevant; if "conception" is relevant, th«m our talk of
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"a relation" demands, to be meaningful, a concelver udio 
iB otherwise aware of vftiat is so - concept-thoughts must • 
he intimately related to a substance-thing by the intimacy 
of "x does think","x does conceive" — and lAo can provide 
some sort of argument in the fora "what is so could not be 
so unless" or "if what is conceived le so, what is so must 
be so".
If we ^nke actually encountered things to be values of 
X in "x is extended”, then certain of the things are also 
values of "x is a thinking thing"! The intime te Union of 
"thinking substance* and "extended substance" is to be found 
in " m m  are extended''and think". The some man is a fora of 
extended substance and a fora of thinking substance - unless, 
we contrast'not "thinking" and "being'extended* but "thou^t" 
and "extension". "Feras of extension” we can treat as familiar 
bodily things or as concsptuali "foras of thou^t" we can * 
treat as any thou^t, or as classes of thou^ts - with due 
lack of senile we can treat the classes as sensationeü af « % 
imaginations^ drerâs, reflections^ jud^ents and conceptions, 
the members of ^ i^®will^differ from each other in fora - -s 
and from then on ^ 1  that seems clear and distinct is that 
we have very little idea of what we are saying in any statements 
about "substance" of "foras" or the relation between our two 
substances. If we treat - "p is a fora of thou^t" as "p is 
a sensation, imajgination,dream br.'w..". We can, after detora— 
ining \diether a particular "p" is a sensation or a dream or... 
consider the "content", the statement of what was sensed or
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dreamed or# #. in relation to other etatejiente which presant 
the “content” or another type of “thou^t“, what was sensed 
or dreamed or####, and once the content is specified our 
question of “foxsa” becomes “of what are the things sensed, 
dreamed# conceived etc# forms”, and the things are dogs, 
centaurs, mathematical equations, omnipotent deities or 
propositions in logic#
9# For Prosper© or for the materialist. History ae fact 
statements remains the some# Caesar crossed the Rubicon# 
Caesar (almost) swam the flooded Tiber# Accept Cassius* 
account in Shakespeare*s play as History - it is easier to 
consider this than “Shakespeare wrote a play“, since Caesar*s 
awiiming is more easily an evmit or a dream# The event 'belongs 
to the past# We understtmd the statement, and can let the 
natural light radiate.
The Tiber still exists, at the moment not in flood, and 
with deeper deposits of silt than in Caesar's dsgr. In a mill­
ion years the Tiber may have disappeared. It may be remembered; 
it may not; that for multitudes the Tiber does not exist is 
irrelevant to any question of vdiether or not the Tiber exists 
even now. If the Tiber ceases to exist, then at one time both 
•the Tiber existed" and "the Tiber does not exist" will be 
eternally true, and at any time the two stataaents, with the 
unspecified dates specified, will be true. The statement 
■the Tiber existed" has to be know», underotwid, as true, in 
order to belong to History; knowing that it is true is knowing 
that the Tiber belongs to history, and this is knowing that
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“the Tiber existed” belongs to History. What is stated in 
History is identical with \;diat is history; what is history 
is in part identical with History and in part does not 
“appear” in History at all. And all this means is that we 
can give an account of some of the events of the past, and 
can discover and give an account of other events of the past. 
•Caesar swam the Tiber” is Indubitably a thought of mine 
to me while I am thinking ”Caesar swam the Tiber”, but if I 
call the thought ”a form of mental substance now” the relat­
ion between the historical act of over 1900 years ago and the 
occurrence of a form of mmtal substance now is “over 1900 
years” and that only. Once we stop thinking about forms of 
thought we can raise the questions “Why do we think that 
Caesar swam the Tiber?”, “How do we know that Caesar swsm 
the Tiber?*, and these permit of answering and critical consid*
tv ^
oration of the answerings. "Why we think" can easily be
i '
twisted into "how we come to think", but not into "How we
•f' /I
think", which seras to lose all flavour of meaning When it 
is cœqpleted by "Caesar swam the Tiber".
Caesar, before he swam, was à fora of flesh and bone and 
blood, a fora of body, an extended substonee; the Tiber was 
a fora of water, a particular river in an ua«*o«t thou^ not 
extraordinary (flooded) fora. Even if the spate ceased a 
little, the fora changed, as Caesar swam, the Tiber remained 
the Tiber, still a river, still a body of water, à fora of 
extension or extended substance or body. When Caesar emerged
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h© wa» still Caosar, a man with a form# lighter perhaps
throu^ sweating, wrinkled perliaps in skin with fear and
»
cold, older and wiser, perhaps grayer, less ebullient. He 
Had lost attributes (which did not remain in the Tiber), 
acquired attributes (which were not in the Tiber) ; the 
Tiber had perhaps lost and acquired attributes, certainly 
had if we call “containing Caesar” an attribute on the ground 
that “the Tiber contained Caesar” was a true statement. The 
Principle of Identity epplies, but it did not sustain Gaeaar 
in the Tiber; the Principle of Différées did not annihilate 
Caesar. The water and Cassius sustained Caesar; the water 
almost annihilated him.
A series of statements of a logical or grammatical kind 
which are (if with some difficulty) able to be understood 
as truly made of the noun “Caesar" or the subject “Caesar" 
in a series of true statements are completely meaningless 
as statements about Caesar, as statwents of history or 
statements in Histoiy. The historical statements are mean­
ingful to those who have no knowledge of the technical terms 
and meaningless to those who can claim knowledge only of the 
technical terms - and to be the latter it would be necessary 
to understand graiamar and logic without an acquaintance with
sentences and statements.
Caesar now is dead, and his flesh may (inaccurately) 
be said to have turned to clay, while he (with poetic licœce) 
may be said, if certain other events have occurred, to stop 
a hole to keep the wind away. The form of an extended substance
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chiixiged, or was changed, from human to irregular cylindrical, 
the substance stayed the same* Caesar the ihiperor is Caesar 
the Bung.
And this seems both sense and nonsense* Given the account 
of Caesar's death, of the putrefaction end Change of his 
flesh, its becoming part of a mixture of earth and the result­
ants of putrefaction, and the moulding of part of the mixture 
by someone into a serviceable shape for plugging a hole in 
a keg, "Caesar is a bung" is meaningful and true - if we under­
stand it as "Caesar became a bung" and can ejgiand "became" 
into the historical account* The historical account itself 
is history as writtra, S£qr, for bio-chemists or criminologists, 
men who are interested in some questions about Caesar and 
not in the least interested in Caesar as Caesar the lagperor, 
soldier, statesman, husband and social animal* Ho one expects 
the bung to issue edicts, or eadiibit behaviour indicative of 
having fallen in love with another Cleopatra* A quite rational 
man m i ^ t  argue that for the issuing of edicts i or furthw 
Caesarean amatory experi races the W n g  would have to become 
Caesar, and many rational men have produced arguments which 
are relevant to ilie question "Under vhat conditions could 
Caesar re-nppear after being in the bung stage?".
If geometers had any capacity for dealing with irregular 
and changing volumes, a geometrical history could, after obser­
vation, be provided of Oaesar and the bung, and such an 
account would be of interest - to geometers. T>iey could, with 
more looseness than in early times, be called "earth measurers".
4 3 0  •
(a) The greater degreei of looseness is clesr from the 
fact that the Initial measurements or forms are not of earth 
at all. It is true that the series of state ente of formal 
chringd# taken in Isolation from fUTthcr statements as to 
what vas measured and had the forja# do not "entail" that the 
measurements of forms were of Caesar or of l%esh or of anything 
else; and if it is held that it is logically possible to have 
forras only if they,*are of a substance, the lack of entailmcnt 
cim be indicated by the disjunction "flesh or earth or cement 
or w f A t e r . a  disjunction #3lch con be determinate only if 
we add "and these are all the substfmces which cbh be in the 
forms in question" as a known trut^ i. The ar^jument to necessary 
substance terminotes factually in one of these, or in a further 
claim that even if it is one of these it is really a substance 
which is none of these# Any of these substances loay appear at 
different stages in the historical account of changing things, 
and they may be said to change and to become one another in 
some cases, end to be capable of assuming loany forms#
Yet much of what was said above of Caesar* s becoming 
a bung is in fact nonsense. Accepting the historical account 
of Caesar and bung, we begin with a form of flesh and conclude 
with a form of earth - substance and form are each different 
at the ends of an historical process# Change of things is com-
^  "  ' - I .  -
patible with difference of substance and of form# only if we 
insist on "Caesar changed forra from humnn to cylindrical" is 
there "rational coiopulslon" to argue to a single and unchanging
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BUbetcfiO* vâiich oakea possible the change of fora within 
the identity of a persisting thing "Caesar", and once we 
expand the account into historical detail «the identity of 
a persisting thing Caesar" is almost completely devoid of 
meaning. But accept the change as change of fleiA into 
putrefaction and earth mixture, and deny that history ig 
what connects the substances in a-process of change, and we 
seemingly must look for a new identity in the guise of a 
substance in Ohanging foras. Ho one of the phase-subs tances 
can be the substance because it'Ohanges; insistence on the 
historically latest or last is pointless because the earlier 
aubstfmoea were not the last. Caesar was not made of earth 
if earth means that ae lAich his bodily decsy ooncludea; and " 
the hheeis that Caesar began as a fora of earth is merely
The history of foras leaves out all substance; add that 
the history is of^ foras of substance, and we leave out all 
subs tances. « «Bust unto dust" is al familiar statement, which
'••a
we are assured was not spoken of the soul; and we know %Ay 
the statement was so often made, why it was not spoken of the 
soul. Those familiar with Bacon realise the historical import­
ance of Jkhe account of creation which involves duet and thé 
Divine in-breathing of the "breath of life*, even if they can 
find nojJustification for any post-creational dualism in Genesis, 
which seems to leave the creation of further human beings to 
familiar activities of Adam and his rib-derivative.
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Du&t l0 a poor candidate for oubatance beoauee we know wlbat 
dust is, what dust is not# can give an account of it and alter 
it| considered seriously# the teaoa collapses into a series 
of disjuncte and one of the foms in which substance may 
appear# And applied to any man post Adam# Including Caesar# 
if “dust" lias any of its usual meaning# "he was a changing 
form of duet throufdiout hie life and after his life? is sheer 
nonsense#
(b) "Kxtension" is in better case# since we can say of 
growing from foetus to senile corpulence that it is a matter 
of changing extension# and we mi^t even extend this to the 
succeeding generations of extensions which procédéd the 
birth of Caesar# But i^ ie purely formal account has no entailm- 
ente# once again# as to substance or thing; we can get from 
history to the formal account# but not vice versa by a principle# 
and if we attest to say "existing ie Just a passage of one 
extended fora into another" we leave out all history, leaving 
out the things whioh may be called ferae of substance or 
substances, and we seas headed for a blank t^ace in vdiidti 
nothing happens, a space which is the ultimate substance itself 
and in which "foras" are meaningless. lor history we require 
that tilings should be spoken of as extended, and as Changing 
extensionally; history is unaffected if "things are foras of 
extension" is equivalent to "things are extended"; and if 
"things are forms of extension" is not equivalent to "things 
are extended" then the atatemrat falls right outside hisAory ,
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(c) Granted thot this holds of flesh and human bodies, it 
may still seem arguable that the historical statements about 
changing fleéh and resulting substances does not entail any 
statement about emotions and activities, loving or issuing 
edicts,being born or dying* There is, then, no reason %*y we 
should not surrender "Caesar is a bung", "Caesar became a bung"*
It was Caesar's body that became or is. If the body-history 
is self-conAàined, Caesar and his history fall outside it.
In so far as my History is in terms of Caesar, man, statesman, 
soldier, »#eror, a human being \dio was born and died after 
doing many things, my History may be fundamentally wrong.
Caesar may have been a thing of a non-bo dily kind.
No one has claimed that Caesar was a thoui^t or a form of 
thought; Descartes claims him to have been a thinking thing, 
a soul or mind; but he also claims him to have been an intimate 
union, and all that is wrong with my History is that it ladks 
a set of statements about men being intimate unions, although 
it contains statements about their thoughts, desires, passions, 
and passionate activities. Vhat we should say of the form and 
substance of things which occhpy bodies intimately and do 
think neither Descartes nor anyone else informs us. The argument 
to souls is, as I have claimed above, from acts to agrat, and 
the removal of body as not logically necessary for the agent, 
lozm and substance are relevant to thou^t or thoughts, not to 
agents. Of the agents we can say that they do, lAat they do, 
not what they are. « u
(c) “Caesar swam the Tiber" is an event, was an event. History
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1b xaado up of evonts and# it may be claimed^ evente alone
are real# All that la real is %hat happens^ Wiat goes on#
the flow of occurrences# the flu* of process# This is intell­
igible onou^# but if it is simple counter^thesis to the 
matter^substance thesis# we are headed inerit^ly for a blank 
time in \diich events or occurrmices are all# while yet there
is nothing to occur* Events do not persist# and after the
date of their occurrence there is nothingleft of them# 
Profesuor Samuel Alexander# concerned with special 
problCiOS of Space and Time# concluded that Space and Time 
must be intimately united" if we are to make sense of our 
talk of events and if we are to Bay anything about Space and 
Time* He recomm<md8 us "to keep constimtly pictores of mater^ 
ial things and events before (the) mind# and then forget their 
richness of colours and miells and other qualities" fSpace*Ti^e 
and Deity. I# 59) | and what we discover as we proceed is that
; ft
we are considering things and evmts "in their simplest and
If
most elmmentary character* We learn that the naive view of 
Space and Time as a receptacle or framework in which things 
and events are found# which makes the connection of things 
with their space "almost accidental"# is so helpless that it 
drives us into a "relational vie%r"# a view for idiich space is 
a matter of relations betwew things and time a matter of 
relations i>etwe«B eventa (p.38). Alexander argues» as I have
t il
argued, that the things spatially related are apatial* Space 
and Time are not "merely the order of coexistwce or success­
ion".
'n
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If on the ast-us^tion Oiat Historical atatsaonts dto 
state or are atateoients of ertmts in history# refer directly 
to histozy (or Indirectly to histozy via History) to give 
meaning to ay, statements about Space and Time and Events#
In similar fashion I can give meaning to talk about fozms 
and substances# a variety of relations including internal 
and external and constitutive# to agents and acts# ^slities 
and attributes# essences end accidents# individuals and modes, 
and all the Principles 'vdiidh are expressed in such terms* 
Alexander# however# proceeds to a "third hypothesis", that of 
Space and Time as "the stuff or matrix (or matrices) out of 
which things or events are made# the medium in which they are 
precipitated and czystallised; that the fini tes are in smae 
Bonse complexes of ^ace and Time"*
"In the lan^iage familiar frma the seventeenth-century 
philosophy# things and events are 'modes* of these & substances'# 
extension and duration* In the saae instead of supposing 
that extension is a partial «Aiaracter of a colour or a touch# 
we may suppose coltmr to be a bharacter of the extension# that 
what we see is not extwded colour but coloured extension"(p.38) *
The second sentence will seem Incoherent# stripped of
its connection with a preceding page# but it serves to bring 
out Alexander's starting point: we have no sense organs for 
apprehending space and time# our sense organs enable us to 
apprehend only sensations# and the task is to get from sucdi 
apprehended sensations to a spatio-tesyporal familiar world# 
It is only In Book II that Aloxandor undertakes the long 
process of demonstrating that Categories are fundamental 
properties of Space-Time# and of elucldatlxig the Categories*
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becomes clear ae we read 1b that the goal is the 
e^qpunsion of Qpaco-Time propositione# of statements about-" 
fozms of a substance Sipaoe-Time# into à \forld and# as in the 
case of Descartes# into a familiar world. ïiue# it seems 
uniamillar enou^ as it "unfolds" with an embarrassment of 
rldhes Into Mental Space-Time and Physical Space-Time# and ' 
the leaps from Space-Time to Events, from Space-Time to 
Categorios# from Category to Category# are like plunges into 
complete darkness \Aich huppily land ue somewhere. Like the 
Hogelian leap from the Category of Being to the Category of 
Essence# they evade Reason# though Reason is professedly our 
only compulsion to proceed from the ( empty) security of a 
neceasory tiuth^ r»-
But the discontinu!'^ of the leaps is exactly M m t  we 
found in the case of Descartes and his Principles# and it is 
similar to the discontinuity of axioms and postulates and 
theorems* and these are "irrational" only %diile we wsert 
that principles or axioms or necessary truths are all wo have 
and from them we must reason into the darkness of the uhknown. 
If we can recognise that our ultimate goal is” the familiar 
historical world from vhibh we began as metaphysicians or 
scientists# that if we never abhieve "connection* trfth that 
world we are not doing eclenco or metaphysics# we must quspeot 
that Alexander is# as Descartes seems perpetually to be, 
arguiigln the wrong direction. The task is not to move, by 
argument frms metaphysical truth to metaphyelcal tiuth...*.to 
historical facts# but to demonstrate metephysieal truths in
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relation to historiœl feet-truths* Trom whatever metephye- 
leal truth, idiatever truth of reason, we begin the ar^uaent 
will hold* "Unless this and that other metaphysical truth, 
then no historical fact statements"* i
Sven the notion of "ordering" seems to prove delusoiy 
hero* Descartes, for all his confusion of different types of 
statements in his principles* never got to facts; it is the ' 
very difference between metaphysical tmths and fsust truths 
which makes it impossible for « sum of metaphysical truths to 
"constitute* a fact truth; but the main point is that it is 
painfully obvious that there is nothing \hlch could be called 
"order* in Descartes' arrangement of principles, and less 
obvious but more painful is the inter os ted reader's discovery 
that there is no "rational order", none of the professed 
deduction of categories, in Hegel's elaborate presentation 
of than* k r'- '
I am not crying "Hegelian nonsense" here, being 
acutely conscious that in so far as I am treading a philosoph­
ical path it was Hegel directly and via Anderéon In syAdey,
and Aristotle and others idio" taught me te walk*
■ . - M i
10. If, in apparently brutal and naively realist fashion, 
we refuse the metaphysical patiis which have been indicated 
above as producing fonts and unknown substances or ultimate 
substance, and contradictions,” vdiat happens?y Ue recognise 
that as well as a subject called history there are subjects 
like geography, anthropology, geology, anatomy, physiology, 
botany, astronomy*..and if there could be no subh subjects
^ 43 8 ,
there could he no hletoiy, if histozy is what is stated in 
our Hlstoiy# W© find no reason to suppose that astronmnefs 
“invented* the heavenly bodies, that biologist's “invented" 
organisms. True statements can be made of the “Roman moon* 
and of Caooar# and the Roman moon was no mor© substantial 
than Caesar because wo can point to the same moon as th^ 
pointed to# and ’•Caesar is noWhere now’* does not give a postal 
address#
History is a matter of events# but It is a matter of 
events like **Caeoar swam the Tiber**# "Then we consider such an 
event# ve can make jmny statements about substanoe ^md form 
and change in relation to Caesar# or in relation, to the Tiberj 
ve can make necessazy statements# even about the evcmt - it
must have preceded other events# succeeded other events# been
. . ... . . 
contemporaneous with other events# since it occurred in this
world; and While thls^  ••necessily’* cannot provide us with a 
statement of any particular event, we can in terms of our 
understanding of the one historical stat<ment provide a 
series of statements about particular events which must have 
occurred if Caesar did cross the Tiber# The historical state­
ment cmd its fellows makes no use of «form**#”substcnce"# 
•attribute’»# •relation”| using those terms we can indicate
that classes of statements,which must be true if the account 
of Caesar and his swimiing it to be in any adequate,a»
actually involved in the understanding of the historical 
statement or statements#
The minisMM requirejuaent for a statement is that something
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should be said to be true or false of a thing; a statement 
of change requires that what is at one time said truly at 
another time, cannot be said truly# The grammarian’s • there 
must bo a subject and a predicate^ parallels the logician’s 
•there must be a substance and an attribute"# though as I 
argued at length above# the parallel is not strict. The 
subject is a noun# and what has the attribute and persists 
while an attribute ceases to ’’apply" is a persistent individual 
thing named# The thing truly spoken of exists#
The looseness of "attribute" and "naming" need not worry 
us if we consider that we are talking about statments meaning­
ful in our language# "Caesar swam the Tiber" is such a state­
ment. "Caesar" is e value of x in "if x is a substance#x is 
a persisting individual". It is only %dien we treat what is 
said of and what it dsJ éaid.of^as separable things# gut the 
subject-substance in one compartment (physical or mental# 
existent or idea) and the predicate^attributes ln”another# 
that we get "persisting Individual thing" as necsBsaxy but 
Tlnknovm,i«e* *x** and not a value of x as subject of all 
Btateaents* te, '
Whatever substance as individual thing we name, it.will 
be a kind of thing, numerically »distinct and generlcally 
distinct from other things, though generlcally Identical with 
some other things. “Caesar" ls3a value of x in “if x  is an 
individual, x is of a kind and not of other kinds". We have
begun to restrict our predicates or attributes now, without
' ' >
specification of the class.
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i’lariy attributes nay be at different times asserted of 
Caesar which are not to be asserted truly at other times.
With Proepero absent# Caesar is no longer Caesar \ùien he 
dies and becomes a bung. The individual ceases to be an 
individual when he ceases to be a member of a determined 
class# ceases to be of a special kind# vdien a defining attrib­
ute ceases to apply. So it seems that Caesar is Caesar while 
and only T^ diile ho is human# though all other attributes may 
at tiiAos not apply. All that remains constant and unchanging 
is "humanity"# and if by "substance" ve me^m "that which is 
constant and unchanging" then "humanity"# essence or definit­
ion or principal attribute# is substance.
If we consider statments about Cfiosar or other things 
which are historical# each is a value of x in "if x is an 
historical thing, x is of a kind all the time it persists".
The many possible kinds are indicated in our classificatory 
system or systems. If we decllure the kind to be substance# 
and manage to decide vhiOh level in our system is to be the 
"real kind" .or "first actuality" we have changed our philos- 
liical terminology. It still remains to declare that our 
substance in the second sense is an individual substance in 
the first sense before we can talk of the Kind as a Universal 
Eind persisting# appearing here and there, being related to 
other Universale# .as being in different places at different 
times and at different places at the same time.
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To the coi^plaint that this is unlntelligihle the answer 
is that the couu>lainer does not understand vdiat Universale 
aare, since Universals are just substances vdiich do vdiat they 
are said to do; to the cooplaint that it is meaningless the 
answer Is made by pointing toa proposition recognised as ' 
intelligible, "Caesar is human", and declaring that this "' 
is what is meant by, or this really means, "Caesar is an 
instonce of Humanity"* The difference between Cassius and 
Caesar is stated as (Wuanity occurs in different forms, 
and both are such forms"*
Once we have "fixed" the individual as a form or inst­
ance of a Universal, we can proceed to write our history as 
before. Caesar, as a form or instance of Humanity, can swim 
the Tiber, can be related to a form or instance of River or 
Rivemess. Indeed, Caesar as form or instance of Humanity, 
could not exist unless he were related to other forms or 
instances of Humani'ty and other Universals, and these relations, 
like acts, are different from one another and classifiable 
because swae are like others, so that'they too can be regarded 
as instances or forms of Relation or Act.
If we accept "substance" as the unchanging condition of 
and individual's persistence as an individual, then substance 
may be Kind or Act or Stuff or even Relation. ' 1er Descartes 
at various times and places in his writings, the essence of 
an individual man is "thinking", doing vihat brutes cannot do; 
as substance, "thinking" becomes "thought", and is an "exists^
nee" independent of bo4y; become "thinking* again, it demands
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an agent# a thing-subst^mce whoae esaence it la# and now the 
oBsenco or substance of a man is relation# intimate union. 
Contrasted with extension in its forms, related as coi^plex 
to the fozms of extension which are somehow "ttiousht" and 
"thoughts", thinking becomes thou^t again, and thou^t-stuff 
in fozms; and when the extended world becomes things in relat­
ion, tlie thou^t world becomes things in relation. Thou^t 
qua thou^t is thing or substance vdilch patterns or forms the 
Idiought-things into thoughts; motion qua motion-thing patterns 
into things the particle-things which it formed ly acting 
on the res extonsa. the extmded substance which is extension.
Throu{^ut we have actual individuals, kinds, acts and 
relations, or what purport to be wtual individuals etc. 
designated by familiar and non-technical terms, and it seems 
fairly clear that whatever we decide is to be called "substance* 
in relation to any individual, we cannot deny the necessity 
of the other non-substance terms if we are talking about 
historical things. At best we get one statement true of an 
individual all the time he or it persists, and this contraèts 
with, but does not falsify or deny, those statements lAich 
are true at one time and not at another. History, in other 
words, cannot be reduced to statements of the form "x is y 
at any time", however many Individual values of x and individual
values of y there may be.
C&osaT may bo rogjardod as a forsa of xoaa# of anlsiaX# 
of matter, of extension, of rationality, of thinking mibatanco. 
In ttie sense that has concerned us primarily in this chapter.
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n;jae2y substanco as stuff In fozxa, Caesar was a form of 
"flesh" - and this term is almost meaningless to us because 
we are familiar with distinctions between flash end blood 
and bone. Once we recognise this distinction, we also recognise 
flesh end blood and bone to have fozms and Caesar to have 
a structure, a structure similar to tliat of other animals.
The child's "fom of substance called fleet" is transformed 
into "structure of fozms of flesh and bone and blood" (thou^ 
we may be dubious of "blood" am formed in the same sense as 
flesh and bone). On the strength of cutting and peering 
throu^ microscopes, flesh and bone can be expanded into 
cells cuid tissues, and fibres, and muscles and bones into 
structures of cells or of tissues and fibres vdiich are struct­
ures of cells - and cells, according to biologists, can like­
wise be investigated and instead of fozms of pzrotoplaam they 
become structures of fozms of other substances. On the stren­
gth of baking and dissolving, all of these substances can be 
"reduced" to chemical constituents, and where the substances , 
have the same or similar chemical constituents, they have 
the same name and can be called fozms of a chemical substance.
We may note however that the bio-chcssist includes an 
element of history in his symbolic statements, the subbtance 
he began with being related to what he concludes with after 
baking and dissolving by an arrow instead of an equals sign.
His statement is "if you do * to y you get a", where y end z 
may he c<tiiyi>lexltieB and x a ooiBplicatod pirocedure; he uses 
the toim "irreversible" to indicate that he cannot do anything
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to X to g©t back to# or to# y - a complexity which has differ­
ent leatures and behaves in different ways from x. The chem- 
1st UDOs the equals-sign# and excludes history: or so it seems# 
until we realise that the top bar of the sign may be the sign 
of a coiî^licated procedure in a laboratozy and the bottom bar 
an entirely different and also complicated procedure in 
cases where the chemist has discovered it.
The Tiber v/as a fom of water, of diéty water; it was a 
structure of mud and water and a variety of chemical constit­
uents related differently to water froia the way in which mud# 
itself a complex of constituents for the chemist# was related 
to water. By mechanical ;uid chemical means the cheiiist can . 
separate from dirty water similar to that of the Tiber the 
particles of earth and the chefnical constituents, leaving pure 
water# which was also a constituent of the Caesarean body.
From •Caesar is a form of flesh”# a specific form of a specific 
substance# a variety of ei#irical transformations of “f o m  of 
substance" Into "structure of formed substances", we arrive 
perhaps at ainute cells# and a bio-chemist hopes to transform 
or structuro inorganic stuffs or elaaents into such a cell, 
thus reversing i^at was previously irreversible, and to proceed 
by a series of reversals of the previously irreversible to 
arrive at a "manufactured man"»
If he does, when he does, history will include events it 
has not previously included, the long and conu>lex account will 
be vitally interesting to many scientists, and statements 
about non—BT'nufactured men, like Caesar, will still be part 
of History, "A man is really made of atoms of hydrogen.
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n i t r o g o n , o m y g e n . w i l l  be true, just as "a aan Is a 
structure of lauscles and nerves and bone and bloodvessels" 
will be true, and any of the statements, if wo add "just" . , 
or "only" after "a man", will be false.
Caesar swam, and in so doing did many other things, 
perfomed max^ y acts consciously and unconsciously, many of 
vdiich are composants of the act of swimming; the Tiber flowed, 
and continued to flow after the period idien Caesar swam, the 
Tiber flowed, and anything else in the universe that was doing 
anything at all near to or distant from Caesar or the Tiber , 
was doing what it v&a doing. ^  And Time nolQier swam nor 
flowed nor did anything at all.
% e  account can be expanded by means of "Caesar was a 
man, t h e r e f o r e . . " t h e  Tiber was a river, therefore.,..", 
"if what he did was to swim a river, thai»..,."« If we under­
stand the terns "man", "river", "swimming", we can make 
further statements of vhat must have, been so prio? to the 
event, statements about the history of Caesar or the Tiber.
All our terms are familiar terms, and we proceed under the 
aegis of universal propositions of the f om "all s u ^  are so". 
Our expansions are, however, limited in particularity — Caesar 
must have had a head, had parents, the T iber must, have had 
banks and a source and a mouth; but we cannot describe the 
head (thou^ we can expand "head" into necessary parbs, whose 
difference from parts of other heads evades us), the parents 
(though, we know they were human,' and male and female), the 
banks and the source, and the mouth. All this we can do, it
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may be said# bocauae we know vdiat it i« necessary to be In 
order to bo a man# a river# swimming# These are "universal 
truths"# "eternal truths"# truths available to the Cartesian 
mind Independently of experience# and truths even if there is 
no world in which exj.;erienco of the things in question could 
occur.
Tt Is true that Descartes does not do much with the 
truths I have specified; it is also true that if v/e try to 
move from Instances of men# rivers and swimming in search of 
what is identically man# river, or swimming in each case 
our universal propositions become very meagre# But Descartes 
refuses# it will be rmembered#' to accept "rational animal" 
as a definition of himself# because of the coEU>le% expansion 
of "animal" that v,^ uld be required before one arrived at a 
"truth" which was simple and obvious# and the simple notion
it-
of thlxdcln^ vAîlcih denotes or repreeentB an act which can be 
e3q?®ï'l®ï>ced and "grasped" esQxands for him into a complexity 
of dlajuncte, claaeifiable as "vrilllnge" and "thinkings", •
In the sense that "thinking" is any of these, the agent for 
Descartes does all of these, (Vihen we consider Aristotlefs 
position below, we shell see that it contracts with this in 
insisting that certain of the disjuncts swy belong to organ­
isms xdiich are not human while others do not* Descartes takes 
it for granted all men are alike as "thiidcers" - he proves 
"other minds" and "no animal minds" by reference to speech 
capacity, and "mind" is identical in all as defined by Deso- 
artes)•
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The universal truths are obviously important in our 
reasoning, and in them we can indicate distinctions of 
subject and predicate, Individual and attribute, substance 
and fona, thing and function and structure» Nevertheless, 
none of these terms need appear. Descartes, wanting to deny 
that ■substance" is ever encountered or known "directly", 
employs a different set of necessazy truths; if we state 
"every predicate is of a subject" and treat predicate as 
"quality or act or f om or attribute" and oub.1 ect as "thing 
or substmce", we have from my point of view a statement 
about all statements, and from Descartes’ point of view a 
rational, intuited and necessazy truth \dii(h enables him to 
infer from "y is a predicate" to a substance-thing. What I 
have argued at length here is that there could be no justif­
ication for asserting "y is a predicate", no possibility of 
understanding "y is a predicate", unless we have experience 
of situations describable as "x is y*. Unless "subject" is 
given a value, we have no statements, but a meaningless 
combination of a variable or logical tern and an ordinary 
predicate ly a copula Which bélouga to neither.
In the light of our discussion above, we can make a 
series of statements which look at first sigÿkt like the 
mongrel expressions with logical and real texms. If Caesar
was not a fona of a substmce he did not exist; if he did not
«  ,
act, there was no event; if he had no attributes, he was 
nothing; if he was not related to mazy things he did not exist 
Bjid no G vont oocuyrod# Tbcyo Is no sghbo in \dilcli tîühoso
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statements are to be understood as meaning that all except 
the existential statements are true, while the existential 
statements are false, and this holds if we give real values 
to "substance","fona", "act" and "relation*. And we are not 
saying that the existential statemwts may be true and all 
the others false, that Caesar existed but was not the bearer 
of any of the "predicates".
If we make the subject of the statements "Caesar", as 
I have done, then "fona of substance" can be expanded as I 
have indieated (into structure and fomed substances etc,), 
"act" can be expanded into all the things Caesar did,"relat­
ions" into a vast range frcso merely spatial to political.
The "totality" would be histozy, the listing at any point 
of achievement vdien we stopped to make the remazk, is Histozy. 
The falÉity of "Caesar did such" constitutes error in History, 
designates nothing in history. Unless we have in mind some 
such operation as that idiich bears his name (of.Macbeth). 
however, "Caesar was not b o m  of parents" would be equivalent 
to "Caesar did not exist", and entail that our account is not 
History.
11. At this point the logician-metaphysician may well object 
that "Caesar was not bom" is not even a logical contradict­
ory of "Caesar was a man", and that I am assuming. He mty 
invite me to declare that I have made "All men are bom" 
analytic; but since I ma not concerned with turning fact claims 
into "necessary truths for me" I am content to leave it as 
merely true, historically true. If he wants to deny it to be
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true as matter of general fact or history, that is another 
matter.
I^ y goal here is "higher", '’-’rom consideration of "Caesar 
swam the Tiber" as a statement of an historical event, a 
statement in English, we can,using only the natural li{^t and 
our understanding of the statement as made in the world in 
which the language developed and the stated event occurred, 
devise a couL lex statement about any thing, or any account 
of a thing, couched in a wholly technical vocatnilaxy. We can 
devise: If no' statement con be made truly as to the substance, 
form, attributes and relations of a thing then there exists 
no such thing} no thing persists if it does not remain the 
kind of thing which it is over the period in vdiioh it may be 
truly said to persist and to exist, thougdi this is not incomp­
atible with its changing in persisting, or with variations 
in the true account vhich can be given of it at different times; 
and if a series of statements can be made of a thing as subst­
antial, formed, attributed and related, then a statemaat that 
the thing did or did not act or react in a particular way is
intelligibly true or false".
It is true that all of these terms, vhiCh I have called 
technical, appear in discourse; they appear especially in 
questions, and they con all be treated in my statemwt as 
variables with an indefinite number of values. Given a value 
to "thing",e.g. Caesar, we can exclude many values of each of 
the other teams as impossibly components in an account of the 
particular thing. There is no reason why we should not refer
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to my complex etntoaents as presenting. If incompletely, the 
motaphyoJcnl structure of things or of any thing, of any thing 
which we can conceive or think of or talk about as an individ­
ual existing in our spatio-t«r®oral world, provided that (a) 
we recognise that what it means is to be exhibited by reference 
to classes of true statraaents, and (b) that we are talking phil­
osophically, not making biological, physical, chemical, mech­
anical, psychologioal or historical statements or analyses.
And this, roughly, is what Aristotle was talking about when 
he was raising the question of Categories as a special question, 
related to but not part pf his emtablished logic and his scie­
nce. nis particular problms we must consider below.
12. At this point I must p(Qr the pwalty for not considering 
in detail various philosophers’ lists of categories, and uses 
of the terra v^hich are different from mine. I am arguing at I
a comparatively 8isu>le and primarily Arietbtelion level, 1
though not "strlcjty according to Aristotle", He does not in '
fact include substanc^stuff-foia in his Categories, thoufÿi he j
has much to sey of it elaevdiere; end he can hardly be said to 
list poteatiality-actuality, thouj|h he discusses It in tlie '
Categories. In the next chapter, when I consider how thing» stu* 
ff-fom operated in thought and discourse, I can do something 
to show why potential!ty-actunlity must be considered, and 
stuff-form is in a special position because any substance-form 
statement seems replaceable bf s thing-structure statement 
after further study. The basic claim is that there are Classen 
of stateients which are essential to Histozy, Histozy which
i
no one "re lly" wishes to deny - and yet quite traditionally j
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universai propositions derived from, or contained in, class­
ifications, are "timeless". So, too, are definitions. But 
Aristotle, concerned with classifying and not rules for class- 
Ificatory structure in abstracto, recognises that a definitional 
"All X are ab" is meaningful if the class ab has maabers which 
are individual xs, and he sees as clearly that treating an indiv­
idual X as one, existing, persisting, and a member of the class 
•X" or the class "AB* and no more is metaphysically hopeless 
as Descartes sees in it the foundation of all metaphysics. 
Descartes converts a definition into an historical truth by 
adding Time to the individual defined, and so gets necessary 
fact and eternal substance-thing. If we put any noun into 
the subject, any adjective into the predicate, definition or 
not definition, only by fiat can we add that the noun is the 
name of a thing eternal; and our fiat is equivalent to saying 
that the thing we are talking about is absolutely unlike all 
the individual things of vdiich accounts appear in History, 
and whose location at szqr place at any time, like their coming 
to be and ceasing to be, is a matter of empirical fact - or 
falsity.
The esyence or definition of x is ab; if there is 
nothing tdiich is not both a imd b, no a which is b, then ab 
is neither essence nor definition. A cataclytaa which destroys 
the majority of existing xs lenves the classification unalt­
ered; if it destroys all xs, our leaving the classification 
uiniltered does not annihilate the cataclysmi Any true prop­
osition "X is y" entails "x exists" unless we have reason to 
ask "when?", and we can readily call "y" a principal attribute
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or ©SBontial ■ attribute since if it has an opposite it 
can detezmine a class. Death does not thereby lose its sting, 
nor any individual which is x the necessity of having 
non-essential attributes if it is an x or ^  y.
If wo glance again at the Cogito, we can see* a fact 
claim as to thinl:ing. made by a thinker; a suppressed recog­
nition of the subject because "Ego Cogito" is merely a 
fact claim; "thinking" declared essence; subject inferred, one 
and existent, persistent and non-historical; subject labelled 
"I" to make it historical and "mind or soul" to preserve the 
non-historical and eternal necessiV* If the "Ego" is intuited, 
as an object and existing, there is only fact; if the "thixlking"
is "perceived", it has to be recognised as act before the?
natural light can add "and there must be an agent" ; only by 
adding "and the agent can be known in no other way" can bwe 
prevent the li^it shining further and and adding to "the 
agent persists necessarily only vdille the thinking goes on" “ 
that the agent is an identifiable thing which is a man or 
Descartes; and if we declare "thinking" to be an essence we 
declare only that even if "thinking things" is a class to be 
indicated always in our classificatory system, no thing 
which ceases to think ifill, even if it continues to exist, 
be known as a thinking thing or by a name %hich means "the
bearer is a thinking thing".
(a) At the highest level of logic, with only true-falœ 
and relations of implication in question, we need only a 
subject-predicate form for statements. If we replace all
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our ordinaiy nouns by «thing of kind se-leÿ". Instead of "All 
X are y" we can write "All things »ish are y", hut our 
minimum intelligible existential statement will be "a thing 
which is 30-ish exists", and the truth of the universal propos­
ition gives us "no thing which is x^ish can exist unless it is 
y". "Mo thing can exist unless it is x-ish" is plain nonsense*
Mo word-juggling can convert historical things spoken of in 
ordinaiy discourse into non-historical things, or non-historical 
"eternals" into historical.
Any predication may be labelled, "definitional" if we 
disregard the logical features of our language and the actual 
features of the world idiich it enables us to talk about. If 
we recognise activities and relations as différait ^pes of 
predicates, tht-se too can be labelled "definitional" under the ' 
same conditions, and the same futile argument can be advanced 
as with predicate in its most general sense or with predicate 
in a quality-sense* Label "y" or "does y" or "Hy" a predicate, 
and there must be a logical subject or metaphysical subject 
or substimce; label any one "essence" and the logical or 
metaphysical substance or subject lasts not for a time but for 
all time. It falls outside Histozy.
And it cannot fall outside History. Every major argument 
above culmina tes in the claim that the attempts to get beyond 
History fail.
It is difficult to believe that the impossibility cannot
' 3  '
be formally and finally proven. If the relation between "sub-
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stance" or "subject" and "predicates* or "historical propos­
itions" is logical, then it belongs with History* this is 
borne out by the claim that nouns in statements can be repl­
aced by "thlng-substance", the result being equivalent state­
ments. If "substance" is non-logically, factuaHj' related 
to the historical \/orld, then the relation - and the substance » 
is historical* Such an argument probably holds, but the level 
of statement is so general that vaguenoas makes meaning dubious. 
The argument that if we deny predication (the logical relation) 
we assert a relation between substance and attribute and (a) 
can never state what the relation is, and (b) can say nothing 
without rcvertiiig to predication, seems to me to hold. But 
many philosophers have, like Bradl^, founded metaphj'sies on 
the acceptance of the double impossibility.
(1) At wh;t we might call the strictly logical level, it 
seems patent that using only the terms "substance",. "attrib­
ute", "principal attribute", "essence", we can say nothing 
at all - or we can state endlessly necessary truths about 
substfuices having attributes, any substance having a principal 
attribute, an essence... If vo extend our vocabulary, and say 
"a substance is one, persists,exists", "attributes,adhere to... 
or..inhere in, substances", our statem^ts are vacuous unless^ 
they are related to historical statements. If we add "subst­
ance is known only as that in,which attributes inhere", this 
involves historical claims, chich Descartes never hesitates 
to aioert in terms of "we know", "we know only", "we have only 
the idea".
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Recognise an historical world, the aeaningfulness of 
historical statements, end "all subjects have predicates" is 
intelligible. So, too, is "principal attribute", "essence", 
"definition". So, too, is classification. So, too,'are itnivep» 
sal propoeitionc and statements in logic. Values given to the 
terme "subject" and "predicate", "have" becomes "is", taue-false 
is a meaningful distinction, and*intelligible statements are 
part of history and of science. Argument is possible, and 
formal features of arguments can be stated.
(2) At a sub-logical level, it seems aijparent that using 
the terms "substance","attribute", "relation",* "act", "foim"%.. 
we ca# say nothing beyond our statements‘of necessary truths 
which are correlations of pairs of terms. Give values to 
each term in suCh'a pair, and we have historical statements. 
These, statements have logical features and logical relations; 
argument is possible. They have non-logical* features and 
con-logical relations as well.
Substitute any historical term for^aw one of a pair 
of necessary ^ correlatives, and we get a necessary question.
As historical premises entail an historical'co elusion, a 
statement "Y is an hlctorical form" entails "there is an • 
historical substance of that form", and this is equivalent to 
"there must be an answw to the question "lAint substance?*.
She "principles" answer no questions, present no inference, 
but indicate a question to be settled. The question demands 
a Justifiable assertion of a real value for one'of the corrol-
, ' ; < I: . -'' «mm mtim =' -
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atlvee, and if "Y" is the value, a ntatetaent that Y is 
correctly taken to be a value aunt be true. In other words, 
"Y* loust be meaningfully used in fact statemsnts Vhich are 
correctly described as instances of the correlative principle# 
A full statement;, as answer to a foim-substance question 
Hill be • this thing x is a substance y in the form a*» This 
is not decision or flat - it is a recognition that this class 
of statements is different from the class \diose members take 
the form "any x is a form of x", v/hich are class if i catoiy. 
Ignoring this distinction is vital to Descartes. "A thoujdit 
is a fona of thouf^ht* is equivalent to "a thought is a member 
of the class thou^ts", "any particular thou^t is a species 
of thou^t". We can formulate in many imys if our usage is 
loose enough. But loose conversion of "x is a y" into "x is 
a form of y" does not convert y into a substance in the
sense of substance that the category, class fore*»substance
■ v ~ .  i
demands. ,
(ill) What now emerges is the possibility of a class of 
statements being treated as a class of explanation of mmabers 
of another class. "X does Y because it is a form W of a 
substance 2", "X is Y because it is related to a thing Z". 
Balls bounce, sheathes insulate vdres, because they are made 
of rubber. The handle is hot because it is or was near the
.-i
fire. The tree is dying because it no longer has a water 
supply.
When substance-fom, under investigation. becMies
structure of f  ormed substances, then explanation becomes more 
effective. Descartes explains {in!mai motion on the model
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mechanical etatuee and winiMllls# structure o f
formed euhetances and related functions he under^tando» Any 
solids admit of the form and structure required# only some 
admit of the function and continuance of the function# and 
no liquids or gases will admit of either# except in containers# 
Motion in general he e^q^lains hy ®fconceivod) particles move”# 
and a conceptual system of such forms of substance provides 
a structured universe and another explanation of animal mo tiens 
His onatoiay is a different question - it produces cozsplex 
structures of different substances on the one hand# but mere 
body and an hydraulic system on the other# So we achieve an 
explanation of animal motion - when %/e add corporel images 
and convert the heart into a boiler#
What stays for science is part of the anatomy and most 
of the Method# The contrast# however# seems plain between 
the transformation of formed^ subs tance into structure of 
formed substances under the guidance of aipirical observation# 
and the transformation of formed»substeince into structure of 
identical fozmed-substances in the opposite direction ^ d  
under the guidance of the natural light# Stripped of the 
•identity” of substance at the base/ the latter is a principle 
of construction, and it is detectable as such in the use 
of the terms thing# substance and form in ordinary discourse.
(IV) Denial of a category is the rejection "of a class of 
stcvte^ents as meaningless or as reducible to another class#
But this reduction is not like that of treating the classes
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as of the bpmo logical fom* At the level of subj ect-pred­
icate# of only true-false# category distinctions cannot be 
raised: having a subject and a predicate distinguishes no 
statement from any other.
We cannot# at will# re-write fact statements from one 
category into another - that they have common lo^ ?:ical features 
does not annihilate metaphysical distinctions* And as with 
subj ect-predicate# so with the metaphysical correlatives: no 
technical term will appear in fact statments# distinctions 
within which or between thieh are indicated by using the 
technical texms*
The argument "I think, thinking is an attribute, 
attributes inhere in a substance, therefore thinking goes on 
in me" is philosophically idiotic* So,also, is the argument 
that thinking is an act, extension is, a quality (%Aich estab­
lishes a difference of category, not co-classifiability),ond 
both are attributes and both are forms of a substetnce and 
both may be the same foim of different substances. We are -
at the same time, in the same argument, a sorting and drying
category differences, concealing the contradiction by using 
a mixed and meaningless mode of e%)ression.
(V) We may wifdi to alter the foim of a statement for one 
of a variety of purposes, but the eorrectness of a category 
determination is the form in which a statement enters History.
What I have tried to show of dreamed occurrences and witnessed
occurrences is that both enter History asb"X dreamed »A‘",
•X witnessed ’A'", and "X witnessed *A’“ entails that A is
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an hiotorieal account. It le only ioolating a i>artl<n»lar 
InetLincOi ono In which the accounte arc the eame# îioad hy hoth 
maintalnln^ and denying the drea^ii^witnoes distinction that 
we zaalze the idontity-of-fona a r ^ i ^ t  posalhlot and the 
coneoquencoa of tlie j/oealhlc argument result in further 
contradlctiens. Prooperot and the matcrlallat# can Include 
"dreams" (and all foims of "familiar thinking^') in ilistoiy 
only hy reverting to "x dreamed" ("x thou#t"). It is true 
that either could Include both hy positing located ond contin^ 
uous process of "thinkings* at various points in a non-thou^tf 
nouf"thinking# universe - provided th^ are not requested to 
give an account of the different species of "thinking*# are 
not requested to give an account of thomeelvea as thinkex^s# 
provided they can give an account of such continuous processes 
as continuous changing forms of an unoxtmded substance# and 
provided they are prepared to surrender all observation state­
ments and all senooiy knowledge of the norwprocess %wrld 'by 
the "process". We can# readily enou^# call the rem&lt a 
"conceptual aystam"# Honads need hare no wlx;dovs. In tho 
aystesa "vs” have no men, no familiar world, and no hletoxy «• 
each monad,' we as monads, individually hays a history and 
"think" History and mmi in a,familiar \«>rld? But aâ dearly 
have vintftn CQ-Titavit. the teeoriser. theorised..*and many have 
both disagreed with and tried to understand Leilaiia.
It is "mere fact" that Leibniz enters history as the 
writer of hooks and a metsphjroiclan, that his^ theories enter 
the history of philosophy and of eclaace, and . that we under-
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etaiid part oi Leibniz because we know that he wrote after 
Deecartea had written and hi a writing© been read by Leibniz* 
Ve know that the monads could not have windows because a 
foundation of gkxyBicQ was threatened if they did* And are 
we really surprised when# in the Nouveaux Essais* Leibniz 
takes the familiar historical world for granted and proceeds 
to consider primarily the questions which I have been raising 
of the role of categmfies and the justification of classes 
of statements# of neceasaiy truths and logic in relation to 
Histoiy?
(VX) When the metaphysician gives values to one term in a 
correlative pair# using ordinary language terms in giving 
values# and denies value© to the other# he must (unless be 
rejects History) write History using a "necessary entity" and 
his value-tenas. He seems immediately to be bound to an 
"intimato-union" of the Real and the Unreal# the Necessary 
and the Contingent# and a neu correlative necessary Truth*
All I can purport to show is that if X and Y are correlatives 
in a necessary truth th^ it has historical application# the 
metaphysician converts X into "necessary—X" and his statements 
have "ncceooaiy-X* as subject (for exa#le) while yet the 
relation to the diverse predicates cannot be in the seme 
sense nocessuuy# and no statement can in the same sense be 
necessary* It is perhaps contingent that the "nccessary-X" 
can# treated as a variable# be given historical values and 
converted into merely historical truths# of each and every 
predicate of which it can be said that it have a twbject
I
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and that it dgos have a auhjeot; but if we believe that 
the distinction between the actual# the necessary and the 
possible# as classes of statements related under thé conception 
of "true**# are not so related that the actual is iisposeible 
or unneceolaay, thie need not perturb ub unduly*
The metaphyeicien against whom ay arguments fail to have 
any effect is the metaphysician accepts logical and meter 
physical statemmts as I have listed them, and supplies all 
his own nouns; verbs, adjectives, prepositions etc# But that 
is to supply his own values, to have the same grammar as 
mine and a totally different vocabulary* Neither disagree­
ment nor understanding are possible after agreed statements 
have been comtmnicated* But this is not the case witii any 
metaphysician or scientist who claims that his statements 
are in some or any way related to the human world*
(VII) Hy list of categories is minimal, incipient, not 
exhaustive* I have made no contribution in this thesis to 
the problem of what would determine that*a list of catego^es 
was esdiaustive* The move frwa Subjeot-?redicate to Subst- 
ance-(iuality, Agent-Act, Substanee-Pozm; Relata-Helation, is 
not deductive, but by recognised distinctions, and its just­
ification is "If History, then these classes of statements"*
The "real" metaphysical principle, applicable to metaphysic­
ians from Thales to Wittgenstein, is "If History, then as well 
as your claimed category or categories, these categories* * * *"
It is not coincidental that this is \diat Hegel discovered
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in the history of philosophy, and that it provides the rationale 
for his developing system of categories - I plead my debt even 
in denying Hegel's claimed "deduction". Nor is it coincidental 
that the same principle alone seems to justify Bescrtes* 
disorderly ordering of Principles, or that the same principle 
seems clearly relevant to the theoretical development of 
various sciences, and to the problem of the relation between 
different sciences. In the last case the claim must be 
asserted in relation to the fact-claims of the various sc&ences, 
and it is these fact-clalms which (a) can be related to the 
system of statements which I have called Histoiy, and (b) 
alone give meaning to the scientist's claim that his non-fact 
assertions are eaqplanatoiy.
Aristotle's special problem is that the "timeless" dniverqol 
propositions and definitions of his logic and his science, and 
their related "particulars", i.e. propositions quantified by 
"some* or "this" as distinct from "all", presuppose a persisting 
unitary subject-thing as a member of a class or thing of a 
kind ( a "bearer of attributes"), lAiile all the individual things 
he is interested in in are historical and many (the biological) 
are short-lived and chruige in a pattern vSiile persisting as 
unites which in fact, and obviously In fact, are complex. 
Descartes' problem could not arise for Aristotle,i.e. of accepting 
universal propositions and definitions and then trying to 
prove that something which exists is spoken of and defined. For 
Aristotle the difficulty is of determining classifications 
and extending them, arriving at universal propositions and
I
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dofInitions ( or extending them) given historical occurrences 
and factual complexity. Fortunately or unfortunately for him# 
fortunately for science and philosophy# Aristotle was rejecting 
a series of systems of concepts handed to him# and hence could 
not tfiken them or any of them for granted as the **natural 
ondo^ i^ment of rational souls**. He was forced to hammer out
nh-
the concepts vdiich# altered and in laaqy ways made rational 
and sterile by mi sunders tanding # became the "natural® endows 
ment of Descartes at La 3 lèche.
The "things** he was concerned to classify and to define 
were not the result of classification and definition# nor 
what was left over after a classificatory system had been 
completed# nor simples and self-identicals arrived at by a |
process of argument. The things are dateable persistants# 
whose complex accounts include statements of different types# 
and marjy statements of each type. In eluded in these state­
ments are multiple sets of contradictories - of one individual 
thing what is true at one time is false at another#and the 
contradictory itself may be false at another time. (We may# if 
we prefer it# opeak of **contrary" rather than ‘'contradictory** - 
strictly neither applies in its foimal sense because of the 
dating of the truths). X which is Y does Z at t^; x which is
o
Dot-Y but ¥ does not do Z, perhaps cannot do Z, at t f yet X
/ f ' -
is the game individual, the same kind of thing, througgiout.
X is the same and yet X is differwt; X persiste and yet X
changes. ....
To understand v*y this was so much a problem to the
it
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Greeks we must turn to the history of philosophy and espec­
ially to Plato and his west ling with it. We come to under^ 
stand at the same time why later philosophers# reverting to 
a primitive logic# draw the conclusion that "x must he dlff-
•v;
erent from its differences"# and treat the differences as 
history and Unreal while the different-x is real - and Unhist- 
orical. But# Aristotle seems to have recognised# if x is an 
historical thing#e.g. a nan# then there Is no contradiction. 
Crudely stated# "if there is history# then there cannot he 
a contradiction". Give values to all the symbol-variables 
in the "etatements"# and we have history and no contradict­
ions. Socrates# at one time mewling infant and at another 
irritating philonopher# was throut^out the same individual# 
in spite of the dniversality of the truth that no mewling 
infants are philosophers { end in spite of the fact that 
no dissection of the infant would have revealed the hidden 
"indiiildual" identical in Infant and adult).
If we give values to both variables in our logical and 
laetaiPhyeical statments we have history and no contradictions} 
the process of dodhle "cashing* Is %hat reveals the nature of 
"logic" and "aeta^hyslca", and our justification for calling 
our necessary truths logical or. .staphysical.
(VIII) The motSiphor of "cashing" is dangerously mlsloàiâng 
if it proiants the conclusion that, as there are cheques and 
notes, and the use of one is equivalent to the use of the 
other, we can dispense with the cheques, as iSspiricMs claim,
* ft A
or with the note»# a» Rational let» claim. It is useful only
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In criticising those who claim that by cashing one variable 
they can achieve fact statements. They offer us neither cheque 
nor cash* That p is a mmher of the class of statements whose 
f o m  is ? is the justification for the complete cashability# 
hut it gives no reason for our classifying statements. The 
core or nucleus of our category classification# however# is 
the recognition that x*s being the subject of a member of 
one class of statements entails that x is the subject of 
statements of other classes for an indefinitely extensible 
list of individual historical values of x# and this features 
of such individuals can be converted into a necessary truth 
by definition of the individuals as subjects of members of 
classes of statements so indicated.
We convert actual features of discourse into necessary 
features of discourse# actual features of statements or thou^ts 
into necessary features of statements or thou^te# actual featur­
es of History into necessary features of History. The point 
in the defining is like ^ e  point in all ^irically i%%%portant 
defining# specifying distinctions which# ignored or obscured# 
produce error and confusion# The metaphysician insists on 
"nocoBsil^" when a scientist or a fellow metaphysician declares 
that a class or classes of statements are unnecessary, or \àien 
a scientist of metaphysician introduces into History a term 
which is claimed to function in some ways like a member of 
one class of Historical terns and in other ways differently.
Discussion at this level must be somewhat vague.
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\'/hen w© turn to actual dlscourscf science and history# we 
can specify directly What at this level we are talking indir­
ectly about. Even if the drop from the simplicity of 
Substance# Individual and Form# to the complicated and unimpre­
ssive realm of substances# individuals and foms is like an 
ejection from the Eden of Ultimate Reason and the Clear and 
Distinct# lot us see how the teims in our metaphysical talk# 
stripped of capitals# actually operate at commonplace levels 
where truth and existential claims are not necessary but 
"actual®. If we begin with "thing" and "substcnco"# perhaps 
wo can find how other technical terms follow and# on my argu. iont# 
must follow - and why they do and must.
Chapter XI.
jjTid Substance in Ordinary Discourse.
The two alms In this chapter are (a) to show a 
variety of uses of "substance" and criteria for detemining 
"substances" when no technical-philosophical sense of the 
term is in question# the criteria being patently similar 
to those advanced by metaphysicians# and (b) -p.473 - to 
show the lUnction of thing# form end substance in statements 
whose form is "x is made of y". We are# it is claimed# 
concerned with inter-related concepts which find a use in 
natural science.
We proceed to establish th’^t certain related Aristot­
elian concepts can be derived from stat^aents in natural 
science. Hence
2. Essence and Being are discussed. "What is it for a thing 
to be such?" is contrasted with "What is it for a thing
to be?"# and this is related to substance and attribute.
3. Potentiality is re-asserted as a valid concept, which 
Descartes is forced to use in its Aristotelian sense. 
Aristotle asserts that statements of "becoming" are valid 
statements in natural science# and so in metaphysics he 
recognises "becoming" as a concept. He accepts history# and 
organic life and death as historical facts; he is able to 
present a correct logical account or analysis of "change" 
statements.
4. The role of different sciences is presented from an 
Aristotelian point of view - many sciences can be concerned 
in giving an account of one thing or class of things 
familiarly distinguished# and this constitutes the meeting 
place of sciences.
A meaning is given to "metaphysical structure of the 
world"# without in any sense denying histoiy or science# 
in terms of categories as classes of statements in natural 
science and history.
5. (p.517) Amauld^s criticism of Aristotle’s Categories is 
presented and discussed. We are able to indicate how 
statements in logic, statements in metaphysics, statements 
in different sciences, and familiar-worid fact-statements# 
are related to one another.
It is squally obvious that ths tera •subatriincs* 
ai»V«ar8 In svoxyday discourse with something of the 
sense in which it spears in phllOBophical treatises".
Chfiptey II. above.
"...r©Bi quaittdaœ olve substantiam..."
"Next he quite correctly says, that we catmot conceive 
activity apart from its subject, e.3. tViought apart 
from that which thinks, since that which thinks is not 
nothing. But, wholly without any reason, and in oppoo- 
osition to the ordinary use of language and good Logic, 
he adds, hence it seems to follow that th;:t which thinks 
lË uomething corporeal; for the subJecte of all activities 
are indeed understood as falling within the sphere of 
substance ( or even, if you care, as wearing the guTse 
matter, viz. metaphysical matter) , but not on that 
account are they to be defined as bodies.
On the other nand both logicians and as a rule all men 
are wont to say that substances are of wo kinds, spiritual 
and corporeal. And all that I proved, vdien I took wax 
as on example, was that its colour, hardness and figure 
did not belong to the formal nature (rr tionem) of the wax 
itself (i.e. that we can cotaprehend everything that exists 
necessarily in the wax, without thinking of these). I did 
not there treat either of the formal nature of the mind,or 
even of the formal nature of body."
Descartes, replying to Hobbes,
H and R. II. p.63.
"I admit also quite gladly that, in order to designate 
that thing or substance (which understands), which I wished 
to strip of everything which did not belong to it, I 
employed the most hi#ly abstract terras I could; Just as, 
on the contrary this Philosopher uses terms that are as 
concrete as possible,e.g. subject, matter, body, to signify 
that which thinks, fearing to let it be sundered from the 
body.
But I have no fear of anyone thinking that his method 
of coupling diverse things together is better ads®ted to 
the discovery of the truth then mine, that gives the 
greatest possible distinctness to every single thing. But, 
dropping the verbal controversy, let us look to the facts 
in dispute.
Ibid.
Chapter 31
Thing Dd üabgj trse.
' ■ . -  t  • ■  ■ -
. . . ,
a.
' . ; K .
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Thing; and Substance In Ordinary Discourse.
I assume still that ordinary discourse and argument are 
meaningful# that fact statements are meaningful and true# 
or if false can be denied by the assertion of other fact 
statements which are true; I assume that we can determine 
the circumstances under which fact claims can be established 
or facts truly asserted, since this is equivalent to the claim 
that discourse is meaningful. I assume that science, as our 
knowledge of the "world" # develops in terms of fact statements 
qua v/hat is stated to be so and truly stated to be so; and 
that the sciences of logic and of graramar are concerned with 
the structure and relations of statements, though differently 
concerned.
word "assume" is, it is true, ra.ther misused in 
the paragraph above. It serves, for the moment, to indicate 
what I am not intending to justify# and am not going to 
question# and to indicate no more than that.
That any "thing" is a substance as subject in the sense 
that any existing thing we can speak of is a kind of thing 
which is different from other things in kind, and that it is 
related to things of various kinds# that it can be stated to 
be of its kind and to be so related, seems clear to the 
natural light. If our accepted# though perhaps unspecified, 
criteria for the difference between chairs and constables, 
or between this and that elephant# are not questioned, 
then Descartes’ "res^sive substantia" indicates a pair of
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equivalent terns. Aristotle’s identification of "substance"
and "individual" is similar to, if not identical with, the 
Cartesian.
I take as a heading "Any thing is a substance" to provide 
a focus for consideration.
1# Any thing is a substance.
This seems patently false. We do not càll chairs and 
tables "substances". We do not call any thing we can name 
a ”substanceV We use the name.
When we do not know the name, we refer to it as a "thing"; 
when we know the name we do not call it a thing. Yet we would 
point to it v/hen asked "what is a thing?".
When we know the form (the shape, the function, the behav­
iour, the appearance) we do not even ask what substance it is. 
We do not bother to ask what sort of substance chairs are 
ma,de of - though we may. When we encounter something unusual 
in the way of chairs, we enquire as their substance: "What 
are they made of?" The answer will be in terms of what is 
colloquially "stuff". Hence we can says
(a) A substance is *hat things are made of.
We distinguish between wooden chairs, leather chairs, 
fabric chairs and plastic chairs. The "substance" determines 
the kind. But this is not held to be different from, or 
incompatible with, but equivalent to /is made from such and 
Buch a substance". Plastic is not wood, nor leather fabric. 
They are different things entirely.
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Substances (irom which things are mad©) are of different 
kinds. Hence we can say that:
(b) A substance is a kind of stuff.
The chemist is concerned with distinguishing substances, 
with making substances of which chairs and bottles can be 
made. Ho takes some commonplace thing, a wild plant or 
a poppy seed, a substance like beer or bauxite, and he 
analyses it. He finishes with things like belladonna and 
opium, riboflavin and aluminium, new substances and useful 
or dangorou» things. We mere mortals call salt a substance, 
but he calls it a compound, because ho knows it is made up 
of two things, sodium and chlorine, a metallic substance and 
a gaseous substance, which Vb can separate out from salt.
When he has separated them, and has sodium in one bottle 
and chlorine in the other, he has established that they 
are different substances. Hence we can say:
(c) Substances exist, or can exist, on their owp«
The chemist's criterion is independence, separation or 
separability. If he suspects that a substance is a 
compound, he will not rest pntil he has produced two 
substances. But the salt in ray cupboard, and the salt 
encrusting the rocks by the sea shore, a fine powder here, 
a coarse crystalline mass there, so little resembling that 
only when I tasted the mass did I even suspect that they 
ware alike in any way, are the same substance for him.
A fine diamond set in a ring, a piece of coal on the hearth.
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the black powder used In making crackers, the lead in a 
child's pencil, these are different things, different 
substances, different in appearance, in function and in 
use. For the chemist, however, they are the same substance, 
which he calls "carbon" and finds in plants and all organic 
structures* lienee we can say that;
substance can exist in yw#:'-and In
many forms at the same time.
The criterion now seems to be ®klnd‘*j they are the sarnie
in kind, of the same stuff, though they have no apparent
feature in comruon* But the carbon in tho diamond is in
one sense not the same carbon as that on tho, hearth; one
may be in New York, the other in Hampstead. They are mad©
of different bits of carbon, just as they can be broken into
bits themselves, and the bits will still be the same substance
Yet gunpowder is a substance, and it can be divided or
"broken up" into sulphur, carbon and potassium chlorate,
which are three substances. Two substances, bits of one
substance, many substances, can occur together and make
one substance, a kind of thing that occurs at on© place. - _
Hence we can say that;
(e) A substance can be divided into the same substances
^  into other substances.
Two things can have tho same form and the saiae substance,
$
and be indistinguishable to us. To make sure that it is 
not the same chair that I see now that I saw before, I have
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to make sui^ e that there Is still the chair in the room which 
1 loft. I discover identical twins when I see tixom together. 
The chemist declares: This isn’t the hydrochloric acid I
was using this morning - the bottle is half full and I used 
at least three-quarters of a bottle. Hence we can say: ‘
(f) Separability is a criterion for thin/^ s of the same 
substance (or kind) as well as a criterion for different 
substances.
We refer to any kind of substance as simple if it is 
uniform, if it is the same stuff. But any specimen of it 
will have form, have features. Hydrogen is a simple 
substance, but it is "a gas and colourless and has volume; 
a molecule of it has duality and structure; an atom, we are 
told, has shape and a corplax structure. Contrasted with 
"kind", the particularity of "thisness" seems to demand 
corrploxity. Kind, considered as stuff, involves simplicity - 
and yet a stuff may be complex, have many attributes.
Hence we can say:
(g) The aimplicity of substances contrasts with-the 
complexity of compounds, not with the complexity of features 
possessed by thinr.s*
! (Typically, when a substance term functions as a predicate 
it becomes simple - as "kind" - but when it figures as a 
subject it has complexity and a history. A chair is just 
wooden, just made of wood; but wood is a complex of chemically 
distinct substances, of cellular structures, and the wood in
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this chûir, in this cliair, in any ciiair, i.e. "this" wood, 
has a long history).
The substance this chair is made of is wood, but the wood 
was once a tree, a plank or a number of planks cut from a 
log. The wood suffered many transformations and transport­
ations before it became this chair. But it is still the 
same wood, as it will be if I make a bookcase from .this 
chair. 3o that we can say;
(h) A substance can have many forms in its history and 
still be the same substance or the same thing that it was 
orifj^inally.
We can add now one further point, and leave it still 
possible to note further distinctions and sinilarities 
between thing and substance. There may be on a table 
several fine eggs. When we bite one, we make no impression, 
when we bite another, our teeth grate and remove clialky 
fragments; when we bite a third, it yields and we can tear 
off a mouthful of something^ chewable and sweet; when we bite 
a fourth, it resists, yields with a crack, and a sticky 
yellowish fluid mingled with painfully sharp fragments is 
left on our lips. I shall not make a separate item from 
this, but indicate only that there may be several things 
which are in some ways indistinguishable {have the same form, 
features, appearance) and yet be made of very dll'feront 
substances (marble, chalk, nougat or "egg") and that we 
may in this sense "know the fom" and not know tho substance. 
But in each case of tiriis or that "egg" we have in fact a
4 7 3 .
variety of criteria by which to distinguish the substances*
Only if we add tlie condition that the "egry" must not be 
broken, must not be damaged in any way, can only be sensorily 
"observed",' does it follow that "we can never know the substance". 
But if this is a universal condition, then we have' no means of 
giving a meaning to "egg" in the normal sens© at all.
It is this sort of situation wliich prompts the thought that 
if minds are aware only of the ideas which things somehow 
cause in (or on) them as effects which correspond to what we 
"think" are sensory qualities of things, such minds cannot 
"know anything at all", can never understand what we mean by 
eggs, and minds which refuse to surrender their illusion that 
sense-data are objective have to stick their sense-data onto 
the outside of a "thing" which is unknown because they can 
never find eggs to attach them to. Something like this must, 
it seems, follow if instead of we (men) being thini;s that 
perceive and sense in a process^of being interestedly related |
to other things, what "senses" is declared to be something j
"inside" us and what is sensed is declared to b© something » 
inside us or something "outsiddVthings.
i We have already, above, eight different uses of "substance", 
eight different feature of substances, eight different criteria 
for determining substances. At no stag© have we been dealing 
with Substance, but with substances; with carbon and wood, 
plastic and sulphur, salt and belladonna. Equally we have
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not been conoomed with Thing but with particular things 
of particular kinds - chairs and diamonds and bottles of 
acid* But, recognising that we are concerned with things 
and with substances, what is the difference between the two?
We would not, I think, want to call chairs ai^ d bottles 
and diamonds substances, but we would scarcely hesitate to 
say that sulphur and leather and plastic and gunpowder were 
things which you could use, which you can buy in shops, which 
are cheap or costly and so on. If this is so, the criteria 
for being a substance are criteria for being a thing. Yet 
there still seems a difference: a substance is a kind of
thing, perhaps? But what things are not kinds of thing?
Chairs and bottles and tables are kinds of thing. Things 
are particular, while substances are general? But to get 
to a particular thing we have to say this chair or that 
chair, a chair or the chair { and these, of course, are 
different in another sense, in another mode of particularity 
and universality), and we do the same with substances.
This chair is an instance of "chair" --thôr© is nothing odd 
about "an example of, a specimen of, Elizabethan furniture, 
of an Elizabethan chair" - but it is equally an instance of 
l"wood". Wood, or what the chair is made of, is the material 
or stuff of ivhich it is "made. The materials include nails 
and screws and glue, which are things, surely enough. We 
can buy them and us© them without knowing?, what they are made of.
We do not, however, say that things are made of chairs; 
nails and screws are made of steel (or other rrfôtals), but
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nothing is mad© of nails or screws in the same sens©* A.nd 
the distinction perhaps helps* In aaay expression of the 
forra "x is made of y", x will be a thing and y will be a
substance* But ife is equally true that if we are interested
in y then we will find a number of true statements of the
form "y is a andw b and c" or "y is made or made up of z"*
Squally, many values of x will be predicates in statements 
like "A is made of x" • bricks are made of clay, houses 
are made of bricks* "Made" and "made of" (and "made up of") 
are different, but tlois need not concern us since
neither all things nor all substances are "made", i.e. the 
question of "constructing" is irrelevant to tho general 
question*
Yet there is some distinction here, a distinction that 
seems to be indicated by "x is made of y", although this 
does nothing to show that y is not a thing, and it would in 
fact be meaningless to say that any kind of thing could be 
made of y unless by, y we meant something of a kind, unless 
we could also say "y is a and b and c". We have to recognise 
that y may be a thing or things. Further, vÉien wo say 
"chairs are made of wood", or "some chair^ are made of wood", 
|W6 are using "chairs" generally and "wo0(J‘generally, and 
when we talk of this chair we can recognise that it is made 
of this wood, while any wood we encounter will be in some 
sense a this — a plank, a piece, a log, a billet, a fashioned 
article. There is still a difference; a piece of chair is 
not a chair, a piece of wood is wood and a piece of weed .
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Uni OSE this wore so, wo could not* make chairs of wood*
Homogeneity is thus suggested as a feature of substance 
as against thinghood, the latter implying particularity and 
individuality* As soon, however, as we think of wood apart 
from "this chair is made of wood", "wood" becomes a this 
wood as against "that" wood, mahogany or white wood or ebony 
as contrasted with cedar and walnut and caneite. A 
classification of woods is just like a classification of 
chairs into armchairs, deckchairs and kitchen chairs*
Homogeneity, nevertheless, does seem important* When we 
say "raincoats are made of gaberdine", "shirts are made of 
silk", we are thinking of the kind of material of which, 
while it is one and identical, many things can be made.
There is no limit to the material, no form in the sense that 
the shirt or the coat, a shirt or a coat, has fom. Things 
have a form or pattern which the material lacks - and the 
material would be (almost) useless if it already had such 
a form. Yet we can still say that gaberdine is made of 
wool, silk is made of the threads of worm-web, that each 
material has Its own pattern and form, as threads of wool 
and web have their own form. !
I Things have a form and are" made of a substance; when we 
consider what they are made of, it appears as thing with its 
f o m  and its matter. Yet the first mentioned things are 
things of a kind, too. Shirts are'shaped to wear from 
silk; silk is woven into a pattern from worn-spun threads, 
a bundle of silk fibres.
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On© furthor question; wiiat has the fom, the thing or . 
the material? The material is cut to a pattern and then 
it becomes a shirt. The shirt is the formed material, the 
sbbstance in a possible shape, ono of many possible Shapes 
(though scarcely an actualised possible mode of extended 
substance with the silk stuck on). What now of the distinction 
between "thing" and "substance"? The thing and the sub stands 
are not related as thing to thing: shirt is not to silk as
driver to car, ash to ash-tray, silk to gaberdine. Wear the 
shirt and we wear silk. Sit on the chair and we sit on 
wood. F o m  and matter are on© and the same in that where 
there is form there is matter, where there is the formed- 
substance there is the thing with its form.
In all matters, thing and form are correlative; in all
things form and matter are correlative. By a "thing" we 
mean a formed matter, a substance given a form. (We moan
more, though). How plausibly we can attribute this to the
growth of h’oman demands and interests: stone is just stone
until a fragment fits a stick or is discovered to cut; it 
becomes a stone, an instrument, a tool, a knife. Sandstone 
is Just rough stOiie until it is ohlaelled, end behold, a 
statue. (’nd these things are diatinghlshed frora substances 
only until they themselves are used to make something else.
A lump of Olay left in the sun becomes a thing, but brick, 
like stone, is a substance from which houses and paths are 
made. A knife la not like a brick; in particular cases 
we can make the distinction between thing and substance.
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But unless w© have the particular case, or particular cases, 
in mind, we chatter about "thing" and "substance".
(And note the rough parallel with "genus and species", 
"cause and effect". Talk generally, without particular 
events or occurrences or things in mind, as if there could 
bo gonora"'andr opocies while there were no things, no bears 
and apes, as if there cculd be causes and effects unless 
particular events of different kinds involving different 
things could be noted, and we can arrive at First Causes, 
a Highest Genoa, a First Substance-stuff, by a single 
argument, which involves only the statement of an obviously 
true principle and the contradictory of it, e.g. every 
event la the effect of a cause but the First Event is not 
the effect of a cause).
Add, too, aa illustrative hypothesis, that things aro 
determined by function and use, by need and character.
This piece of stone is an axe-stone, a killing-stone; we 
attend to it because we have the need for a killing-thing 
in a world of things we need to kill. Otherwise it would 
pass unnoticed although it was (as we nan now say) of 
manageable weight and nicely pointed. What 1 am trying to 
suggest is the complexity of the situation of interaction 
in which sense-perception and discrimination are possible# 
The aim is not to p oft ray a state of nature, to portray the
ultimate natural simplicity before perception and language)
began, but to throw back into consideration as an obvious 
feature of any experience what has long been dispelled by 
philosophical essays which could be headed: Give an account
of sensation and perception without mentioning either the 
thing that perceives or any thing that can be. related to the 
percoiver; Give an account of appetites and needs and
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interests without reference to anything which is desired or 
needed or focusses attention: Give an account of thinking
vd thout ment j. on of anything thought about, of language or 
comriunication or motivation, of the thinker or speaker or 
any purpose he may have in opening his mouth. By pulling 
our problems completely out of context we get ans we re very 
easily, but v/e cannot explain what questions they answer - 
and that, I suggest, is one of the reasons why we have so 
many "definitional equations" In theory of mind and conclude 
with "unknowns", or "unknowables".
This piece of stone is an exe-stone, this is a cutting- 
stone, a skinning stone. So we can classify in an exhibition, 
and put up a notice "Knives tlirough the ages". The matter 
or sLibstance changes, from rough stone to shining steel; the 
form changes from clumsy half-flaked flint limps that are 
barely distinguishable from unfashioned fragments to a 
delicate scalpel's fragile thinness. What is In common is 
perhaps, as well as the function, having an edge. And in 
©very case the material, the substance, existed before the 
thing; and ohly certain kinds of substance, certain materials, 
can have certain forms imposed upon tlieni, can be made into 
certain kinds of thing.
2. Wliat has this to do with philosophy, with philosophy of 
mind, with Aristotle, or with Descartes?
Primarily, we have trodden the first half of the path 
that Aristotle trod in reconsidering the problems and solutions
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oi his predecessors, and the complete impasse which they had 
reached* The impasse can be illustrated by reference to 
Zeno, and thf clash between Pythagoreans and Parr^ ienicleans, 
or between the Socratio doctrine of forms and Parrnonidsan 
monism. We have noted at least something of the subtle 
complexity of ordinary discourse and its use of "thing" or 
"substance", a subtle complexity very different from the 
pî»e-Platonic, and any rationalist, treatment of the logic 
of "substance" or or "things".
And we iiave already illustrated a number of Aristotelian 
doctrines, and can perhaps see tho significance of them as 
logical doctrines, as indicating certain formal and universal 
features of tlie things we talk and think and argue about, 
the only things we encounter familiarly, and not as indicating 
new "entities", even if it is not yet clear why it was 
necessary to introduce them in this way. Let us now consider 
the Aristotelian doctrines in a summary fashion.
(I) Hatter and Form.
The Aristotelian doctrine is that matter, as the stuff 
or as tto substance of which things are mad© {in the general 
sense I used above) is inseparable from form. Whenever
we speak of a thing,whatever thing we speak of, we can 
recognise it as a fon\ed matter, though when we raise specific 
questions of the matter in question, when, for example, we 
ask of any thing "Of what is it made?" and investigate, we 
will find ourselves talking of some other matters and their 
form. Familiar things wliich we observe, manipulate and
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discuss are always like this* Empirical investigation reveals 
multiplicity of kinds of thing, multiplicity of forms, 
multiplicity of substances - the further we go the more we 
get. A man is, for the child or the philosopher, meat with 
a shape. For the man who is seriously concerned with the 
study of man, the "muat" expands into flesh and blood and 
bone, into nerve fibres and lungs and organs of (Efferent 
kinds and structure*. Further:
(a) A thing is a formed matter, but the form of a thing 
and the form of its matter, are not such that any f o m  can 
be had by any matter. What kind of thing goes with what 
matter is a question for empirical enquiry. Knives are 
made of stone or bronze or copper, perhaps, but not of water 
or cloth or bread; animals are made of flesh and bone etc.; 
fruits consist of other than flesh and bone.
(These sumriary illustrations are not intended to present 
a complete Aristotle. X do not wish to claim that Aristotle 
had got completely away from the four elements, the hot and 
cold, the wet and the dry of his predecessors, or even from 
the associated fire, air^earth and water - three of wMch 
Descartes restores. But the doctrine of form-mat ter is 
independent of "ultimates", even if it can, as P suggested 
above, produce "ultimates" by simply contradicting itself 
as a principle.
T lie re is also, I have maintained, a sense in which all 
sciences determine their own "matter", the substance-analysis 
of which' is not the concern of the sciences in question; and 
part of wliat’ metaphysicians have been concerned with is the 
determination of the "ontological" status of scientific 
"ultimates". Hence so frequently it is the philosopher who 
is concerned to deny the scientist’s claim that his "ultimates" 
are "ultimate constituents of reality".
Nor is the theory of the four elements a "single" theory.
It is in many ways even more complicated than the contemporary 
thesis that there is only the dry - nothing is really hot or 
cold or wet, but feeling makes it so).
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(b) When asked what is the difference between this chair 
and that chair, the form and the function being the same, 
we refer to the material, the stone or the wood. This 
/iristotle calls finding the material cause or the material 
essence, claiming that in the case of any statement "x made 
y into z" the question "khat mat tor-stuff was y?" can always 
be asked. He was also aware, I believe, that if there is 
only one "material", then the "material essence" is useless 
for science. Explanation depends upon difference if 
difference is to be explained. The "material cause" or 
"material essence", in a statement of a necessary principle 
of explanation, is equivalent to the disjunction of different 
substances or matters. We get a "metaphysical matter" 
only by misinterpreting the fomal principle, treating it 
as a necessarily true fact statement. "All things which 
can be changed are forms of a matter" actually implies a 
plurality of things, and the variety of matters we encounter 
is not denied by the principle. Add, however, that all 
tilings are identical as things, all matters identical as 
matters, and we seem to have established a necessary relation 
between Thing and Matter, and all thinfrs are, as forms of 
Thing, forms of Matter.
Facts,and history, and science, remain however as before. 
We may say that things differ from things and matters differ 
from matters purely as forms of the one Thing and forms 
of the same. Matter; the forms we encounter and "know", tlie
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Thing and the Matter are unknowable. But what we are then 
saying is that any statement like %  chair is made of wood" 
entails "wood is a form of an unknowable substance", and 
this seems to mean "every intelligible statement about 
familiar things wi:iich are forms of any substance entails the 
truth of a statement which is necessarily meaningless to the 
maker of the intelligible statement".
Vihat is assumed is that (a) we can understand a variety 
of empirical statements about things and their matter, (b) 
that having grasped those we can formulate a principle, and
(c) we can argue to necessary but unknowable Thing and 
Substance. Nevertheless (c) is indistinguishable from a 
statement of the principle which includes no reference to 
instances, and such a statement would be unintelligible to 
anyone who in fact knew no instances. The meaning of the 
principle can be exhibited or grapsed only in the instances; K 
and this seems to be what is meant by calling certain 
statements "principles". * ’
It is in this sense of "principle»" that the philosopher 
or the scientist, having noted that he or others has been 
proceeding in investigations by asking "Why?" and "How?" 
and "Of what stuff?" or "How structured?", can make positive 
statements using a technical vocabulary which are readily 
intelligible to all who have been so proceeding, and call 
the statements "principles". But the scientist who asked 
"What caused this corrosion?" and answered "Hydrochloric 
acid", or the ordinary man who asked "What broke thés window?"
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and answers "A thrown stone", are not required by the 
stated principle "Every effect has a cause" to assume that 
they were wrong, and should now talk about causes causing 
effects, and not acids corroding metals^ and thrown stones 
breaking windows. The scientist who has been listing the 
many substances of which things he investigated were 
constituted correctly interprets the principle "all things 
are made of a< substance" as somehow equivalent to the state­
ments he has been, making and to the many statements he will 
make as his investigations proceed.
"No thing is made of a substance" is to him nonsensical, 
if not meaning633. Equally nonsensical to him is the 
suggestion that once be has grasped "All things are made 
of a substance" all his investigations az'e superfluous, 
either because he knows the answer to all questions now, or 
because no answer can possibly be intelligible. That he 
has been "errploying" or "taking for granted" the principle 
all the time is something he can accept as an^accusation or 
as a description of his procedure, p,rA he needs no more than 
the success of his procedure to make the accusation harmless
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and the description correct. If "things" means chalk and 
charcoal fragments') and "substances" means "calcium carbonate" 
and "carbon", then the principle Is Intelligible and holds;
If such things and such substances are not what are deferred 
to In the statement of a principle, he doe^ not know what 
the principle which Is stated to him means.
But neither does anybody else.
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(2) Essence and Beinp;.
(a) 1^6n we are asked for the difference between spoons 
and spears, both of which are bronze, we refer to their 
use or function. This we may call the formal or functional 
explanation, or the formal or functional definition, and 
w© may talk of the formal or functional essence of spoons 
and spears. They can, in other words, be described or 
classified instrurnentally.
The "being" that Aristotle was searching for is the 
answer to the question: "\>*hat must this thing be in order
to be the thing it is?" It was not Just his question, but 
an established one, and the answers commonly given involved 
matter, form and function. A house is not a house unless it 
is made of something, stone orwood or earth; unless it has 
a sliape; unless it keeps out the elements (its function) •
Any one of these serves as an answer to the question, but 
a partial answer^ only. That there are several answers 
possible leads on to the further philosophical question,
"What must any thing be in order to be a thing?" Aristotle’s 
C3?:Ltioiam of his predecessors was largely that they had 
asked this question and answeréd it in terms of the first 
qumntion, and given only one of the possible answers as the 
only answer. This needs elaboration, but briefly; they, 
like Descartes in his physics, assumed one Substance, bne 
Matter, and tried to show that all things must be formed 
from it; or they assumed a multiplicity of identical units.
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again like Descartes,and a principle of patterning; or they 
assumed a limited number of different units, and a principle 
of combination.
(Difference is observable, but is to be explained by 
postulating a material identity and a principle which causes 
difference. The argument must bé from facts (contingency) 
to ultimates (necessity); the problem is then to join the 
two worlds into one. I am stressing a central problem, and 
ignoring much that is vital in pre-Socratic theory - 
Heraclitus is a revolutionary who insists that change is a 
feature of the world, that "x exists" inplies "x is changing"; 
Socrates Insists that the forms are unchanging, and change 
is a matter of forms coming and going. The first maintains 
the reality of the world as we find it, the second denies it, 
and nrovides the basis for Cartesian logic, metaphysics and 
theory of mind and ideas).
(b) When we know the substance to be the same in spoons and 
soears (both being bronze) we need, in order to distinguish 
then, only to refer to the formal differences, differences 
of shape or function. "Formal" must be understood as the 
antithesis of "material"; it is now a technical term, and 
no longer restricted to "shape". V© cannot write for 
"fomal" the word "predicative", however, since we can have 
material differences which can be indicated by "x is bronze",
"y is silver"; only if tliere is a single matter does "matter" 
become meaningless as a predicate, since then it differentiates
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nothing from anything else* What Aristotle insists on is 
that matter, shape, function, are all involved in the being 
of a particular tning* We must keep the functional essence 
in mind because whet we mean by certain words is a thing 
with e f'anction, and wr;ile a fora and a matter are required, 
there ere many forme and many matters which can go along with 
a specific function* Compare the case of the knives hbove# 
Almost all our social and political terms for things are 
"fuiKitional - father, friend, teacher, politician, guardian, 
ruler, etc. But note the further points of interests of 
each of these, and many other, terms we can proffer as an 
ana], y si 8 "if x is a y (father etc.) x is a nan , though In 
no case can we say "if x is a nan x Is a y". The functional 
essence emerges from "x is a man who acts so", "x is a man 
who is related so", and in each case the "form" depends upon 
there being a distinguishable thing capable of acting and 
being related. v*hether it is an act or a relation in 
question, meaning depends upon there being a distinguishable 
man who is agent of the act or one. term of th? relation, and 
that the nan so acts or is so related Is logically contingent. 
"Necessity" appears in the logical statements that every 
act has a specific agent, every relation is a relation of 
(at least) two things. But if the terms are not analysed, 
we have a series of direct entailments - "if x is a father 
ho has a child", "if x is a cousin, x has a cousin".
488
I have already indicated that these features of discourse 
are the source of some of Descartes* "necessary tr^uths"; but 
for an Aristotelian the meaning of the necessary "truths" 
derives from the meaning of the contingent "truths". Only 
if we are familiar with a particular kind of thing which 
acts in a particular way is there for us anything to which 
the correlative agent-name can be attached; and it is tnis 
which provides the necessity in "if there is going on an act 
y, there must be some thing doing y". The logical parallel 
to "x thinks" is "x moves", not "x is extended"; the last 
functions as an answer: if x moves, x is extended, i.e. x 
is a body which moves. The question of what matter in the 
stuff sense can only be asked, in connection with an act, of 
the thing which acts, or, in connection with a relation, ùf 
the things wiiich are related.
(c) Any terminology presents certain difficulties because 
the matter, the form and the function are necessarily related 
to the thing, and we speak both of the thing having a form 
and the matter having a form, though only of the tning as 
having a function. Speaking in the material or factual, as 
distinct from the logical, mode, we change the expressions 
only in pai*t. ‘ We say that a knife is made of steel, not 
that it has steel; we are uneasy saying the thing ^  matter, 
but we say that the knife is steel. Ve say that a ball 
has shape, not that it has "round" or even has "roundness", 
though what we mean by "round" can be expressed as "a shape".
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iii© sfcinotloiïB nero are obviously valid In ordinary speech* 
but they denand further attention before we can say that they 
are logically ^riportant or what their logical lüîport is. 
^rlstotle suggests in tbs final section of the Categories ^  
that the verb "to have" was already a source of difficulty 
to Greek logicians* and already the source of confusion.
What suggests itself iimediatcly is that "x has a shape" 
is equivalent to "x Is round or square or angular or.,,.,"* 
where the complete disjunction would include all possible 
shapes, and that "has" indicates a formal and not a factual 
mode of expression. If we do not insist on a distinction 
between "attribute"* "mode", "quality", "act", "affection" 
etc., but use "attribute" as a genus term for all predicates, 
we could indicate that we were speaking formally by the use 
of "has", e.g. "every substance has attributes" would be a 
logical statement about statements which can be made. Its 
meaning wouJd be exhibited impartially by "roses are red", 
"ëlephants are mammals", "particles are triangular".
Vnat we should have tc argue is thât (a) the use of "have" 
as a substitute for 'is" at the fact level is mistaken* and
(b) there can be no meaningful statement which combines the 
tor? modes by making "substance" the subject and asserting 
of it* after either "is" or "baa", a particular attribute.
If the argument holds, then "necessity" la confined to "if 
this can be called an act, there must be an agent* whatever 
the agent is; if this can be called sn attribute, there must 
1. If the section is spurious, the point is genuine.
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b© a substance, whatever the substance Is”, i.e. son©thing 
which can be called a substance because it can be the subject 
of a statement ”this thing so acts”, ”this thing is such”.
If we convert "every substance has attributes” into a 
class-relation state^ient, so that we can say "there are 
substances” and "there are attributes”, we may have difficulties 
developing a logic or arguments, but we can still at least 
recognise familiar fact assertions as meaningful. But if 
we treat "attributes” as a class term and refuse to do the 
same with "substance”, we refuse to accept as meaningful 
any of our commonplace nouns. What I have tried to show 
above is that Descartes, beginning by making "thing-substance” 
the only noun, is forced to move to "there are minds and there 
are bodies", and to treat minds and bodies as the subjects of 
statements. But his first significant statement is actually 
"extended substances move”. "Thinking, therefore a thinking 
substance” produces a necessarily true "there is a thinking 
substance" which is not an existential claim, not a fact 
statement, but belongs to the twilight metaphysical region 
of truths whose subjects are terms in logic and whose 
oredicatcs are tezns in fact-statementa•
The general proposition we can assert, granted that we 
arc talking in familiar terms of the many things which we 
are concerned with in experience, is that while what a thing 
does is possible because it is a substance with a particular 
form (shape, structure), tlie function Is of the thing, and not
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of Its l o m  or of its matter. The ball, we say, bounces; 
it bounces because it is made of rubber (and rubber always 
bounces? But when wo speak in this way, "rubber" means 
"rubber things", "rubber in any sriape", anything **raade of 
rubber", not "rubber in general").
(5) Potentiality
(a) Different subatancos are suitable for b eing made into, 
or for becoming, certain things, other can never be made into 
or become such things. In some tiling the amne way, things 
that are suitable for doing ^ certain tilings are not always 
being; used for the purpose they can fulfil, while others 
cannot fu].fil thai: purpose. These are matters of facts 
bronze is made into knives, ora into bronze, but some bronze 
is made into statues, some ore is not treated at all, and 
knives made from bronze are sometimes being used and some­
times not being used.
Aristotle would use the term "potentiality" of bronze, 
ore and knife to Indicate that bronze can become knives, ore 
can become bronze, and knives are actual cutting tools in 
use or tools which can be used for cutting though not in use.
In each case, the statement would be, in full, "x is potentially 
y"t There is nothing esoteric or difficult about the 
doctrine, and until we see why it had to be put forward it 
seems trivial. Consider Descartes’ "necessary" thinking 
substance, derived from "I think" (where "I" is distinguishable 
from "you" or anyone else in a variety of ways if "I" is
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used in ordinary fashion), and shown by means of "essences” 
to be necessarily always thinking; if we accept the doctrine 
of potentiality, we should expect Descartes, if he has really 
demonstrated that there ia a thing or substance which thinks, 
to be able to indicate or to describe the thing in question 
and to make a furtlier series of stateiuants about the sorts 
of acts it was capable of perfoming, unless "thinking” is a 
single kind of act that goes on.without change or interruption.
"Buu it has to ba noted that, while indeed we are always 
in actuality conscious of acts or operations of mind, that 
is not the case with the faculties or powers of nind, except 
potentially. So that when we dispose ourselves to the 
exercise of any faculty, if the faculty inside in ua, we 
are immediately actually conscious of it; and hence we can 
deny that it exists in the mind, if we can form no conscious­
ness of it”.
Descartes is replying to Arnauld’s criticism, that if the 
mind is the self in so far as it is a thinking thing distinct 
from body, there must be much in the mind of which the mind 
is not conscious. But to Descartes
"that nothing can exist in the mind, in so far as it is 
a thinking thing, of which it is not conscious, seems to 
me self-evident, because we conceive nothing to exist in it, 
viewed in this light, that is not thought, and something 
dependent on thought; for other wise it would not belong 
to the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing. But there 
can exist in us no thought of which, at the very moment that 
it Is present in us, we are not conscious. Wherefore I have 
no doubt that the mind begins to think at the same time as it 
la infused in the body of an infant, and is at the same time 
conscious of its own thought, though afterwards it does not 
remember that, because tho aoeclfic forms of these thoughts 
do not live in the memory". ^
1. Reply to Obj.IV. H. and H. II. p.11b#
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Thon follows the paragraph first quoted. If Descartes 
Is to stick literally to "nothing is in the mind of vhlch it 
is not conscious" a complete description of "mind" when it 
is aware of p is "p"« It is almost hopeless trying
intelligibly to state what is involved.
Descartes simply must use pronouns in talking of minds 
and mental acts and operations. V/hen I was reading the 
Gassendi objection all that I was aware of, all that I had 
in mind, was the sentence I was reading, or what the sentence 
"said", what Gassendi meant. I was aware of p, and if p is 
what was in mind, I was aware of vd-iat was in mind. But I 
was aware neither of myself nor ray mind. It is surely 
impossible to sunder "I" and "mind" so confietely that we 
can say "I was not aware that I wasaWt that p, or that my ' >•
mind was aware that p, but my mind was aware both of p and
that it was aware of p". VÆiat the sundering demands (and 
what demands the sundering) is "I am aware of p and p is not 
out there in the world so p ia in mind" ; I am aware of what 
is In my mind, and "mind" is a location or collection of 
ideas, and not a thinking thing, a conscious thing, but an 
object of consciousness, that of thlch I am (time by time) aware.
If we surrender the "mind" talk altogether, and simply use "I" 
we can state clearly what is the concern.
Whenever I think, I think of something. I see, perceive, 
imagine, conceive, judge, doubt and deny, will and wonder, etc. 
One of these I will always, if I am thinking, be doing, and 
this means that at that time I will not be doing any of the
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others, although I have the power to do them, i.e. I can at 
a later time perform these operations. That I so operate, 
that 1 can so operate, I can discover only after so operating. 
"Imagining" has to occur and bo noted, discriminated from 
seeing, before I can say that I imagine or that I can imagine.
The only account I can give of myself as a thinking thing, 
i.e. an account which mentions nothing else but thinicing, 
is in terms of actueO. performances of operations which I 
remember, and, if I am not concerned with history, the 
corresponding "power" statements which convert "did do" into 
"am able to do". If I write "thinking substance" or "mind" 
for "I", then no changes are required. The account is 
exactly the same - and we could write "it" for "I" quite as 
readily. We could also write "a man". In other words, while 
there may be disagreement as to whether I am a man, a spirit, 
a mind, a thinking thing’s account of its think!hr will be 
compatible with any of the alternative theses about what I am.
Further, whichever "substance" the account is of, the 
objects of thought present the same problem, in that they not 
only "appear" but "reappear". Whatever "is aware", the sens© 
in which p is in mind when we remember p is different from the 
sense in which p is in mind when we forget p and cannot perhaps 
remember it or are simply not remembering it, although we can 
perhaps remember it later. If we take seriously the doctrine 
that "ideas" are things in mind, then either we have to 
distinguish between a sense in which they are potentially in 
mind in contrast with being actually in mind, or treat them
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as always in itiind and sometimes looked at or "known" by the 
sell who looks, in Lockean fashion, into the mind.
In the final paragraph (which I quoted first) the whole 
sense is presented with pronouns. The meaning is clear 
enough; we know that we are sensing. Imagining, conceiving, 
remembering etc. when we are actually sensing, imagining, 
conceiving, remembering etc. Thus we know that we have the ,> 
power to do t W  se things, as we could not know it before we had 
done them and distinguished them. Treated as universal, the 
first statement is in fact false, i.e. we do not always know 
that we are sensing etc. when we are sensing etc. We have 
to add "sometimes", recognising that sometimes we are totally 
unaware of vdiat we are doing, and sometimes completely wrong 
in our judgment of what we are doing - we think that we are 
sensing when we are imagining, remembering when we are
inventing. Inventing when we are remembering ard the like.
*
And the conoluslon, "hence we can deny that It exists In the 
wind, if we canform no consciousness of It" either does not 
follow or says only what was said before, i.e. we can deny 
that we are aware of, have noticed, an act which would entitle 
us to talk of a power we have, "in mind" being equivalent 
to "aware of".
And having noted what is involved here, we can also note 
that the previous paragraph also depends on pronouns: it is
"we"vho dispose ourselves to the exorcise of any faculty, in 
the last, and it is "we" who cannot fall to be conscious of any
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thought In us at the moment that it is present in us, in the 
first. But what is the sense of "thought"? p, or sensing, 
imagining, remembering p? If it is p, as ia suggested by 
the impossibility of any act being other than present in us 
when it is being performed, and anywhere else at any other 
time, we may feel it necessary to treat p as actually in mind 
all the time and potentially "in consciousness" at all times 
wlien it is not actually being thought, i.e., is "in mind" as. 
being "minded" by a tiiinking substance which is not the mind.
The account of the thinking thing, if nothing is included 
in the account except "thinking", will at any moment be "is 
a persisting thing which is actually thinking'that p and has 
the power to sense, imagine, conceive etc., powers which are 
not at the moment actualised." I shall show later that this 
is roughly the Aristotelian account, except that Aristotle 
maintains it to be meaningless to assert either acts or powers 
of nothing, and he asserts them of a continuing and developing 
human being. He also asserts a sub-division of mental-acts 
and powers to be qcts and powers of animals other than men. 
Descartes prefers pronouns, and avoids talking directly 
of men.
(b) Only because tnings are at a time something with form and 
matter can we talk of them as potentially something else 
at ttxat time. "Potentiality" applies to things of a kind 
as they actually are, and it is nonsense to call a thing a 
potential actor or agent if it is actually acting.
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If we make two moves, we may seem to get a f o m  without 
a matter, a matter without a form. Bronze is potentially a 
& knila, but it can be actualised only when a workman acts on 
it and gives it a form; the matter seems to precede the form 
which is only potential, or which it is only potentially, 
a form only in a mind. But the actual!sing agent is himself 
actual at the time of "imposing the form", and the bronze 
had some form prior to the imposition, just as the,, ore which 
became the bronze in its turn had a form. No matter how far 
back we trace the historical processes, we have formed matters: 
but if we consider the bronze and the workman who is about 
to work on the bronze, the form which the bronze is to have 
is only an "idea", part of the purpose of the craftsman, a 
future state of the substance.
Aristotle takes it for granted that this is a familiar 
and intelligible situation, just as Descartes takes it for 
granted that we all know what "thinking" is. In such a 
situation "purpose", "intention", "knowledge", "skill", 
"desire", are intelligible, since we are presented with the 
sort of'Situation which gives rise to their use. The question 
that I want to raise, however, is not of what more needs to 
be said or can bs suid of this situation, but of the difference 
between the case of the craftsman and the case of a plant.
The plant develops without the aotualising activity of a 
craftsman with his purpose. A seedling is potentially a 
blossoming plant, a plait is potentially a reproducer of its
-I
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species .... these ara two ways of formulating facts which we 
learn and which are important to us, that seedlings do become 
blossoming niants, do seed and the seeds do become plants, 
and plants of the same kind as the plants which produced the 
seeds.
But even here something is needed for the actualisation, 
namely food and a set of environmental conditions. So with 
babies becoming men, or even with boys becoming philosophers; 
something outside is needed, something actual, nourislinent and 
care and instruction, food, clothing, and an instructor.
The importance of this sort of argument Is first that it 
re-asse^ts becoming as a scientific "category”, a valid 
concept, in a philosophical background y^ich had rejected 
becoioing as "unreal" or had discovered that it was unaccountable 
except as the result of an utterly unintelligible "force" or 
"principle" acting on what was incapable of alteration. But 
second, it solves a logical puzzle without recourse to 
metaphysical entities, since we can now say that being a babe 
now and a man at a later stage is precisely what is meant by 
the term " a human being". We do not need an unchanging 
material sub-stratum to which an attribute is attached at 
one moment and not attached at another in order to explain 
that the thing with and the thing without are the same thing.
And thirdly, instead of confining philosophy and science 
to explanation by means of the concepts of unchanging matters 
and principles, or unchanging forms and their aggregations.
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these concepts are elaborated and expanded. The foTia which 
a thing has enables it to be contrasted and compared v/ith 
other things, and so classjlicntions are possible; the 
doctrine of n. variety of matters correlated with a variety of 
forms maJces it possible for there to be an empirical invest­
igation of the matters, i.e. of their constituents and 
structure as revealed by dissection and inspection - we are 
allowed to break the eggs, and Darwin and Harvey bear witness 
to the efficacy with which Aristotle the scientist broke 
aggs. The development which a thing reveals is not incom­
patible with the matter-form doctrine, nor is it a substitute 
for it; and the development doctrine itself leads on to the 
notion of interaction, of causal relation in which two or more 
things different in kind are concerned. And as with the 
development, so with the causal doctrine; the latter does 
not replace the former, but supplements it, and as a result 
we get a glimpse of the expanding series of philosophical 
concepts, each of which suggests a particular science and 
each of which draws attention to the artificiality of 
insisting on one of them as the pattern for the Ultimata 
Reality.
(c) Aristotle takes it for granted that there is a very 
great number of different kinds of things, all of which exist, 
can be classified, and con be studied. He accepts the 
distinction between living things and non-living things, and 
that with this goes the recognition of complex differences
5ûÛ.
in er>ny enough to see. As well, there are difficulties*
The criteria for being alive are in part behavioural; 
there may he acute difficulties in determining uhiether a 
thing is now alive or dead as there may be difficulties for 
a scientist in deciding whether a discovered thing c^m be " 
claesed with "living things", nevertheless our distinctions 
between "living" and "dead" and "neither" are clear enough 
in the case of an Iran Is and plants and sand piles, and the 
scientist’s difficulties are not such as to present the 
8 0eratic-Crrtesian challenge "What is Life?", with the 
assumption that if we carmot answer, the word is meaningless.
The demand here is for definition or e^qplanation 
by reducing a concept to other concepts, and hence a Cart­
esian riddle; a concept is meaningless unless it can be 
reduced, and superfluous if it can have other concepts 
substituted for it. The argument of the Regulae is that 
there must be irreducible concepts if there is to be thinking 
■ t fill, but the concealed claim is that all concepts other 
than those Descartes calls simple are either invalid or 
0>iorth6ind terias for complexities of other concepts. As I 
stressed, no\(^ iore in Descartes do we find a serious attempt 
to justify concepts or their rejection by reduction to 
sixaples; but if a concept like "life" cannot be reduced, then 
all the argument pemito is that it be accepted as a simple 
and necessary concept. The method can, at best, show only 
reducibility or irreducibility. Proof of meaninglessness 
demands a demonstration that science - and not just physics
or soul-ology - can, without loss or use of equivalents, get
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on without it. That work after work of Descartes stops just 
when the question of the ’’nature" of organisms is to b© 
explained to us, when we get beyond statues and windmills and 
fountains, has again its significance. ^
Aristotle, on the other hand, treating concepts as (in part) 
classlflcatory, can indicate the class divisions which the 
concept demands, and is able to note that along with the 
classification goos the empirical discovery of organic 
structur*e, specific forms of relation, and specific forms 
and variants of forms of behaviouB. Not tiaving reduced 
animal» and plants to particles or extensions ih motion, 
Aristotle can simply talk about then and study them, without 
the need to posit a sub stance-soul which "explains”. all the 
non-physical features of these things* He is not, for the 
sane reason, bound to deny that animals can perceive, feel, 
and desire. .
The psychic "powers”, which are spoken of as belonging to 
organ!? ns, and in relation to ways In which organisms act 
(and inorganic things do not act) in a complex environment, 
always involve (a) an organism of a particular kind, and
(b) certain aotualising conditions'before the power is 
exercised, i.e. the act in question occurs.
Being nourished demands food (and stones lack the power 
to nourish or to be nourished); seeing demands an object 
that can be seen; imagining demands something imagined; 
thought demands a different type of bbject. Questions asked
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about seeing may be answered by reference (a) to the kind 
ot thing seen, (b) to the kinds of thing tixat can be seen^ 
and {c) the condition of the occurrence of a "seeing” or 
any "seeing”. We have, in,other words, to study the thing ‘ 
which SÜÔ8, including his visual organs, the thing looked at, 
and the njedium which makes seeing possibles what is demanded 
is research and reflective consideration, and the difficulties 
are indicated in & fairly lengthy general, discussion In the 
Pc3 Aniim of the particular powers and their exercisings.
The survey contrasts markedly with the Cartesian reductio ad 
noF.ationem of sensing.
Reasoning, and the higher powers of thought, raise acute 
problems, and we can sec already part of the reason. There 
is lacking here the obvious relation between the aenser and 
the thing sens^ d^, i.e. the independent aotualising thing 
MÏ103Q presence "occasions" the sensory awareness. What 
Aristotle seems to maintain, ^ however, is that it Is the man 
who has the powors, the same man who senses and imgines and 
reasons and does metaphysics. 'Imt I have claimed above is 
that this is the conditions of there being a problem of 
"relating" the objects of the various activities, what is 
sensed, what is imagined, what is thought; the condition., 
of there being a problem of relating metaphysics, science and 
the familiar world; and Aristotle shows no signs of doubting 
that there was a familiar world, containing things of many 
kinds, some of whom were, in Descartes’ generic sense, thinkers 
and soma of whom and which ware "thought" but not "thinkers”.
5 0 3 #
(4) Ttw Hold of Different Bclenaes.
If we claiia that the objects of different sciences are 
independent of one another, we are denying that familiar world 
tilings are what sciences study. In the :e Anima (403a-403b) 
Arlttotle gives two example a - anger and a house - to illustrate 
the way in which the same sort of altuatlon or occurrence 
can belong to different sciences, and tills la vital to hla 
metaphysical theala that "aubstance" meana "Individual thing".
Since I am to be closely concerned with the first, I shall 
here refer only to tiio second, developing and exaggerating 
Aristotle’s exa:T$le. A student of fiuictional design studies 
shapes of houses in relation to human needs, an historian 
studies the development of houses, a geographer the relation 
between houses and different human situations, the economist 
studies demand for houses and price fluctuation, the architect 
studies principles of construction, while the industrial 
physicist studies the material - wood and its potentialities 
as a building material, steal and Its characteristics, stone 
and its durability.
To each of them a house is a different kind of tiling, yet 
after all each is concerned with the same houses. The houses, 
in a sense, are independent of any of these sciences; but they 
are not independent of the truths which the sciences determine - 
there are not "just houses" before we begin to think, to ask 
questions and find answers. The study of matter is study 
of matter with form, formed-matter which is patterned or to
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be patterned into a form* ' Each science is concerned with 
features inseparable from things, and not even separable 
in thought from things. Each of the sciences could be 
called "qbstract" in a sense fairly familiar to us, in that 
they deal with aspects of things while yet the aspects are 
not independent of the things - they deal with a selected 
set of propositions wMch are true and in which the thing in 
question is a term, and exclude others: physics includes
"x is extended", excludes "x costs £1000".
Physics is interested only in extended things, economics 
in things with a value, architects in the design of things 
which fulfil human needs in a particular way, but the same 
familiar things may be the subjects of study af any 
combination of the sciences. What is denied is the 
"simplicity" of things as against the complexity of science, 
and the sundering of science from things.
There is, Aristotle also recognises, a special science, 
namely mathematics, which deals with "attributes" separable 
by abstraction from particular kinds of things (or bodies) - 
and this seems clear enough in the case of geometry, which 
does not depend upon any material things having the particular 
geometric forms, while yet all bodily things have the extension 
which is the basic concept of geometry. He could agree with 
Descartes that all bodies are extended, but the very fact that 
geometry can work with only regular figures would for him be 
obviously an argument against a mathematical interpretation 
of the real "things" in the world. The extended forms that
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"substances" have are irregular, although the imposition of 
forms may be the human endeavour.
There is another science. First Philosophy or Metaphysics 
(as it was later called) which deals wich attributes separable 
in 1 act and in thought from any particular kind of body.
There is room for a variety of interpretations of the final 
"science". I suggest as a possibility that it means the study 
of the general attributes of anything whatever, qua thing 
and irrespective of its kind. It cannot refer to a special ^ 
stiidy of "soul", if %80ul" is connected with anger and fear 
and the like, since these Aristotle declares in the following 
sentence in the De Anima to be inseparable from the physical 
matter of the bodies to which they belong. "Anger" and "body" 
are separable only as the subjects of two sciences; their 
union is clear, and psychology is an empirical science, a 
part of natural phllosj^hy, if it is concerned with such ; 
phenomena as fear and anger, and, as we .will see, with most 
of what we call "mental occurrences".
"First Philosophy" may be concerned with nous as a 
separate, incorporeal substance, and this is argued by some - 
its resemblance to Cartesian doctrine would then be plain.
But of this I am e xtremely doubtful - even the celestial 
"intelligences" do not seem to be "separable" from the 
celestial bodies, and I am not satisfied that Aristotle’s 
God is a Thing in any way independent of tne universe.
. Thera la only this to be said for setting down In such
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a surnniary r o m  the statements as to the nature of mathematids 
and first philosophy, that we realise how difficult it is to 
find a meaning in what is said. Aristotle may seem at times 
in the Phyaics and in the Metaphysics to be concerned with 
arguments involving only necessary truths, but in general it 
is obvious that he is concerned with problems that arise from 
accepted and complex facts. It is these that are the 
foundation of his rejection of the philosophy of his 
predecessors, and it is with empirical (observable) facts 
that he begins, not with "conceptions" of a mind or soul or 
self, and of God, which are "immediately given”. It is 
facts of the familiar world, where we have criteria for 
determining whether what is said is meaningful and true or 
false, which determine whether “principles” are justifiable 
or adequate.
Rather than look for odd quotations to endorse vdiat I have 
said about Aristotelian doctrine, and especially what I have 
implied, that the terms “substance”, "matter", "form”, 
"potentiality", "actuality", are logical or form^, and not 
material, i.e. are not names for "things”, I shall endeavour 
to show how what has been said and implied applies directly 
to the De Anima. I summarise what has been said of "thing” 
and "substance” before turning to the new topic.
(5) Thin:! and Substance
It was assumed that our ordinary language nouns were 
meaningful, and that distinctions which those nouns imply
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are distinctions which wo can Justify in a variety of ways. 
Eight criteria were distinguished for "substance”, and with 
the exception of (d) - "the same substance can exist in many 
places and forms at the same time", and (g) "the simplicity 
of substance contrasts with the conplexity of compounds, not 
with the complexity of features possessed by things", the 
criteria apply to things well as they do substances.
Of (d) it may be said that if we write "things" or "kind of 
thing" for "substance" in "the same substance", the criterion 
holds for both, and it is at least a dubious matter whether, 
for example, we call "carbon" a thing or a substance. And
(g), when examined carefully, seems rather to stress the 
similarity of thing and s ubstance, since the substances in 
a compound, when specified, have like things and the compound, 
a variety of features.
The thing-substance distinction seems to hold, in fact, 
only when the two terms appear in an expression of the form 
"x is made of y", where what is asserted is that a thing 
of a determinable kind is made of a substance of a determinable 
kind. Even the homogeneity of "substance" In this case is 
qualitative or functional, and is illustrated best by the 
facility with which we turn sub a tance-nouns into aubstance- 
adjectives, often without a change of form, or into 
prepositionsal phrases. This is. a cotton dress, that is 
a brick house, there is a frame of steel.
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3ut, as I have already shown without express Intention 
initially, we tend rather to use "matter", "material", or 
"stuff", rather than "substance" when we are contrasting 
form and function with the constituent"body" of a thing, 
and as the adJective-tendency shows, the homogeneity stress 
is largely predicative (answering the question "What kind?") 
and not - the grammatical t e m  being signifieant-'^substantive" K 
or "substantival". Subject and predicate in a sense contrasts 
with matter and form, but the contrast is neither precise nor 
consistent.
Now predicates we take, too easily and uncritically, to be
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simple and obviously distinct from one another because each 
has its "siiqDle" meaning. "Red" and "round" and "tieavy" 
are attributes we would never confuse, but their simplicity 
is not so apparent when we use them in classifying and 
comparing things; and without that use it is difficult to 
give them any meaning at all. "Wooden" and "brick" and "steel" 
lack the apparent, sirrç)licity of "red" and "round" and "heavy", 
although they too are never confused as attributes, and they 
too function in comparing and classifying. They are much 
more "substantial", but their function is the same so far 
as use in statements is concerned. The way in which we 
determine whether or not attributes are exclusive indicates 
this to some extent: "x is round" does not imply "x is heavy" 
or "x is red", but the three are compatible, and "compatible" 
here is a question of the same thing being all three. We
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can bagin to decld® by starting with red things and saelng 
If they are red and round ,»,-.we can begin with any class, 
in other words, and if we could not begin with a class, if 
there ware no round things, red things or heavy things, the 
terms would be meaningless.
Vo do not show much interest in these types of classification, 
since they do not serve our purposes directly, though 
indirectly we find ourselves continually subdividing 
established and named classes in all our dealings with things 
by distinguishing the red, the heavy and the round, "x is 
wooden" irrlies "x is not brick", "x is not s tool", but x 
may be round or red or heavy. I tried to argue above that 
it was plausible to claim that if we Imd no senses we could 
never know anything at all, but that this argument does not 
load to the conclusion either that we "know" only "sonaâtions" 
or that our only criteria for tilings ere sensible qualities, 
however important they may be. Descriptions of the visual 
features of comparatively simple things we find iiïçossible 
to give when confronted with the things; and we^get "results" 
by talking as little children d raw, using "green" as they 
colour trees and lawns with one green chalk, whichever "green" 
happens to be handy. m e n  our talk fails to "match" we 
elaborate it, and are forced to refer to objects with the 
colour, the green, the variety of greens, in question. If 
there are "sensations" of green, we have only class names for 
them; and if there are green things which we sense, we have
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only class naraas for thorn.
It is when we find odd examples, of a snooker ball which 
is called 'the green", of portions of a golf course cal!M 
"greeiW, and realise that it is quite intelligible to say 
"the green goes there", "greens are not always square", that 
we realise how prédicates can function as subjects, just 
as subject-tiling terms function as predicates. This need 
not be laboui'èd in the case of sensible qualities, but it 
must be laboured in the case of "sensible things". The
I
predicate "animal" is simple enough as a prédicat©, but in 
order to explain its "meaning" we liave to make use of 
statements like "ardmals are...." (A dictionary will, as likely 
as not, give an Aristotelian definition, which clearly few 
users of the term have ever "conceived" - e.g. "an organised 
being, liaving life and sensation and voluntary motion; it is 
distinguished from a plant, wliich has organisation and life, 
but not sensation or voluntary motion; the name sometimes 
implies the absence of the higher faculties peculiar to man").
In the case of "aniuials", few users of the ttarm are at all 
faiTiiliar with what animals "math of"; in the case of 
"brick" there is a greater familiarity, and when "brick" is 
used in "this house is brick" there? is a very great familiarity, 
with the laaterlal or stuff concerned. But "familiarity" is 
of no special importance; what is important is that the 
question "of what stuff?" can be asked of any thing, and can 
b© asked in a variety of forma.
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What, If we accept general discourse as meaningful, can be 
said of any thing?
(a) That it exists somewhere and some when. (This Is Descartes* 
primary condition of a substance, i.e.(ax). ^Essence is not 
substance until it exists).
(b) That many statements can be made with it as subject. (The 
more attributes we know a thing to have, the better we know 
the thing - this is Descartes* equivalent).
(c) That it is different from other things, vihich belong to 
the sane or other classes. (It must be conceived as distinct 
from and as existing independently of other things).
(d) That it belongs to a number of classes, and if it Is 
familiarly named thing, it will seem to the unphilosophical 
that it belongs to one class, or to two classes. "Pedro", 
the child knows, Is obviously a oat; pai'haps It Is obvious 
to the child that it Is an animal. Relating it to a third 
dess Is somevdîat difficult, because few know to what class 
"animals" belong, yet they accept vaguely the biologist's 
determinate els sslficatlon. The philosophically interesting 
point la that Pedro belongs to as many classes as the statement 
beginning with "Pedro is" has predicate corroletions, and
only if there a many different kinds of thing and a non-logical 
principle of classification do we get classlficatory systems 
which are determinate. (Only then does it make sense to talk 
of stirana genera, as Descartes speaks of minds and bodies as 
summa genera).
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(e) Ihat It Is sp at! o-temp orally and otherwise related to 
other existing things. (Descartes* "conceiving as existing 
independently" is "conceiving as independently related").
(l) That it will show an' inner complexity wliich is a possible 
field of study for scientists, or perhaps a "usable stuff" 
for those v^ose interests are instrumental. (Descartes asserts 
this of all gross bodies; and the "particles" are as much 
the stuff of structure as of use in gross bodies. It is 
true that he claims "minds" to be simples, but unless "ideas" 
are to be completely separable from minds, then the minds 
that exist are complex).
(g) That statements about its structure may serve as 
explanations of its beimviour. (This is true of Descartes’ 
gross bodies and of the thinking minds do).
(h) That it will act, or react, in a limited variety of ways
in common with other* members of its class (if thé classification 
is determinate arid names established); that it will act, 
or react, differently from other members of its own class, 
and differently from members of other classes, under different 
circumstances or conditions. (This does not seem to apply ^ 
to minds and bodies for Descartes, since the latter can only 
move and the former only think — but it is true oi gross 
bodies that they behave differently, and minds both think 
differently and are acted on by bodies in ways in which 
bodies cannot act on bodies)
(i) That it will be in different conditions at different
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tines, and will not be acting in all the ways in which it 
can act all the tine, although at any time it is the sort of 
thing that can act or react in ways characteristic of its 
class. What ways and what conditions are isolated can be 
stated generally but must be determined empirically.
(J) That once it has been determined to be of a particular 
kind, in relation to other kinds already classified precisely 
by sciences or Imprecisely by convention and use, certain 
other statements can be made of it which are necessarily 
true. These statements will include assertions of membership 
of certain classes and assertions of non-membership of certain 
classes.
(k) That it can be a tcim In an indefinite number of relation 
statements of different kinds.
(1) That it is universal in the sense that it is a "kind" and 
individual or particular in the sense that it is of a kind, 
is what it is where and when it is, and while it is. And 
If commonly named things were not both universal and 
particular or individual, there would be no meaning to the 
subject or predicate terras of our discourse.
(m) That as a persistent thing it may exhibit development 
In a regular pattern of phases which are evidenced by changes 
of appearance, behaviour or structure, without thereby ceasing 
to be the thing of a kind that It is; and the changes wliich 
the phases represent may be "essential" to the thing 
persisting as the kind of thing it is. This is a feature
of all organisms........ ............ .
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For a do tailed consideration of Doscartas* coraplox treatment 
of "substanca", and a collootion of t W  many statements Which 
he makes, I recozîimond Jean Laporte’s La Rationalisme da Descartes, 
especially the chapter on "Las Limites da la Connaissance 
Rationnelle". But what is Important here is that the series 
of statements which I have itade above can be instanced from 
oar use of common nouns in ordinary discourse, and any common 
noun can appear in a fact statement.
Those noons we can regard, if we like, as names of the things 
and the only things which constitute our familiar world.
The skeletonic logical structure presented above is in a 
sense the logical or metaphysical structure of any thing that 
we familiarly encounter; it represents what we "mean" by the 
plirase "a thing", or what everyone assumes to bs the meaning 
of "a thing", what tliay take for granted as thj® meaning of the 
word "thing" although they probably never have made any attempt 
to formulate the "meaning".
That they take it for granted is illustrated by the way 
in wMch, having the "natural light" only for a guide; they 
reject such statements as "x is a thing but it is not a kind 
of thing", "x is a thing but it is not near or distant from 
any other thing", "x is a thing but it never affects other 
tidLngs or is affected by other things", "if x is a thing then 
it never changes". It is illustrated by the way in which 
they consult doctors and watchmakers and mechanics, dieticians 
and veterinary surgeons and gardeners, e:qplain irregularities
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in behaviour by things going wrong inside, or things going 
wrong outside, the thing whose behaviour changes.
A classlficatory system also shows in its own way a certain 
structure of the world, and it expands into the familiar world 
with the location and description of the things classified, 
with statements of tlieir qualities and relations and behaviours. 
So the skeletohic logical structure of "thing" expands into 
the "real world" by the expansion of the logical terms into 
the language in which thinp^ s are named and the relations, 
structures and activities stated.
There is no sense in which we can talk of the logical or 
metaphysical structure of the world as the real structure and 
distinct from other structures wliich, by implication, are 
unreal. There is no sense in which we can get closer to 
Real Being or Substance by logical or metaphysical analysis. 
There is no logical or metaphysical reason why we should 
surrender the coramon-sense restriction of "exists" or "came 
into being" or "ceased to be" or "was born" or "died" to 
things which are name able and individual hameables. vVe 
are not in so refusing to surrender a use declaring that 
qualities and relations and activities are "unreal" or that 
tlioy do not "exist"; nor are we declaring that things exist 
independently of their qualities and activities and relations, 
since the things we declare to exist are the things we declare 
to be qualified and related and to act and to be acted upon....
I am not concerned with exhausting a list of the category
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questions or statements. V/hat it seems we are trying to do 
in declaring the logico-metaphysical structure account to be 
an independent account is to describe the world in a way  ^
different from that which our language fashioned itself 
historically to make possible • while we have no language 
for the purpose and having no idea of what we want to say.
The latter privation seems to be entailed by the first.
The core of the puzzle seems to lie somehow in our wanting 
to give a meaning to "the world" or to the "unity" of the 
world, the "world" not being complicated by masses of 
assorted and irrationally located rabbits and mountains 
and fevers and intestines, not complicated by the illimitable 
facts of observation or the systématisations of astronomers, 
geographers, anthropologists, anatomists, geologists.......
and the rest of the members of the class "scientists". 
Doubtless scientists seem to want to do something like this, 
too; but we want also to maintain a sense in which we 
declare that what men in general, and those scientists who 
speak truly, say truly is true, and that what is truly stated 
to be such and so and in such places exists.
Those who give the logical structure account and declare 
it to be what really is are remarkably like people who have 
misread fehe logical statements as fact statements; who, 
like Mill,^ read an Aristotelian list of categories and 
regard them as a list of "beings". They are unlike those
1. Mill, Ross...... and their readers.
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who suppose possible worlds by denying a category or asserting 
one category only, thus removing from Reality a class of 
statements or insisting that Reality is extiaustively described 
by one class of statements. I have already suggested here 
that the insistence on subject-predicate statements is neutral, 
in that it indicates the whole class of statements which 
can be true or false. The category denials occur with sub­
divisions of this class.
6. I have twice above made mention of Arnauld in connection 
with categories; and his brief discussion enables me to 
illustrate how Descartes is guilty of both confusions.
In Part I, Chapter I, of his Art de Penser (The Port Hoyal 
Logic) Arnauld has discussed "the relation of ideas to their 
objects", and in Chapter III he discusses briefly the "ten 
categories of Aristotle". I simply translate.
"To this consideration of ideas according to their objects 
we can relate the ten categories of Aristotle, since they 
are only different classes to which this philosopher wanted 
to reduce all the objects of our thought, grouping together 
all substances in the first class, and all the accidentslunder 
the nine others. Here they are:
(1) Substance, which is either spiritual, corporeal, etc..
(2) Q.ukntitv. which is called discrete when the parts 
are not bound together, as in number, continuous 
when they ai’e bound, and then it is either successive, 
like time, like movement, or permanent, which is 
otherwise called space, or eatension in length, 
width or depth; length alone making linos, length 
and width surfaces, and the three together solids.
518.
 ^ of which ^ristotl© has four species:
ih© first includes the habits (lea habitudes). is#, 
dispositions of the mind or of the body, which are 
acquired by repetition of acts, like the sciences, 
virtues, skills in painting, writing or dancing.
The second includes the natural powers, such as 
the faculties of the soul or of the body, the 
understanding, will, memory, the five senses, the 
power of walking.
The third includes the sensible qualities, like 
hardness, softness, weiglit, cold, heat, colours, 
sounds, odours, the different tasted.
The fourth includes form and figure which is the 
external denomination of quantity, as being round, 
square, spherical or cubic.
(4) Relation, or the relation (rapport) of any one thing 
to any other, like father, son, master, servant, 
king, subject; of power to its object, of sight
to what is visible; and anything that indicates 
comparison, like equal, greater, smaller.
(5) Action, either in itself, like walking, dancing, 
knowing (connaître). loving; or beyond itself, 
like sjbrixing, cutting, breaking, lighting, warrming.
(6) Passion (pâtir), being beaten, broken, lit, warmed. 
(The remaining four I shall only list: Where, When,
Situation - being seated, standing, lying, before, behind, 
right and left of - and Having).
These are the ten categories of Aristotle of which such 
a mystery is made: although, to tell the truth, it is a
matter of extremely small use in itself; it scarcely serves 
at all to form our Jud^ g^ nent, which is the goal of all genuine 
logic, and very often it is extremely harmful for two reasons 
that it is important to note.
The first is that people regard the categories as something 
established on a basis of reason and truth, instead of 
something quite arbitrary, having its source only in the 
imagination of a nan who has no authority to prescribe a 
law to other men; they have as much right to arrange the 
objects of their thought in another way, each according to 
his method of philosophising. And Indeed, there are somd 
who have understood this couplet as containing everything 
which a new philosophy presents to the world .
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Ipne, mon^ juraii qules^ laotus, poatura^ figura.
.^ uut cum materia cunctarum pxerdia rerum*
In other words, these pec^le have persuaded themselves that 
the reason for everything in nature con be given by consid­
ering on these teven. thing© or modes:
(^) 1*esprit or thliûfîng ©ubstimce*
(^) i.'i^ -terla. body, or extended mbstonce*
(^) Hoh^ura. the greatness or mmllness of ea<h pext of 
matter*
(4) pQotura# the position of one with regard to the other*
(5) 1-iiSi.r^ * their shape*
(6) Hotop* their movement*
(7) ÊujOB# their rest or least movemmit*
Tîie second reason which makes the study of the categories 
dangerous is that it get© them into the habit of giv^Uig word©
for cash value Cà ae paver des mot©), into imagining thfit
tiiey know everything, they know only a set of arbitrarily
selecMd names whlcîi. form no clear and distinct ideas in the 
mind, a© we will see in another place*
My comments will be brief* The account of the categories 
is largely a travesty of Aristotle, directly because no 
consideration is given to tlie subject-predicate distinction 
which even Descartes recognises a© a •distinction of reason" 
and not real distinction"# Hence Aristotle is presented 
so classiiÿing thimt© under the guise of "objects of thou^t®, 
which are both things of a special kind and distinct from iâxQ 
•ideas® whose objects tlioy are* And no attenticm #  ell is paid 
to what Aristotle directly and indirectly and at length
about dlsposi tions, actuality and potentiality, ©specially in 
relation to •knowing" * This we cannot sii#ly let pass, as we
520.
cim minor corilUoionBt on the ground that Arnauld wrote the 
volume in oomething loeo th'm a weetk* But even more striking 
and more serious is that no indication whatever is given of 
the central theeio that substances are indivi^al thimm. 
illustrated time and again lay particular persons and animals 
which ccmnotf gua individual s. be predicated of any toing at 
all.
The logical distinction of subject and predicate, and the 
logical doctrine of the role of individual things in propos­
itions, mtdces it quite impossible to say that m y  one individ­
ual and any other individual are differently substances.
But as soon as the distinction of "spiritual" and "material" 
is added, we have made a distinction of kind or quality, and 
are mcdcing a fact claim as to the classes of individuals, a 
claim which is remote frem the logical considerations.
Arnauld adds "etc."; Descartes does not. The division of 
individuals into these two classes is con^letoly unAristotelian 
and so, at times, Descartes understood Aristotle and attacked 
him, especially for confusing the account of the Immm m>ul - 
and Aristotlo*8 account of "soul" %^11 concern us in the next 
chapter.
Arnauld* 6 illustrations show clearly l^at he is consid­
ering all the categories except substance, as Aristotle did, 
within the frmcwoik of a developed and non-technical Ifuigufige. 
Substance, however, he considers only from the point of view 
of commonly accepted ?aetf^liysical beliefs about souls (u%d 
bodies - what "all philosophers and most are agreed
about, as Descartes claims in replying to Hobbes. Descartes*
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major arguments, which depend upon and illustrate the role 
of the natural light, are regularly conducted purely in 
terms of the technical "substance" and "attribute", and these 
arguments must have appeared completely vacuous if he had not 
immediately included non-technical and ordinary language 
terms. But the terms which he so admits are predicate or 
attribute terms, and the metaphysical statements preserve 
the technical term "substance" as the subject of all statements 
(at least so long as its suits Descartes to do so). All 
"substances" are unknowable, all subjects of propositions 
arc unknowable, because every proposition is a bastard combin­
ation of a technical term as subject and an ordinary discourse 
term as predicate.
These are Descartes» metaphysical propositions, and they 
derive their necessity from cutegorial propositions and their 
meaning from the intelligible predicates. Thqy are Descartes* 
only metaphysical propositions. Once the disjunction of 
minds and bodies is stated to be inclusive of all things, we 
have a fact claim that there are in the world only things 
called minds and things called bodies, and fact-claims as to 
what they are and what they do and vhat is done to them — the 
fact claims being odd in that most of them are meaningless 
to the minds which alone can assert tho». The statements 
"coîüe under the categories", but only as all statements come 
under the categories. The truth or falÉlty of any statements 
is non-cat ego rial, while their logical relations are the logical 
relations which must be determined by examining statements in
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a non-technical language. . Descartes» "Img^licatlon" la largely 
conflndd to applications of category truths (or category 
fuialyeis) to fact atataaentaj all the rest, it turns out, is 
Inieronce {pxaranteed ty inspection of What is completely 
known (if wo really attend to our notions), and a rule oi 
procedure vdiich axsounto to "inspect carefully, and ignore what 
is not clear and distinct".
The structure of Reality, if it "corresponds" to 
thou^t, is thus in an important sense indicated for Descartes 
hy the relation between attributes and the substance to \diieh 
t h ^  "belong", or in idiich they "inhere" or "reside", and this 
relation is either logical or categorial or a cœoplete mystery. 
(The "relation" is insisted upon as logical, necessary, and 
"clear and distinct"; it is mysterious only when it is denied 
that the substance can never be known). The structure of - 
Reality is also, however, a set of relations between mind-things 
and body-things, and these relations are either merely ^atial, 
or logical in the sense that they con be proven and not 
observed (and we revert to the structure above) or they tooo
are a complete mystery, - '
Wliether Amtuli had Descartes i^eclfically in mind in 
his reference to the "new philosophy" A  not of Importance 
here — perhaps he thought of Malobran<âïo, but the cai> fits 
Descartes as it fits so many post-Cartesian scientists.
What is involved is not-the denial of the category of substance 
and the assertion that the categories are limited to attrib­
utes -. which is tantamount to a claim that nouns can be 
dismissed from language and our stataaents confined to uses of
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adjective©, adverbs, verbs and conjunctions - but that w  
need only two nouns, and can dispose with pmctlcally the  ^
whole range of all parts of speech which we familiarly 
employ though preserving specimms of each type# Unless#*•• 
our familiar language and its logical or metaphysical 
or categorial structure is preserved for the familiar wrld 
as an "object of thoufht", a phenomenal and mental "thing".
If wo interpret the "unknown mibstanco" doctrine as
D
DeccurteB aometlmea does, namely as enabling us to analyse 
any noun we use in stateaento into "thing" and a "principle 
attribute", all we need to do to re~\-/rite our statements 
is to write for a subject like "this cat*, "this thing i^diich 
is feline",, and our statements of its relations and acts and 
noUf defining properties will be exactly the same as before 
except for the cdumged (but équivalait) subject. The logic 
of statements and the classification of statmaoits will be 
unaltered, and if there is to be disagreomtot between soaeone 
insisting on conventional forms and Descartes it will be dis­
agreement about the doctrine of "principal attributes of 
which everything has one" - a ddctrine \diich Descartes makes 
no attenq»t to justify and which is impossible to maintain 
on a thesis of "simple notions". (Descartes probably saw 
"clearly and distinctly" üu?t "principal" implies oag).
yhile the two nouns are preserved, the cate®»riea 
"re—assert themselves" — "action" ^pears in "thinking", 
treated literally as act and not as process; and even if it
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la troatod aa procuael, "act" la reafcorod with Ood, who
started the tv^ machines and keqps on driving them across the 
ruts of time.
I ehall not attœgit to take up the special question of 
what logical categories will re-asaert thsctoelvee in any 
science whidh, with perfect justification, restricts the 
things it studies and the questions it asks. I shall not 
even raise the question of the possibility of a science 
in which no tenaa are fact terns or directly related to fact 
terms in ordinary discourse; 1 iœ?ke only the obvious cof®ient 
that such a science would have no relation to the world as 
we know it. What I do wish to stress is the way in idiiCh 
the account I have suggested of Categories enables us to
1. "Thoughts are....in me". Many philosophers advance this 
claim, and \diat I have argued in the case of Descartes is 
that "in me" Is meaningless on his own thesis. The "spect­
ator Ego", and the vaotous Consciousness or Self-consciousness 
of later philosophers, are not of any aseiataaoe. He^l, 
treating Thtmght as Object and also as Scientia, idmitlfies 
"thought as historical process" and "Scientia as historically 
developing". "Thought self-conscious" becomes "sciaice of 
thought", or Logic in a special sense. His pocition is 
intelligible enough, even if the treatment of Science as a 
sort of resultant of a Joint enterprise of "culture" or 
"society* leads him to over-simplify history and history of 
science and philosoply in the interests of a theory of devel­
opment. But we have no account of "individual minds"; indivw 
iduals make their contribution to Scientia, a contribution 
which is, as "thought", objective. It is to this sort of 
view that the Heaailae doctrine of simple notions and truths 
belongs — they bto the Irreducible concepts of Scientia, 
and the formal rules are criteria for the combination of 
concepts in any cane being part of Scientia. The "thing" of 
"thinking thing" is not the thoufdit-substr-nce whose forms 
are thouf^ts and scientia (or fancy); it has to be ^ t  into 
Scientia, and can be, I arg*e, as scientist . At the d@vel 
of particle physics a scientist-man cannot be put into the 
world", and this is Descartes* foundation for "mind or soul".
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r©l‘^te laBtapliyslcal doctrines to facts and to sciences, 
to understand vAy metapbyelcs corae and go on:I 3^e-ui>pear 
(rather diflerently from the 'my in #iinh scientific theories 
coi^ e and go tmû re-appear), while the general langUB^ge 
remains enriched only hy metaphors and odd Idimae and 
the natural sciences present a developing "ordinary world"#
It enables us to understand why so many different metaphysics 
oe<^ to function by asserting one Category as the Heal 
Category - a feature of metaphysics yhich is not xay discovery 
but Hegel*8, unless my ignorance of history makes me credit 
him in error in acknowledging a debt#
On my general thesis, which I contend is Aristotelian, 
neither a statement in logic or a statement of cate^ries 
will contain a term which cag ai^ pear in a fact statement or 
in a statement which comes under the head of "natural science"# 
The distinction between •thinking substance" and "extended 
substance" is not a category distinction, and Aristotle 
zaaintained neither the distinction nor that it was categorial#
Chapter XII.
The Ppctrlne of Soul in the De Anima.
1. Certain claims a,re advanced as to Aristotle’s general 
position. He is a natural scientist, and values of 
variables in his logical and category principles are to 
be found in natural science.
(p.527) Special difficulties are briefly discussed, to 
show vdiy I do not begin with nous and the God of 
HetaphyslcB L. Aristotle works in the opposite direction 
from that of Descartes. He established the biological 
sciences which Descartes thought that he could establish 
in spite of his dualism of substances; he established as 
well the formal sciences, the technical terms of which 
Descartes misunderstood and misused.
(p.534). Rose’s summary of Aristotle’s doctrine presaited 
and discussed at length.
A. Robs presents correctly what Aristotle says are 
the problems which must be solved before he can undertake 
the task he envisages, but presents no solution to these 
"first problems". Aristotle does give the solutions, and 
these entail that "soul" does not designate a substance 
qua individual.
(p.535) Arguments to soul-as-subs ton ce and soul-structure 
from geometrical facts are ^ is-based, and produce the 
opposite conclusion from that claimed - if there is 
analogy, "soul" is attribute or form, not substance,
(p.542) Ross’s rhetorical "series of souls" stops at two, 
and can at best be extended to three. But Aristotle is 
talking of powers and faculties of an organism. He relates 
"soul" to classification of organisms throughout.
B. "x has a soul" is equivalent to "x has a set of 
powers". Both are closely reloted to "x is alive",
8. Three sections of the De Anima cited and discussed to 
demonstrate that for Aristotle' values of x in "x is a 
thinking thing" are men; in ®x is able to sense and feel" 
are "animal" (including "man"), etc.
3, What is poscible to human sciantists.
(p.565). What happens when category terns are 
alienated from natural science illustrated by a discussion
of J.S.Hill.
(p.572), Aristotle's Categories discussed. The 
technical terms belong to a formal science which is related 
to logic - none of the terras are "material",
(p,578), Aristotle’s problaia is the Greek problaa
of Being,î*0# "Vhot can be said in b l'un sense to be?"
Tlie answer is "an historical Individual", and this 
must be elaborated by reference to natural classification 
cmd definition# tode ti and ousia discussed, related to 
the Categories, and the coiaplex of technical teims shovm 
to be inter-related#
(p#582) Logic, ClasBification and Substance# These are 
discussed in some detail, and related to what has been 
ai^guod throughout the thesis# "We are men" and "men can 
do natural scienco and metaphysics" are taken for granted 
by Descartes and by Aristotle.
The peculiarity of "taking for granted" in this 
sense has been discussed above, but the situation is that 
Aristotle genuinely accepts it# Qua individuals we as 
men come under the category of Subst-nce, and satisfy 
the demands of metaphysics, of logic and of science#
Agûlnj) region of ;rlnd there are apparently
1^4 ^  Secondly, we have to notice
«‘t L «?« 1. « SÎ ® intiaeto relation between minds 
^  living bodies* The minds tlmt we know ere not disembodied
®?2’F ^  tied to organisms, to grow end decay
i«iith tnea, an. to cease when they die. îtoreovcr» in our port 
of the world at any rate, there seems to have been a gradual 
historical development of mind going hand in hand with a 
growth in the complexity of living things. Any theory of 
Reality which con claim to be even approxirxiteiy adequate must 
takw such afjparent facts into account, and must contain a 
doctrine of matter and mind which shall be consistent with 
them* Now it may well be that, of the various theories which 
were p- ssihlo when we considered merely the cocsaon properties 
of mind and matter and when we looked on laind merely as the 
coatemplator of matter, som will be ruled out when we take 
account of the different sorts of mind and matter, and the 
apparent relation of dependence between these two departments 
of Reality"*
C*D*Broad*
«If we turn our attention to the of
living beings in this world, in the consideration of which 
reason is obliged to accept as a principle, that no organ, no 
faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is super­
fluous, nothing unsuited to its end; but that, on the contrary, 
everything is perfectly conformed to its destination in life - 
we shall find that man, who alone is tte final end and aim of 
this order, is still the only animal that seams to be exçoptod 
from it",
Kant* Crltidue of Pure Ucason* (Refutation of Mendel­
ssohn) •
"1 had after this described the reasonable soul, and shown 
that it could by I» means be educed from the power of matter, 
as the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be 
expressly created; and that it was not sufficient that it be 
lodged in the humn body like a pilot in a ship, unless porlisps 
to movo its members, but that it is necessary for it to be 
joined and united more closely to tho body in . rder to have 
sensations and appetites similar to ours, and thus constitute 
a real man"*
Descartes* n^flcoursg on Method* ft V.
"Aristotle, 2000 years ago, was asking bow is the mind 
attached to tlie body* We are asking that question still* *
Sir Charles Sherrington, intrcducing a series of 
broadcast talks published as "The Physical aa^laJif.Mnd".
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Les a ^ s  de Monsieur des Cartes qui prennent son homme pour 
une machine, auront sans doute, pour moy la bonté de croire, 
que i® De parle point icy contre sa machine, dont j'admire 
1 artifice; mais pour ceux qui entreprennent de démontrer 
que 1 %®!zime de Monsieur des Cartes est fait comme les autres 
hommes: 1 experience de l'Anatomie leur fera voir que cette
entreprise ne leur scauroit réussir",
The address of M.Stenon (a competent anatomist) to 
the gathering at the house of M. Thevenet, Subject: The 
Anatomor of the Brain. 1669.
"If one uses the expressive terminology of Ryle (19^9) 
the "ghost" operates a 'machine', not of ropes and pulleys, 
valves and pipes, but of microscopic spatio-temporal patterns 
of activity in the neuronal net woven by the synaptic connex­
ions of ten thousand million neurones, and even then only by 
operating on neurones that are momently poised close to a 
just-threshold level of excitability. It would appear that this 
is the sort of machine a 'ghost' could operate, if by ghost we 
mean in the first place an agent whose action has escaped 
detection even by the most delicate physical instruments".
J.C.Eccles. The Heurophvsioloelcal Basis of Mind.
"It has a slow and dark birth, more ngrsterious than 
the birth of a body. When the soul of a man is born in 
this country there are nets flung to hold it back from 
flight. You palk to me of nationality, language, 
religion. I shall try to fly by those nets".
Stephen Daedalus, in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as
a Young Man.
Oh iqy Lord, lye not idlô;
The chiefest action of a man of great spirit,
Is never to be out of action; we should thinke 
The soule was never put into the body 
Which has so mary rare and curious pieces 
Of Mathematical! motion, to stand still".
Romelio, in Webster's Devil's Law Case.
(Early l?th Century).
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The Doctrine of Soul In the De Anima.
I want, in this final chapter, to consider chiefly a 
section of the De Aniiaa which gave rise to the present title, 
and indeed to the complex form, of this thesis. I shall use 
Ross’s summary of the central doctrine, since it is brief, 
authoritative and clear as to the question which I want to 
stress and discuss in terms of it - Philosophers have talked 
much of "soul”, but what sort of concept is it? Does it 
come under the category of substance, quale, quantum or some 
other?".
(a) The question, for the "outsider", is immediately;
"What does it raean to say that anything comes under a category? 
What is meant hy the category*terms?". And immediately, when 
we turn to the Categories for information, we are confronted 
with a doctrine based directly and essentially on predication, 
on "that which is subject of predicates but not itself predic­
able of any thing". Further, Aristotle himself asks "Is 
soul potentiality or actuality?", and proceeds to raise questions 
of classification and demonstration, while the tenas forra and 
matter and organisation of organs appear as soon as he begins 
to make statements about what his own doctrine is. We are, in 
other words, confronted immediately with a set of technical 
terms, of inter-related technical concepts, with stress on the 
question of which of them, and which related procedure, is or 
are relevant to our new field of inquiry,i.e. to one different 
from that or those in which the technical terms were establ­
ished.
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separable from body) to a different thesis in the early 
parts of the De Anima with its reservation about nous, 
and to the later parts of the De Anima with a special treat­
ment of nous, and finally to the God-mind of Metaphysics 12*
The last represents the tip of one horn of the dilemma which 
Nuyens characterises as ”le dilemme de 1 •âme-intellect". I 
draw attention to this, since if we begin with the God-mind, 
a substance self-conscious and thinking only about its 
tiioughts, the content of which is purely formal, consisting 
of intuited simples akin to simples which the human being 
intuits and must accept because they are unanalysable, who 
or which knows nothing of the visible universe or of the science 
thereof, we begin with what Descartes should have regarded as 
his completely "unembodied" self. Aristotle seems further to 
add, as I have claimed Descartes must add, that the "simple 
contents" are potential, and, as I have argued Descartes must 
add, thou^ with illicit "material" included, that subject 
and object are one, so that at the divine level mind as 
thinker and mind as thought cannot even be logically dist­
inguished. And quite clearly, I suggest, no matter what 
happens to such a mind, any further thinking is possible 
only if different contents are got into the mind so that they 
can be operated on.
We begin, if we begin here, with a substance (self-consc­
ious) and an act of its as agent (Ego Cogito); a distinction 
of fona and matter in the object of such an act in the case 
of man results in a claim that the object may be purely formal.
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and in the case of God must he purely formal, and immediately 
after\*/ardB the substance-agent-act-ohject statement is declared 
to be meaningless. What is substituted for it is a statement
attempts of rationalists and idealists 
to show that Act can be preserved as Mere or pure. Divine or 
Mental, whether at the level of theology or rational psychology, 
suffer shipwreck precisely on the logical difference between 
"process" (which demands no agent and makes "self-conscious" 
meaningless) and "act" (which enables a meaning to be given to 
"self" because it demands an agent).
The same transition is to be found in parts of the discuss­
ion of nous in the De Anima. It might be said to begin to be 
apparent as soon as the discussion of the senses produces the 
notion of special objects and their function as matters 
formed or related or united in judgments, or as giving rise to 
concepts (higher-level objects) which are so related. The 
discussion is dubiously intelligible - our terms and concepts 
do not seem to fit the Aristotelian* When in Chapter V of 
Book III Aristotle claims that in the case of soul, as in 
the case of "every class of things, as in nature as a whole, 
we find two factors involved, a matter which is potentially 
all the particulars in a class and a cause which is product­
ive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing 
to the former as e#g. an art to its material), and goes on 
to speak of the mind as "pure, impassible,separable", and "in 
its essential nature activity",^ it seems that either his
1* Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from 
J.A.Smith’s translation.
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words or ours are betraying us.
( d) • Is it not unjust, then, to Descartes to begin with 
his metaphysics, contrasting him with an Aristotle whose 
metaphysical difficulties I ignore, and whose metaphysical 
difficulties appear, almost literally, to be those of Descartes? 
And is it not ridiculous to ignore all that is difficult in 
Aristotle while claiming to present an "Aristotelion" point of 
view? Especially if you are prepared to admit that i^ you 
begin with Metaphysics 12 end the nous doctrine of pure act 
and objects there seems no more hope of getting to observ­
ation in its ordinary sense than in the case of Descartes?
The answers, brief and incomplete, are:
(i) Aristotle begins with natural science, and principles 
demonstrated therein. Nous and the God-mind are argued to, 
not from. If Descartes had a natural science, had principles 
which derived honestly from natural science, I would have i 
begun with it and with them. But in brute fact he has neither. I 
He begins with a rejection of organisms from consideration,
and can never restore them though he talks much in his |
introductions of men and medicine; Aristotle talks of 1
organisms throughout the De Anima, and actually founds the !
sciences which Descartes claimed to be founding.
(ii) I have not ignored the Aristotelian problems, but have -
been considering them throughout the thesis. Particular '
attention has not been paid to his statements, but in consid- 
ing thou(^t and its theory, simple notions, images and 
concepts and the theory and nature of formal as well as 
natural science, I have been asking his questions and have 
sou^t to answer them using his principles, at length instead
of in BUimaaiy form. That certain consequences do not follow 
which Aristotle thought did follow leaves the natural 
science and the logic, the doctrine of categories and a 
variety of principles, quite intact.
(iii) I think I can now understand why Aristotle had part­
icular difficulties, not apparent until we analyse arguments 
and seek their background in previous philosophy, not ' . 
apparent until we have studied in detail his principles and
his application of them. What appears to me now to be 
Aristotle’s question'is not "How is the soul related to the 
body?", but "If we are to maintain our science of living
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organisa and a science of matters, must we posit a soul 
which is a substance?"
It is that question which I have advanced as the 
genuine "form" of the "mind-body" problem. A brief sketch of 
the way in which I believe it arises for Aristotle will make 
clear what I have intended by my use of "Aristotelian".
(a) His biological classification, its associated theory 
of classification, and the prepositional and syllogistic 
character of statements and arguments which validate { or 
constitute) particular classifications is correlative with 
an acceptance of observation statements, of animals as 
individuals discrlminable numerically and generically. It 
is appropriate here to talk of animals as sensing, perceiving, 
reflecting, as doing science and science of animals who so 
act. It is appropriate also to talk of genus and differentia, 
of definition and essence, of growth and generation and 
nourishment, of loving and hating, acting and. not acting, 
being acted upon and not being acted upon. Aristotle provides 
the logical foundation of a science of such animals,i.e. of 
historical individuals, making both change and changing 
things scientifically and philosophically respectable. (The 
clearest discussion of this is in Physics I. There Aristotle 
Introduces the technical term "substrate", which does not 
mean "an unknown and necessary thing which does not change 
and explains change" but "the subject, whether a matter or 
a thing, of any intelligible statement of change’.* We have 
here perhaps the best example of Aristotle’s recognition of 
the nature of philosophical principles, end of his rejection 
of a logic of self-identical terms and relations of such 
terms).
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(b). The matter-form doctrine begins with a thing-matter- 
form analysis, and illustrations of a special form of 
becoming, cases such as that of a form being iuxposed by an 
artist on a "formless" stuff. Understandably, since many of 
our Bciencos were not developed, he has too simple a notion 
of the "inorganic world". The full effect of the principle 
of mat ter-and-form, as analysis of "a thing", can be sought 
only by considering it in detail, and in more detail than 
I have done above not less; it operates in the physical 
sciences as well as the "medical" sciences, and Aristotle 
lacked both.
But the doctrine, applicable in a special sense to statues 
and artefacts (which are individuals, as organisms are 
individuals,i.e. historical entities coming to be and ceasing 
to be), must be applied to organisms themselves. It must be 
applied as I have applied it, not simpliciter; and (admitting 
that it is difficult for a variety of reasons to give detailed 
references - what is in question is the change in mode of 
discussion after the discussion of sense and organ in Book II 
of the De Anima) the simple application seems to trap Aristotle 
into (a) treating "matter" as the individuating factor in 
contrast with generic or classificatory or universal features 
and essences, (b) confusing "form" in a strict sense and 
"attribute", which is related to "individual" and not to 
"matter" (by "formed-matter" is meant the Individual - recall 
the discussion in the previous chapter), (c) treating the 
form—matter analysis as demanding a substitution of "form" 
for "individual" as agent, which (d) leads to "powers" being
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considered as agents, or as the powers of the form,i.e. of
the soul, m a t  seems to follow is both .the treatment of
sensation as actualised power or process, and the further 
doctrine that what is known is the form only, together with 
the treatment of soul "forms” as impressed on the senses, 
as resident in the senses or sense-organs, and (qua higher 
level entities) resident in "mind" and elements in the mind 
process which is "thinking".
(e) One of the consequences is that Aristotle is as much in 
difficulty in talking about senses and organs as were his 
successors and are his successors. Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable how late in the De Anima the difficulties arise, 
and what I want chiefly to show is that, on the main argument,
all of our discussion of "soul" depends upon the meaningfulness
and truth of statements about organisms, as classifiable and 
as acting or suffering in distinguishable ways, being in 
distinguishable states (by whomever and however the distingui­
shing is done), and upon the validity of the distinction 
between "living" and "non-living" ^  this level. Here 
classification is possible because existing individuals 
can be studied and classified; syllogism operates, since 
quantification of subjects is possible and syllogistic 
arguments justify a classification as they can be read off 
from a determined classification; the doctrine of categories 
follows (initially) of necessity if natural science is taken 
to be possible; and the resulting problems make it clear how 
actuality—potentiality, and matter—form, are to be applied, 
and why "the individual" and "substance-as-individual" were so
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much in the forefront of Aristotle’s thou^t.
I begin, then, with Ross’s summary,
"The object of psychology is to discover the nature and 
essence of soul, and its attributes (De.An.402^7) . The 
method of dealing with attributes is demonstration; is there, 
Aristotle asks, a corresponding method of discovering the 
essence? He suggests division as a possible method, and in 
effect adopts it. The first step is to determine to which 
of the main divisions of being - the categories - soul belongs, 
and again whether it is an actuality or a potentiality. But 
at this point a difficulty arises. Suppose there axe differ­
ent kinds of soul, and various species or perhaps even genera 
arising from the presence of these parts in various combin­
ations; it may be that the primary facts are the different 
kinds of soul, and that there is no one thing answering to the 
name "soul" in general, or only a slight nucleus of common 
nature in the various souls (402^10-^8).
Aristotle’s answer is in effect that the kinds of soul 
are neither so much alike that any single definition of soul 
will give a sufficient idea of its varieties, ranging from 
its humble manifestations in plants and zoophytes to the 
heights it reaches in man or in God, nor yet so different 
that we cannot recognise a common nature in all its varieties. 
Geometrical figures can be arranged in an order beginning 
with the triangle and proceeding to more and more complex 
forms, each of which contains potentially all that precede.
So, too, the forms of soul form a series with a definite 
order, such that each kind of soul presdpposes all that come 
before it in this order, without being implied by them. The 
minimal soul is the nutritive, for this exists in all living 
or "be-souled" beings; in plants and animals alike. Next 
comes the sensitive soul, which exists in all animals. Within 
the sensitive soul the same scheme appears, for touch is a 
minimal form of sensation, presupposed by all the others, 
present whenever they are and sometimes when they are not 
(412^2-4, 416^3-6, 436&12). And it is not perhaps too fanciful 
to say that for Aristotle, touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight 
form a series in which the distinctive nature of sensation, 
that of ’receiving the form without the matter’ of its objects, 
is increasingly manifested (cf. 429®2).
"The sensitive soul has not merely the function of perc­
eiving, but, as a necessary consequence of this, that of 
feeling pleasure and pain, and therefore of desiring, which 
is found in all animals. There are two other faculties which 
are outgrowths from the sensitive faculty, found in most 
animals but not in all. (I) There is an outgrowth on the 
cognitive side, which Aristotle calls imagination (phantasia)
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of this in turn memory is a further development. And (2) 
there is ^  outgrowth from it on the appetitive side, the 
faculty of wvement. Finally there is a faculty peculiar to 
man, that of reason. This is treated as generically distinct 
crception, yet to perception, when acting not in any 
of its specialised forms, as sight, hearing etc., but in its 
generic nature as perception, are assigned various functions 
which tend to bridge the gulf between sense and reason".*-
We may note that Descartes begins, perhaps coincidentally, 
with "division" - "the only surnma genera I recognise are minds 
and bodies" is the gist of Descartes’ first premise (Cf. Princ­
iples l.XLVIII). He finds it immediately obvious that "mind 
or soul" is a substance, that its essence is "thinking" or, 
as in Meditation II, "perception of mental content". He has 
his species or varieties - doubting, affirming, loving, hating, 
knowing objects and being ignorant of objects; These are 
varieties as "modes" - such varieties as your mind and mine 
he does not discuss, but assumes identity and difference, 
aasuming existence, as he pleases, and only men have souls.
The "common nature" is substantial identity and identical 
thinlcing for him,
If we take Ross’s account as it stands there are 
two distinct types of difficulty in understanding it. The 
first is of understanding what several of his expressions - 
which are not Aristotle’s - actually mean, and this we may 
let rest for the moment. The second is that Aristotle is 
presented as suggesting and employing division, but equally 
insisting that before dividing we must answer the questions 
"^A/liat category?" and "Actuality or potentiality?".
What answer is given?
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A» The Buimoary seems to indicate none. Ross stresses 
geometrical figures as an example of an alternative to a single
definition, but this does not help much since it is not
easy to see the parallel between "souls" and "figures", even if 
we designate "figures" by nouns and use "the" and "a". Aris­
totle actually gives a second alternative : "Can soul be 
defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with 
animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for 
each sort of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the 
latter case the "universal" animal - and so too for every common
predicate - being treated as nothing at all or as a later
product). (Stoiith explains the braxketed section as equivalent 
to "pre-supposing the various kinds and members of kinds";
Hick’s prefers "logically posterior". Aristotle has a general 
concern with this question, considered below - stripped of 
references to "knowledge", it is roughly a question of whether 
the meaning of a genus characterisation is dependent on the 
meaning of specific characterisations or vice versa).
The example is important in part because Aristotle thinks 
previous discussions to have been too much concerned with 
human beings, and because there is no possibility of making 
a member of a "higher species" from a member or members of 
a lower or lower, e.g. a man from a dog or dogs, a god from 
a man or men ( the lack of possibility being a lesson in the 
nature of classification or of any Scala Naturae), and we have 
no need to add a quadruped and a vertebrate to a cat in order 
to get an animal. It is certainly true that we can divide a 
square into triangles, this being Aristotle’s actual and only
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claim, meagre as it is beside beside Ross’s statement 
about "geometrical figures" and "more and more complex forms" 
each potentially containing the preceding.
I am endebted to Sherrington ^ for the information that 
kernel, that important physician, claiming that Aristotle 
was \rrong about the mode of union of souls, and arguing that 
the rational soul "absorbed" the other souls, uses the 
possibility of creating figures from other figures as an 
indication of how substances can be united to give one 
substance. Descartes uses geometrical figures as an example 
of classification, and a demonstration of the meaning of 
"genus","species" etc. in Principles I.LXIX.
Yet at the end of 1.1 Aristotle stresses the difference 
between a natural science and the special science of mathemat­
ics, which deals with "attributes separable by abstraction", 
and while either a classification of figures or of animals 
would illustrate the formal features of any classification, 
the difference between "geometrical things" and zoological 
things is not thereby altered, and the issue, when we turn 
to "souls", remains as to whether they are like the zoological 
or like the geometrical; and while we are concerned with 
triangles and plane figures, this amounts, I claim, to a 
question of logical likeness to substances or attributes, 
and this is exactly what "coming under a category" means here.
Let it be stressed that there is nothing especially 
"geometrical" in the insistence on demonstration. Geometry 
illustrates the way in which a set of definitions enables a
1. Man on His Nature^ Ch. 2#
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special form of proof to be given to the "undefined prop­
erties" or "non-defining properties", the attributes as 
distinct from the essence which is excluded from attributes 
by being incorporated in the "designated subject". In 
general what is required for demonstration is a universal 
major premise, and this is not peculiar to geometry - indeed, 
as I have shown above, geometry seems peculiar in relation to 
it, and Aristotle is much concerned with the relation between 
universal major premises and definitions. But I also mentioned 
above Descartes* complaint against geometers, that they had 
taken "line" and "surface" to be "truly distinct" from body 
and from one another, an objection which is close to Aristot­
le’s objection to the triangles of the Timaeus. The point to 
be stressed is that "triangularity" could be regarded as a 
particular attribute of a surface of a body, but all that 
could be claimed to exist as things to be classified would 
be bodies with triangular surfaces, and not triangles. (The 
ubiquity of uses of "thing" demands, perhaps, that we say 
"triangles are not things in the sense that bodies with 
triangular surfaces are things, co-classifiable with things 
like men and trees. This ubiquity is what confuses discussions 
of the Categories). While the range of "figures composed of 
triangles" is limited, that of "regular solids composed of 
solids with triangular surfaces" is even more limited, while 
there are no solids which are "coi^posed" of surfaces or 
triangles.
Further, it is obviously the case that "irrational"
539.
figures do characterise the surfaces of reo.l or encountered 
bodies, while the "rational" do not, and it is a geometers* 
coJiimonjj)lace that the "truth" of a geometrical classification 
does not entail the existence of any "geometrical" bodies 
as individuals historically related to other existing bodily 
things.
Thus, while it is easy to treat any solid figures 
as modifications of one substance-stuff, space or extension, 
the planes and surfaces and their specifications remain 
"formal"; there is no reason to claim that if regular bodies 
existed they would be different from existing irregular 
bodies in not being "forms" of the various distinguiohable 
matters encountered bodies are in fact found to consist of; 
if we want to talk of the geometer’s solids as "potential 
existants" the advantage is entirely with the Aristotelian 
formulation along the lines "there are at best empirical reasons 
why existing matters in their irregular forms should not 
be given a regular form", and the geometer’s truths would 
then be clearly true of the regular body vAatever matter its 
surface "enclosed". While "substantiality" belongs to animals 
in the same sense of "formed-matter", since they are bodies, 
it also belongs to them in an entirely different sense - 
their "unity of kind", their being this or that animal is 
not related to "one stuff because no distinction of stuff is 
relevant" but to specific stuffs and forms and structures, 
and their being this or that animal derives directly from 
classifications in structuring which the question of "stuffs" 
need not arise. Even as bodies, cats and<dogs cannot be
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considered as bits of animal or made up of bits of animal;
and on the side of form Aristotle insists on "organisation 
of organs".
In fact, the argument seems to result in the conclusion 
that "souls" are like "forms" ^r"attributes". Forms and 
attributes do, in a variety of senses, intermingle - though 
v/e get special problems if we insist on any strictness in 
our use of "form". But so, too, do acts, since performing 
one type of act may involve doing what is involved in 
doing a variety of tasks. This is the foundation of contem­
porary "factor analysis" - statistical examination of the 
measurable results of complex performances, or performances 
of complex tasks, indicates "elemental performances", perhaps 
in fact not isolable, and a "factor" is "a capacity to perform 
so". Of the oddities and subtleties and complexities of 
individual procedures and claims there is no room to comment, 
but it must be noted that the intermingling of acts entails 
the intermingling of powers only in the sense that "A does X" 
entàils "A has the power to do X", and the "powers" are not 
thing-agents.
There is here no argument directly from act to power 
and to soul—agent, as there is not when Descartes classes 
corutandi modi as species or kinds of thinking. If we remove 
the linguistic awkwardness of "souls are attributes" by 
writing "our soul-talk is talk of what organisms do and can do" 
the argument can be stated as "soul—terms lunction in 
discourse as do words like "triangle" and "figure" in the 
sense we have illustrated". There is no force to any claim
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that the illustration is relevant to a discussion of 
souls as substances.
B. Aristotle begins, not with an issue as to whether animals 
thin]{ or souls think, but with a survey of what his predecessors 
have had to say about soul. He poses, as Ross points out, 
the questions "What category?" and "Potentiality or actuality?" 
as preliminary questions, to be answered before we know what 
we are classifying. And part of what is entailed by this is 
whether we are to classify by presenting a hierarchy of 
attributes or by noting distinctions, determining essences, 
and considering the individuals (the substances) who cannot 
bo placed in a hierarchical order at all.There is no need to 
misunderatand the logic or the procedure of classification 
in order to understand Aristotle. I comment on this below.
The immediate ipoint is not obscurity of the terms in 
the questions, since Ross, like Aristotle, discusses them 
elsewhere, and we can quite justifiably be asked to look 
elsewhere to find what is meant by "a this somewhat", "quantum", 
"quale", "actus" or Aristotle’s equivalents. It is simply the |
case that no answer is given by Ross, although he insists that
I
the division v/hich depends on the answers is at least "in effect;
I
carried through. i
And as soon as we continue we are confronted by another j
question: "What is the connection between soul as substance 
or quale or actss. potentiality or actuality, and the 
"nutrition","sensation", "imagination" etc. which are discussed 
by Aristotle, as by Ross, under separate headings?" Ross's
!
statement of the final position, like statements made by
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ijjiaoay others in similar contexts, seem to involve different 
answers at the same time,i.e. the writers treat soul as 
substance and as quale or actus or relation, and while 
discussing the relation between soul and sensation etc. 
as connections between substance and act, they present 
distinctions and connections as relations between substances.
a. The questions are, I claim, both answered, and answered 
in such a way that it becomes meaningless for Aristotle to say 
that the soul is a substance in the sense of an agent , or 
individual qua thing. Hence it is meaningless to speak of the 
soul as doing anything or suffering anything, or as being within 
a body or related to a body in any spatial sense. And one of 
the consequences of this conclusion is that a meaning can be 
given to Aristotle’s talk of "parts of the soul",
Consider Ross’s formulation. We seem to be offered
#
a list of the kinds of soul from the humble manifestations 
in plants and zoophytes, ranging to the heights attained in 
man and in God; but the series of souls stops surprisingly 
short at two, the sensttlTS and the nutritive, so that the 
talk of each soul pre-supposing all that comes before seems 
at least superfluous, and these correspond to the classes 
"animals" and "animals and plants". Further, we seem suddenly 
to have stopped reading about souls at all, and are reading 
about faculties and capacities only - even "reason" appears
as "a faculty peculiar to man".
The lowest soul in the "series" is the nutritive, the
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second is the sensitive. "Within" the sensitive is the set of 
distinctions which produces the hierarchy of touch, taste, 
smell, hearing and sight. The sensitive soul Is said also to 
feel pleasure and pain, and so to desire, and it has two further 
ieatures, the faculty of movement (always) and of imagination 
( Bometiiiies). (What exactly we are to understand by the 
reference to "within the sensitive soul", and to "faculties 
of movement and imagination" as off-shoots. I do not know.)
We still have to find a place for (or a kind of soul fofjj) belief 
and opinion, and for the thought which Involves imagination 
and images - Ross argues (p. 148) that Aristotle rejects 
Plato’s "imageless thought" of Republic 510^-511^, and the 
De Aniraa is clear in 431&16-17 and 432®l2-14t "The soul 
never thinks without an image", and "..neithei? these nor the 
rest of our notions are images...but they cannot dispense 
with images".^ Further, calculation and practical reason and 
all the distinctions made Inter in the De .Anima will have to 
be located somewhere on the hierarchy.
The pattern is by no means so clear or so simple now.
Each of the senses can be called a faculty - so can calculation, 
imagination etc. - but it would I think be ridiculous to suggest 
that Aristotle regarded each faculty as implying a distinct soul.
1. Aristotle here does speak of the soul thinking. But it is 
not nous, and thought is thus a faculty of soul. Note,however, 
the’resemblance to Descartes* "corporeal images" which make 
possible awareness of entended substance * And, in conjunction 
with the argument of 403^5-10, vhat is entailed is that think­
ing of any kind involves a bodily agent and is thus a matter 
for natural science. Anger, courage, appetite and sensation 
arc said to involve body; thinking to be an exception ^  it does 
not prove "to be a form of imagination" which requires a body.
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If the Boul is a substance qua thing, then the sensitive soul 
has a number of faculties or powers, and the hierarchy of 
sen BOB is a hierarclrjy of powers. If the nutritive soul has 
one function or faculty or, v/hon we add "reproduction" as we 
must when we consider later statements in the De Anima, two 
functions or faculties, and there is a futther faculty found 
only in man which does not belong to the sensitive soul, then 
we have a hierarchy of three souls, the traditional sensitive, 
or middle soul, and the lower nutritive and upper rational.
As I have stressed, there is nothing illogical in this, since 
we have things with powers, namely souls of different kinds, 
provided of course that we can give some account of the 
soul-things.
But the question to be considered is whether Aristotle 
intended in the least to suggest that there were three souls 
or soul-things, as distinct from different things differently 
souled, things with different powers. And we may note immed­
iately that it is very difficult to see any sense in which 
the nutritive soul can be said to digest its food and even 
more difficult to see any sense in which it can be said to 
grow or to reproduce; certainly there is no way in vhich this 
soul can bo said to "act" as it is suggested the sensitive 
soul can sense; and it there is purely rational soul its 
activity will be completely cut off from the activity of the 
sensitive soul while its "thought" will have neither sensible
nor imaginable content.
The hierarcliy of powers of the sensitive soul imvolves 
no souls, but only powers, powers related in such a way that
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taste presupposes touch, smell taste, hearing smell, and 
sight hearing. But in so far as these are distinct, examination 
of any soul or any set of senstive souls would not give a 
hierarchy since each would have all the faculties and there is 
no means of ordering. We can write "any soul which has smell 
has touch, any soul with taste has smell etc.", but vihat we 
must ask is whether this means more than that any living thing 
which has ppwer to smell has power to touch etc.. We can 
order given an organism with power-x, organisms with powers 
X and y, and none with power y and not power x. Aristotle 
in fact establishes the hierarchy in two ways, (a) by indicating 
organisms which have certain powers and not others, though 
none have the o;the% without the first, and (b) by considering 
the utility and necessity of the powers to animals in a complex 
environment. ^
The three souls, considered as corresponding to plants, 
animals and men as kinds or as classes, have the same relation 
of pre-supposition of lower kinds. We can write: any thing 
which has power to sense has power to be nourished (and to 
reproduce) ; any thing which has the power to reason has power 
to sense and power to be nourished. It is surely meaningless 
to say that being an animal presupposes being a plant, though 
being the first guarantees the possession of powers possessed 
by the second; and I can find nothing in Aristotle to suggest 
that what has a sensitive soul has also a separate nutritive 
soul, or that man has three souls - that within the body of 
man there are three soul-things.
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The distinction of souls repeats, and only repeats, the 
distinction of plants, brutes and men; what is stated is that 
living things can be divided iAto three classes, and that 
along with the distinctions of classes go distinctions of 
powers and activities, distinctions in the main of vâiat the 
members of the classes can do and do©
It is true that Aristotle remarks in 413%-10 that 
"we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be 
the actuality of the body in the sense in which the sailor is 
the actuality of the ship", but here he speaks of the soul, 
and the "problem" is not further considered# And when we 
turn to the De Partibus Animalium# where the first methodologi­
cal problem of starting with generic or specific concepts is 
discussed in detail, or the Historia Animalium, vdiere we 
find the notion of "Nature proceeding little by little from 
things lifeless to animal life", from which the rhetorical 
"Continuous scale" and "Scala Naturae" are extracted by 
enthusiasts and converted into diagrammatic classifications 
(see Charles Singer’s writings for historical details, Ross’s 
p#117 for a diagram), we find that it is precisely what 
organisms can do and their mode of doing it which provides 
the "vertical ordering" within any division of a scala.
If a soul is a substance (qua thing, and not qua power 
or form or essence - and qua essence it is closer to the 
generic "liiplng" than the generic "sensing", which is of 
dubious meaning for Aristotle) then "pre-supposition/ demands 
either (a) a lower soul in a hi^er soul, or (b) three 
distinct souls in man, two in animals, or (c) one kind of
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soul and one only which (i) reveals its potentialities 
differently in plants, brutes and men, or (ii) develops 
new potentialities according to whether it is in plants or 
brutes or men. (Each of these would involve different sorts 
of answers to questions about distinctions between the souls 
of birds, snakes, mice, leopards and tarantulas - there is 
nothing like insistence on the fullness of subject matter to 
bring out the emptiness of a theory, or like insistence 
upon specific variety to show what generic identity means).
(cii) is transmigration doctrine - which involves "any 
soul may be in any body", and Aristotle dismisses this cont­
emptuously (407^). (ci) is in little better case - any soul 
in any body, but different only because of the body, (b) 
seems to have nothing to support it in Aristotle, whatever 
interpretation is placed upon nous. Aristotle indeed lays too 
much stress on the unity of the organism, on the soul as the 
first actuality of the (living) organisation of organs, to 
make it possible for any of these views to be his. And (a) 
is simply incomprehensible, a form of words without matter, 
if souls are not sets of powers byt things.
B. If "x has a soul" is equivalent to "x has a set of powers", 
this is perfectly in accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine that 
a potentiality is always possessed by some thing, and on any
account the "power" will be "known" subsequently to observât-
•/
Ion"of the “act" , if it is act-power in question, or the
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process if it is a process-power in question. If the powers 
are possessed by organisms, then the biological classification 
with its hierarchy is intelligible, and so is the possibility 
of further investigation to determine what the distribution 
of powers is in relation to organisms, how the powers are 
related as possessed by organisms, and how the power-acts are 
inter-related, along with the conditions of such actualisations 
as acts. If "parts" is equivalent to "faculties", as Ross 
suggests ("And though he often uses the traditional e^çpresBion 
’parts of the soul’ the word he prefers is ’faculties’ -p.133), 
the faculties or parts may be considered (I) generically, 
as what faculties there are, or (2) specifically, as what 
faculties occur in different types of individuals or in single 
individuals. And a further question of the relation between 
faculties considered in detail and the historico-geographic 
situation of individuals, or between faculties and science 
or any human enterprise, could equally well be discussed.
This programme certainly fits the ^  Anima, and it could 
follow directly from the biological studies and classificat­
ions, which already involve in some part the act-faculty 
doctrine. But do the biological classifications involve more?
I want briefly to indicate that they do involve more.
(I) Illustrations of soul-body"relation" are given by 
Aristotle in terms of analogy* the seal—formed wax, the axe 
and its cutting power, body and line or surface. These are 
not instance of soul, but of the essential predication which 
is the relation of organism and soul. The predicate is
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inseparable", since if "x is now souled" is false, then 
"x’s soul exists" is meaningless, and "x is a living thing" 
is fc Ise - X has become an anatomist’s body. As "the first 
actuality of a natural body having the capacity of life" - 
Smith’s additional "potentially in it" in 412^ is an indic­
ation of how easily "capacity" is treated as a substance - 
or as "the iirst actuality of a natural body furnished with 
organs", soul is correlated with life : "x is alive" implies 
"x is souled", and vice versa.
Compare Boss (p.134) ; "Aristotle is helped (here) by 
the fact that the natural expression in Greek for a living 
thing is ,"besouled body", where "besouled"
evidently stands for the attribute that distinguishes 
living things from the lower". (My stress - it also "distingui­
shes** living things from dead things). Aristotle, in , 412^13. 
writes: "Of natural bodies, some possess life, amd some do 
not", using t^r(riKoP rît é^ éc ÇmiiÇh , but continuing "where by 
life we mean the power of self-nourishment and of independent 
growth and decay". And D.J.Allan notes (Aristotle.p.ôl) : 
"Psyche, however, must in many contexts be rendered by "life"
In fact, when we talk of animals and classify them, we 
assume "life", and "having life" entails "having a soul" as 
Aristotle suggests it means for him having the minimal powers 
of self—nourishment and independent growth and decay. But it is 
no part of Aristotle’s doctrine that lifeiis a thing that comes 
into bodies "from outside", nor that the thing-soul comes in 
from outside; nor is death a matter of either life—thing or
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Boul-thing leaving the body; and in a strict sense it is 
meaningless to speak of the animal as losing either life or 
soul. "X is potentially alive" or «X is potentially besouled" 
entail "X is not alive", "X is not be-souled". The only 
really convincing example of the potentially alive seems to 
be the egg or seed (or perhaps "fruit") and what seem to be 
Aristotle’s criteria for being potentially alive are still 
accepted, however unwillingly by biological science. Deep 
freezing of seeds to a point at which bio-chemical activity 
was held to be Impossible challenged a special explanation 
of what over and above certain structures was necessary 
for "fertility" of seeds, but the test was, and is, finally 
whether or not seeds do or do not under certain circumstances 
grow. The notion of living tissues or living cells, which 
raise special questions not only of criteria but of the 
meaning of the term "alive", was not one familiar to Aristotle, 
though it is worth remembering that in De Partlbus Animaliuia 
(643®*) he denies that any part of an animal is "either material 
or immaterial". In general he is concerned with traditional 
associations of soul with sensation and movement in the 
sense of the sensitivity of organisms and self-movement 
and growth of organisms, whatever may in fact have been the 
field in which his predecessors "applied" the concepts.
No one, I should think, has attempted to argue that it 
is life that lives, nor concluded from "x is alive" to "life 
is a thing which is in x and may depart". Nor has "life" been 
said to grow, or nourish itself, or sense or imagine or
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rerson - like soul, or mind, or consciousness, it can be 
said to "manifest itself" or to "be born into the world" 
or to " make its appearance in the world", rather as 
universels can be said to "instantiate themselves" or a 
genus to pejppetuate Itself in its species", but these 
irapreesive modes of oblique speech either cash themselves 
completely in direct historical statements or they are 
meaningless.
If Aristotle is, as it seems, equating a "theory" 
ridden phrase - "besouled-body" - to an attribute term - 
"living" (we can note how "having life" is somehow intermediate) 
- he is equating it to an attribute term which (a) is an 
established and standard term, (b) is primary to the mew 
science which he is establishing, and (c) is the basis of 
the "theory" which promotes or underlies the conventional 
phrase, then we can understand v/hy he asks "Is the soul a 
substance?", "Is soul potentiality or actuality?". He is 
not in the position of a Descartes who, after years of 
established biology, is calling into question the biological 
use of "life" and "living" by asking "Is the soul a substance?P 
and answering "Yes", with the consequence that animals do not 
» feel or sense or desire (as well as the other consequences 
noted in detail above). By "life" - a term which disappears 
from the vocabulary of a Cartesian — Aristotle adds, "we mean 
the power of self—nourishment and of individual growth and 
decay". And when he talks of soul he talks about, at the 
"bottom" and most universal and fundamental level, powers of 
self-nourishment and growth and generation. It is possible
that Aristotle had some special eonception of powers, over 
and above what is entailed and only entailed by his mode of 
determination of powers, but any consideration of this 
possibility is subsequent to a. recognition of true propositions 
whose subjects are plants and animals,i.e. members of the class 
living tilings”, and neither that class xioT its faiaillar 
8uh-divisions does Aristotle think it sensible to alter.
Growth, given existence (by encountering! and coming to 
be (a matter of observation), in the form of continuous 
becoming in relation to a specific form, is at least one of 
the accepted, if usually unspecified, criteria of recognition 
of animals and plants and of their distinction from non-living 
things. Becoming , as patterned change, is part of the being 
of living things, part of the essence ^if we switch from 
talking about things directly to the use of techhical terms 
which find theiruomanlng in direct statement; it contrasts 
with their doind and suffering, their acting and being acted 
upon. The doctrine of substrate, in its different forms, 
together with potentiality and actuality, provides for 
Aristotle the justification for taking the existence of 
living animals and plants for granted,i.e. for accepting 
observation and fact-statements in science of organisms, 
and from such a point of view the elaborate doctrine of 
powers is an elaboration of what it means to say that a 
things is a plant and alive, animal and alive, to be 
plant-ensouled and animal-ensouled. "Being souled", "having 
powers", is the most universal feature of living things 
in extenso. Descartes» argument is from "thinking" to
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essence (without reference to classification), and the 
essence is universal since it has specific varieties or 
species which are powers or acts - there is no precision 
in Descartes» treatment. But the issue is as to what has 
the essence, an essence which Aristotle argues must he 
onnattered, and which Descartes declares is and must he and 
need not he, and while so is inexplicably so, while the 
"matter" in question presents all the difficulties I have 
discussed above. It is Descartes who claims that essence 
is substance, or "becomes" substance with the addition of 
"exists", Aristotle who denies that simple identification 
of essence and substance is possible. And it is Aristotle 
who can accept, as I have accepted, the conclusion of the 
Cogito as a fact statement, and can answer Descartes* own 
question "What am I that am a thinking thing?" with "You are 
a man, an animal, who was born, who eats and grows, senses 
and feels pleasure and pain, imagines and dreams and reflects, 
knows a few things and is ignorant of many, sometimes deceived 
by your senses, your imagination, and by your prejudice, as 
well as led into error by a gross abuse of the technical 
terms I did so much to establish as the vocabulary of a 
philosophy of the science which you refuse to consider".
2. What follows from the general argument is that Aristotle 
is claiming that the value of x in "x is a thinker" is "a man"; 
of X in "x is able to sense and feel" is "an animal"; of x in 
"X is self-nourishing" is plant or animal (and so *or man*), 
born and not dead. I want to point in detail to three sections
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Which join the doctrine of potentiality and actuality and the 
doctrine of matter and form In leading directly find entirely 
to this conclusion.
(a). The first full statement of Aristotle*s o\m position 
is in II.I (412®-).
habit of recognising, as one determinate 
Kind ox what is, suhetance, and that in several senses, (a)
In the oense of matter or that which is itself not Ra this", 
and (h) in the sense of form or essence, which that precisely 
in virtue of which a thing is called "a this", and thirdly 
(c) in tlxe sense of that which is compounded of both (a) and 
(b). Now matter is potentiality, form actuality; of the 
latter there are two grades related to one another as, e.g. 
knowledge to the exorcise of knowledge.
Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies 
and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles pf 
nil other bodies. Of natural bodies some have life in them, 
others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with 
its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body 
which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a compos­
ite.
But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, vis. 
having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject 
or matter, not that whiS is attributed to it. Hence the 
soul imst be a substance in the sense of a form*^of a natural 
body having life potentially within it. But substance is 
actuality* and thus soul is the actuality of R body as above 
characterised. Now the word actuality has two senses correspon­
ding to the poBPession of knowledge and the actual exercise 
of knowledge. It is obvious that the soul is aot^iality in the 
first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both 
sleeping and waking presupposes the existence of soul, and of 
these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowl­
edge possessed but not employed, and, in the history of the 
individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise.
That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a 
natural body having life potentially in it. The body so 
described is a body which is organised. The parts of a plant 
in spite of their extreme simplicity are * organs*....... we
con dismiss as unnecessary the question -ladiether soul and body 
are one; it is as meaningless as to ask vdiether the wax luid
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stamp arc one, or generally 
the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter.
Unity has m ^ y  senses (as many as *is* has), hut the most 
proper ^ d  iundamental sense of both is the relation of an 
actuality to that of which it is the actuality.
We have now given an answer to the question, What is 
soul? - an answer which applies to it in its full extent. It 
is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive 
formula of a thing? ô essence. «
If this recount is in English and approximates to what 
Aristotle was endeavouring to say, we have something (a) 
perfectly in accordance with the denial ofmextension to the 
soul, and (b) perfectly clear in its complete opposition to 
Descartes. It is still necessary to make some attempt to 
clear up the use of "substance” « ousia - here, but at least 
it is clearly stated that the being of soul, what it is to be 
soul, is to be potentially or actually a form of a matter, 
and the formed-matter is a living organism. An organism is a 
natural body which is alive, or which as alive exhibits 
soul-functions - and until we witness the actual functions we 
cannot tell whether the body is alive or not, though when the 
function is witnessed we can say "was alive" - the complicated 
entailment of life and function demands expression in terms
of "potentiality".
Note, however, that we have only to declare that 
soul as ousia is also de ti, a this or an individual, and 
we have Descartes* position.
(b). The quoted passage continues :
" (Being substance in the sense which corresponds to 
ths definitive formula of a thing's essence) means that (soul) 
is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just
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u A have had to he a natural body of
++f ^ • TiZ' one having ^  itself the power of
setting Itself in motion and arresting itself. F ext, apply 
this doctrine in the case of the 'parts' of a living body. 
Suppose that the eye were an animal - sight would have been 
Its Boul, lor sight is the substance or essence of the eye 
which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the 
matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer 
an. eye, except in name - it is no more a real eye than the 
eye of a statue or painted figure. We must now extend our 
consideration from the parts to the whole living body; for 
what the departmental sense is to the bodily part \4iich is its 
organ, that the whole faculty of sense is to the whole 
sensitive body as such."
Note the phrase "if the eye were an animal". Tine eye 
might itself be an organisation of organs - consider how we 
regularly find discussion of the lens, retina etc. as things 
with "functions" - but it would have, on the general argument, 
the power of seeing only if it were a complete and independent 
organisation of organs. For a perfect example of claii^ed 
independence of an organ, consider the womb of the Timaaus - 
"an indwelling creature desirous of child bearing" (9Ib.) 
Denied its desire, it wanders about the body and causes all 
kinds of maladies, cured by love and sexual union. This, of 
course, is the origin of the term "hysteria", and it is inter­
esting that there were violent reactions to Freud* s analyses 
of hysteria which made it a complaint of men, although those 
who found this nonsensical no longer thought the uterus was 
capable of wandering. Aristotle*s doctrine seems clear and 
uncompromising. I have stressed above our difficulties in 
talking about organs because they can be treated as anatomical,
557.
physiological, biological or psychological subjects. No one 
now wants to talk in literal fashion of the eye as seeing, 
but the tendency seems still plain, after a familiar dualist 
fashion, to insist on the anatomy, distinguishing this from 
the psychological, and by severing "power" from organism as 
well as organ, zaaking it necessary to look for a special 
organ - the brain, something in the brain, the cortex, or a 
portion of the cortex, or an agent over and above and occupying 
these# jRyle’s "ghost in the machine" or the ever-populeir 
"switch-girls" exenplüy the something over and above. Ryle 
and Aristotle are one here, to the extent of denying the 
machine- thesis.
(c). If we keep in mind the condition "if the eye were 
an animal", we can make sense of the passage from 408^, which 
spx'ings directly from Aristotle,i.e. there is no question of 
it being anybody else»s doctrine.
"Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as 
inexact as it would be to say that if is the soul which weaves 
webs or builds houses. It is doubtless better to say that it 
is the man who does this with his soul. What we mean is not 
that the movement is in the soul, but that sometimes it termin­
ates in the soul, and sometimes starts from it, sensation etc. 
coming in from without inwards, and reminiscence starting from 
the soul and terminating with the movements, actual or residual, 
in the sense organs".
For "with his soul" (the parallel obviously not being 
with "with an axe or tool", or "with timber") read "because 
he has the power which is exercised" or "through his power" - 
other\/ise we get the difficulties I have suggested in connect­
ion with Descartes, that soul can act on body, body on soul, 
but it will be impossible to talk of "the whole" acting on 
either the soul or the body, and yet this mode of speech is
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forced on us. For "terminates in the soul" read "results 
in the actualisation of the sensitive power",i.e. the man 
senses; for "starting in the soul" read "originates in an 
actualisation of the power to recall", i.e. the man remem­
bers or imagines, either admitting of "the man tries to".
It is not suggested that the new readings are made 
necessary by what is said in 408^, which is a most difficult 
section even when we relate it to what has preceded in the 
way of discussion of "affections of soul" and their involving 
a body. "What is suggested is that the new readings are 
provided by Aristotle*s own doctrine, presented later and at 
least as a partial answer to the problems being considered
as arising from facts which Aristotle regards as antithetical
)
to various theories he is going to present and attack.
But prior to accepting or refusing to accept the 
readings,i.e. taking the section as it stands and as it 
occurs in order, we can, I think, see why Aristotle feels 
it necessary to deny that we can replace "a man" by "a soul" 
in the statement "a man perceives, imagines, thinks, is 
pained, is pleased, is bold, is fearful, is angiy...." (it 
could be expanded to include a host of types oi passion, 
emotion and activity). In 403a-403^(l.e. In the Introductory 
section) he has pointed out that "affections of soul" (emot­
ions, passions) seem to Involve hodily changes or motions; 
anger, he points out, can he treated hy t3ie dialectician as 
"desire to return hurt for hurt", hy the physicist as "the
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boiling of blood or warn substance around the heart" " .
A house in "a shelter against destruction by wind, rain or 
heat", but it is also "stones, bricks and timber". But in 
each case an account which includes both pairs of definit­
ions must be possible, and the concept of individual thing 
satisfies the demands this house, any house, i^s a thing 
which i^s a structure or form of the matters, and qua form- 
of-matters ij. has the function of sheltering. Decay of parts 
is correlative with loss of efficacy in functioning - if the 
roof rots the rain comes in. If the house were an animal.....
What desires to hurt what hurt it, what desires to hurt 
because it was hurt, is an animal which an organisation of 
organs, is a set of matters in specific forms and a form.
Its anger is correlative with a state of motion in a part of 
it (and we can now amplify the account of "what goes on in" 
by reference to several sciences); but ^  le angry, it is 
hurt, end if it can it acts and hurts, and this is correlative 
v/ith further changes and motions of and in its parts. What 
follows the quoted section of 408^ is the further recognition 
that as a man grows old his ergons "decay" - if he recovered 
"the proper hind of eye" he would see just as well» Memory 
and love are like sight and sense in that a man loses capacity 
as the body ages; memory and love are "activities" not of 
soul, but of what has soul, the composite of form and matter,
i.e. the living organism.
The Aristotelian composite is not a composite of 
substances, not an intimate union of things. Aristotle thinks
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there is a special problem of nous, and he is in difficulties 
with his ôheory of perception, which is presented in part 
as an atteiijpt to explain what goes on when a man looks at 
a thing belore him, a thing which may be a substance like 
3iimsoli, namely another man, and in part as an attempt at 
theory oi knowledge. Of this there is much that needs to be 
said. But the difference between Aristotle and Besckrte® is 
that the first comes to deny that that soul is a substance 
qua individual existing thing capable of act and passion, 
while the latter conceived ' the philosopher’s task to be that 
of proving what is known to be true - the soul is a substance 
as individual existing thing capable of act and passion, 
eternal and so lifeless as well as deathless - to be necessarily 
known to be true.
According to Ai'istotle, the dialecticien can do geometry 
and a sort of geometry of soul, talking only of desires and 
passions and acts etc. without mentioning what they are of. 
Descartes is such a dialectician, as are his successors. True, 
they claim existence and substantiality; they add "existence" 
to a conceived agent and to the desires, acts etc. in order 
to get truths and necessary truths. But, as I have shown, 
to such on agent the question which is then asked is Iaeaning- 
less,viz. "How are the two sciences related?". It is meaning- • 
less because all is kno\m. Once, however, tne delusion has been 
surrendered that surfaces are solids, that s<^id geometry is  ^
pliysics or becomes physics with the addition of "exists" as a
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predicate to geometrical bodies as subject, that irregularly 
foi*med bodies are of no importance to science or to philos- 
oplXS''» tliG que St.Ion is meaningful and answerable, and the 
answer that Aristotle gives is his ans^ '/er to "How is soul 
related to body?", nom.ely " the dialectician is a man, a 
living organism the body of which, in Its structure of 
parts and states of parts, is described by various sciences, 
and which qua organism suffers and acts in ways which are 
listod in the dialectician’s abstract science".
Such men, ceasing to do only dialectic, can do natural 
science as veil; and by using, as Descartes recomiaends, all 
the capacities that men have, they can come to give an account 
of many things, including themselves. "Soul" and "figure" 
are in like case - neither is substance qua individual, and 
no Instance of either is directly an instance of a substance 
qua individual, though without being an instance of either 
figure or figure-and-soul no individual can exist. It 
'remains only to add that while geometrical figures exemplify 
classification demands, it is non-geometrical fircures that 
arc forms of existing things.
3. Such human scientists can, protesting the truth of their 
observation statements, classif^r organisms in a variety of 
ways; they can confine their attention to statements which 
permit of an existence-claim on the part o% the subject, since 
only existing organisms are of interest to them; they can 
consider the actions and capacz.ties of such organisms and 
their Interrelations, producing a hierarchy of powers; and by
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relating organisms to the hierarchy of powers they can 
present a hierarchy of organisms, placing man e.t the top 
because he can do science, and lesser animals cannot# Any 
extended classification will demand terms which are more gener­
al than other terms, to designate classes which include other 
classes which yet again include classes; the class relations 
can be stated syllogistically, using "all" and "some" as quantif 
iers, and the classificatory structure can be said to depend 
upon, or be equivalent to, or be justified by, a complex of 
syllogisms#
If, as Aristotle did, such a scientist develops a prop- 
ositional and syllogistic logic and a theory of classificat­
ion which clarifies his principles, and especially if ( as 
was the case with Aristotle) he has to argue against previous 
logical and classif icatory theories, he must encounter certain 
problems# First, while it is his study of individual things, 
of this or that existing thing, which justifies him treating 
his predicate terms as meaningful and making the existential 
claim which itself justifies the second step in his classifying, 
his classificatory system will contain no mention of this 
or that individual# Second, the members of his classes, qua 
individuals, are not related in a hierarchy, but are "horiz­
ontal" - they are spread out on the earth which supports them in
time.
Syllogistic logic, as Aristotle presents it, reflects 
this, since it includes statements about all things of a kind 
and some things of a kind, but not individuals qua individuals# 
Yet any statement of the form "All x (or some x) are y and there
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are no xs" removes x and xs from natur-1 science and from 
classification; and no exaraination of an individual which 
is completely isolated from all other things - admitbing this 
to be possible, and that sensible qualities can be noted under 
the conditions - will reveal "catness" or "animality" • Both 
predicate terms apply to a host of distinguishable things, 
yet they seem to be "conceptual", not perceptible in or on any 
one thing, and their relation (which is necessary) is not 
revealed by any thing which can be said to be both or which 
can be said to be one and not the other. Hence the Platonist 
thesis that in classification we are concerned with such conce­
pts and their relations of containing and excluding; classific­
ation is by dichotomy of concepts. What has logical priority 
is the widest universal concept. "Animal" is logically prior 
to "bear", "lion", and both are logically prior to "a bear"
or "a lion" and to "the or this bear" etc..
The full strength of this position is felt when we reflect 
that our characterisation of any individual, a characteris­
ation necessary for the distinction of any individual, is 
"a 0» or "the 0 there", or "this 0". But it is still possible 
to recognise this, and to maintain that 0 is not a member of a 
species, a thing alongside this or that 0 - animal is not 
an animal or a species of animal alongside lions or a lion.
An Aristotelian is able to treat "animal 1 ty" as * naturally 
parsterior" or "logically prior", able to treat the individual 
as coming first and in fact alone comingat all in the order 
of nature or existence. "There is a 0" is true and is
discoverably true, and knowledge (if "this is a 0" is known).
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is identical with what is. It is not suggested that these 
questions will arise for the scientist qua scientist; "but 
the logician can, considering them, conclude that a genus 
term, and any class term, will h^ve both extension and 
intension if is a term in natural science, and this is really 
equiVc'lent to asserting that what has "priority" is not the 
universal and not the individual, but the proposition, the 
meaningful assertion, the situation as it canbbe truly 
described.
Once this is recognised, we can cease talking about 
universals as objects or things known and talk about 
universal terms in discourse, and a study of classif icatory 
investigation helps to show us how terms come into discourse 
and operate in discourse (and so in science) as well as what 
complicated procedures of distinguishing and relating are 
involved in "learning a new term", briefing it into a portion 
of a language already (if roughly) known. Whatever Aristotle 
has to say in his theory of knowledge or of nous, this sort 
of consequence follows from his logic and his theory of 
classification - and in so far as natural science is knowledge, 
theory of knowledge and of nous must finally accept it.
If Aristotle’s Categories are derived from natural 
science and are consequent, as I claim, Upon the logic and 
the theory of classification, and if the doctrine presents an 
attack upon the problem of Being, it must be compatible with 
the logic, the theory of classification, and natural science; 
and in fact it is ÿnrt of the "filling" which relates the 
former to the last. Nor is it difficult to see how it begins.
5 6 6 .
What is difficult is to see where it ends, or should end, 
or can end; and this difficulty produces the question "On 
what principle can the categories he ordered?" as well as the 
question "On what principle can the list of categories he 
termed complete?" Neither of these important questions am I 
going to answer, I want now to consider what follows from 
a Cartesian assumption with regard to Reality and a thesis 
regarding categories advanced in opposition to Aristotle, 
and then to consider all too briefly the Aristotelian position, 
with some mention of interpretations of it. The Cartesian 
"exposition" is provided by J.8.Mill.
Categories.
Mill, doing metaphysics in Cartesian style in his Logic, 
reduces the world as agent to a potentiality of causing sens­
ations, and the mind as patient to a permanent possibility of 
being affected by the potentially affecting acting upon it.
To him this is metaphysical and rather mysterious, but philos­
ophically indubitable. To an Aristotelian it must appear a; 
philosophical and logical imbecility.
His conclusion is reached in Book I. Ch.Ill, a chapter 
which begins with a list of Aristotelian categories which he 
insists are "things denoted by names", "Existences", "Summa 
Genera" - and therefore "highest Predicates", He chàractef- 
ises them as " a catalogues of the distinctions rudely worked 
out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt 
to penetrate, by phAlosophical analysis, to the rationale even
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of these common distinctions", and he insists that "feelings, 
or states of consciousness, are assuredly to he counted among
they cannot he reckoned either among substances 
or attributes". It is suggested^that these might be placed 
"by the Aristotelian school" in either actio or passio. and 
rightly so in the case of such as are active in relation to 
their objects, such as are passions as to their causes, but 
wrongly so in respect of "the things themselves, the feelings 
or states of mind". (My stress - it does not strike Mill that 
calling "feelings" both things and states, whatever they are 
of, suggests a problem).
Calling Habitus, one of the Summa Genera, is
for Mill "manifestly" incongruous. But equally manifest, one 
would have thou^t, is,if we are classifying "existents",ttoat we 
should be talking of infima species rather than summa genera, 
and quantity. When, and Where at least seem as manifestly not 
infima species as does Habitus. This might lead us to suspect 
that what Aristotle was doing was not classifying "existents", 
but it raises no such suspicions in Mill# For him Aristotle 
is clearly trying to classify all the things that exist, and 
doing the job badly; though he goes on to suggest that "thing" 
is not à suitable word (it suggests the things classified in 
natural history), nor is "substance" ( it excludes "attributes"), 
nor is "being" (which is by custom synonymous with "substance"), 
nor is the barbarous "entity" nor its associate "essence".
Mill is not at all perturbed by the fact that his 
"feelings" are (i) realities or things, (S) states of mind.
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the latter being a substance (and "unknown", so that that 
the states are of it is likewise "unknown"), and (lii) 
theiiiselves classifiable into "sensations, or any other / 
feelings and states of mind, as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, 
taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, conception and the 
like", while (iv) each sensation is of something, each feeling 
si something, and thought, judgment and conception are 
not states in the sense that the feelings are states, and are 
of in a different sense from that in which feelings are of.
v/hat is Mill’s procedure? After confessing that he cannot 
find e suitable word for obliterating all category distinctions, 
though he finds the concept of "denoting whatever exists as 
contradistinguished from nonentity or Nothing" transparently 
clear, and having rejected natural science and its things (which 
contrast with gods and centaurs as nonentities, if they do not 
with such pluralities as Nothing), he simply re-v/rites Cartes­
ian doctrine, substituting "Peelings or States of Consciousness" 
for "Les Pensees", the varieties or modes or factons of thinking. 
Peeling is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion and Thought are 
species. We drop straight into the Cartesian morass: what 
is meant must be explained by reference to we and what we 
think and feel, or the states we specify by "I am angry",
"Mary is content", "John feels afraid"; all such verbs are to 
be replaced by "am (or is) conscious of", and the explanatory 
statements are reduced to adverbial clauses - "Thought includes 
all that we are conscious of when we are said _to _ thii%2! ( 
stress); thoughts and sensations are (both, similarly or differ-
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ently?) of , but what they are of is not to be included in
-Msg named "thought" or "sensation", which is "what
passes in the mind itself", though we can only "denominate"
the sensation "from the object or from the attribute which 
is excited".
Mill’s criticism of Aristotle’s list that the terms 
arennot exclusive since, for example, act, passion and situs 
may Involve relation, certainly holds ij[ Aristotle is claiming 
to present "completely independent things"; but Mill’s plain 
realities seem to be created and sustained by relations, 
can be denominated only by or thowi^ d relations, and cannot be 
"knoim" apart from relations even if they can be "known" at 
all. What Mill’s precise philosophical analysis apparently 
demands is that for "I thought p" we should substitute "there 
was a thought in my mind and the thought was related to me by 
awareness, to ’p ’ ly of, and to mind by "in"", while for 
"I sensed X" we should write "there was a sensation or feeling 
or state of consciousness in ny mind itself to which I was 
related by awareness and which was related to what X is of 
by excitation"; and both statements seem to come under tha 
Aristotelian categories. They have the form of a complex 
whose compenent statements are cat ego ri ally distinguishable - 
the difficulty is that while they have the form the matter or 
content evades us; what needs to be done is to show that 
there are intelligible statements as components.
Without a conventional (non—technical, familiar discourse) 
use of "I" and "we" there seems to be no structure to the 
"stated" situations; with such a conventional use the "objects"
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are nebulous, seem certainly not "independent existences" in 
any sense, and their relation to "I" or "we", like that of 
"I" or "we" to the mind in which they are or of which they 
are, seems impossibly to be "aware of" in any sense. Either 
the relation fails to relate (we cannot give a meaning to "of" 
and am conscious of" or "excite") or one' term of the relation 
seems missing - whether the subject or the "exciting object" 
at one level, whether the thing "said to think" or the "state 
of mind" at the other.
Mill’s talk is Descartes’ double-talk, Berkeley’s 
double-talk: I am a soul who is aware only of ideas occasioned 
in my soul-self, I am a man who wears coats and drinks wine.
So we read; "..part of our notion of a body consists of a 
number of sensations Qf. our own, or of other sentient beings, 
habitually occurring simultaneously" (it is manifest nonsense 
to include habitus as a category? Like the "non-wildness" of 
sense-data, habitus is our o#ly guarantee that described 
bodies or their causes exist) ; we read "that my conception 
of the table at which I am writing is compounded of its 
variable shape and size, which are complex sensations of sight, 
the tangible form and size, which are complex sensations of 
our organs of touch, ^ d  of our muscles." So we come to 
realise why the categories do not work for Mill# He has very 
little idea what we wants to say, and less idea how to say it# 
He takes for granted an Aristotelian world in which Mill is a 
man, like and unlike other men, like and unlike other animals 
different in kind but philosophically unmentionable; he is 
a man who sits at tables (situs,relation), who writes (act)
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as he looks and sees, listens and hears, touches and feels; 
who feels pained and pleased, hurt and delighted; to whom 
tilings seem and upon whom things act hy impact and hy arousing 
attention and desire - making him continue looking, handle 
and want. He takes for granted (or as proven) that there are 
only mind-substances and body-substances, and with the trans­
ition from I-Mill to I-mind he achieves a world vhich is to be 
described (if that is the word) only in terms of feelings end 
states of consciousness which are things mental and within 
mind, and another world which is what the feelings and states 
of mind are of. In the language suitable for describing this 
"phenomenal world" the mind-wo rid cannot be described at all; 
the phenomenal world is unreal in relation to the real mind- 
world or the real (unknovm) body-world which is causally 
related (how?) to the real mind (not its contents?) and thus 
occasions the states or feelings and their of-hess# Philos­
ophers (says Mill, including Kant) have taught him that "all 
we know of objects is the sensations which they give us" (my 
stress). Men, and philosophers, are such objects, and none of
them are agents in the "real world".
The real world is completely described in fact by a 
conjunction of "unknown" or'Unintelligible", a failure to 
mention what does not know or understand, and a set of 
category terms,viz. substance, relation, act (or causal act), 
passion (passive affection), potentiality and a,ctuality.
What we have is metaphysics pushed one stage beyond what I 
condemned above as bastard statements in which technical terms 
are "related" to n o n - technical terms, to the fonaulation
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ol statements which contain only technical terms and which 
need to he disguised with "mind" and "body" before there is 
any possible pretence that anything is being described.
What of logic, meanwhile? In section 11 Mill insists 
that of indicates relation. and in effect he denies tha distinc­
tion between substance and attribute by treating the technical 
"attributes are of a substance" as an ordinary-language 
statement oi relation between things - "mental things", doubt­
less, or what mental things are "of". The result is thds to 
banish predication; the "is" of identity replaces the copula - 
any fido is the fido it is. Nominalism permits us to name a 
fido Fido, and confusion permits us to treat Fido as a class 
name for individuals which resemble one another and differ 
from members of other classes, so that predication can be used 
after all - and if we continue to analyse things into their 
"complex predicates" we conclude with the named subject as 
the merely named, the merely related-to-attributes thing.
Named things, qua attribute-things, are analysable into 
simples, which can be related into complex things which can be 
differently related, spatially related, to other complex 
things. It being asBiimod that these things are different in 
kind, philosophical analysis presents us with an account of 
what thought is (though the thoughts can be denominated only 
by what they are of, thought-elements by "the attribute excited' 
or "the object that excites the attribute"); with an account 
of what the world really is (Under the same conditions as for 
thought) ; with an account of what minds contain, both as 
thoughts and what they are of. These correspond roughly
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to logic (relations of ideas, or laws of associating ideas 
in terruo oi what they are of); to psychology (mental elements 
and powers to relate - see logic) ; and ontology ( what 
thoughts are of qua elements, becoming phenomenal science 
when acted upon and related so that thoughts are of a natural 
world).
Aristotle’s CoteRories.
However we "arrive at" our phenomenal world, in that 
world Aristotle’s categoyy distinctions can be made in terras 
of the constituent accounts of things in that world. The list 
given by Aristotle in the Categories is not completely 
consistent with the lists given elsewhere - and this indicates 
some uncertainty as to the principle of listing. The terms, 
as Mill claims, are not exclusive, and may not have been 
intended to be. But how does Mill know this? Because he knows 
that a man cannot push without pushing something, sit without 
being related to what he sits on, and Aristotle was perfectly 
familiar with both impossibilities. They belong to his world, 
though not to Mill’s category-ridden metaphysical world.
Granting this non-exclusiveness, the chief issue with 
regard to the categories is as to what the list is supposed to 
convey,i.e. as to what categories are. Boss refers to them 
as "the main divisions of being", a phrase which I flxid diffic­
ult to understand and difficult to relate to Ross’s discussion 
of the Categories; and I find the same true of his alternative 
"general aspects of reality". I shall give a possible meaning 
to such phrases below, without being at all sure that it is
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particularly close to what Ross means. Ross’s argument that 
the terras are called "categories" because "substance" is the 
ultimate predicate of an individual such as ' Socrates seems to 
me completely futile, since it entails that if substance is a 
real predicate then to say "Socrates is a substance" is to say 
"Socrates is a predicate", which Aristotle would certainly 
deny, and if "substance" is a technical term it is meaningless 
to say "Socrates is a substance".
What seems to be the case is that all the categories 
are technical terms, and cannot be regarded as class-nmes for 
"existences" - the penalty for taking this view is that all 
are names for things , and the members of the classes have to 
be related by denying that the categories are class-names for 
things.
What I have argued above is that the distinguished 
categories can be regarded as classes of terms which do function 
meaningfully in discourse, but that they are better regarded 
as classes of statements which permit of an existential claim 
on the part of the subject. I have recognised that at the 
most general level of logic, where only the distinction of 
subject and predicate is required, it seems plausible to argue 
that all the category terms except substance (which remains 
on the subject side of the proposition) can be grouped as 
"predicates"; but this, resulting as it does in the confusion 
of "attribute" with "predicate", and the further confusion of 
substance as a category tern with subject, which is purely 
logical, need not be accepted as it stands, and the consequences 
can be avoided if we recognise a distinction between the log-
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ical and the metaphysical, and recognise the priority of the
logical. What I want to show is that such a position émerges 
from Aristotle.
If we take any list of the Categories - Substance (Ousia) 
quality, quantity, Relation, Activity, Passivity, When, Where, 
Position, Habit or Disposition - there is no difficulty in 
indicating a host of distinguishable individual things of 
which questions corresponding to all except the first can be 
asked and answered, both question and answer being in non- 
teclmical language. Considered as a statement, and. as either 
true or false, each statement will have a subject and a predic­
ate, so that the logical distinction is common to them all.
So, too, is the copula, a special use of the verb "to be", 
which (whatever Aristotle’s position) draws our attention to 
the absence of "Being" from the list.
For all predications, the logical relation of the pred­
icate to the subject is copulation. In no predication is it 
intelligible to say that the subject the predicate, and the 
predicate is related to the subject only in the logical sense, 
a sense completely different from that in which spatio-tempor­
ally distinct things are related. My restriction above of 
"category" to "classes of statements" shows its use in pres­
enting the results of analysing statements in comparison with 
each other — we are concerned with distinctions and classific­
ation of statements or propositions, not with grammatical or 
"ph^oBophical" analysis of Isolated statements or propositions.
That Aristotle is concerned with predications in ordinary 
langua.ge is patent in the Categories if we look at his tech­
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nical statements and at his examples. However obscure and 
complicated we may find that piece of writing, it is apparent 
that statements like "this man is human", "Socrates is sittipg", 
"the horse is white", are being considered and discussed; 
the distinction between temis and ptirases (simples) and 
sentences.(complexes) is fundamental by Aristotle’s specific 
statement; and the criterion for "substantiality" is "cannot 
be predicated of a thing, but can have predicates". Aristotle,
then, is concerned witii distinctions over and above the i
li
logical distinction of subject and predicate, in propositions, 
and riot with a logic over and above the propositional, nor with 
things which exist over and above the classifiable world of
i
the things of natural science, these things being what are
f
instanced as subjects of the requisite kind and so as substanceEu^ l 
What characterises the treatments of Aristotle’s categor­
ies cited above, and many others, is (l) the complete ignoring 
of the logic, and the substituting of another, (2) the 
complete ignoring of natural science, and the substitution for 
all or some of its terms of technical category-terms, with 
a special treatment of substance as category-term, real-term, 
and class term for "minds and bodies". It is no accident that 
in contrast with Aristotle’s biological natural science, in 
connection with which (a) our notions of individuals, (b) 
classification and all the related terns, genus, species, 
differentia, class, member etc., and (c) syllogism, and all 
related technical terms, present only the difficulty of 
learning a set of sciences, whatever is the case outside this 
field, the Cartesian rej^ection of animals as subjects of
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whole cla,SBes of statements accompanies a rejection of |
syllogism (except in pseudo-proofs of desired "truths"), jj
of classification (as fruitless - Descartes has mixed attitudes ij 
here, which cannot detain us - perhaps, hut certainly irrelevant i 
to metaphysics and minds and bodies), and of predication, 
although the technical terms and necessary truths, as well as h
the relevant criteria form"substantiality", derive from I-
Aristotle. 'i
To claim that substance, quality and relation are really j
class terms for substances, qualities and relations which I
are "things", "beings", "elements of reality", "entities", Ml
"ontal elements", is to obliterate the very distinctions 
Aristotle is concerned to stress, and one immediate result 
is that "relations" (which in ordinary terms cannot be 
stated without two substances) have to be treated as things 
which relate other things, as things between other things, ^
or as things over and above other things. I do not wish to 
elaborate this, but it was made clear in the discussion of - 
"adhere" and "inhere" as relations of attribute and substance, 
in the discussion of simples as ideas or elements of reality, 
and in the disottssion of the nature of thou^ ÿht, how peculiar 
the treatment of relations is; and while in Empiricism 
generally we find the treatment of relations as somehow 
mental and distinct from elements, we can find the "ontological' j
■ I
issue in its most virulent form in Bradley, with his dreary |
I
juggling of category-terms in the first chapters of Appearance ' 
and Reality. ^
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For an Aristotelian there is no special problem attached 
to our use of "have" in "Subjects ha^e predicates", or of ' 
"belongs" in "A belongs to all B", or of "relation" in "the 
copula relates subject and predicate", since we are concerned 
with technical terms entirely, and these are given a meaning 
by reference to predications in a natural language. It 
matters little, likewise, what additional technical terms 
we use in order to speak about subject,predicate and copula, 
i.e, as a common term for the distinguishable trilogy-in-relat­
ion, so long as we recognise that we are doing logic, and 
not moving upwards to a new understanding of natural science 
or "what really exists". And the same is true of any general 
term we may devise for other distinctions as a class r what we 
need to know is where and how the distinctions are of can be 
made.
To sum up, the repeated stress on predicability as the 
criterion for distinction between the first item and any other 
item on the list, the use of familiar-language examples, and 
the stress ot? parts of speech, indicate that Aristotle is 
working within the field in which the logical distinctions 
he recognises can be clearly pointed to. Thus substance is 
distinct from any other category term, and each of the other 
terms is meaningless except in relation to substance, and this 
parallels the situation of subject and predicate if types of 
predicate or of predication can be distinguished. From this 
there arises a special problem with his use of ousia. which 
appears to be a predicate-term "denoting" kind and essential 
kind^
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Hy main task is now to show, all too briefly in spite of 
lay discussion of related Issues above, that the problem arises 
in many contexts for Aristotle, and that his solution repres­
ents his solution to the Greek question of Being, i.e. What 
is it that can be said in a full sense to be?.
Aristotle’s answer is "an historical individual", and 
the answer is demanded by hie logic, his classification and 
his natural science. It is given in different ways in 
different contexts, and requires for its understanding a 
knowledge of a set of Aristotle’s technical and correlative
n
terms. The answer that comes from the Categories is: Only
on individual can be said to be, and any individual is of a 
n ii
kind. The logical presentation of this takes the form: What
can be said really to be is that which is not preiicable of
any thing, but can bo subject of predicates. The classific-
atory doctrine is: Wliat exist are individuals which are
members of an infima species, thou^ at a "higher" level they
are me^abers of a higher and hi^dier classes, and<this enables
s
a definition to be given., Thus definition and essence .are 
related to ousia via the class-name and membership of the class, 
the prhaary class-names being those of "natural classes", ^ which 
are already recognised.in the language Aristotle hns learned
from others. ,
What corresponds to "is a member of" is-the technical 
tern tode ti. the "this" which converts an infima species tevui 
into a member-of-species terra, and which Aristotle relates to 
ousia: we shall see below the.^  iif^ortance of this, , and why
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Aristotle speaks of "ousia in the sense of" in the De Anima.
If we have organisms in mind as clear instances of individual ^ 
things, if we remember Aristotle’s examples, the doctrine of 
formed-matter will present us with the conclusion that what 
exists in the full sense (as actuality) is an historical 
individual, and to be such is to be an enmattered-fom; and 
this is related directly,and indirectly via eidos and logos, 
which are themselves related to enmattered-forms, to an attach 
on both "formalists" and "materialists". Equally the doctrine 
of potentiality and actuality "applies", since to be an 
historical individual is to be a thing-becoming, and a thing 
becoming in a specific way characteristic of the thing of a 
kind as of its kind; and interraittent acting in various ways 
and BO being potentially a particular kind or kinds of agent 
is a further necessary feature of any living organism, at 
least above the level of plants.
Further, while syllogism needs no individual propositions, 
quantification in the form of "all" and "some" in natural 
science demands existing Individuals as subjects (and members 
of classes), these members are characterised in a classifica­
tion only by certain predicates and they themselves are not 
specifically mentioned; while along with "all" and "some" and 
relations of implication go arguments which result in our 
distinguishing definitional predicates, prépria and accidents, 
these distinctions being meaningless unless all types of 
predicate can "belong" to an individual.
If we look again at the éntegories listed, tode _tl is
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implied by the doctrine of non-predicability, which determines 
a thisness in relation to ousia, but the thisness is to be 
stated in terms of ubi and quando - to exist is to be somewhere 
Bomewhen. And this, I have argued (developing Aristotle) 
entails being related to other things, while (for organisias) 
it also entails acting and being acted upon, the developing 
individual being "sustained" by the complexity of things, 
relations and acts.
Whether or not this notion of "sustaining" is directly 
Aristotle’s is not important, but it must be stressed that 
when we cash it in detail we find ourselves involved in saying 
not only that no individual could in fact exist independently 
of other things but that it is logically impossible for this 
to be so, rather as it becomes logically impossible,for an 
organism to exist without being an organisation of organs.
Once we recognise modes of acting, which require natural 
objects, to be included in the definition of organisms of 
different kinds, we have made it logically impossible for 
those kinds of organism to exist independently of the objects 
of their acts. Consequently, if we recognise organisms as 
individuals and as things (res), it needs only the definition 
of "substantiality" in terms of "absolute independent exist­
ence" - or of "simplicity" - to make it necessarily true 
that no things are substances. Res sjve substantia becomes a 
complete disjunction. For Descartes, as I have stressed,
I
res sive substantia functions as an identification of the 
meaning of two terms, but he Insists on both the special 
criteria - absolute independence and simplicity - and the
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result is that organisms cease to be either res or substant- 
- they hfive been defined out of real existence. For 
Aristotle, res sive substantia would indicate an identific­
ation of two terms, and the meaning of the identity is 
throu^ res and individual, and the possibility of pointing 
to individuals of which organisms are at least typical 
examples. Such individuals fall outside neither language 
nor logic nor existence.
It matters little whether we call the variety of categ­
ory terms "minimal concepts for considering the organic world
1
or a world which contains organisms", or speak as I have 
preferred to do of classes of statements members of which o,re 
necessary for the account of historical individuals. It is even 
possible that Aristotle was chiefly concerned to assert the 
validity of a class of statements which could be made about
ij
organisms or a sub-class of organisms - much depends upon the "
precise values we admit to "act" - but all the categories |
he lists "apply" to men, and on his general arguments it would j 
be nonsensical to deny that our account of men should include 
act-terms or agent-terms. If we can give a meaning to individ- 
ual in the "inorganic world", and so in a science of the 
inanimate, on finding that such individuals are never agents 
we must exclude "act" from the categories relevant to that 
science. Nevertheless we can justifiably claim that such 
issues are subsequent to our determination of categories h
in relation to organism-agents.
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logic. Classification and Substance.
Whatever may be said about the members of the list of 
categories, any such list will, on an Aristotelian view, 
contain "substance" - and substance is my main concern.
A logician, accepting syllogism, a classifier concerned with 
classes and relations. If they recof^ise that .the arguments 
or classes they are concerned with are related to natural 
science, will recognise the existence of individuals, will 
recognise that a particular science whose true statements 
they are concerned with will pay attention to individuals.
Can we move directly from this to "substance" as "individual"?
Consider statements like "some apples are red", "red 
is a colour", "Achilles acted bravely", "courage is a virtue", 
"squares are rectangles", "tables are square". Colours, 
virtues and rectangles may be classified, as may apples, heroes 
and tables. Colours, virtues and rectangles may be subjects 
of statements as well as predicates. "Virtue" may be predicated 
of "courage", "courage" (in its adjectival form) predicated of 
"a man". And clearly there is a sense in which courage can be' 
said to "exist in actuality" only when someone acts courageous­
ly; red to exist i^ actuality only when something is red.
"The box is red, red is a colour, therefore the box is a 
colour" produces nonsense - and it is logical or metaphysical 
nonsense. It is so clearly nonsense that no one would take it 
literally - "is a colour" would be understood as "is either
red or blue or.... ", or as "has a colour", or as "is coloured".
Ho one is going to be misled by it - only a philosopher would
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would have any reason to bother about it. '
If we confine our attention to statements like "roses 
are red", "balls are spherical", "children fight", the 
distinction between individual thing and quality or act seems 
clear, and we are not at all disturbed by the complex 
background of things and relations against which the situations 
indicated by the statements are isolated by our interests.
The treatment of "substance" as the individual - a rose, this 
ball, that child, the singulars which give meaning to the 
plurals - seems clearly justifiable. It is brute fact that 
any given individual has an account which is exhaustible only 
at the limits of our immediate knowledge or our immediate 
language.
This prompts one philosophical claim that threatens 
a simple identification of "individual" and "substance" as 
subjects of a class of true statements. Individuals, it 
is pointed out, cannot be "kno\dI", and if they cannot be 
known, they cannot be known to be subjects of propositions.
And in this sense of "know", viz. "completely known", "having 
an exhausted account", it is obviously'true that they cannot 
be known. But having said this, we have said all that needs 
to be said. Recognition and identification of individuals, 
in any one of a variety of contexts, does not demand "complete
V'
knowledge", and it is recognition and identification which 
provides a basis for noting qualities, acts and relations, 
and so for the propositions which, in an incomplete systan, 
give meaning to "complete knowledge". There is no call to
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say that there must he things completely known, since other­
wise "know" is meaningless, and then, accepting the estab­
lished distinction of substance and attribute, claim that 
attributes are "known", the "substance" really unknown, and 
at the logical level predication is either meaningless or 
coiopletely misunderstood by those who use it. I insisted 
above on the validity of the terms "discriminating" and 
"recognising", as I insisted on "giving an account of" and 
"discovering or observing such to be so". As activities of 
scientists (seekers after knowledge) in a world which contains 
other men, other animals, plants and coal mines and carbon 
molecules, these producer facts and theories, veridical 
statements and accounts, including accounts of men doing 
science.
Here "what we know" can be stated, and our talk of 
statements, propositions, subjects and predicates, substances" 
and attributes, individuals and their kinds, given a meaning 
without pre-supposing something over and above the accountable, 
questions of "what we really know", of what we really sense 
and perceive, are subsequent to this, not prior, even if we 
pose them as "under what conditions are ^ discrimination and 
giving accounts possible?", and considerations of this have 
been, I have argued, tortured beyond-recognition by the 
conversion of "what do we really perceive?" into "what do 
minds really perceive?". Special "objects of consciousness" 
so "conceived" are immediately "inserted" between minds and 
non-mind substances, both "unaccountable", and I have tried to
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show in detail above how the various attempts to deiignate 
the "objects" by a category term and to argue via category 
truths to something beyond the "objects" collapse. The 
most general designation of the "objects" as "qualities" or - 
as "attributes" produces (a) the thesis that propositions need 
no subject-substance, but are relations (in a special sense) 
of predicates, and "things" are really collections of attrib­
utes, (b) that propositions must have a subj ect-substance, 
but this is never known, and (c) that all propositions really 
have a subject, and one subject, namely Reality. These are 
not "on the same level", except that they all presume to tc-ke 
us below the level of propositions and accounts in natural 
science, to show us what our accounts and statements in our 
accounts "really mean", and all employ category terms and 
assume that those terms have the same meaning or function , :
at the "lower level" as at the "ordinary level".
Accept it, however, that our account of X is a set 
of true statements which admit of logical distinctions, it is 
possible to make distinctions between the component statements 
and to classify them, and to note the structure ,of .the .account. 
General features of such accounts enable us to e]g)and an 
accouAt by question and empirically %found answer, as general 
terms in the known account ^ permit expansion through our 
knowledge of the terms. The role of categories is not that of 
"universale". Butrequally the role of universal propositions 
is different from the role of individual propositions, 
and "this apple is red" is logically different from "this 
red is a colour", although any apple that is red must be
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this red or that red,i.e. a particular red. The difference 
cannot be stated, as a result of comparing the two statements, 
in terms of subject and predicate, since "red" is a eubjnct 
of its statement in the second case. Nevertheless the differ­
ence is clear, and is reflected in common usage - though not 
in the usage of "substance" and confusedly in the usage of 
"thing".
, (a) "All men are quadrupeds", "All men are rational ,
animals", "All reds are colours", appear to be logically similar 
propositions, and each can be the mdjor in a syllogism. Each 
proposition, moreover, is incipiently^ class if icatory, and on 
my general argument each could be held to entail an existent­
ial truth, "there is a man", "there is a red"; "there is a 
quadruped", "there is a rational minimal", ."there is a colour", 
follow with conversion. We can, and do, talk of particular or 
individual reds, particular or individual colours - we can put 
"this" in front of any of the terms. Converting adjectives 
into abstract nouné^ i verbs into gerundives, prepositions into 
abstract nouns, we can classify under the gross heads of 
qualities, acts and relations, doing something similar to and 
different from classifying numbers, geometrical figures, 
opinions, cricket performances, virtues and vices, or motives 
for murder. If we put "this" in front of any such noun, we 
have something individual which (as a term) cannot be predicated 
of anything, .but which caii be subject of a proposition.
The consequence is that any act, relation, quality... 
is an individual, and seemingly, in Aristotle’s sense, a 
substance. But the consequence is also that any act, relation
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or quality (as a reality) is predicable éf a thing and any 
such term is meaningless unless so predicable, and with the 
recognition of this Aristotle’s distinctions re-assert them­
selves. I not going to consider especially what terras 
other than act, quality and relation are further required, 
nor logical difficulties held to follow from the treatment 
of a relation as predicable of a thing; my concern is with 
substance and subject, and the validity of certain distinctions 
whatever others may be possible or necessaiy.
If we give a meaning to "(3x) x is an act" it seems to 
follow of necessity that "(3x) x is an act entails (5y)y is an 
agent". From "(3x) x is a quality" the conclusion is to 
thing or substance instead of agent, thougli an agent will be 
a thing or substance. What we seem to have is a set of 
necessary truths whose terms are variables, closely related 
to "any predicate must be of a subject", or "whatever is said 
about must be said about some thing". Aristotle’s position 
depends upon being able to show that there are values of % 
which cannot be values of y, and as well that there are 
values of x which can be distinguished and classified as 
such values, without the relation of x-value and y-value 
being destroyed. ^
In fact-statements about organisms we can find a 
justification for all the claims; in-fact-statements about 
common-place things we find a justification for most of 
them, hill is perfectly right: when you talk of classifying 
things, substances, entities, essences or existences you
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suggest that you are talking about classifying trees, birds 
and beasts, not yet exploded into fragmentary mysteries 
by philosophical analysis; and any one of these "things" is 
the subject of types of statement corresponding to all of 
Aristotle’s categories.
(b) Corresponding to the degree differences of universality 
of man, animal, organism in a classification of living things 
is the degree difference of univeusality of scarlet, red, 
colour. Red is less universal than colour, is a particular 
colour - and there are many particular reds into which "red" 
can be divided, while there may be any number of instances 
of any particular red. Yet it is possible to accept the 
statement “You cannot point to any red without pointing to a 
thing which is red, since colours are only qualities of 
things". The things may be ribbons or flowers or pillar 
boxes.... .the reds which exist will be ribbons or flowers or
This last use of "reds" indicates that we designated 
things in terms of their colour or redness, instead of in 
terms of function etc. as ribbons and flowers and pillar boxes, 
we should have a class of reds logically similar to what we 
have now with a class of flowers. In fact we do "name" things 
thus in special contexts, with billiard and snooker balls, 
poker chips, children’s teams in question; but othem-zise it 
indicates distinction and similarity (i.e. discrimination) 
and is an attribute term. If it were a substance-term, so 
that it would be true to say "any red you encounter will be
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a pillar box or a ribbon or a rose", we couldûnoolonger 
use "red is a colour" in its present sense. "Colours" would, 
in the new usage, be identical with what, in our present 
usage, we call ribbons, flowers, roses and motor cars, i#. 
subst:inces qua things.
The question that concems-i us is not of the possibility 
or advisability of such a change, but of what is involved in 
such a change, and what is involved can be recognised and 
stated in terms of substance and attribute, although it cannot 
be stated simply in terms of subject and predicate. "Red" can 
be the subject of a predication in our present usage, but 
it is not a substance; and the difference is indicated by 
distinguishing the typo of proposition of which it can be 
a subject from other types of proposition or by using the 
technical term "quality" of "red" or "redness".
Relations and acts are in somewhat similar case, since 
these also can be subjects of statements and classified. But 
once we move beyond quale, or the confusion of quality and 
attribute with predicate, and pose the question of the 
possibility of replacing our general nouns by act-terms and
Tie
relation-teims, the project seems alzûost lunatic. As 1 
pointed out at length above, if we pose the project as 
re-writing statements in ordinary language, replacing our 
nouns by "thing of this or that kind", the re-writing seems 
possible, and to make no difference to our account of "the 
world". But the full project is not to characterise "a thing" 
by the use of "is so related to a thing such that" or by 
"which so acts", but to alter the logical and grammatical
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force and function of verbs and prepositional phrases so 
that they have the force and function of nouns.
It is easy to convert them into nouns by denominating 
them acts and relations - the Highest Kinds of Things are 
Substances, qualities. Acts, Relations. But with these 
nouns nothing can be said until they have been accepted as 
differently nouns, and the declension via logic (subject and 
predicate) and metaphysics (dtypes of predication) concludes 
with fact statements made and understood in ordinary language, 
and justified or verified by accepted techniques. The "world 
presented by" stating existence -entailing facts is not a 
world of substances and of attributes and of acts and of 
relations (and forms, stuffs, structures) but of substances 
which are structured of forms of stuff - whatever details 
investigation may supply -,which are quailtied, do act and 
are related, if they can be said to act. To present that world 
in detail we need all the resources of our language, not one 
part, and all the resources of science, not simple conceptions.
(c) The use of abstract nouns is sufficient to make it 
plausible to ask "Does a such exist?". But once again, "jZfness 
exists" can be given a meaning by "If (3 x)0x, then jÿness exists" 
for any type of attribute-term. If it is this which prompts 
the claim that attributes exist in a different mode, or at 
a different level, from that of substances, or the claim that 
categories designate not realities but levels or aspects of 
Being, there is no difficulty in understanding "modes of 
existence" or "levels of reality". We do not need to say
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"a table exists in one mode and squareness exists in another 
mode", with a consequent impossibility of tables being 
square unless there is a third mode of existence which is both 
and neither of the others. Aristotle was aware of such a 
position - the argument suggested is a version of the th±±d-mnn 
argument directed against the Socratic forms. "(ax)gfx“ can 
be treated in natural science as equivalent to "gfx exists", 
and this is a formula for matter-and-form or subject-and-pred- 
icate or the union of both in an account of the x in question. 
Vfe must stress, however, natural science cuid the historical 
character of matter-formed and thing-of-a-3cind; we are not 
concerned with possible or imaginary or conceptual universes 
from which we exclude by fiat men and other organisms, 
universes consisting of "one sustained sound", "a self-consc­
ious mind", "a point-instant" or "trieuig^ ular particles" - to 
give only four "philosophical Instances".
(d) The quantification requisite for syllogism in natural 
science, the plurality demanded by classification, demand the 
existence of Individuals, but these individuals may be "things" 
or "attributes", vhatever types of attribute we recognise. 
Conversion operates in the propositions of syllogism - so 
Aristotle insists - and class-relations are convertible. 
Arguments and classifications may contain only colour-words, 
genus-words and species-words. Syllogism demands no singular 
propositions, a class statement refers to no specific member 
Qf the class. The tdistinction of subject and predicate, 
which is purely logical, dem^mds the further distinction.
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which I have temed "metaphysical" , within the shadow of the 
logical, between substance-individuals and attribute-individ­
uals if the rationality of syllogism or df classification is 
to be s. feature of natural science. We are breaking no new 
ground in referring to attribute-individuals as particulars 
and ceasing to refer to them as individuals at all. Part­
icular-terms will appear in statements which are components 
in the account of an individual or of the comraon features of 
individual members of a class. The "account" corresponds to 
what philosophers have called "the notion of" or "our notion 
of", and it is by abstracting the logical and metaphysical 
articulation of accounts from the accounts that philosophers 
have arrived at "simple matters" of knowledge which (a) are 
"unaccountable", (b) can "come to consciousness" or "be 
thought" only when minds have "related" or "formed" them, 
while (c) th#se accounts of the requisite relations which do 
not make thought impossible arc accounts of logical forms and 
categories which must be claimed to be the articulations of 
actual thought.
(e) There must be individuals ‘is the conclusion, and prop­
ositions like "Socrates is human" point, for Aristotle, to the 
fact that only in the individual are thing-ness and kind actu­
ally "united". This unity is stricjly logical, and the union 
is the foundation of the system of types of statement which 
is the account of an individual qua substance. But of any 
thing merely qua thing we can say no more than "here now", 
"there then"; "thinghood", "substantiality", implies existence 
The traditional criterion of "independent existence", vital
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to Descartes, reduces to here-now, there-then, at p^t^, at 
p^t^. And this, far from being incompatible with "being 
related to", has no reference to "being the only thing, or 
conceivably being the only thing, in the world".
But while we can Si\y of any substance that it is here-now,
or there-then, in any particular case what is here or there
is a thing of a kind, of some kind, whatever its actions or 
relations. In Russell’s terminology, we cannot say "x is" 
or "0 is", or "(ax) ", but on&y "0x is" or "(3x)/2fx". Aristotle’s 
tode ti corresponds to (3) or to (Hx) when x is completely 
indeterminate, i.e. to "there is a thing"; but he is well
aware that this is im incomplete e^qpression. We have not made
a statement with (3 x), and we have a full statement when we 
add not only (0) but (0x) and (^x), when we say not "(3x) x is 
yellow" but "(3x) x is a rose and x is yellow", i.e. "this 
rose is yellow". Aristotle seems to recognise clearly that 
the function of "rose" as a predicate is different from the 
^Unction of "yellow", and indeed in Categories 3^ he seems to 
claim that species and genus are only in a special sense 
"qualities" - they "determine the quality with reference to 
a substance". In other words, with the prefacing of "a" or 
"the" we have an individual, whereas with predicates like 
"yellow" we have "a quality".
When we ask what is it to be a substance, two answers 
are possible, each in a sense Inseparable from the other,
"Being somewhere, somewhen", and "Being a specific kind of 
thing co-classifiable with other things". This "kind" may 
be a genus-characterisation, a definition, or an infima-
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species characterisation - and the latter, if ousia, can he 
given a definition. Whichever we choose, the distinction 
between to de ti or thing-existing-qua-thing, and ousia, will 
be logical, as abstract as the distinction of matter and 
form or thing and structure or formed matters, and being 
a formed-matter must be compatible with substantiality.
It is what Descartes, following his tutors, calls 
a "distinction of reason", what others have called a 
"distinction within an identity". And when Descartes, seizing 
upon an essential or principal "attribute", not only seizes 
upon an act or power but ignores any question of a classif­
ication, he presents us with an excellent differentia but 
no genus at all, and so he by-passes substance completely.
But this produces vacuity. Category-truths must be called in, 
and on the ground that an act must have a subs tance-agent 
he provides a necessary substance agent, about which nothing 
can be said except that it has the at tribu te, i.e. does think, 
can only be conceived, and hence cannot be described. Yet 
he does not hesitate to tell us that this thinking-substance 
informs the body, and this mysterious relation of substances 
replaces the necessary logical relation in Aristotle by a 
necessary and "unintelligible" material relation. It is then 
we begin to realise what has happened to Aristotle’s logic 
and theory of classification and of natural science in the 
intervening centuries.
What Descartes cannot do is to give an account of 
the thinking-substance - nor can he classify it with other 
substances, relate it to other substances, show that "mind or
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Boul" lunctlons as do other nouns in his language. He 
cannot justify it as a concept, because the conceptual 
system fails him completely. All he can do is to seize 
upon the necessity of category-principles - if it is 
subst?ince it must have a principal attribute, it must have 
qualities, it must be related to other things, it must 
be related to bodies - and these provide not answers but 
questions that must be answered and cannot be.
(f) Nor is this, in the end, surprising. Descartes’ 
major enterprise is in fact concerned with knowledge and 
certainty, with the rejection from consideration of factual 
truths as contingent, as not necessarily true, in the search 
for what cannot be false. He finds necessity, as we might 
expect, in the realm of formal truths, logical and categorial, 
as they were arrived at by Aristotle, or in the realm of 
conceptual science w^ere the propositions have no existential 
entailments. For Aristotle the logical and metaphysical 
truths are important because they are the logical and metaph­
ysical truths of natural science, and no existential statement 
is meaningful with such terms as appear in the truths as 
subjects. "Sdbstance" is a metaphysical concept, but there 
is no "existing metaphysical substance". Descartes, beginning 
his attach on the problera of knowledge, recognises "thinking" 
justifiably as having a priority, as necessary in the sense 
that there must be thinking if there is to be an inquiry, and 
if he is to classify "thoughts". But the necessity he is 
seeking is to be universal, the truths to be determined are 
to be truths for any thinker, i.e. necessarily true in
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their own right, and not simply in relation to an individual 
whose nature and existence have not been "proven" and who 
cannot be mistaken in asserting a contingent fact.
The necessary "argument" from "thinking" to "fua agent 
who thinks and must exist" hangs upon a metaphysical truth - 
"every act must have an agent", "every attribute must have a 
substance" - which Descartes presents (illicitly) as a 
logical truth - "every predicate is of a subject" - which avoids 
the empirical issue of determining what agent since he can 
give the conventional definition of "subject" that sunders 
it forever from "observation". Nevertheless, what gives 
meaning to the general ar^^ument is "I think", and "I must 
think,as I do, because I do, and I would not be a thinking 
thing if I did not think".
It is the verb in Ego Cogito, the act of cogitatio 
made act by having an agent, which makes it possible for the 
category truths to have application, and so meaning, at the 
Cartesian level of consideration of the first statement of 
"experience". Without a statement which exemplifies the 
forms, the forms are no forms at all, and neither logic nor 
metaphysics has meaning. That "mind or soul" is a value of 
"substance" or "subject" if "think" is a value of "act" is 
for Descartes an obvious truth which has to be shown to be 
necessary; its necessity cannot be logical or metaphysical 
on the basis of it is certain to me that I think, because 
existence and thinking are here contingent; «I would not be 
what I am if I did not think" suffers from the same limit-
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ations, and "What am I?" must he answerable by "I am a man" 
for Descartes on the grounds of common sense and theology. 
Descartes then offers the additional proof that all the obser­
vable features of men are contingent and unnecessary - they 
are so in a strict sense only in relation to the necessity 
of the essence or principal attribute which Descartes has 
selected as definitional. But on Aristotle’s argument, and 
in terms of the metaphysical principles Descartes accepts with 
their Aristotelian origin, the contingent features are 
necessary; it is metaphysically impossible for an individual 
to have only a defining characteristic, to be a "pure" instance 
of a genus-characteristic.
Book III.2 of the De Anima concludes with; "About the 
principle in virtue of which we say that animals are percipient 
let this discussion suffice". The book Itself concludes;
"All the other senses are necessary to animals, as we 
have said, not for their being, but for their well-being. 
Sight....it must have in order to see, and taste because of 
what is pleasant or painful to it, in order that it may perceive 
these qualities in its nutriment and so may desire to be 
set in motion, and hearing that it may have communication made 
to it, and a tongue that it may communicate with its fellows".
What in general Aristotle wants to say is clear enough.
And when Descartes, with a rare expression of a sense og humour, 
rallies Gassendi with % "Next, with a not infelicitous comedy, 
you proceed to question me, no longer as a complete man, but 
as a soul in separation from the body; and in doing so you 
seem to remind me that these objections proceed not from the 
mind of an acute philosopher, but from the flesh alone" ^
I
1. H and R. II., pp.207-8.
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it is clear enough what he is saying. Of course there are 
philosophers, who coimnune in a language and prove thereby 
that they are not beasts "devoid of reason".... .But the 
jest leaves a bitter flavour on the tongue after a close 
acquaintance with the results of Descartes’ meditating, A 
few lines before he has written;
"I4y statement that the entire testimony of the senses 
must be considered to be uncertain, nay even false, is quite 
serious anî so necessary for the comprehension of my meditat­
ions, that he who will not or cannot admit that, is unfit to 
urge any objection Against them that merits a reply. But we 
must note the distinction en^hasised by me in various pass­
ages, between the practical activities ( actiones) of our life 
and an enquiry into truth; for, when it is a case of regul­
ating our life, it would assuredly be stupid not to trust to 
the senses, ^ d  those sceptics were quite ridiculous who so 
neglected human affairs that they had to be preserved by 
their fttends from tumbling down precipices. It was for this 
reason that somewhere I announced that no one in his sound 
mind seriously doubted about such matters; but when we raise 
an enquiry into^  what is the surest knowledge which the human 
mind can obtain, it is clearly unreasonable to refuse to treat 
them as doubtful, nay even to reject them as false, so as to 
allow us to become aware that certain things, which cannot 
thus be rejected, are for this very rj^ason more certain, and 
in actual truth better known by us".
If we write "the surest knowledge we can obtain" for 
"the surest knowledge the human mind can obtain", we have a 
proposal as to the way in which men who do natural science of 
necessity can do metaphysics; and after an examination of 
Descartes’ writings we need no longer be perturbed hy the 
belief that we have proven (l) we are not men, but minds, 
and (2) that qua minds we cannot do natural science, qua 
individuals we come under the category of "substance", thus 
satisfying the demands of metaphysics and of logic and of 
science.
